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From Laws to Liturgy: An Idealist Interpretation of the Doctrine of Creation 
Edward Epsen 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Christian idealism is an interpretative framework for developing the doctrine of creation in the parallel 
contexts of theology and philosophy. It recommends itself by its explanatory fecundity and consilience. 
Against physical realism’s claim that the physical world is ontologically fundamental and mind-
independent, idealism holds that it is constituted by facts about the organization of human sense 
experience. The sensory regularities in turn may be explained by a prephysical temporal reality of angelic 
minds who causally constrain human experience within a divinely decreed nomological system. Idealism 
is here re-attached to a tradition of Christian Platonism, recovering and updating the traditional notions of 
the aeon, angelic government, and the divine ideas, so as to be capable of explanatory work in regard to 
the philosophical problems of perception and induction. In so doing, Christian idealism enables 
theologians coherently to articulate the thesis that the ontological objectivity and empirical immanence of 
the world, as grounded in the phenomenological laws of nature, is explained by the liturgical function of 
the cosmic Church hierarchy. An idealist theology thus develops the doctrine of the cosmic liturgy, that 
the various works of God in heaven and earth are analogously unified in a single sacramental economy of 
the Eucharist.  
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Preface 
   
This work aims to offer an interpretation and defense of orthodox Christian cosmology as 
expressed in the traditional doctrine of creation, that the triune God freely creates out of nothing a world 
that he absolutely transcends, which remains wholly dependent on his continued sustaining providence, 
and whose final purpose is the sanctification of man in union with his Creator through the attunement of 
man’s heart to the praise of the Lord’s glory. In the spirit of systematic theology, my goal is to provide for 
an understanding of the content of this article of faith, using the resources of idealist metaphysics for 
exposition and insight.  
Developing Christian idealism as an interpretative theory for the doctrine results in a rationally 
defensible exposition. It is rich in explanatory power on account of its grounding in analytic metaphysics, 
where idealism offers solutions to the problems of perception
1
 and induction, but also fertile in its 
implications for dogmatics. It is a helpful resource to theologians in the attempt to articulate a dogmatic 
cosmology: an understanding of what God produces in creation, and how it is ordered and governed.  An 
idealist interpretation helps systematize the interrelations among Trinity, creation, providence, 
Christology, the sacraments and other confessional elements, including those that were once traditionally 
significant but have fallen by the wayside, such as the doctrine of angels
2
 and the doctrine of the cosmic 
liturgy.
3
 It shows us that a coherent idealist theology of the laws of nature that appeals to angelic 
cosmology is abductively supported by its solution to the philosophical problems of perception and 
induction. Thus the interpretation enables us to make a very bold claim indeed. As the establishment of 
the laws of nature through the angelic governance is in the service of the liturgical life of the Church, the 
angels and thus the liturgy are the reason why the physical world is objective and empirically immanent. 
The possibility of science is explained by the possibility of the Eucharist. 
The broad outline of the theological argument for the particular version of Christian idealism that 
I wish to offer runs as follows: 
 
(A) Revelation presents us with a trinitarian model of creation in which the transcendent, omnipotent God 
                                                          
1
 See Howard Robinson, Perception (London: Routledge, 1994), and John Foster, The Nature of Perception 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), both of whom offer idealist theories of perception. 
2
 Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. IV, 32-49, pseudo-Dionysius, Hierarchia  Coelestis, Aquinas ST Ia.50-64, 106-114; but 
see also Gregory the Great, Dialogues (1911) IV, 177-258, and John Damascene, De fide Orth. III.2.  
3
 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), Erik Peterson, The Angels and the Liturgy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 
Louis Bouyer, Cosmos: The World and Glory of God (Petersham, MA: Saint Bede’s Publications, 1988), pp.194-
205,.and Keith Lemna, “The Angels and Cosmic Liturgy: An Oratorian Angelology”, Nova et Vetera 8,4 (2010): 
901-921. 
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creates through his Word and in Wisdom. What he creates is limited, contingent, and totally existentially 
dependent on his sustaining word of power. The Trinity creates all things for the Incarnation of the Son in 
his body, the Church. Christ’s lordship and priesthood are thus fully implicated in his creative role, as the 
sovereign lawgiver of creation and the one who bestows blessing on creation, even the ultimate blessing 
of consecration into the life of divine sonship through the sacrifice of the Paschal mystery. 
 
(B) Consonant with this trinitarian model, the very foundational order of creation is hierarchically 
arranged so that all life may be uplifted through liturgical action. The hierarchy extends from the throne 
of Christ the Royal Priest, through the ranks of the invisible and visible Church, and to the ends of the 
earth
4
, to every creature with the breath of life
5, for Christ’s eulogistic rule and liturgical praise are to be 
coextensive.
6
 The cosmic order of the hierarchy is regulated to conduct charitable, ministerial movement 
downward in condescension and upward in priestly, anaphoric con-ascension. In proportion to the 
knowledge and charismatic blessings received, each living creature is consecrated to the extent that it 
communally participates in this hierarchic movement.  
 
(C) In the cosmic hierarchy, the role of inanimate matter is to act as a medium for liturgical action. The 
nature of matter is thus symbolic or linguistic, and the causal-nomological structure of the physical world 
is constituted by divine speech as addressed to its spiritual participants. The phenomenal events of nature 
are made from the “invisible reality”7 of the Royal Priest’s liturgical commands, hierarchically mediated 
by the angelic spirits in the immanent context of human sense experience, while the sacramental 
mysteries of the Church are mediated by both pure spirits and human beings cooperatively in the wider 
context of the cosmic liturgy. This means that: the angels are invested with the “powers of nature” insofar 
as the purpose of creation is liturgical; that we, the lower orders of the cosmic hierarchy who are 
charitably served by the higher, participate in the consecrating and indeed divinizing work of the liturgy 
at the same phenomenal level at which this service is revealed to us; and that the very “powers of nature” 
possessed by the angels consists in their power to govern the phenomenal order of human sense 
experience as liturgically ordained by God and executed within the celestial hierarchy.  
 
(D) Therefore, given that the angelic powers for creating the physical world through the governance of 
human sense experience derive from the ultimately liturgical purpose of the cosmic hierarchy, in 
consonance with the trinitarian model described above, it follows that the ontological reality of the 
                                                          
4
 Ps 22:27, Is 41:5, 45:22, Mk 13:27 
5
 Gen 1:30, Job 12:10 
6
 Ps 48:10, 72:8 
7
 Heb 11:3 
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physical world is in no part fundamental but in every aspect logically dependent on the way in which 
Christ has instituted the Eucharistic mystery.  
 
If Christ is Priest, Prophet, and King, and if creaturely holiness is conformity to the likeness of 
Christ, then creaturely holiness participates in the threefold office. Scripture reveals that angels, as sons of 
Gods, act liturgically (as priestly worshipers in the Books of Ezekiel and Revelation), prophetically (in 
the Books of the Zechariah and Daniel), and presidentially, as guardians of nations (in the Book of 
Daniel) and individuals (in the Psalms and the Gospels). We know that they reveal the Law to Moses, the 
oracular visions to the prophets, and the Gospel to those close to Jesus. All together the angels thus 
imitate the threefold office in their ‘ministry of salvation’.8 But if all of creation—including the 
inanimate—is a gift from God, then its charistic logic, its donation and eucharistic blessing, ought to fall 
within the arrangement of the cosmic hierarchy, which is itself an explication of the absolute primacy of 
Christ. If all things are created through Wisdom and Word, then we can see Christ as head of the 
hierarchy and his liturgical / prophetic / kingly instructions as pertaining to the whole of creation for the 
purpose of the glory of a human nature in Christ.  
Theologians who find this line of reasoning persuasive should look to the immaterialist 
metaphysics of phenomenalistic idealism as part of a strategy for explaining how it is that Christ as the 
Incarnate Word and Wisdom creates the world through and for (comm)union with the triune  
Godhead by the mediation of the dynamic arrangement of persons that is the cosmic hierarchy, in  
particular through the hierarchy’s mediation of the creation of the visible world, the bodily gifts 
that human creatures lift up in the Mass.   
We can account for Christ’s divine, continuously creative activity as the giving of creative 
wisdom to angels and men, that is, as hierarchical ordinances or instructions to the angels about how 
causally to regulate human sense experience, as the way in which the angels lift up those below them 
(human beings) within the provision of the hierarchy. Angelic presidential activity would consist in the 
execution of these commands, as the causal imposition of constraints, of nomological regularities as such, 
directly on the human mind with its created receptive endowments for having sensations and interpreting 
their thematic content in characteristic ways, so that sensible experience is the reading of a divine 
language, and interaction with the environment (most proximately the body) a form of communication 
with God.  
                                                          
8
 The most sustained modern theological reflection on the biblical revelation of angels is found in Karl Barth Church 
Dogmatics (III/3 §51). Though Barth is critical of the speculative tradition associated with Dionysius and with the 
liturgical interpretation of the angelic office in Peterson, his own expansive conception of the angelic ministry of 
witness effectively reconstructs a highly sacramental understanding of intracosmic hierarchy as mediating the 
covenant, Kingdom, and “the whole secret of God” ( pp.176, 192).  
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To support such an account, we need a theory of perception in which the nomological 
organization of actual and potential sequences of human sensations and volitions is such that when 
experienced at the human subjective viewpoint and interpreted in accordance with our created 
psychological endowment, they give rise to the experience of the world as we know it and so “encode” a 
physical world. In this way, visual sensations become the words of an embodied language, words whose 
meanings are, for example, possible future tactual sensations. More generally, as the compresence of 
consciousness brings together “pure sensations” from disparate sense-modal realms into “total 
sensations”, we could say that the regular conscious succession of such episodic compresence comes to 
signify possible future total sensations. In this way the world of space and time and 3-D mobile occupants 
is created at the human empirical viewpoint by such sensory regularities together with, or within the 
context of, the conceptual resources of the human mind. This means that to create the physical world God 
must only create human minds and causally impose on them a certain characteristic sensory 
organization—a system of ordinances and executive control for what possible sensation-volition 
sequences are lawful—which He may well do through the cosmic hierarchy, that is, through the causal 
mediation of the angel spirits in accordance with the plan for the liturgical glorification of all things in 
Christ, culminating concretely in the eucharistic supper of the Mass.  
Inasmuch as the idealist theory of perception just described has already been shown to solve two 
deep problems in theoretical philosophy—the problems of perception and induction—we may then, all 
together, give a theological explanation for our empirical epistemic access to the laws of nature and the 
inferential practices in which we use them instrumentally: the possibility of science is explained by the 
possibility of the eucharist.   
In Part A of the work I begin making the theological case for idealism and introduce the key 
conceptual content as found in historical and biblical context. Chapter II seeks to establish premise (A) 
above by introducing the Trinitarian dimension of the doctrine of creation, the “logos cosmology” of the 
Psalms and the wisdom literature, the theme of the absolute primacy of Christ, and biblical angelology. 
This chapter also goes on to make an argument for idealism from sacramental theology which, while 
incidental to the overarching argument of the whole (as outlined above), is nonetheless representative of it 
in miniature. Chapter III introduces the two core ideas of phenomenalistic idealism by appeal to the 
theories of Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa. By appeal to the writings of pseudo-Dionysius, Chapter IV 
introduces the concept of the cosmic hierarchy as a development of both Biblical angelology and the 
absolute primacy of Christ, and seeks to establish premise (B) above. With the goal of synthesizing the 
concept of the cosmic hierarchy with phenomenalistic idealism, Chapter V introduces an immaterialist 
metaphysics and idealist perceptual theory through a study of Bishop Berkeley’s thought and 
philosophical system. The result establishes premise (C) and so, by inference, (D). Also here I tie together 
5 
 
the cumulative cosmological and sacramental themes of Part A with an idealist theory of sense perception 
in an explicit way. 
 In Part B of the thesis my purpose is to elaborate an idealist metaphysics and theory of perception 
in order to show that the theological argument for idealism receives abductive support from its 
explanatory power. In Chapter VI, I introduce an idealist ontology of sensory universals, or qualia, and 
introduce the problem of perception: simultaneously to account for the phenomenological and causal facts 
about the perception of physical objects. An idealist theory can solve this problem by defining physical 
objecthood in terms of nomic and phenomenal relations among qualia. Such an account of objecthood 
also allows us to give an elegant account of the mundane causal order of perceptual experience across 
normal and deviant episodes in a way that explains why genuine physical objects and events are taken to 
be causally efficacious in producing perceptual episodes. 
Chapter VII takes on the challenge of showing how the regular order and thematic content of 
sensory experiences, together with the endowed conceptual resources of the human mind by which we 
interpret experiences, is able to logically sustain the entities and facts of the physical world. Where Ch.VI 
had focused on the mind-matter relation as found in perceptual consciousness, showing that the physical 
object of perception need not be anything over and above the systematic order of appearances, so Ch.VII 
considers more broadly how the world of space, time, and matter, described ordinarily or scientifically, 
could be (exhaustively) existentially-dependent on facts about how human sensory experience is 
organized. Here I propose a sequence of syntheses by which the physical world might be logically 
constructed from the temporally-structured qualitative content within sensory experience, and 
analogously between experiences, in a way that harkens back to the specification of criteria for physical 
objecthood in Ch.VI. The most important concept is that of phenomenal overlap, which extrapolates the 
relation of temporal succession among component sensations within a single episode of awareness (e.g., 
in hearing a melody or seeing the flight of bird) into a relation between episodes. The goal is to show that 
there is enough order at the pre-interpreted phenomenal level of experience to prompt conceptual 
interpretation, which is itself an organizational force in perceptual consciousness that allows the subject to 
discern increasingly sophisticated patterns of sensory regularity. The descriptions corresponding to such 
stages of discernment correspond to the various notional and scientific physical theories, from a unified 
space of persistent 3-D occupants to the more refined descriptions of contemporary physics.      
Having demonstrated the coherence of a “logical construction” of the physical world from facts 
about sensory regularities, the next step in demonstrating the coherence of idealism tout court is to 
explain how the sensory regularities are themselves ultimately grounded by something nonphysical. This 
is the subject of Chapter VIII, which first specifies a theory of mental time, and then a prephysical 
temporal community of pure mental agents capable of interactively regulating human sensations in accord 
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with divinely-issued causal laws. Here the idealist appeals to the wisdom and power of the Judeo-
Christian God to prescribe such a harmonious system of laws and to a community of celestial spirits as 
the pure mental agents who receive them and, through one-to-one pairings with human minds, causally 
execute them. All together the idealist can now coherently claim that the physical world is logically 
created at the human empirical viewpoint by the way the angels administer the divine regulatory 
commands. In accordance with principles of the Dionysian hierarchy, we can attribute ontologically 
dependent levels of organization within the empirical order to the idealistically creative work of 
corresponding ranks of angelic governance within the celestial hierarchy (which are in turn ordered by 
knowledge and power).  
Rather than seeing the administration of the presidential commands as mechanically imposed by 
God on the angels, it should be regarded as the liturgical function of the celestial hierarchy within the plan 
of glorification. With the full analytic exposition of the theory of Christian idealism in place, Chapter IX 
returns to the consideration of the theory’s merits in exegeting the theological tradition. Special emphasis 
is given to Augustine’s own interpretation of Genesis and also to the angelological texts in the Prophetic 
and apocalyptic literature. Ch. II had already drawn attention to the Biblical revelation that angels, as 
servants of the Lord, are ministers of public service (literally practitioners of liturgy), dispensing the 
Mosaic Law
9, and in so many ways assisting man in the Holy One’s plan of salvation.10 In the Old 
Testament, any theophany or appearance of God occurs in conjunction with an angelophany or the 
appearance of angels. They always mediate his presence, and this mediating function is confirmed in the 
New Testament with the revelation that the Lord is Jesus Christ, the King of the Angels
11
, even unto the 
end when he will take up his position as the head of the Church, his body, in the nuptial union. But less 
well known is the Scriptural revelation that the angels are also causal governors and elemental 
regulators.
12
 Christian idealism makes sense of the view that even the elemental laws of phenomena are a 
work of the angels, performed in obedience to their divine charge. It is their uprightness of will, freely 
affirmed in charity that prompts them to perform their liturgical office of transmissively magnifying to 
those below the good he has given them with their own labor mixed in, cooperatively giving back to God 
“a sacrifice of praise”13, in their own imitation of the trinitarian chesedic condescension.14 With the view 
of Christian idealism now in place, we can make sense of this statement in a very concrete way. The glory 
                                                          
9
 Deut 33:3, Acts 7:38, 53, Gal 3:19, Heb 2:2 
10
 Ex 23:20-21, Ps 34:7, Lk 22:43 
11
 Dan 7:9-10, Phil 2:10-11, Rev 5:11 
12
 Ps 102:19-21, Rev 10:1-3 
13
 Heb 13:15 
14
 Job 38:6-8 specifically emphasizes the connection of liturgical praise with angelic cosmology and the typology of 
temple and cosmos brings this out more generally. Like the angels, when man is in awe his eucharistic impulse 
translates itself into a desire to make or build something. Cf. Gen 32:30, Ezra 3:10-11 and Mt 17:4. 
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given to God by the heavenly hosts participates in the song of creation, which is quite literally, in its 
sustaining effect, the words of man’s sensory experience ignited by the angelic mind and written in the 
fire of his own. The manifest liturgy of the eucharist, with its sanctuary, altar, incense and lamps, is the 
manifestation of the hierarchically encompassing liturgy. Man’s liturgy is joined with the angelic cosmic 
liturgy in the Mass because the human eucharist is hierarchically contained in the angelic, as is all human 
environmental activity, though in this special form of public work the angelic and human interact in the 
way they were intended to, with man collaborating in praise and thanksgiving, and using the superiority 
of the office of the angel as a real, continuous extension of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to help his song 
and above all—in the Mass—his sacrifice be brought to God. The sacrifice of course is itself the gift of 
the Trinity, which again (or rather, firstly) is mediated by the angelic government.
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
I.1  The God-World Relation in Metaphysics: Idealism and Traditional Christian Theism 
 
In view of the doctrine of creation, that “the Word was God” and “without him was not anything that was 
made”, and the fact that “God is spirit”1, I want to suggest that traditional Christian theism has a strong 
tendency in favor of idealism, that a Christian should regard idealism as the first and most straightforward 
philosophic option, and that systematic theological reflection on the doctrine of creation should 
appropriate the metaphysics of idealism especially as already found within its tradition.  
At a basic conceptual level, idealism would seem to be a close corollary of traditional Christian 
theism. If God alone is absolute existence and “God is spirit” but of course not matter or body, then spirit 
would seem to be metaphysically fundamental in a way that body is not. For the same reason any version 
of physical realism, or the thesis that matter, space-time or the physical world is metaphysically 
fundamental, seemingly puts itself in conflict with traditional Christian theism. If the physical world is 
God’s free creation and so wholly existentially dependent on him, how can it be metaphysically 
fundamental? Notice that when we ask what is metaphysically fundamental, we are asking a question 
from a transcendental framework: obviously within our experience the physical world features as 
something objective and conceptually independent of that experience. But what is its status beyond our 
experience? This is both a metaphysical and theological question, though not a question of natural 
science. Physical realism holds that it is substantial and so ontologically independent of that experience. 
Idealism denies this and so too it seems does traditional Christian theism.  
I intend for the arguments contained in this work to strengthen the claim that a version of 
idealism, what I call ‘Christian idealism’, is the right philosophical companion for liturgical and 
sacramental theology and in greater harmony with revealed theology generally than any version of 
physical realism. Put briefly, this is because idealism, as a successor to Platonism, is able to make sense 
of the claim that the physical world is a sensible language, a medium of communication and ultimately 
liturgical participation, that it is proto-sacramental, its very being grounded in the logic of divine 
proclamation and creaturely eucharistic synaxis, so that in a very direct sense the world is mystically 
contained in the Church. For many this will be a startling claim, likely to be met with suspicion, and for 
understandable reasons. Berkeley’s own idealist position was often, though not always2, misunderstood 
                                                          
1
 Jn 1:1, 1:3, 4:24 
2
 Notably, he was not misunderstood by the British empiricist-phenomenalist tradition that followed him, including 
Hume, Mill, Russell, and Ayer. 
9 
 
by influential succeeding philosophers like Kant
3
 and Hegel
4
, and at times mockingly dismissed by the 
upholders of educated common sense. 
Though it is counter-intuitive in some striking ways, idealism’s understanding of the ontological 
status of the physical world and our relation to it is not only rationally defensible but, from a 
philosophical and theological perspective, rationally preferable to competing explanatory alternatives. As 
Berkeley himself was concerned to show, the prevailing philosophic alternatives reinforce intellectual 
errors that in turn affect other disciplines. They also distort the relationship between natural science and 
religion. To think of space, time, and matter as logically independent of the human mind and ultimate 
metaphysical categories (a proposition that the prevailing alternatives accept but idealism strongly denies) 
promotes the false belief that the world navigated by people in their everyday lives and investigated more 
deeply by science either has no immediate relation with God (deism) or is identical to some part of God 
(pantheism). In both cases, either because the world is conceived as some part of God or as being so God-
like (in its mind-independence and metaphysical fundamentality) and at the same time more immediate in 
its empirical immanence than God, we become inclined to a practical world-idolatry, whatever we might 
profess on special occasions.  
Thinkers of faith have recognized this problem, but so far in the modern history of theology the 
only new option that has exercised them to a significant degree, as an alternative to deism and the 
pantheism, is the panentheism of liberal Christianity
5
.and its companion metaphysics of emergentism. 
Owing to the apparent lack of satisfying alternatives, this position also has more recently attracted 
orthodox-minded theologians.
6
 Whether liberal or orthodox, these theologians reacted against the 
exclusive disjunction of divine transcendence and immanence, and rightly so. But because they were 
                                                          
3
 See, e.g., Kant’s characterization of the “psychological” or “material” idealism he attributes to Descartes and 
Berkeley in the “Refutation of Idealism”  (B274) in the second edition of the Critique. Following this 
characterization, Berkeley’s idealism was closely associated with a kind of skepticism in much of the history of 
philosophy.  
4
 The view of Hegel in III.2.A of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy,1805-6, trans. E S Haldane, 1892-6 is 
similar to Kant’s. 
5
 See, for example, Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 
John W. Cooper, Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers—from Plato to the Present. Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2006, and Philip Clayton and Paul Davies, eds., The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist  
Hypothesis from Science to Religion (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).  
6
 See, e.g., Kallistos Ware, “God Immanent yet Transcendent: The Divine Energies according to Saint Gregory 
Palamas,”.in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a 
Scientific World, P. Clayton and A. Peacocke, eds. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 157–168. 
One could also mention Barthian neo-orthodox and Radical Orthodox theologians as supporters of traditional 
Christian theism against panentheism. The former tend to eschew metaphysics all together, however. Modern 
theologians more generally seem to be once again comfortable with the use of descriptive metaphysics, recognizing 
its value to aid the interpretation of Scripture and received doctrine. But they largely—indeed almost exclusively?—
have considered only physical realist options in Thomas’ hylomorphism or Kant’s empirical realism (which, one 
will recall, is the corollary of his transcendental idealism). In both cases, when ‘updated’ to be in conversation with 
contemporary analytic philosophy, emergentism seems to be the position with the greatest family resemblance. It is 
really to Platonist theologians that the idealist hopes to make the greatest appeal.   
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unwilling, consciously or not, to relinquish their commitment to an ultimate and experience-transcendent 
physical world, they were forced to affirm that God is in the world in the same way that the world is in 
God, and so the tendency to idolatry remained. Being unwilling to relinquish their commitment to an 
ultimate and experience-transcendent physical world, they have been forced either to accept an 
emergentist metaphysics in order to affirm that God is in the world in a way different from that in which 
the world is in God or to give up on such a claim altogether. Emergentism, however, presupposes that the 
physical world is ontologically independent of the way in which it is disposed to appear in human 
experience, that it has some significance in God’s plan outside of the relationship between God and 
human beings, that he would have created dust even if he had never intended to breathe life into it.  
Against all three positions of deism, pantheism, and panentheism, traditional Christian theism 
maintains both that God is neither exclusively transcendent or immanent in relation to the world (he is 
both) and that the world is asymmetrically dependent on him—he is in the world as its creator, redeemer, 
and end, while the world is in Him in neither of these ways but as His handiwork, messenger, servant, and 
ultimately, his household and dwelling place. With deism, traditional Christian theism maintains that God 
is not dependent on the world; with panentheism it holds that God is both transcendent and immanent to 
his creation; and against all positions it insists on the (absolute) asymmetric dependence of the world on 
God. The table below lays out the relations between these four basic positions. 
 
God and the World  God and the World  
     are Interdependent   not Interdependent 
 
 
God is exclusively Transcendent Pantheism   Deism 
or Immanent (in relation to the   (God is immanent)  (God is transcendent,  
world)         God/world mutually  
         independent)  
 
 
God is both Transcendent   Panentheism   Traditional    
and Immanent (in relation to   (God/world   Christian Theism 
the world)           mutually dependent)  (world asymmetrically 
         dependent on God)  
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It is notable that traditional Christian theism would seem to be the only one of the four options that 
countenances metaphysical supernaturalism. Given the systematic connection between metaphysics and 
doctrine, this is no accident. Idealism denies the ultimate, external status of the physical world that still 
predominates in much contemporary thinking. It proposes instead that the metaphysically fundamental 
external reality that constrains our experience is purely mental and indeed spiritual. So a Christianity that 
embraces idealism can justify its ease with traditional interpretations of Scripture, supernatural miracles, 
and the truth-value of religious language. Christian idealism can uphold claims of traditional 
supernaturalist dogmatics against contemporary theologians who emphasize God - world interdependence 
and support a panentheistic metaphysics. But it addresses their concern to reconcile science and theism. It 
provides a clear, traditional framework in which to understand the content of scientific discovery, 
psychophysical interaction, the status of the laws of nature, and our moral and ecological responsibilities.  
 Theologians have once again become secure in their right to test claims to knowledge against the 
canon of their tradition of faith. They are resisting the cultural and institutional pressure to regard their 
faith as narrow, private, and intellectually a kind of ‘optional extra’, where contemporary science and 
educated common sense leave room for it. They want to recover a traditional conception of the relation 
between faith and knowledge (gnosis), in which the wholeness of truth as found in the faith is the 
standard or criterion for theological speculation, which itself must be in mutual exercise (askesis) with 
Christian worship.
7
 With this orientation, working from within the life of the Church, we may position 
ourselves rightly to evaluate and appropriate the wealth of Christian philosophy as it has come to us, not 
least of which from the modern era.  
Accepting this much, it still may not be clear why this would point us in the direction of idealism. 
In expounding and elaborating a subject of doctrine, why not turn to the metaphysics of Platonism, which 
time and again seems to have inspired philosophically-minded theologians? Is it not Platonism rather than 
idealism that has been the mainstay of the Christian philosophical tradition and so our heritage? Put 
briefly, my answer is that, for the reasons mentioned above and soon to be elaborated, we want a 
theological metaphysics to imply the denial of physical realism, and whereas idealism clearly does, it is 
not so clear that Platonism does. Fortunately, the move of transforming Platonism into a system that does 
imply the denial of physical realism was already taken for us by the Church fathers. This is how idealism 
arose. It was a Christian philosophy from the first.  
 
I.2  How Platonism Becomes Christian Idealism 
 
                                                          
7
 Here I am thinking of the patristic model of gnosis as described by Irenaeus in On the Apostolic Preaching and  
Clement of Alexandria (Miscellanies).  
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As a preliminary, it will help to have a working definition of the terms ‘Platonism’ and 
‘idealism’. The former is more likely to be familiar to theologians even though both tend to be used 
vaguely. We could simply take it to mean a system of thought or set of intellectual tendencies resembling 
that system or those tendencies characteristic of Plato. Now what exactly is it that is characteristic of 
Plato’s thought? Is it the Theory of Forms, a belief in the eternal and necessary existence of abstract 
universals, including mathematicals, a belief that the Good is the end of all being? For a project of 
theological metaphysics, the first suggestion would seem the most fitting. Interestingly, if we follow 
Lloyd Gerson’s definition of Platonism8 as a very specific kind of ‘top-down-ism’, we end up with a quite 
different understanding. Gerson’s definition, which he derives from the later Platonists and Neoplatonists 
in accordance with the exegetical “harmony thesis”9, takes Platonism to be a belief in a systematic unity 
of being, hierarchically organized by simplicity and explanatory priority into noetic, psychic and material 
existence.  
Depending on how exactly material existence or ‘matter’ is understood, particularly in its 
existential relation to what is prior to it, such a philosophy is potentially already in agreement with the 
core thesis of idealism. On a traditional reading of Plato, matter is conceived of as a coeternal abstract 
substrate that is a necessary principle for physical creation.
10
 Whether other ancient Platonists understood 
it this way is an interesting question. Gerson, in emphasizing the harmony thesis, argues that the 
Neoplatonists interpreted Plato to be in agreement with Aristotle, though not without confessing 
significant differences between them in both method and doctrinal content.
11
 Aristotle conceives of matter 
(hule) as the underlying subject (hypokeimenon)
12
 for all physical items. Middle Platonism, however, as 
represented in Alcinous’ Handbook of Platonism (Diskalikos)13, follows Plato and not Aristotle in 
identifying matter with space or ‘receptacle’, defining it negatively as ámorphos, apoios, and aneidos14, 
without mentioning hyle or hypokeimenon. Matter is thus described in terms compatible with a conception 
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 In Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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 This is the thesis that the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are in agreement with each other.  
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 See Timaeus 49A6-53B2. 
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 John Dillon, translator, Handbook of Platonism, Ch.8, pp.15, 90-91. 
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 p.15. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 51A4-B1. Dillon’s commentary on this chapter in the Handbook (pp. 90-91) appeals to 
the aforementioned fact that Plato unlike Aristotle never uses the word hyle (to mean ‘matter’)  nor hypokeimenon. 
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of it as spatial form or qualitative extension.
15
 Again depending on how such qualities are existentially 
related to the noetic, such a position could well be a nascent version of idealism. According to the 
exegetical view of the later Academy, the relation of ontological priority in the Platonic hierarchy—and 
its inverse, ontological reducibility—is determined by criteria of noetic simplicity. It would follow from 
this that matter, understood as a quality of extension or spatial form and hence as both sensible and 
divisible, would be reducible to the noetic.
16
  
Turning now to the term ‘idealism’ in quest of a definition, this too may already be familiar at 
least in a form with some adjective before it, such as ‘absolute idealism’ (associated with Hegel), 
‘transcendental idealism’ (associated with Kant), or Berkeleyan idealism. While seemingly concrete in its 
consideration of historical examples, this is a precarious road by which to approach an analytical 
understanding of the topic. What exactly do those three forms of idealism have in common that helpfully 
could be extracted to move us in the direction of a deeper understanding of the theoretical possibilities of 
metaphysics? Using this approach, perhaps we could do no better than to invoke Norman Kemp Smith’s 
definition of idealism as the philosophy “maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the 
ordering of the universe”.17 This would certainly encompass all three versions of idealism and much of 
“perennial Platonism”, including the philosophies of the Cambridge Platonists, Renaissance neo-
Platonists, Scholastics, and the ancient Neoplatonists themselves to name but a few. A moment’s 
reflection allows us to see just how inclusive this definition is, and so, while by no means utterly 
unhelpful, it will prevent us from discerning a deeper and logically stronger philosophical position that 
has developed right at the center of the tradition of Christian philosophy.  
It is this more specific brand of idealism that we want to seize upon. Perhaps ironically it is best 
to see it as a thesis about the nature of the physical world, the sum total of physical entities and physical 
facts. The thesis of idealism is that the physical world exists but in no part composes ultimate reality; in 
other words, that physical existents, whether objects or facts, are not an ultimate category, that they would 
not be included in a complete theory of metaphysics, that they do not enter into an account of what is 
logically basic or ontologically primitive from a transcendental perspective.
18
 This is not to say that the 
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 Not unlike the characterization of Plato himself as he was understood by ancient commentators, including 
Aristotle (Physics, Delta 209b11-16).  While Alcinous follows a tradition of understanding matter by analogy with 
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idealism’s thesis of the reducibility of the physical world to the mental.        
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 Kemp Smith Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge. p.1, quoted in Gersh and Moran (2006).  
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physical world does not exist at all or that it is somehow not fully objective or conceptually basic in our 
ordinary interpretation of our sense experience. Rather, according to idealism, the physical world is 
objective and conceptually basic within the immanent framework of experience, because it is logically 
sustained by purely mental facts about how human sensory experience is organized. We can carefully 
explicate the relevant notions involved in this defining thesis as needed later on. Here it is important to 
notice that it is not too dissimilar from Kemp Smith’s definition, that it would apply to the systems of 
Berkeley and Kant (and almost to that of Plato), but also that it allows us to have a more intensive 
purchase on something at the core of Christian philosophy.  
With these preliminary remarks in place, let me now explain my preference for conceiving of the 
present work as being a project in the tradition of idealism rather than Platonism or what is sometimes 
called “Christian Platonism”. The first reason for this preference is that I read the intellectual history of 
the developments of Plato’s thought into Christian philosophy as a process by which the core of Plato’s 
metaphysics, his Theory of the Forms (Ideas), becomes gradually transformed into something close to 
idealism even among Pagan philosophers, especially Stoics, Middles Platonists, and Neoplatonists. When 
received by Christian thinkers it is reworked in accordance with the doctrine of creation and Scriptural 
revelation so that the core of Plato’s original metaphysics and cosmology—the doctrine of forms—is 
modified into an idealistic interpretation in which the forms are taken to be divinely commanded creative 
structuring principles of human knowledge, very similar to what Berkeley will call the “laws of Nature”.19 
Plato was the first philosopher to introduce and systematically to use the term ‘idea’, for whom it referred 
to a fundamental kind of being as found in the total complex of thought, both in the change (kinesis) of 
the soul’s cognitive act and the changelessness (stasis) of its cognitive object. The ideas or forms are thus, 
in a sense, not fundamental at all as they are logically entailed by the being of noetic reason (nous), a 
spiritual or immaterial principle of cognition.  
The essential connection of the forms with noetic activity, especially as described in the late 
dialogues such as the Sophist, led the Marburg neo-Kantian philosopher Paul Natorp to defend an 
interpretation of Plato on which the forms are not entities but structuring principles or laws (gesetze), 
objectively real and valid because they are transcendentally grounded in divine goodness (what pleases 
the gods), but logically dependent on the activity of the cognizing intellect whose content they structure. 
Their esse is cognoscuri.  The Middle Platonists understood Plato in this “de-mythologized” way20, and 
the later ancient tradition progressively modified and developed the theory of ideas as a theory of noetic 
logoi, increasingly in the context of the relation between the divine or transcendent reality and the 
changing reality of the empirical cosmos. This is so among the pagan philosophers like the Stoics and 
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 See John Dillon, “The Platonic Forms as Gesetze” in Gersh and Moran (2006). 
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Neoplatonists, even before the theory’s full appropriation into Christian philosophy at the hands of the 
Alexandrian school, Nyssen, Augustine, and eventually pseudo-Dionysius.
21
  
The transition of the Platonic Ideas from the abstract noetic logoi of a pagan metaphysics into the 
creative principles of Christian cosmology occurred alongside a wider transition of the principles of 
Platonism in their reception into the personalist metaphysics of Christian theology. The three arche or 
hypostatic principles of Platonist philosophy as systematized by Plotinus become personalized in their 
Christian interpretation as the Trinity, just as do the modes of activity of the causal principles of created 
reality become personalized. Alcinous in the Handbook of Platonism has an argument that qualities 
(poiotētes) are immaterial, which “no Platonist after Antiochus [of Ascalon] would have disputed” 
according to John Dillon.
22
 The poiotētes of the physical world are realized by the agency of personal 
minds. They are essentially objects of cognition and so existentially constituted by facts of cognition. 
A little earlier historically Philo Judaeus had de-mythologized the Timaeus’s demiurge and 
identified the intelligible realm with the Logos, the summation of the spermatikoi logoi. In a different 
paper, Dillon points out that “this system is thoroughly Stoic, except for the important fact that God 
Himself is immaterial and transcendent”.23 And the Logos (not the demiurge) is personalized as Son and 
Sophia. In Philo’s De Agricultura 51, God is described as ‘King and Shepherd’, and the logoi as the 
intelligent formulae by which he commands creation into being. The transition from the Logos/Demiurge 
to the second person of the Trinity is taken a step further by Alcinous and Numenius, for whom Ideas are 
“a creative link between God and matter”.24 Porphyry’s trinity of Father, Power, Intellect25 takes over the 
trinity of Being-Life-Intellect from the Sophist
26
, and by the time one arrives at Ch. 2 of Gregory 
Nazianzus’ Third Theological Oration, he identifies the Holy Trinity with the monad, dyad, and triad, and 
the Plotinean mone, proodos, and epistrophe, while being careful to deny any abstract mechanical 
interpretation of the processional movement.
27
  In Proclus’s Elements of Theology28 the Platonic hierarchy 
of being finds a place for pure created spirits, who as noetic beings are well-suited to administer the 
divine ideas as creative structuring principles and so sustain the physical world by organizing the 
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(immaterial) poiotētes of experience. The pure spirits can perform this ministerial function because, as 
noetic and hence simple beings, they are self-constituted (authupostaton) and perpetual
29
 and so capable 
of reversion (epistreptikon) upon themselves.
30
 This develops a theory already found in Plotinus that the 
physical world is the consequence of a projection of the plurality of Ideas in Nous onto the sensory 
receptivity of immaterial human souls.
31
 In Proclus, this process of immaterial noetic “projection” is now 
accorded to the personal agency of the pure spirits.    
Augustine receives the Platonist doctrine of the creative logos and adapts the Platonist theory of 
the pure spirits or noetic beings into a Christian angelology. Like the early fathers in the tradition of 
Irenaeus, he is concerned to test Platonist philosophy against the truth of the revealed word. In different 
places Scripture seems to indicate that creation is both instantaneous and processional. According to the 
Book of Ben Sirach, “qui manet in aeternum creavit omnia simul”.32 So creation is from an eternal and 
hence instantaneous act. Yet the creation narrative of Genesis tells us that the work unfolded in sequence. 
So somehow, Augustine reasons, what grows, what develops, what later comes into being was “already 
there from the start”, in some latent form. Such reasoning leads him to adopt the Stoic doctrine of seminal 
principles (spermatikoi logoi) and to see their immanent operation in the created world as the ectypal 
activity of the archetypal reality of the divine ideas. On Augustine’s interpretation of Genesis, the ‘day’ of 
creation
33
 is the act of creating spiritual intelligences of heaven, transmitting the knowledge of the divine 
ideas of creation to them (morning), their shared governance of the visible world (evening) in accordance 
with those received ideas, and the referral of praise for the glory of this work back to the Lord (morning 
of the next day).
34
 
In developing the divine Ideas of the Platonists into exemplar causes used by the Trinity in 
creation through the mediation of angelic governing knowledge, Augustine also sometimes refers to 
God’s creative principales formae which are stabiles atque incommutabiles, transcendent patterns of 
creation that form but are themselves unformed. God does not create new effects, neither are causes at 
once created and creative. So-called “secondary causes” are but occasional causes that reflect the 
governing influence of the spiritual powers of heaven who have been invested by God with a knowledge 
of the forms.
35
 Like causality in the physical domain, causality in the cognitive domain is ordered by 
parallel archetypal and ectypal powers. While sense experience acquaints us with the secondary 
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operations of natural phenomena as produced by angelic administration, only the light of noetic reason 
can produce knowledge and the clarity required for justification must be provided directly by the primary 
agency of God. Even the psychological endowment by which we conceptually interpret the content of our 
experience is provided by the Creator and true judgment requires illumination, for “In your light we see 
light”.36   
So Augustine’s Platonic hierarchy of being has a corresponding hierarchy of cognition, in which 
sensible/material things are passive and cannot causally effect the senses or the mind but only provide 
occasions for reflective understanding and other noetic acts. The Neoplatonist realms of Being, Living, 
and Intellect correspond to the faculties of sense, common or inner sense, and intellect, and the reflective 
(self-)certainties of existence, life, and understanding.
37
 Augustine accepts the privacy or internal 
(subjectively relational) character of sensory experience, even of vision and audition. He takes seriously 
the epistemological underdetermination of sensory cognition and its inability to ground scientific and 
religious knowledge and the need to explain the justification of any form of reasoning like induction, viz., 
reasoning from parts to wholes, particulars to universals, or contingent truths to necessary ones, by appeal 
to indivisible rational principles. The higher form of cognition achieved through noetic illumination is a 
form of direct acquaintance for Augustine because the object known is ideal albeit objective. As in the 
Platonist tradition, this theory of cognition is plausible for Augustine because he has a cogent argument 
for the immaterial substantiality of the soul.
38
   
Though taciturn on the theory of cognition, Dionysius assumes Augustine’s treatment of the 
divine ideas as transcendent patterns of creation in his discussion of the transcendence of divine being
39
, 
who as such causes and pre-contains all that is. For Dionysius the exemplar causes or divine ideas of 
things are paradigmata logoi, proorismoi, and thelmata. Thus they have both an intellectual and 
voluntative status, and are indeed unified in the simplicity of the divine essence. This too recapitulates 
Augustine, who says that the divine ideas are not merely in the divine mind and thought about in their 
multiplicity on some model of human cognition, rather they are in the Word, which is God’s Wisdom.40 
Following both, John Scotus Eriugena
41
 comes to see the divine ideas as pre-eminently contained in the 
simplicity of the eternal Word, referring to them variously as prototypes, predestinations, and divine 
volitions. For him they are (somewhat problematically) created and creative, the first way in which God 
who is beyond all being comes to know himself, but in a manner from all eternity.  
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While in the Scholastic period Aquinas seems to follow in this established divine ideas tradition, 
there is an interpretive question as to whether or how much he retains of Augustine’s theory of cognition 
and immaterialist Platonic metaphysics.
42
 For an idealist, the important question concerns the status of his 
hylomorphism, particularly in regard to his use of Aristotle’s formal-functional causes (formae naturales) 
and their relation to Augustine’s principales formae. Like the mainstream of classical Platonism, idealism 
insists that forms can only inhere in a mind. Insofar as it would transfer the transcendence of the ideas 
into the operative powers of material substances in nature, hylomorphism is incompatible with this 
tradition. Whereas for Augustine it seems clear that the spermatikoi logoi are not responsible for bringing 
about new effects in nature and do not act as natural causes of human sensory experience
43
, it is not so 
clear that the forms of physical substances do not do so for Aquinas. Another important interpretative 
question from the standpoint of assessing compatibility with idealism is the status of Aquinas’ view of the 
soul, which on one reading goes against Augustine’s Platonic view. Aquinas holds that while the rational 
soul is a subsistent it is not a substance because it does not form a complete nature apart from a body.
44
 
There are two points of contention here. One is the general point that man, as an animal and a material 
substance in Aristotelian science, can only have a complete nature as a hylomorphic composite. While his 
immaterial soul, being his substantial form, can subsist apart from his body and is incorruptible, its 
powers cannot operate independently of the body. The particular sticking point for Aquinas is that the 
faculty of sensory cognition, the soul’s sensitive power, is according to him completely dependent on the 
bodily organs and has no per se operation of its own.
45
  
A key component of Platonist philosophy
46
 is a stratification of being into: i) a highest level of 
transcendent being, identified with God either in the pagan or Christian sense; ii) a level of noetic 
structuring principles or creative laws, described as divine ideas, logoi, or exemplar causes; iii) a level of 
pure living and life-giving spirit; and iv) a level of physical or material reality that characterizes the 
inhabited empirical world of human subjects. If this stratification is a mark of Platonism, then we see it as 
a kind of trunk from which different branches diverge. One is Christian idealism that dispenses with the 
level of living being as a necessarily distinct ontological category and, more crucially, explicates the 
ontological reducibility of the physical to the noetic in a certain way. It takes the physical world to consist 
in being a system of appearances organized by the imposition of certain immaterial causal constraints on 
the human mind in accordance with the celestial transmission of the divine ideas. In the Christian idealist 
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tradition the world-transcendent logoi are taken to be both noetic inasmuch as they are ordained by the 
divine mind (and executed by the pure intelligences of heaven) and physically creative inasmuch as their 
content determines the order and thematic character of human sensory experience. In this way, the logoi 
remain operative transcendentally and explanatorily prior to the physical world they encode. The resulting 
system of appearances, experienced as the physical world of human habitation, with its thematic 
character, is subject to empirical laws of nature as found in scientific investigation; yet on the idealist 
view these are consequential upon or logically sustained by the transcendentally operative laws of sensory 
organization.  
While idealism does not deny the two-way causal traffic between the mind and body in the 
empirical order nor the fully objective and public character of the physical world, it sees itself as being in 
a position coherently to do so because it does not take the physical to be something that is in itself mind-
independent and ontologically fundamental. It regards the empirically immanent as logically sustained by 
the transcendent at the level of sensory experience, the site of the genesis of our epistemic access to the 
empirically immanent. Since both Scholasticism and (Christian) idealism are fundamentally motivated by 
a desire to appreciate the reality of Christ, we may invoke a Christological metaphor. The divine and 
human natures of Christ are able to be unified without any admixture or confusion because they are 
unified by a divine rather than a human person. So idealism would maintain that similarly the physical 
can be preserved in its full integrity and lifted up into the dignity of the spiritual because it remains, in 
any created order, strictly subordinate to and ontologically dependent on the spiritual. One can understand 
the Scholastic temptation to see in the incarnational reality of Christ a cosmic pattern, and in following 
this, seeing the mind and body as synthesized into a higher unity that in sublating them equates them. But 
in Christ the divine and human natures are never equated nor sublated into a third nature as the 
monophysites and Eutychians maintained. Even in the person of Christ the asymmetric dependence of the 
human on the divine is an enduring reality, and the elevation of the former in the order of grace would be 
threatened if this dependence were disrupted. Similarly, idealism contends that the material, in all its 
particularity and concrete sensory immediacy, can only be justly valued and intelligibly understood if its 
asymmetric ontological dependence on spiritual realities is recognized.  
Having traced one path of the development of Christian Platonism into Christian idealism, it is 
worth pausing to emphasize my intentions. The thesis as a whole is not intended to be a work of historical 
exegesis but a piece of concept-driven, constructive philosophical theology which draws upon key figures 
in the tradition on a particular reading. Similarly, in this particular case, I am only arguing that that there 
is available a plausible reading of the intellectual history of Platonism in which idealism may be seen as a 
late-stage development. Noting the fact that Platonism may be developed along the lines of Aristotelian-
Scholastic metaphysics rather than that of idealism, and the historical fact itself, serves to qualify the 
20 
 
strength of the claim I am making. Idealism was and is a way of developing the topdownism of the 
Platonist worldview, but not the only way. Although I may question whether other developments are as 
preservative and faithful of the Platonist topdownism, my first purpose is to explore the value of idealism 
for Christian theology. Just as with Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics, idealism may be evaluated 
independently according to standards of conceptual coherence, economy, fecundity, and explanatory 
power. But even these evaluations are aided by using historical case studies as sources of evidence. 
Idealism is both an endogenous intellectual development of Platonism and also one that historically was 
precipitated by its conformity to the demands of Christian theology. Exploring these developmental 
moments thus serves to clarify understanding of the relevant concepts and their value. When we consider 
the motivations of Christian theologians and philosophers, whether in the case of Gregory of Nyssa,  
Augustine, or Berkeley, we can expect to learn more than we would through a wholly independent and 
ahistorical evaluation. I am not interested in the historiography of the Platonic tradition or even in making 
particular exegetical claims so much as exploring and ultimately demonstrating the virtues of idealism for 
Christian theology, especially the dogmatics of creation.  
Having invoked the theological perspective in the point above
47
, we arrive at an opportunity to 
consider its greater significance. A likely reservation about idealism, or the idealist development of 
Platonism as I have described it, is that it might seem to deflate or degrade the created value of matter and 
the physical world. If the Incarnation (together with the doctrine of the Trinity) is the central doctrine of 
the Christian faith, does not idealism threaten the redemptive and eschatological significance of the body? 
The objection might be thought of as a charge of Gnosticism on the one hand or a charge of Origenism on 
the other. Indeed, it may be that this worry is what motivated Maximus the Confessor to view the spirit 
and body of human nature as synthesized into a personal unity and in related ways to deviate from the 
patristic idealist tradition as it had developed up to his time.
48
 The human nature assumed by the Word in 
the redemption of Christ is a composite nature of body and spirit. As such, does it not follow that the 
body is as much a vehicle for the communication of grace as the spirit, or even that the communicated 
activity of grace inseparably involves both? It will be useful to have this objection in mind at the outset of 
my exposition, because its very force can be used against it, to intensify the attraction to idealism.  
In an important sense, the “Maximian worry” anticipates a still further objection concerning 
transubstantiation, that the idealist, in denying the reality of material substances, is in conflict with the 
Tridentine constitutional formulation regarding the replacement of the substance of the eucharistic 
antitypes by the substance of Christ’s body and blood. Here it is important to recognize several things. 
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First, in regard to the eschatological significance of the resurrected body, that the order of grace is 
different from the order of glory, the latter only being properly eschatological. Second, that in regard to 
the order of glory, revelation about the state of the body is still quite hidden. Think of the transfigured 
body of Christ on Mt. Tabor, John’s cautioning words that we shall be (at the parousia) has not yet been 
revealed
49
, and Paul’s repeated reference to the distinction between the psychic body of Adamic human 
nature and the spiritual body that the elect shall enjoy in the post-resurrection kingdom
50
, which is only 
analogically (and sacramentally) related to the psychic body. All of this might very well incline us to 
think that the body in the order of glory is finally revealed in truth to be what it is made to be now but we 
fail to recognize with our fleshly senses and fleshly minds
51—something whose being is dependent on 
spirit. After all, the visible things pass away, “only the invisible things are eternal”52, and “flesh and blood 
cannot enter the kingdom of heaven”.53  
And yet it seems clear enough that in the order of grace, the body is of the greatest importance in 
view of the Church’s singular understanding of the Incarnation. The Word of God came to us by taking 
flesh in the womb, affirming every stage of biological development up to the full flower of manhood. In 
performing miracles, he demonstrates his transcendent power over the order of nature, but always in a 
way that reciprocally affirms the value of the natural order in its very conformity to his words. His 
Passion was certainly nothing less than the endurance of bodily torture, and medical analysis of the 
evangelists’ testimony confirms that the “blood and water” that flowed from the pierced side of Christ on 
the cross is consistent with a build-up of pleural fluid around the heart as a predictable consequence of 
severe scourging at the center of the back, just as he is recorded to have suffered, explaining the surprise 
of Pilate at the quickness of Jesus’ death when he realizes that the scourging was overdone.54  In 
preparing his institution of the eucharist, Jesus steadfastly resisted any attempt to allegorize his teaching: 
“How can this man give us his flesh to eat?”, his followers complained, to which the insistent reply is 
given, “Truly I say to you, unless you gnaw55 on my flesh and drink my blood you have no life in you”.56 
And lest his resurrection appearances be misinterpreted as ghostly apparitions, he eats with his disciples 
and invites them to inspect his wounds.
57
 There can be no doubt, therefore, of the reality of the body of 
Jesus Christ in all its visceral immediacy, in his birth, death, and seat at the right hand of the Father, 
mediating for us as a High Priest, in communion with the Father in heaven and on earth at the sacrifice of 
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the Holy Mass. It follows, too, that our bodies are no less real as we are made in his image, to grow into 
his likeness, and that the “dust” of our bodies, their material constitution in nerve, tissue, cell, and 
molecule, by which they influence and are receptive to the physical world are equally real and “lifted up” 
through the life of the Son of Man who descends from heaven.
58
  
None of this is controversial from the perspective of traditional, orthodox Christianity. In fact, all 
of this is merely to recount one of the main lines of emphasis of orthodox Christianity against the 
Christological heresies that in one way or another devalued or misconstrued the status of the human body 
or the flesh
59
 that composes it. The genuinely controversial question is what to make of this at the level of 
a theory of metaphysics, so that we might understand what we believe. What does revelation teach us 
about what is ontologically basic, about how precisely to describe the relation between mind and matter, 
spirit and body, invisible and visible? Is there a clear relation of priority as Platonism maintains? Is there 
additionally a relation of ontological dependence as idealism maintains?
60
 These are not idle questions. 
Addressing them would seem to be necessary for an understanding of our Lord’s revelation, not only of 
what he taught but of who he is. The fathers and great theologians of our tradition have always recognized 
this and so should we if, like them, we wish to be faithful to the Gospel, in our preaching and in our 
worship.
61
  
 In Origen’s ‘temporal interpretation’ of noetic priority within the cosmic hierarchy, matter is 
created after the fall of pure spirits. In reaction again this and in effort to reassert the original created 
goodness of matter, Maximus overcorrected in his sublation of the spiritual and the physical in the 
synthesis of human nature. But given this synthesis, it is not difficult to understand the Scholastic 
hylomorphic view as a self-conscious attempt to ‘preserve’ this Maximian insight. In fact, however, the 
purported insight confuses something the Christian idealist understanding of the Platonic hierarchy had 
already made clear in the time of Gregory of Nyssa and Basil
62
, and it was this idealist line that was 
preserved in Scotus Eriugena and modernized—updated to reflect modern intellectual development in 
science and philosophy—in Berkeley63, Edwards64, Butler, and Newman.  
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Orthodox doctrinal tradition has never deviated from the assertion of the ontological reducibility 
of the physical to the spiritual, of visible to invisible. The very presumption that such an assertion carries 
with it a Gnostic tendency, or that it does not do justice to the incarnational dimension of the Mystery of 
Christ, is itself telling of the danger of the Maximian/Scholastic syntheses of spirit and matter. True 
enough, the human soul does not temporally pre-exist its embodiment. But, thinking within the 
transcendental framework that is proper to theology, it is correct to say that the soul unlike the body is 
ontologically substantial in its memory, intellect, and will, that it is ontologically prior to the body, the 
latter being asymmetrically dependent on it. It can exist without the body and does so exist between death 
and resurrection, since the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is God of the living. This priority is not 
dissolved at the resurrection but is the condition of its possibility. The physical body was made to serve as 
the medium of participation and communion in the life of Christ and this is indeed ultimately realized in 
the eschaton. Yet the very ‘mediumhood’ of the body, what makes it such a medium, is that it expresses 
in an intelligible way the intentions of its agents. It can only do this because it is public, objective, and 
logico-rubristic or proto-sacramental. According to Christian idealism, all of these features of body as 
medium of communication are grounded in the sensory organization, the nomological system of control 
over the possible sequences of human sensory experience instituted by God and executed by angels. Just 
as the Mosaic law, instituted by the Word and revealed by angels, is not dissolved by the revelation of 
Christ, so in the eschaton the system of appearances is not dissolved but elevated in transparency to the 
glory of the Lord in the Parousia, as Jesus’ human body was not destroyed but elevated in its 
transparency at the Transfiguration when, briefly, the eternal glory of the Lord broke into the temporality 
of creation in a perfect way.  
 
I.3  Cosmos and Eucharist: A Starting Point in Liturgical Theology 
 
In the present work I want to suggest that an expositional metaphysics for a theology of the eucharist is 
found in phenomenalistic idealism, an idealism centered on the creative hierarchical relation of the Lord 
to man as its essential core. In the previous sections I introduced, interrogated, and specified some of the 
philosophical terms of my thesis. Here in this section I want to do the same for some of the key 
theological terms. In the next section and final section I will engage in some methodological reflection.  
In carrying out a project of theology internal to the life of faith, arising from the shared personal 
life of worship in the Church, the question I want to answer is this: given the vision of the complete shape 
of the liturgy, in its fullness and unity par excellence—the eucharistic synaxis, or Mass—what kind of 
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created order—of space, time, and matter—must the Lord establish so that the very movement of creation 
is attuned in all its springs and workings to that shape, to facilitate it, to condition it in its full potential, 
and to make it possible and intelligible? Any answer here should be able to explain how God’s creation is 
directed towards the goal of establishing the body of Christ, the community of Christian disciples, in its 
essentially liturgical constitution, centered on the reality of the eucharistic sacrament. For by it, in the 
words of Pope Pius XII, “this union [of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ with its Head] during this 
mortal life receives, as it were, a culmination”.65  
Given this explanatory condition, we should expect any answer to conform to the canon of 
mysterium fidei
66
 in regard to the eucharistic mystery. Whatever our theology of the eucharist, it should 
reflect an awareness of the theology as it has been in the whole scope of tradition, from the Platonist 
mimesis theology of the early Church, from Thomas’ sacramental theology, to Tridentine and later 
understanding. When the Church adopted the spirit of the Liturgical Movement and accepted for her own 
the views of its scholars, especially in Pius XII’s Mediator Dei and the conciliar Sacrosanctum 
Concilium, she already gave this critical and comprehensive theological understanding an authoritative 
formulation. At the bottom of this understanding is the impulse to say that the worship of the Church is 
the essential mode of its participation in the Mystery of Christ. Therefore this should be our starting point 
not only for any wider theology of the sacraments and liturgical activity, but, at least occasionally, for our 
systematic treatment of doctrine, especially those doctrines that can be shown directly to relate to the 
same mystery.  
In the neo-patristic tradition of liturgical theology influential on the French School, but 
appropriated authentically in the 20
th
 century liturgical school of Maria-Laach, Dom Casel, Dom 
Warnach, Dom Dix, Pius XII, Louis Bouyer and the wider Liturgical Movement, and ultimately by the 
Church in Vatican II’s Conciliar Constitution on the Liturgy, we accept that “the Mystery of Christian 
Worship is the core of the entire Catholic liturgy, the re-enactment in, by, and for the Church of the Act of 
Our Lord which accomplishes our Salvation”, and “the central property of the liturgy…is the unique 
mode in which Christ’s redeeming act is permanently renewed and partaken of by the Church. 
Understanding this mode is the very clue to the understanding of the whole liturgy”.67 The mode is not 
theatrical, not imaginative, nor physically realistic (viz., a repetition of the historical sacrifice). What then 
is this mode of renewal and participation? Again in the words of Pius XII: 
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The holy liturgy, therefore, is the public worship which is offered to the Father by our Redeemer 
as Head of the Church; it is also the worship offered by the society of the faithful to its Head, and 
through Him to the Eternal Father; in a word, it is the whole worship of the Mystical Body of 
Jesus Christ, that is the Head and its members.
68
  
 
And Bouyer, referring to Pius XII tells us: 
 
The liturgy…is hierarchical because it is carried out in dependence on the hierarchical ministry of 
the Church and because it is closely connected with the proclamation of saving Truth which was 
committed to the same apostolic ministry.
69
 
 
This is to say that the received word of truth is what constitutes the corporate body of worship, so that 
liturgical functions go hand in hand with the greater ministerial functions. The words of life entrusted to 
the apostles, and through them to lower ministers, are what nourish and create the body of the Church. 
The apostles (or their vicars in the episcopate) are the organs of the body. The words are its life-blood.  
 
Christ, the one Mediator, established and continually sustains here on earth His holy Church, the 
community of faith, hope and charity, as an entity with visible delineation through which He 
communicated truth and grace to all. But, the society structured with hierarchical organs and the 
Mystical Body of Christ, are not to be considered as two realities, nor are the visible assembly 
and the spiritual community, nor the earthly Church and the Church enriched with heavenly 
things; rather they form one complex reality which coalesces from a divine and a human element. 
For this reason, by no weak analogy, it is compared to the mystery of the incarnate Word. As the 
assumed nature inseparably united to Him serves the divine Word as a living organ of salvation, 
so, in a similar way, does the visible social structure of the Church serve the Spirit of Christ, who 
vivifies it, in the building up of the body.
70
 
 
Inner subjective piety must not be suppressed but fed on the “objective content of Christian faith and the 
sacraments, in other words, upon the Mystery”. “Feed my lambs”71—is not only an injunction but a part 
of instituting a hierarchical provision for the sacramental distribution of the Mystery. Traditional forms of 
devotion and asceticism are to be encouraged, but their mode of operation works from the outside in, and 
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this is complementary to the action of the sacraments, which works from the inside out. The Incarnation, 
the assumption of a human nature by the hypostasis of the Word of God, communicates the graces of his 
divine essence through the mystical corporate communion of the human essence.  
In Bouyer’s neo-patristic theology, supported by his extensive historical scholarship, the catholic 
liturgical-hierarchical identity of the Church is founded on the liturgical-hierarchical identity of the 
cosmos itself. The cosmos is (and in proper idealist fashion, I would want to emphasize, is nothing over 
and above) a revelation of the word. The visible portion is the revelation of the word to man. This first 
step in understanding what this means is to note that the traditional conception of the liturgical identity of 
the Church described above is bound up with the great Biblical theme of the People of God. Bouyer traces 
this to its origins in the covenant theology of the Old Testament and the Qahal Yahweh
72
, the great 
liturgical assembly in Exodus 19 when the Israelites become holy, God’s kin, simultaneous with their 
hearing the proclaimed word of God from Moses, making thanks and praise to him and sealing their 
liturgical response with sacrifice. Only on two other occasions is such a great Qahal recorded: when 
Josiah convenes the people of Judah to hear the newly uncovered Book of the Law and renew the 
covenant under the presiding of Hilkiah the High Priest
73
; and again when the scribe Ezra calls the people 
to hear his newly made Bible, when the released captives had been freed to return to the ruins of the holy 
city. Bouyer goes on to argue that because in the post-Exilic period this was transposed to the observance 
of the Sabbath and the Jewish meal prayers, the Berakot, this was the interpretative context for the 
institution of the Christian Eucharist at the Last Supper in the Apostolic period. He thus explains the 
continuity of the early Christian Mass with the Biblical theme of covenant holiness, as found in both the 
universal and domestic character of the Jewish family and the ancient Jewish liturgical cult, with its 
hierarchy and grounding in angelic cosmology.   
Patristic evidence for the same theme, and the claim that the early Church understood the 
eucharistic liturgy in just this way, is abundant. Just to mention one source briefly, consider the  apostolic 
age text of 1 Clement. The immediate occasion for Clement’s writing is to chastise the local church of 
Corinth for taking it upon themselves to depose their appointed presbyters. In order to establish the 
injustice of this action Clement builds a complex but consistently sustained argument that the legitimacy 
of the ordained Church hierarchy derives from Jesus Christ, the revealed word of God, by way of 
apostolic authority through its own hierarchical distribution of ministerial offices; that this was in turn 
derived from the hierarchy of the ancient Jewish priestly-prophetic tradition; and that this was in turn 
derived from the liturgical character of the celestial hierarchy; all of which is grounded and unified as a 
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whole in the sovereignty of the Divine Lord, who rules the cosmos as he rules the Church. The parallels 
between legitimate local worship, the hierarchy of the apostolic ministry of preaching and the celestial 
liturgical hierarchy are not accidental. Whether visible or invisible, the hierarchy of salvation ministry 
goes hand in hand with the hierarchy of the liturgy. Thus Clement does not hesitate to invoke theme of the 
People of God in all its cosmic significance, even as it unfolds personally in the life of the individual: 
Whither then shall one depart, or where shall one flee, from Him that 
embraceth the universe? Let us therefore approach Him in holiness of soul, lifting up pure and 
undefiled hands unto Him, with love towards our gentle and 
compassionate Father who made us an elect portion unto Himself. 
For thus it is written: When the Most High divided the nations, when He 
dispersed the sons of Adam, He fixed the boundaries of the nations 
according to the number of the angels of God. His people Jacob 
became the portion of the Lord, and Israel the measurement of His 
inheritance. And in another place He saith, Behold, the Lord taketh for Himself 
a nation out of the midst of the nations, as a man taketh the first 
fruits of his threshing floor; and the holy of holies shall come 
forth from that nation. 
But he does so finally to make the concrete point about order of the local community: 
Unto the High Priest his special “liturgies” have been appointed…let each of you brethren 
(including laity) make eucharist to God according to his own order, keeping a good conscience, 
and not transgressing the appointed role of his “liturgy”.74 
The same Lord who first called Israel and established a correspondence between the numbers of men and 
angels, even he, so Clement implies, and as Bouyer and Dom Dix point out, has instituted these rules of 
ecclesiastical governance. The Church eucharist is a corporate action depending on the cooperation of 
each order. Such offering to God is the Church’s defining activity.  
According to Dix, the unity of the eucharist requires a unified logical development or “shape”, 
the structure of which should express the function of each order, in which all faithful are in common 
agreement, of one mind. This constitution is enabled by the Spirit but enacted by the divine command of 
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Christ at the Last Supper, “Do this” (poieite—plural form).75 Enrico Mazza points out that in accordance 
with the “mimesis” theology of the early Church (especially, perhaps, of the Roman Church), the rite of 
the eucharistic liturgy was understood to be identical with the Last Supper, an ontological possibility 
intentionally instituted by Jesus’s “Do this” command, and realized by the liturgical assembly as it fulfills 
that religious duty.
76
      
Nor was Dix alone in this view. Per Chrysostom
77
, the word of Christ at the Last Supper was 
efficacious “once and for all”, like the words of creation in Genesis. So the Mass of the Church is a 
liturgical sacrament that identifies us through anamnesis (of the Holy Spirit) with or mystically represents 
the Last Supper, again because of the sacramentally creative and singularly efficacious words of Christ—
“Do this in memory of me”, and the Last Supper is itself the sacrament of the eschatological supper, the 
marriage/banquet feast of the bride/kingdom won on the Cross. Thus the earthly liturgy does not imitate 
the heavenly and the heavenly does not imitate the earthly. They both imitate the Last Supper and in so 
doing they participate hierarchically in the cosmic unity, the body-cosmos, the eschatological liturgy, the 
song of praise of the Last Day, the new creation, each according to his office, his membership in the 
body.  
The idea of the eucharist as the eschatological sacrament takes the shape of the liturgy and fills it 
in with certain thematic details. First is the creative power of the commanding and eulogizing Word, the 
arch-form of all liturgical directives. Second is the expressive, dialogical, relational, or symbolic character 
of the body—“This is my body”. This tells us what body/matter/soma is. Third, it follows that if body is 
symbolically expressive or expressive in a way that can be shared, then it is word made flesh. But the 
Word makes himself flesh. Christ is the self-expression of God, God’s theology. So body is the word 
spoken by God. It is not material in the sense of a mind-independent spatial medium, a substrate or a 
principle of individuation. But if body is not material it is spiritual or as we would say mental, not 
analytically or conceptually, but metaphysically. If we can receive it and indeed share in it and its creative 
power then we must do so in virtue of our minds, even if this mental sharing and reception is itself 
expressed in bodily images, in words made flesh. This does not diminish the body. It uplifts it.     
In the Liturgical Movement’s view78 the constitutional shape of the Church’s liturgy is perfected 
for all time in the sacramental reality of the Last Supper. It is thus the shape of the liturgy in any time 
period, from the first assembly of the People of God when they received the Mosaic law to the current 
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rites of the Mass.
79
 Therefore any liturgical theology that would seek support in the doctrine of creation 
should understand the four elements of the Mass and their “consubstantiality”—mystery—as enshrined in 
the mold of creation: communion (communio sanctorum), sacrifice, eucharist, and memorial (memorio 
Christi). The first two elements show us ‘society in condenscension). The last two show us ‘society in 
con-ascension’. From these two groups we can derive the two great cosmic movements from the shape of 
the liturgy. Condescension is the agapic ecstasy of the Creator, the Christian proodos (the pro odos, the 
“foresong” of creation, the chanted liturgical rite of heaven that will become the victory hymn of 
salvation). Con-ascension is the erotic ecstasy of the creature, the Christian epistrophe, the worshipful 
turning of the heart in the Church’s life of grace.80 The eucharistic element is anagogic and anaphoric. 
The memorial element, in line with the work of Protestant theologians like Brilliot
81
 and Jeremias
82
, must 
be understood as it was in the early Church theology. That is, memorial is not a reminiscing of deeds in 
the past but a supernatural identification with those deeds in the eschatological present. The Last Supper 
and Cross are not simply remembered or repeated but they pull, or rather the activity of Christ in them 
pulls, us through the liturgical celebration into his Passover. There is also of course a secondary and 
derivative sense of the memorial element in the temporal, recollective, ‘attentio’ dimension appopriate to 
finite creation in the life of the Church, though strictly speaking this does not belong to the eucharistic 
celebration as such. In the expansive life of the world in the Church, it is essential to human receptivity of 
Christ’s economic communication of his Paschal Mystery. The repetitive character of the laws of nature is 
one of their marks as laws. This may be derived from their liturgical quality, just as our temporal 
liturgical works, our calendar and offices, prayers and psalms, are repetitive, though their goal is the very 
overcoming of this worldly temporal repetition as they enfold the created order into the sacred service of 
the Church.      
By taking all of this as our starting point, as the focus of our interpretive lens, we may examine 
the eulogistic nature of the created order and see in it a prologue or prefatory
83
 dialogue to the creation of 
the visible Church, the human Church on earth. And since the Church is one, this means that the 
eulogistic, hierarchic, and katabatic-ministerial character of the order in fact betokens its liturgical 
character; what is more, finally, that it is a kind of eucharistic synaxis and, in light of ours, ultimately a 
unified Mass together with us, by the Word of God in the unity of the Spirit. There is no way adequately 
to describe the Mystery that is the essence of the Church’s worship, not in philosophical language or in 
any other parlance. It contains within its own activity a kerygmatic dimension. As the Sacrament of the 
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Word in his Church, it speaks for itself. Worship is the reception, creative action, and return of the Word 
of God
84
, its sowing, flowering, and harvesting. But so fruitful is this Mystery that it colors and shapes all 
human activity that encircles it, and especially the rational activity of the mind that seeks in love and 
joyful expectation to prepare itself for the feast.  
So the shape of the liturgy, the elements of the Mass, the identity of the Church as the People of 
God, the liturgy’s historical and actual angelic cosmology, and the wider vision of a “sacramental 
universe” implicated in the Church’s liturgical identity draws us to a cosmic theology, a theology of 
creation that is informed in its first impulse and in all unfolding details by the eucharistic theology of our 
Church in its living, concrete reality, informed by the Roman Canon, the anaphora of the Novus Ordo, 
and other eucharistic prayers of living practice. Any elaboration of this theology will require a companion 
philosophy that can justify its claims and make them systematically coherent. Over the course of the 
present work I want to recommend and develop such a philosophy in Christian idealism, because of the 
traditional way in which it conceives of the God-world relation, the spirit-matter relation, the way it 
makes the relation of substance and appearance found in transubstantiation a genuine mysterium fidei, the 
way in which it shows the heavenly and earthly church are pre-eminently unified in Christ’s sacramental 
operator, even in the order of nature, as the physical world is ontologically realized in the way the angelic 
liturgy of the word hierarchically participates in the Mystery of the Incarnate Logos by ordering the 
system of human sensory appearances.  
Benedict XVI writing as Cardinal Ratzinger in the Spirit of the Liturgy
85
 says that liturgical 
theology is symbolic theology. Liturgy works on the mid-level between historical reality and the eschaton 
of the Paschal Mystery; and also between the ‘false day’ (in what was mistakenly believed to “open the 
eyes”) of the original sin and estrangement from God and the new day of the Sun of Righteousness, in the 
dawn of the day star, in the luminous darkness of Sinai and Tabor. This is a period of symbolic 
intelligence, in which perceptible symbols remain, but now open up to the invisible realities they contain. 
This is the sacramental period; the veil of the temple is rent, but we have not fully entered into the 
sanctuary, remaining in the court (at best, during the liturgy). This transformative process, occuring 
within Church worship is what he calls ‘logike latreia’, the “logicizing” or spiritualizing of man within 
the liturgy, using the word logike in the ancient Greek sense, similar to that of ‘oblationem rationabilem’ 
in the Quam oblationem of the Roman Canon, a ‘spiritual offering’.86 In the liturgy we pray to God to 
eulogistically make of us such an offering together with his Son. 
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I.4  On Angelic Cosmology and Method 
 
One of the most striking supplications in the Roman canon is the following text from the Post-
Consecration Epiclesis: 
 
Supplices te rogamus, omnipotens Deus, iube hæc perferri per manus sancti Angeli
87
 tui in 
sublime altare tuum, in conspectu divinæ maiestatis tuæ; ut quotquot ex hac altaris participatione 
sacrosanctum Filii tui Corpus et Sanguinem sumpserimus, omni benedictione cælesti et gratia 
repleamur. (Per Christum Dominum nostrum. Amen 
(Humbly we implore you, almighty God, command that these gifts be borne by the hands of your 
holy Angel(s) to your altar on high in the presence of your divine majesty, so that all of us, who 
through this participation at the altar receive the most holy Body and Blood of your Son, may be 
filled with every grace and heavenly blessing. [Through Christ our Lord. Amen]). 
 
The explicit invocation of the cultic function of the angels, at this juncture of the prayer, after the 
memorial invocation of the sacrifices of Old Testament righteous and before the commemoration of the 
dead, is a vivid mystical representation of the unity of the cosmic Church. The cultic function of the 
angels in particular reminds us of the apocalyptic vision of the angel with the golden censer performing 
the heavenly liturgy of the saints
88
 and the intercessory liturgical function of Raphael in the Book of 
Tobit.
89
 The action of the anaphora, in this epiclectic moment, which is the work of Christ in the presiding 
minister, effects a union of the People of God through the cooperation of the angels, not only those on 
earth, but the truly catholic People, the cosmic whole whom God has made his own, on earth and under 
the earth, in participation with the court of heaven, the same we wait upon to descend from heaven, the 
New Jerusalem. This vision has unfolded in salvation history stepwise with the revelation of the word and 
God’s purpose in creation of making a people his own, making spiritual creatures to be like Him.  
In his Mystagogy
90
, Enrico Mazza remarks that in Theodore of Mopsuestia’s mystagogical 
homilies the earthly liturgy does not relate to the heavenly by way of participation and the angels 
contribute nothing to effecting their eschatological union, which is solely achieved by the redemption of 
Christ. Yet Theodore’s understanding is rather exceptional in this regard. In Chrysostom’s homilies, the 
idea of cosmic liturgical participation is quite explicit. In commenting on the baptismal rite he says: 
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The angels who are standing by and the invisible powers rejoice at your conversion, receive the 
words from your tongues, and carry them up to the common Master of all things. There they are 
inscribed in the books of heaven.
91
 
 
This idea is also explicitly contained in the Cherubikon, the hymn for the offertory procession that begins 
the eucharistic Liturgy of the Faithful in the Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom, “let us [we faithful 
assembled here] mystically represent the cherubim, that we may sing the thrice-holy hymn [the Sanctus of 
the anaphora, which will follow in due course] to the life-giving Trinity”. Explicit references to the 
interaction of the angels with the celebration of the eucharist are mentioned in all of the historically 
significant rites
92
, from the Canon of the Roman Missal, the (other) eucharistic prayers of the Novus 
Ordo, the anaphora of the (Alexandrine) Liturgy of St. Mark
93
 and that of the Apostolic Constitution. 
Indeed, in the case of the Roman canon, the reference is quite detailed. The inclusion of the Sanctus itself 
is a theological commentary and what is happening in the eucharistic rite, and even before its inclusion in 
the ancient liturgies there was already such a theology. If Bouyer is right, the Jewish berakot and tefillim 
that are continued in the Apostolic writings, already contained such an understanding.
94
  
In what follows—particularly in Chapters II, IV, XIII, IX— I shall be exploring the thesis that the 
angel spirits, the pure intelligences of heaven, play a cooperative role in the creation of the visible world, 
a role that is liturgically executed and included within their ministry of salvation. Put concisely, the 
argument I make in each of these chapters is this. If we already believe, as the revealed content of faith, 
that the angels participate in God’s ministry of salvation to man, that they perform a liturgical office and 
worship the Creator, and that they execute a mediating control over the phenomena of nature (all of which 
has strong Scriptural support), then we ought to be well-motivated theologically to seek to understand the 
unity of these roles. I aim to show that the metaphysics of idealism can facilitate just such an 
understanding. 
Here it may be worthwhile to step back and say something to address the likely concern, as much 
instinctive as reflective, that there is something fanciful and non-academic, something out-of-place, 
gauche even, in writing about angels. Every reader will at least be aware of the potential for such a 
response in general, even if she does share it herself. And speaking generally, I think this presents current 
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theology with a useful measurement of just where it stands in regard to its recent past and the reception of 
its traditional heritage; a way to gauge just how post-liberal, how consistent it is in its current make-up in 
recognizing the errors of modernism in its historicist biblical hermeneutics and eschewal of metaphysics; 
and a benchmark for how far a theology of ressourcement has been carried out. In this self-examination 
we should think through whether our suspicions or skepticism about angels is the product of a sustained 
inquiry made in intellectual honesty, or an obeisance to the ‘practical’ social exigencies of the secular 
culture in which we live and work. And if we think we have set ourselves free of such coercion in some 
aspects of our faith, do we have good reasons for bracketing the traditional teaching in regard to angels?  
Can we worship in the eucharistic liturgy and believe that what we are doing is not joining in 
some civic social event or meeting up with neighbors to lift our sentiments, but actually worshiping, 
hearing the word of God, sacrificing to Him, and being sacramentally changed into His Word—can we 
believe all of this and yet believe that when we sing the Sanctus that this alone merely represents some 
fanciful sentiment that perhaps helps to focus our minds in the right way? How did we learn to sing the 
Sanctus? Was Isaiah writing about an authentic oracular vision, a God-given revelation inspired by the 
Holy Spirit, but then quietly interspersing something of his own invention and dressing it up for effect? 
Can we believe that the Lord is really present and in sacrificial communion with us but without his 
angels? Do we believe in the communion of saints, but only human saints? Can we believe that Scripture 
is authoritative but that the hundreds of explicit and detailed references to angels, uniformly distributed 
throughout the canon and bound up with almost every significant narrative of salvation history from the 
Fall to the last vision of the New Jerusalem, the mysteries of the Gospel from the Annunciation, Nativity, 
Passion, Resurrection and Ascension, are again somehow to be bracketed and set aside to be subject to the 
historicist interpretation that we reject for all other cases? On what basis is it exactly that we think 
Augustine and Aquinas are to be taken seriously when they write about law and ethics, sin and grace, 
salvation and the Trinity, but not when they write about angels? Do we really believe that Christ has won 
for us the victory over death, and therefore that the soul is separated from the body at death, but that there 
could not be spirits who were never embodied in the first place? Are Adam and Christ the only sons of 
God?   
 These remarks also provide me with an opportunity to reflect on method. If I am not doing 
‘speculative theology’ in the pejorative sense nor history of ideas or liturgy, and not high systematic 
theology in the most conventional and expected sense, what then is the method? Here I think it is 
important to realize that there is no contradiction in a method that recognizes: on the one hand, that 
theology has a primary and ultimate dependence on God’s revelation—that any value found in the human 
work of theology is merely the influx of the truth of God’s own theology, namely his incarnate Word, into 
the human mind; and on the other hand, that we should make a (at least locally) systematic effort to 
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discursively reason about and form a set of concrete inferences about some theological subject—in our 
case the connection between liturgy and the metaphysics of creation—that represents our current best 
efforts to receive, interpret, and coherently articulate what we take to be the consequences of the word of 
God as it has been given to us so far. These conclusions may even be things we want to regard as 
principles and organize into a more or less systematic metaphysics, without them ceasing be, for all that, 
provisional and continuously open both to criticism and new revelation. In fact not only are these points 
non-contradictory, we might well say that in order to honor our unconditional theological dependence on 
the one great Theologian, we must be as expressive and explicit about our current understanding of his 
teaching as we can be, lest we deceive ourselves and remain in or fall into some prejudice that would be 
effective by being hidden.
95
  
Accepting this, I can say that the method here to be used is that of speculative theology, not in the 
more contemporary pejorative sense of an airy, idiosyncratic musing that takes the articles of faith as a 
jumping off point. Rather it is that of the more traditional sense of seeking fullness of faith through faith, 
or a reflective seeking of the fullness of truth by truth. As the spiritual pursuit of ‘contemplation’, taken in 
the classical sense, this is how Clement of Alexandria
96
 defines faith itself, as “an insight through grace”, 
as “a wisdom working through itself”. The goal of this method is what in the early Church was called 
gnosis. While it was understood that such knowledge may be presented as a scientific reconstruction of 
faith, because it is the product of reflection, the subject worked on is not a set of concepts handed to us 
but “something united to us, rooted in us, living, and expanding life”. What distinguishes genuine 
theological knowledge of the orthodox or traditional kind from the heretical versions (most prominently 
that of the early Gnostics who used the same term) is precisely that it never asserts itself or its own claims 
against the wholeness of truth as preserved in the Church up to that time. Speculative theology is 
individual but not egotistical. Only by working from the interior of the Church, with a faith formed within 
it and constantly united to it in its wholeness, can faith journey into gnosis, into a scientific knowledge 
that has any chance of being universal and so preserving its identity across times and places, into what we 
would call an orthodox systematic theology. And yet it must proceed from individual efforts of original 
theological speculation because ultimately the “confession of the Church” is “the total and original 
speculation of believers, as the unmediated portrayal of their inner, total faith”.97 
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Part A – Making the Theological Case for Idealism: The Conceptual Content in Traditional Context 
 
Chapter II: A World as Liturgical Language 
II.1  Introduction: Trinitarian Themes 
In the last chapter I located the present work in relation to certain focal points of interest to theologians, 
including creation metaphysics, history of Christian philosophy, and liturgical theology. I introduced the 
driving question of the thesis: What does God need to produce in creation, and with what organization 
and system of governance, in order to accomplish his predestined purpose in Christ? What sort of space, 
time, and matter does God need to make in order to make the Eucharist? In sections 2 and 3 of this 
chapter I ask after what it means to consider the character of creation in this way. If creation is the outer 
action of the Word’s eternal eucharist to the Father, we should expect this to be reflected in the character 
of creation, coordinated around the mystery of the Cross and ordered to its celebration. To explicate this 
idea, I introduce the notion of the absolute primacy of Christ and its relation to the biblically revealed 
angelic ministry. In sections 4 and 5 I argue that by taking transubstantiation as a mysterium fidei in the 
traditional sense, and so as a canon for theological reflection, one becomes motivated to adopt an idealist 
metaphysics in order to account for the unity and continuity of the sacramental and creation economies. If 
God’s consecratory activities in the sacraments are able to effect the work of our redemption, then, on 
pain of seeing the economy of redemption separated from the economy of creation, we should aim to 
understand ‘substantiation’ on the same model as transubstantiation. This would be to regard the 
mysteriousness of the Eucharistic sacrament as anticipatory in the very objectivity of the physical world. 
In Von Balthasar’s trinitarian theology, the cosmic centrality of the Son’s eucharistic sacrifice to 
the Father, the Paschal Mystery of the Cross, is regarded as a temporally interpolated stage in the eternal 
life of the Trinity itself, the Son’s eternal response to the Father, which is “made in absolute spontaneity 
and in absolute ‘obedience’. Both take place in a generous, eucharistic availability [Geloestheit] that 
matches the limitless proportions of the divine nature”.1 For many trinitarian theologians, it is tempting to 
say that it is from these intra-trinitarian relations that creation derives its reason for being and its 
purposive end. For the Father’s full self-expression in the Son has its counterparts in the Son’s eternal 
truth of all things, their knowledge and delight in this Truth, and the diverse way in which the goodness of 
this knowledge may be enjoyed forever.  
The Father expresses his own fullness in the Son, so that the Son imitates God (his “world of 
ideas”) in every possible way. At the same time, we must maintain that the Son, in responding to 
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and accepting his Father’s self-giving, is ready to pour himself forth in any way the Father may 
determine.
2
  
Given the plan to bring about creatures endowed with freedom, the ultimate form of the pouring-forth will 
be that of the Eucharist, which, as we know it, is intimately connected with the Passion, pro nobis. This 
“readiness”, or active, eager obedience, can and must also be understood as a spontaneous “offer”, so that 
there be no question of the Son being “forced” to do something by a will that is exclusively the Father’s. 
Creation, if it is to be free, can only be envisaged and decided upon
3
 by the entire triune God; it follows 
that this decision must be regarded as standing from all eternity. This being so, we are justified in 
thinking backwards from the Eucharist—the Son’s ultimate self-giving—to the covenant that it makes 
possible, and from there again to the creation that gains its meaning from the covenant. Covenant and 
creation are not only rendered possible by the Son’s “eucharistic" response to the Father, they are 
“surpassed” by it, since both of them can only become reality within the embrace of the Son’s response.  
One of the major themes of the present work is the suggestion that a systematic Christian 
cosmology ought to understand the divine offer to participate in the eucharistic life of the Trinity, poured 
forth on creation through the Son, in the Spirit, as providentially extended to all rational creatures. Going 
a step further, we might wish to say that not only is the reason and wherefore of creation implied in the 
intra-trinitarian relations, but also a created order of certain kind, a community of free, intelligent 
creatures who may, according to a harmonious arrangement of the whole, match the eucharistic response 
of the Son in various limited but ultimately unified ways. To anticipate a concept to be understood more 
fully in Ch.IV, this is to say that there is an implication of hierarchical movement in the eucharistic logic 
of the Trinitarian relations, and so of a cosmic hierarchy, a systematic framework at the foundations of the 
creation intended to facilitate the Eucharist, a world within a Church of angels and men.  
 Scripture tells us not only that God makes all of creation, that it remains absolutely and 
continuously dependent on him as its sovereign, but that he makes it in a very peculiar way: he makes it 
through words, that is, by speaking it into existence. Consider the following:  
Let all your creatures serve you; for you spoke and they were made. (Judith 16:14)  
The stars shone in their watches and were glad; he called them, and they said, 'Here we are!' They 
shone with gladness for him who made them. (Bar 3:34) 
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By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the breath of his mouth. Let 
all the earth fear the Lord, let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of him! For he spoke, 
and it came to be; he commanded, and it stood forth. (Ps 33:6,9) 
These passages cannot be interpreted anthropomorphically, as if a collection of material elements “listens 
to” and then complies with the order of the Lord as an army obeys its commander (after all, the “host” is 
made from the breath of his mouth—they are invisible spirits). Rather these passages tell us that his 
command is the creation, the esse of matter is the fiat-logos of the Creator, plain and simple. Already we 
have the strong suggestion that the physical world is not ontologically fundamental, that it is constituted 
by the particular facts of divine ordinance. We also have the suggestion that there is an order of execution 
in the creative commands, wherein the heavenly intelligences, who are spirits made directly from the 
breath of God, are the bearers and executors of the creative commands, resulting in the standing forth in 
awe, or liturgical ontological establishment, of worldly creatures. Already we have the hint that the hymn 
of glory is inscribed in creation. But if creation does not sing on its own, anthropomorphically, as an 
overly literal reading of Old Testament poetic theology would suggest, how exactly is the earth filled with 
the glory of the Lord? In the words of Pope John Paul II,   
This hymn of glory, inscribed in creation, awaits a being capable of giving it adequate conceptual 
and verbal expression, a being who will praise the holy name of God and narrate the greatness of 
his works (cf. Sir 17:8). This being in the visible world is man. The appeal which goes up from 
the universe is addressed to him as the spokesman of creatures and their interpreter before God.
4
  
Interestingly, the concept of anthropomorphism is the key to the riddle; not in the sense of the mistaken 
belief that nature is already animate or spiritual like man, but in that nature is made to be uplifted by man 
in the his liturgical ministry. But Scripture and tradition teach that man’s liturgical office through the 
creation medium is enjoined to one already in progress. The whole interaction between man and nature is 
itself already the ministerial work of the celestial liturgy. Just as man is made to be spiritualized through 
the angelic ministry of salvation commissioned by Christ, so the earthly domain below man in the chain 
of being is made to be anthropomorphized through man’s liturgical ministry. In both cases, the liturgical 
ministry is one in which the higher serves the lower as a sacrifice of praise to the Creator. The visible half 
of creation that we call ‘nature’, while seemingly ‘governed’ by laws that are independent of us, in fact 
has its very order as a result of and in subordination to the mental dialogue between God and his 
intelligent creatures. The nature of this fundamental relationship, so characterized, is what the systematic 
theologian seeks to expose. The metaphysics of idealism will serve to focus on the status of creation as a 
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liturgical medium of communication and anagogy among God and his rational worshipers. It gives clear 
voice to the idea that nature is a system of accommodated revelation, measured words made through and 
for the eternal Eucharist of the immeasurable Word.   
II.2  Logos Cosmology and the Absolute Primacy of Christ 
In Scripture we are told that it is the Word of God, which is also intimately related if not identical 
to his Wisdom, through, by, and for whom all things are linguistically made.  
All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being. (John 
1:3) 
…for in him all things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether 
thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him and for him. 
(Col 1:16) 
but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, through 
whom he also created the worlds. (Heb 1:2) 
O Lord, how manifold are Your works! In wisdom You have made them all. (Ps 104:24) 
He has ordained the splendours of his wisdom. (Sir 42:21)  
Thus Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, as the coeternal Logos of John’s prologue is the word that 
God speaks in sustaining all of creation. Chapter 8 of Proverbs confirms this in revealing to us that Christ 
is the divine Wisdom that, as one of the Trinity, was the motivation and instrument for the Father’s act of 
creation in the Spirit.
5
  
The mystery of Christ as the creative Word, then, in all its multiform significance is the key to 
any understanding of the doctrine of creation. For my purposes—and given the liturgical focus 
established in I.3, in which the Church in its living tradition is the People of God constituted by the 
Word—this will amount to two recurring points of emphasis: that the created order manifests the 
sovereignty of the Lord as a living, personal command that goes forth
6
 with the causal efficacy to 
transform that which receives it; and that the goodness of the divinely ordered creative purpose reaches its 
comprehensive and unifying fullness in Christ, the ultimate living, personal command that goes forth 
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among whom he creates to draw them into the final reality of divine sonship that he embodies. The 
incarnate Word of God is the comprehensive plan for creation, its way, its truth, and its life, the full 
expression of God’s sovereignty and beatifying action. If this first aspect involves Christ’s kingship, the 
second involves his priesthood. While the offices of priest and king are separable in account or in 
conception, we know that in the reality of Christ to which we, the Church, are called they are inseparable. 
They are inseparably united in the third office of Christ, that of prophet. As the eternal word of God, he is 
the ultimate revelation of God to his creation, that we might have the knowledge of God that he has of 
himself. Christ is perfect theology.  
Thus the consummation of the Israelite prophecies, the Messiah, the Son of David, is a royal 
priest, and his order a royal priesthood, a holy nation. The royal priesthood of Christ is implicated in the 
whole testament of creation, beginning with the first creation narrative of Genesis—“And He saw that it 
was good”—which introduces the theme of creation as eulogy. Why does God create with His Word of 
Power and then bless what he has created? Because blessing, the author is telling us, is an integral part of 
the act of creation. It is not just a nice reflective sentiment; it tells us that the whole character of creation 
finds its meaning as presided upon by the authority of the triune God who breathes his Word and words 
into it.   
 All of this is summed up in the thesis that tradition calls the Absolute Primacy of Christ. Taking 
its mandate from the text of Col 1:18 (hina genetai in pasin autos proteuon).
7
 It is the idea that the 
glorification of a human nature, which is the reality of the God-man, is the final purpose for creation and 
so the ultimate reason for creation.
8
 The thesis gives a very straightforward answer to Anselm’s “Cur 
Deus Homo” question, and deflates some of the puzzlement that leads to the question, because it removes 
the presupposition that Christ’s primacy was only relative to the Fall, that the Incarnation only became 
necessary to accomplish salvation as a result of the Fall and would not have happened otherwise, leading 
to the “Fortunate Fall” problem.  
The Absolute Primacy of Christ is another name for the biblical teaching that Wisdom is “the first 
of all creatures”, that the union of God and the Church in the person of Christ is the reason for creation, 
its purpose, the reason why it exists. In order to make Christ—the hypostatic union of human and divine 
nature, the God-man—the Trinity has to make man; to make man He has to make animals, plants, 
microorganisms, earth, air, water, stars, matter-energy, space-time; and in order to make all of visible 
creation subject to the “royal-priestly” or divinizing influence of Christ the God-man, he has to make the 
relationship between human nature and the rest of visible creation one in which the organization of human 
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sense experience is the locus of creation. In this way the dynamic between thought, word, and action is fit 
to communicate the influence of spirit to body and of body to spirit so that spirit, which is active, 
intelligent, and affective or volitional, can rule over and lift up visible creation into conformity with 
divine life. In order to create such a visible world, He has to make sure that human sense experience is 
organized in a systematic way, itself being ruled by His creative commands so that it is essentially 
nomically necessitated and yet contingently dynamic and open-ended, yielding effects to the free choices 
of its intelligent users, just like a language, a thing that, being both regular (because regulated by 
intelligence) and contingent on user activity, is meaningful because it is passively respondent and phoric 
to the intelligent intentions of minds. And in order to make this kind of visible world, a world as language 
between God and man, he has to make it collaborative on both sides and ramified in its intelligibility, 
with linked levels of communication and influence, a hierarchy of power and knowledge from God the 
Spirit, to created pure intelligences
9
, to embodied intelligences, and to bodies.  
 As the first reason and ultimate end of creation, Christ the Royal Priest relates to his created order 
through a covenant. The laws that create a world are a covenant with man. In the Incarnation, God 
becomes subject to his own laws and faithful to the covenant in a unique way. As the God-man he is 
doubly faithful to the covenant, as God and as man. In Him the name of God is hallowed and by Him the 
name of the man, Jesus, is put above every other. From this perspective, desiring to understand the 
covenant in philosophic terms, we should ask the question (just as we have in previous section in regard 
to the eucharist): What kind of space, time, and matter does God need to become man?
10
 To become 
incarnate in history in the way of the historical Jesus, to create the Church through the cross, to constitute 
the eucharist and the post-resurrection parousia? Does he, for example, need these to be substances for 
such purposes? Or after all, in light of the primacy of Christ (and in particular primacy with respect to the 
created order) does he need these to be subordinate to his final purpose in the Incarnation, an incarnation 
that will be revealed, unfold, and develop in the seventh day through the work of the Holy Spirit? 
 Again consider Scripture:  
O Lord, thy word endureth forever in heaven. Thy truth also remaineth from one generation to 
another; thou hast laid the foundation of the earth, and it abideth. They continue this day 
according to thine ordinance, for all things serve thee. (Ps 119:89-91) 
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“All things serve thee”. As in the case of Psalm 33 above, there are two ways we can interpret this: one 
way is the naïve or primitive, animistic way in which we imagine that items in the physical world move 
themselves, that they are really intelligent, and not only intelligent but spiritually intelligent to the point 
that they are aware of God and presumably self-aware, so that they can voluntarily serve him. The second 
way is what I will develop in the chapters that follow
11
 as the “angelic-phenomenalistic way”, in which 
we read it as “All things (that happen), all phenomena or appearances are what they are because of your 
call of duty, that is, they appear through a course of service to thee, in that phenomenal appearances are 
performed by intelligent agents in an act of divine service, acting on the created receptive faculties of the 
human mind. Since Christian cosmology does not allow for such agents to be any other than angels
12
, we 
have thus an angelic-phenomenalistic interpretation. Interestingly, the same passage clearly rules out the 
possibility that God’s own agency acts exclusively and without mediation in bringing about phenomena; 
and in effect, the only possibility for such mediatory, ministering agents are angels, which is supported by 
many other passages (including other Psalm 119 passages). “Angelic phenomenalism” or the 
angelological version of Christian phenomenalistic idealism that is my subject, is the result of combining 
this angel-hypothesis from Psalm 119:89-91 with Gregory of Nyssa’s phenomenalistic-idealist 
interpretation of Heb 11:3.
13
  
It is a familiar teaching of Scripture and tradition that angels are ministers of public service 
(leitourgika pneumata eis diokonian apostellomena
14
):  
I am going to send an angel in front of you, to guard you on the way and to bring you to the place 
that I have prepared. Be attentive to him and listen to his voice…(Ex 23:20-21) 
  The angel of the Lord encamps around those who fear him, and delivers them. (Ps 34:7) 
  Then an angel from heaven appeared to him and gave him strength. (Lk 22:43) 
As servants of the Lord, they are ministers of his justice, assisting man in Christ’s work of salvation. In 
the Old Testament, any theophany or appearance of God occurs in conjunction with an angelophany or 
the appearance of angels, e.g., at the binding of Isaac, Jacob’s striving with God at Peniel15, Moses’ 
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reception of the Law on Mount Sinai
16, the consummation of Gideon’s offering17, and others18. They 
always mediate his presence, and this is confirmed in the New Testament, with the revelation that the 
Lord is Christ, even in the end when he will take up his position as the head of the Church, his body, in 
the nuptial union:  
When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on the 
throne of his glory. (Mt 25:31) 
Following Augustine, we should distinguish the ‘pure spirits’ whom Scripture calls the “sons of God”, or 
sometimes his “holy ones”, from the concept of  ‘angel’, which means messenger, and so properly refers 
to their office whereas ‘spirit’ is the name of their nature. As Paul says, “Are not angels spirits in the 
divine service [or liturgy], sent to serve for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation?” (Heb 1:14). 
Angels, then, are ministering spirits whose apostolate, as we know it, is to reveal, announce, assist, 
mediate the covenant
19
, and in so many ways participate in the salvific work of Christ. Indeed, Christ is 
the king of the angels, as the seraphim proclaimed to Isaiah: “Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of hosts”.20 He 
is the Son of God in whose image the sons of God are made.  
But less well known is the teaching that they are also causal governors and elemental regulators:  
 
I saw another angel coming down from heaven, wrapped in a cloud…and when he shouted, the 
seven thunders sounded. (Rev 10:1-3) 
The Lord prepared his throne (ton thronon) in heaven…Bless the Lord all ye his angels, mighty 
in strength, who perform his bidding, ready to hearken to the voice of his words. (Ps 102:19-21) 
 
Scripture describes them as causally responsible for various phenomena of nature, such as earthquakes, 
volcanoes, lightning, eclipses, the phases of the moon, storms, pestilences, and droughts.
21
 To them is 
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attributed the power of effecting human experience through the elements
22
, through burning coals, pools 
of water, winds, and lightning.
23
  
Angels are ministers of grace in the predestined plan of salvation, supporting man in his spiritual 
needs, leading him into the Promised Land, defending him against enemies, and announcing the Mosaic 
Law
24
 and the Gospel
25
 to him. And yet this supernatural role is an extension of a common one in which 
the angels are so closely connected with the operations of nature that we may interpret natural phenomena 
as the effects of divine power mediated through their cooperation. To complete the picture and to show 
the way the angelic-kerygmatic office is unified we need only draw attention to the revealed fact that the 
angelic spirits are themselves assembled
26
 before God, that is they are an ecclesia, within a hierarchical 
arrangement
27
, who thus perform liturgical rites proper to their order: 
 
And the smoke of the incense, with the prayers of the saints, rose before God from the hand of  
the angel. (Rev 8:4) 
The angels not only rule the gifts of creation, they rule them eucharistically, because the love of the 
Creator reigns in their hearts. This means that the “physical world” is eucharistic and liturgical—with 
man in view—“all the way down”. Even the elemental laws of phenomena are a work of the angels, 
performed in obedience to their divine charge.
28
 It is their uprightness of will, freely affirmed through an 
analogue of a sense of conscience, that prompts them to perform their office of “giving back to God” in a 
cooperative fashion—with their own labor mixed in—the good he has given them; not literally giving 
back so that the antitype vanishes, but given back to Him by being transmitted to others in charity.  
 So even in its fundamental laws, the nature of the universe is moral/personal/ecclesial: angels 
carry out the divinely prescribed transition states in which the causal laws of nature consist because they 
want to do what is right, to please the Creator and further the beauty of his plan by their cooperation. And 
in performing this function, they not only act within the invisible order, but the product of their loving 
obedience is directed at the manifestation of order to the human mind. This is the angelic-human exidus 
and reditus, proodos and epistrophe, interpreted as the procession song of the cosmic liturgy. Human-
angelic interaction is spiritual: they speak directly to us, providing admonitions, ideas, communicating, 
effecting, interpreting God’s Providence to us. This is why the abuse or perversion of the office is so 
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destructive and oppressive. The fallen angels have the power to suggest thoughts, incipient images, and 
play on our will through images.
29
  
In the new creation proclaimed by Christ and the apostles, the eschatological breaking in of the 
glory of the angelic order into the human terrestrial order, is proportionate to the extent to which we, as 
the community of the Church, bring it about, intellectually by recognizing the transparency of nature and 
seeing the causal agency of the angels behind the phenomena, and liturgically by making this 
transparency apparent to others, with the liturgy of common prayer and worship, sacrifice and 
communion, the model for so doing.  
In the view I will develop
30
, the ministerial function of the pure intelligences subsumes their role 
as the agents of natural phenomena, because the divine ordinances that they execute, the messages they 
announce, include the very words that God uses to creatively sustain the visible world. By synthesizing 
Biblical angelology with the metaphysics of phenomenalistic idealism, we infer that it is God’s 
commands to the angels about how to regulate the order of human sense experience that not only institute 
the acts of supernatural revelation but indeed the constant, sustaining acts of natural revelation, which 
create the physical world as an objective reality and as a liturgical medium.  
My claim will be that the angel spirits are the causal agents that execute the divine prescriptions 
for ordering human sense experience. As pure intelligences, they can “hear” our mental states to a limited 
extent that includes our motor volitions and communicate with us directly at the mental level, bringing 
about sense experience for us. It might even be that each person’s “guardian angel” is the one responsible 
for executing the psychophysical laws that relate the person’s mind and body.31 Other angels may 
coordinate these effects in turn by distributing the instructions about how such human volition-sensation 
sequences are to be received and caused by the assigned guardian angel, collectively bringing out what, at 
our empirical viewpoint, we interpret as the intra-environmental phenomena and body-environmental 
interactions of nature.
32
 This world governance is a song of praise, in which they align their will with the 
Lord’s, freely bringing about the order of the world by communicating directly at the level of the mind. 
They communicate with us by directly causing our sense impressions or sensations as of a world—with 
the angels able to “hear”, or receive in awareness, some of our volitions and actively respond to them by 
communicating among each other, causing further sensations, and so allowing human beings to causally 
influence each other.  
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45 
 
This is the view to be developed in the chapters that follow.
33
 The governance of human sensory 
experience is one of the main ways the angels serve God—they obey his commands for the unfolding 
pattern of potential human sensory experience and so idealistically regulate the visible world under the 
divine sovereignty. This governance is also the way they preach the Gospel. In the very act of 
participating in creation, they preach to us the glory of the divine Wisdom. Romans 1:20 tells us that this 
glory has been perceivable in the physical world, and this has been the very work of angelic preaching. If 
we already accept the Biblical witness of the role of angelic preaching in regard to supernatural 
revelation, in accord with the oracular visions of the prophets and the annunciation of the Gospel, then not 
to extend this kerygmatic office to the work of natural revelation risks severing the orders of nature and 
grace. Acts that share in the governance, that sustain the creation of the visible world itself, are the same 
acts that proclaim the wisdom and majesty of the Creator. Angelic co-participation in creation is an act of 
love. Like the absolute act to which it is subordinate, it is philanthropy. It participates in the philanthropy 
of God in Christ that was the primary reason for act of divine creation in the first place. If God made man 
in love and finished making man in the ultimate act of love in the Incarnation and Passion (“It is 
finished…” [te teleste]), then angels participate in the divine creativity by imitating the creative love of 
man. Philanthropy is the creative force that sustains the world, in its most literal and fundamental sense.  
From this position we can dogmatically articulate that the reciprocation of this love is the human 
subcreative participation in the cosmic liturgy: visible creation is the work of the angelic hymnody and 
the invitation to join in that song of praise to the Creator through the eucharist, through our earthly 
liturgical rites and mysteries, to have our expression lifted up by the hierarchical movement of creation, 
through a coordination of our thoughts, words, and actions. To produce the synaxis of the Eucharistic 
liturgy, the agape feast of the paschal mystery, requires among other things that we, as a community, as a 
household, produce bread and wine (or their analogues) and bring them to the priests as free offerings. 
Even this requires cooperation in the cosmic liturgy. This is not metaphor. Agriculture, winemaking, 
breadmaking, and other traditional arts, are only possible through an understanding of certain laws of 
nature, certain nomic necessities, that constitute certain natural processes, e.g., soil fertility, plant 
propagation, mechanical elaboration, and fermentation. This culture, in the purest form of the word, is 
coordinated human activity that follows and subordinates itself to the world’s ruling economy, not as the 
that term is commonly used to refer to the perverse imitation of it, but the divine ministry of salvation, 
spiritually executed, which alone is responsible, as the prophets repeatedly tell us, for all that we see when 
look at creation.   
As our human Church hierarchy contains ranks of ascending scope of ministerial oversight, so too 
does the celestial hierarchy, traditionally regarded as dividing into three triads. The triadic ranks of the 
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angelic hierarchy, as Dionysius explains it, are ordered by their knowledge of creation which they receive 
from God and each other in a proportionate degree of immediacy: the more directly the knowledge is 
received from God, the greater it is. This knowledge of creation would in turn mean a responsibility for 
ordering a higher level of nomic organization in the visible world. In developing the theory of Christian 
idealism I will have occasion
34
 to introduce three broad categories of angelically-mediated sensory 
organizational activity—phenomenal, physical, and socio-historical. And there are in the Dionysian 
celestial hierarchy three triads of angelic ranks whose domain of governance match these categories. Just 
as the domains of organizational activity encompass each other in an implicate order, the angelic 
hierarchy is structured so that the internal uplifting activity, the theosis that is its purpose, its reason for 
being, is holistic, being unified in the divine wisdom of the Logos.  
With the help of Dionysius’ treatise on the celestial hierarchy, to be examined in Ch.IV, we can 
distinguish certain choirs or ranks in the celestial hierarchy by the level at which they operate, by the level 
of physical reality at which they implement laws—e.g., psychophysical, macrophysical (in the 
phenomenological sense, which, note well, would include anything observed under a microscope), and 
socio-historical. This gives us a natural way to understand Paul’s talk of “elemental spirits” as performing 
a different cosmic function from thrones
35
, dominions
36
, presiding spirits
37
, and messianic messengers or 
announcers. The Divine Wisdom is seen in the way the different commands appropriate to the different 
levels of the hierarchy are implicate and ordered with respect to each other, so that the lower actions 
subserve or conform to the goals of the higher (just as the lower creatures of earth depend on man to help 
their actions contribute to the great eucharistic prayer). Christ the Divine Wisdom knows how to put the 
Father’s will into a hierarchy of prescriptions that all work to create a world (“and God saw of the whole 
that it was very good”38), one that is uplifting and glorifying. The cosmos is made to have this uplifting 
motion, one achieved in the hierarchic order, because the glorification of a human nature is the first idea 
of creation—the reason for everything else. The God-man is the first-fruit of creation. He is the total plan. 
In fact, therefore, this proposal can relate the two parallel and corresponding structures—of the visible 
and invisible order—in a special explanatory relation. The structure of the laws of nature is what it is 
because it is a consequence of the prior structure of the angelic hierarchy. Given the divine intention for 
the latter, this means that the structure of the laws of nature is ultimately a consequence of Christ in the 
Eucharistic mystery, God’s predestined plan for the liturgically-realized glorification of human nature. 
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II.3  Idealism and the ‘Protosacramentality’ of the Physical World 
 
To recall the central question introduced in I.3, I want to ask: given the vision of the complete shape of 
the liturgy, in its fullness and unity par excellence—the eucharistic synaxis, or Mass—what kind of 
created order must the Lord establish so that the very movement of creation is attuned to it, to 
propaedeutically condition it? In other words, given the particular theological portrait of the liturgy drawn 
in I.3 and above, how does God make the world protosacramental, the kind of world that is made in, by, 
and for the sacramental mystery of Christ?   
Here I want to suggest and argue that the protosacramentality of the physical world requires that 
it be a language, a system of signs that refer in an arbitrary yet meaningful way (because regular and 
uniform) without a resemblance or conceptually necessary connection to what they signify. With such a 
sign system as a base there can be a sacramental order, built on that prior intelligibility in the relation 
between God and man. Sacramentality will presuppose the arbitrary meaningfulness of the physical in 
order to construct its own meaningfulness which is a layered meaningfulness of grace and character
39
, 
with intentional action and hierarchical conformity to Christ’s institutions—not merely to Christ in the 
abstract, but to what the historical Jesus commanded. This layered meaningfulness presupposes the 
arbitrary meaningfulness of the physical as its bedrock, on which it lays its own matrix of action, words, 
and constraints of validity. Only by taking for granted the intelligibility of sensory signs and our 
interpretation of them can we use the derived notions of causal connection and resemblance logically to 
construct sacramental signs embedded in a pre-existing lebenswelt. As we know, e.g., that water cleanses, 
sinks, drowns, conveys, sustains life, that oil gladdens, soothes, fuels, and embalms, we can use these 
intelligible signs to construct the sacramental signs of baptism that take them for granted. The meanings 
of natural or sensible signs do not follow by their own self-sustained or self-explaining or self-revealing 
order. If they did then the necessity of their order, flowing from its own fixed physical self or ‘essential 
nature’, would have to be a strict necessity lacking the conventional flexibility of meaning derived from 
the intentionality of a mind. The physical order could not then be conformed to an order transcending it, 
sacramental, salvific or otherwise.  
The road from the intelligibility of nature to the intelligibility of sacramental signs—which 
introduce causation and resemblance relations—would be blocked if nature’s intelligibility were already 
the result of causation or resemblance. It is because the sensible signs of nature are only contingently 
necessary that there is the imaginative freedom to use them to mean something else, something by way of 
a relation of causation and resemblance, only in this (sacramental) case a relation of causation and 
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analogical resemblance between the outward sensible and the inward spiritual. The meaning of a 
sacramental sign, because it makes use of relations of causation and resemblance that are superadded to 
the sensible meaning, becomes strictly or transcendently necessary. There is no possibility of a sacrament 
being something other than what it is in the order of grace, in the economy of salvation. The sacraments 
are instituted by Christ and carry with them the transcendent creative power of his word. But if the 
sensible signs used in sacraments were meaningful because of their own intrinsic power, their own 
endowed and self-revealing essence, then their connection with what they signify would be as strict as 
any sign in the sacramental system, and no sacramental meaning could be layered on top of them or built 
out of them. In other words anything other than arbitrary meaningfulness among sensible signs introduces 
a source of strict necessity, competing with the authority of the divine command insofar as it would bind 
the sensible signs across all imagined possibilities, precluding the possibility of sacraments, which depend 
on the contingent necessity of sensible signs for their own strict necessity. There can no intrinsically 
meaningful content in nature, no authority in creation that would compete with the authority of the 
Creator’s divine command. The same Author whose commands institute the sensible order of the physical 
world must be the same who institutes the sacramental order in the economy of salvation. He must use the 
sensible to prepare the moral and historical, as a temporal language in which to write the truths of the 
eternal law.   
The point is not that sacraments have to make use of some pre-existing language or other—or that 
deliberately socially constructed meaning such as sacramental meaning can only take place against a 
backdrop of non-deliberately socially constructed meaning. Rather the point is that any deliberately 
constructed meaning must take place against the backdrop of a prior non-constructed meaning that while 
meaningful must be meaningful in the arbitrary way a language is meaningful, so that it is flexible enough 
to be used as an iconic figure or image in the Christian sense. To have this flexibility the meaning of the 
physical must not be logical or strict. The meaning of the physical while non-strict and so flexible for 
layered use must also be regular and uniform with a certain kind of non-strict but genuine nomological 
necessity so that it can be assumed as common knowledge and common expectation intersubjectively for 
communal activity, like liturgical worship.  
There is a comparison to be made here with what God does when he uses a layered meaning to 
reveal the law and the prophecies as figures or types for later revelation. Sacramentality work similarly. A 
sacrament goes one step beyond allegorical type or figure and reveals/creates a hidden reality as such, as 
hidden, whereas the allegorical type merely signifies. The allegorical or typological has directionality or 
relatedness but it does not, as such, reveal and create the reality it signifies in the way a valid sacrament 
does. This sacramental possibility is opened up after Christ. He can institute sacraments through his 
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commands as a man because he is the Word of God who has come in the flesh. This is the new creation. It 
is created-revealed as sacramentally hidden.       
Let me pause here to consider the objection that the mode of idealism I advocate appears to 
render God a benign deceiver and to instrumentalize the Incarnation and the sacraments, effectively 
denying them as objects of contemplative devotion.  The objection presupposes the metaphysics of 
realism. God is only a deceiver if we, in the discursive framework of metaphysics and theology, go 
beyond the warrant of our experiences to affirm that their content is experience-transcendent and 
ontologically basic, as realism does. This move, on which realism depends, will receive critical focus in 
VII.4, where I develop a larger argument against the coherence of realism. By contrast, it is argued that 
idealism can maintain simultaneously the public objectivity and empirical immanence of matter, the 
physical world, the body, etc., exactly because it denies the body and the physical world such experience-
transcendence.  Why should this trivialize the body
40
 or deny the incarnational sacraments as objects of 
contemplative devotion? To the contrary, I have been arguing that because it is the spiritual res and not 
the physical sacrum tantum that is the active source of sacramental grace, realism risks supplanting the 
true object of devotion with a philosophical idol. 
In V.5, I introduce the principle of “analogous fields of discourse” as a way of distinguishing 
between different orders of intracosmic being and causation and then use this principle as a tool in 
demonstrating the coherence of idealism and as a weapon against the competing claim of physical 
realism. The idealist can say that physical causes do not compete with spiritual causes because they 
belong to ontologically distinguished fields, the spiritual causes being basic and the physical being 
derived. But the theologian who adheres to physical realism must say that (at least some) physical causes 
are just as ultimate as any spiritual or mental ones. Unlike the realist, the idealist can grant that in the 
divine economy supernatural occasions can be added to physical ones, because, viewed transcendentally, 
the latter just are occasional or instrumental causes themselves. This accords with the protosacramental 
conception of physical creation, the Christological realignment of space, time, and matter to the axis of 
the Cross. God does not create new laws for water to become a thing that sacramentally cleanses the 
spirit. But in one Logos, one system of laws, he makes water protosacramental in its arbitrary or natural 
connection with cleansing, healing, drowning, and genuinely sacramental after the Incarnation. This 
pattern, like every other created pattern, unfolds in time and in the predestined sequence of the plan of 
salvation to which the angels, as beings of the aeon, who have the intelligence to grasp the simplicity of a 
universal decree for all time, contribute their mediating agency, just as do our own ecclesiastical 
hierarchs.  
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In this respect the formula of transubstantiation only summarizes the sacramental theology of the 
fathers. The signifying occasional powers conferred by one command (or one consequence of the eternal 
command) have been replaced by a new one that adds the conferral of a new power, a power of saving 
grace, yet in such a way that the sensory effects of the old command are retained.
41
 In transubstantiation 
the natural “powers” are not replaced any more than the species, they must have the same status; they 
must be no more related to an internal necessity of the “nature” of a thing than the conferral of saving 
grace. The bread of the consecrated host still nourishes and “effects” human senses as does ordinary 
bread. Consider the words of Gregory of Nyssa in regard to baptism, in Oration de Baptismo Christi: 
“But this blessing water does not confer [regeneration by its own power any more than it does other 
things by its own power]…Because we are accustomed to cleanse the body, therefore we use it in the 
mystic action…”.42 He continues with the question “How does the water of baptism regenerate?”, and 
points out that this is not so different a question from how does the word create ex nihilo by mere fiat. If 
he can do the latter, is it any wonder by comparison that he can do the former. Which is more mysterious 
generation or regeneration? We should expect the same fiat-logic to operate in both. As Cyril of 
Alexandria says: “Boiling water can burn no less than fire itself; and thus is the water of baptism imbued 
with divine power and efficiency”.43 There is no place for transcendentally fixed natural essences here. 
All creation must be attuned to mystery of the sacraments.  
Ambrose, in De Sacramentis, makes the point quite clear:  
 
When it comes to the consecration [it is the word of Christ that is effective]…what is the word of 
Christ? [The same word that effected the reality of creation, as Scripture reveals]...Thou seest 
therefore how effective is the word of Christ…If, therefore, there is such a power in the word [to 
create from nothing]…how much more is it effective [to consecrate or transubstantiate 
sacraments].
44
  
Creation of nature is more miraculous and incomprehensible than sacramental consecration because the 
latter only effects that “things previously existing, should, without ceasing be changed into something 
else….”. This is basically an early statement of transubstantiation. For Ambrose it is not a new idea in 
Christianity but an unfolding consequence of the idealist (or liturgical fiat-logos) manner of creation as 
revealed in the Old Testament theology where the divine miracles wrought for Israel seem intended to 
reveal (among other things) that ordinary natural substances are nothing over and above the meaning they 
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have as fixed by what God wills for human experience. A bush burns without being consumed, iron 
floats, wood sweetens water, water comes forth from a rock. Just so in the sacraments, says Ambrose, the 
old species of the bread and wine can become the flesh and blood of our Lord because there was no 
connection between those species and bread and wine other than the idealist sustaining of these facts by 
divine intentional policies, which same policies can result at times in what seem like aberrant miracles or 
enduring sacramental realities.   
The ‘dispositive theory’ of sacramental causality, necessary to explain anti-Donatism and 
reviviscence and the distinction between seal (character or sphragos) and grace, is comparable to the Last 
Supper-Cross theology explained in the earlier section. On this theory the sacramental rite 
signifies/becomes the symbolic reality (Last Supper-Cross, in the case of the eucharist) that in turn 
signifies/becomes the eschatological reality (the Passover that Christ eats with us at the feast of the 
Parousia). Billot’s theory of the ‘intentional causality’ of the sacraments applies for even stronger reasons 
than the ones he gives in the case of the sacramental causes to the case of so-called “physical causes” 
themselves. Physical phenomena “being essentially signs, exist as such only in a significative order of 
realities and hence are incapable of carrying ‘physical’ (we might say ‘mind-independent’) force: 
There is a special ‘force’ or power added to the sacraments by God’s institution, but it is such as 
is consistent with the nature of sacraments as signs: ‘Used by God as the principal cause, they 
truly, and not merely verbally, cause that intentionality which is a disposition exigent of grace: 
inasmuch as the symbolic force, which by its own nature can do no more than signify, is lifted up 
to an effective application and investiture of its meaning.
45
 
This expresses at once the way physical phenomena, as intended from the beginning of creation to be so 
elevated sacramentally in the dialogue between the Father and the Son incarnate in his Church, ought to 
be in themselves merely significative. Being such, they are well-suited to the sacramental elevation 
insofar as they already served as medium of figurative communication. Now as sacramenta tanta, they 
are a medium of communion and divine participation in the one cosmic liturgy. 
The efficacy of sacraments flows through the union which they cause with the mystical body of 
Christ, the visible Church: inasmuch as the sacrament, by uniting the recipient in a special 
manner to the Church, expresses Christ’s will to confer grace upon him if he places no 
obstacles.
46
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II.4  Idealism and the ‘Apophasis of the Real’ 
Just as the idealist, unlike the physical realist
47
, can say that physical things genuinely possess the sensible 
qualities that we ordinarily ascribe to them, so that a brick in the sun genuinely possesses its heat, redness, 
and other sensible qualities—in the same way the idealist can say that the eucharist genuinely possesses 
its sensory appearance. She can say this in a way that is not ad hoc, but as something consistent with the 
ontological structure of the created cosmos more widely: that the genuine belonging of qualities to 
physical continuants is determined by the contingent nomological organization of idealist creation, 
something whose normative force flows directly from the sovereignty of God. The idealist is faithful to 
the miracle of transubstantiation as mysterium fidei, a canon for lex credenda—seeing in the 
transformative power of consecratory words a creative instrument used in creation ex nihilo now enjoined 
liturgically by human beings following the hierarchical pattern of the angels.  
William Hamilton once speculated that Christian philosophers would have embraced Berkeley’s 
immaterialism were it not for its perceived conflict with the doctrine of transubstantiation.
48
 This is a 
serious challenge, especially in light of the tradition of mysterium fidei, that liturgical practice is canonical 
for right belief. If the dogmatic formulation of the Eucharistic mystery requires the attribution of 
substantiality to the offertory gifts of bread and wine, should not this then serve as a norm for Christian 
philosophical theorizing? It would be one thing if the notion of substance at work were the common, pre-
philosophical one that the Berkeleyan phenomenalist can happily accept. But the notion, ostensibly, is 
rather one that must be conceived of as something independent of its sensible species, since these remain 
after consecration and the two are clearly distinguished in the Tridentine decrees.
49
 However, Christian 
idealism does distinguish the physical object from any of its sensible appearances (qualia) and even from 
the extensive collection of them, so that there is a meaningful and satisfactorily explicated sense in which 
material things like bread and wine have a lawful but invisible ground or principle for their identity; it just 
happens that this identity is a consequence of the system of appearances organized by the celestial 
intelligences under the divine authority, and so its ‘substantiality’ is ultimately immaterial, being 
constituted by mental facts. This is far from an ad hoc contrivance to avoid the challenge, since such a 
distinction is not only important for the explication of the theory of theistic idealism but something that 
motivates it in the first place, in effort to offer a superior alternative to other metaphysical options. There 
is nothing in the conciliar decrees to indicate that ‘substance’ must be understood in Aristotelian 
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hylomorphic terms, or Lockean substrate terms, or Kantian terms, and of course it would be a mistake to 
expect that the Church would canonically enshrine any such position.
50
  
In point of fact, and perhaps surprisingly, in its relation to the mystery of the eucharist, idealism 
might be thought better to reflect the content of the sacrament, as unpacked by the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, and so do justice to it as mysterium fidei, as a canon for orthodox belief. Let me 
explain. Unlike physical realist systems of metaphysics, idealism rejects the thesis that there is in matter 
some non-mental essence, substrate, or principle of individuation. And so neither does it claim that the 
sensible qualities of a physical item, as manifested in appearances, are necessitated, logically or naturally, 
by its material essence, intrinsic substantial qualities, quiddity, intrinsic form, Lockean solidity, or modes 
of extension. According to idealism there are no such things. The status of the item as object, its 
thinghood or substance in a de dicto sense, is constituted by facts about how human sense experience is 
organized and these in turn are grounded in no authority other than the absolute sovereignty of God. For 
this reason, idealism has no difficulty in accepting the suggestion that the individuation of a physical 
item, its substantiality or whatever allows it to persist through changes, should be separable in account 
and in reality from its sensible qualities; since the former rests in the free, eternal creative purposes of 
God and since he has made this freedom an intelligible condition to us when we reflect on the meaning of 
our sense experience.  
Reflecting, then, on the linguistic nature of sense experience and the contingent necessity of its 
meaning, we know that there is nothing apart from the divine will that should keep the sensible qualities 
of a physical item attached to its substance. The substance is wholly in virtue of and nothing over and 
above facts of divine creative intention, so that should the divine will decree that the same sensible 
qualities be collected together within the system of appearances as the manifestation of some other 
physical item—e.g. the body and blood of Christ—not only is there no barrier to accepting this within the 
metaphysics but, as will be made clear, the metaphysics itself is as if set up to make such a possibility—
the possibility of transubstantiation—as intelligible as the fact of substantiation generally, albeit more 
unusual.  
To put it another way, for an idealist metaphysics transubstantiation is of the same order as 
substantiation, acts differing not in their causal order but only in their place within the total divine 
economy. It is important to note that on the idealist theory to be developed, bodies as opposed to mere 
physical items are individuated by their psychophysical relations, so that the body of Jesus is his body 
because it and not some other body is in the right nomic relation to his human mental faculties to be 
immediately sensitive and effective to it. Thus the contingent or non-strict necessity of the relation of 
‘substance’ and sensible attributes as found in the sacrament is for idealism canonical of the manner in 
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which to conceive the relation of substance and sensible attribute at large within the physical world. This 
makes the classical, patristic notion of mysterium fidei something truly enshrined within the doctrine of 
creation, and makes very clear and concrete the manner in which the whole world is indeed a sacramental 
system. Note that it is not as if the mysteriousness were somehow diminished or explained away in 
idealist metaphysics. Rather that very mysteriousness of the Eucharistic sacrament is seen to be 
anticipatory in the very objectivity of the physical world. Idealism thus practices what we might call an 
‘apophasis of the real’, in opposition to physical realism which identifies the real with the terms of 
theoretical or folk physics.    
 Sacramental theology requires a recognition of a res tantum, a res et sacrum, and a sacrum 
tantum. By giving a concrete interpretation to what it might mean for the world to be created liturgically 
through Word and Wisdom, through the Son of God who is the head of the Church, and by a ministry of 
salvation that is inseparable from the creative and governing office, idealism shows the latter, as 
pertaining to the form of the sacramental rites, is smoothly continuous with the ecclesial activity that is 
the work of visible creation, the way even ‘mere nature’ is revelatory—to the eyes of faith—of the 
everlasting
51
 which is veiled and yet newly disclosed in Christ. This mystery, this plan for the fullness of 
time, is something to which the only fitting response is worship and participation in the same means by 
which one has received it.  
Rather than trying to align the sacramental model of res tantum, res et sacrum, and sacrum 
tantum with a physical realist metaphysics, which already identifies the externally real with the physical 
(whether hylomorphically or otherwise), idealism can align the sacramentally real with the spiritual, just 
as it should be. Physical realism is an awkward fit with a high sacramental ontology because it has 
already used up the category of the real, of the res tantum, in its physical ontology, in its interpretation of 
empirical theory, the theory of what is created at our empirical viewpoint, rather than the how of visible 
creation understood within the absolute what of creation at the transcendent viewpoint. Idealism reserves 
the category of the real for the prephysical, for the mental or spiritual; it thus can use the category in its 
ontology of the activity of creation, aligning the sacramental reality of the invisible with the reality that 
underpins the objectivity of what is visibly created. Similarly by using the category of the physical 
exclusively for the sensible, the idealist has no trouble in showing that the sacraments, like the physical 
world more generally from which their forms are drawn, are immanent within the human empirical 
viewpoint, forming the content of human experience in a mode of ontological immediacy. For physical 
realism, by contrast, the category of the physical is at the very least heterogeneous and perhaps a 
disjunctive kind, as it includes both the sensible and insensible.  
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Even leaving aside the arguments to be explored later for the incoherence of physical realism and 
the very real difficulties it faces in articulating an account of perceptual contact with physical items
52
, in 
any given sacramental rite, what is it that determines whether or not the sensible qualities that constitute 
the form of the sacrament, the sacramentum tantum, are suitably related both to human sensory 
consciousness and to physical items to enable a genuine channel of participation between them in the 
experience of receiving the sacrament? What determines whether the oil and water the initiate senses are 
the same ones sensed by the assembly of the faithful and the consecrating hierarch, the same that were 
drawn from the earth days before? How do the sensible species of the Eucharist that the communicant 
tastes belong to the same bread and wine that were conscecrated? By understanding the physical world to 
be logically created by contingent but nomically necessary causal constraints on the course of human 
experience, the idealist maximizes both the secrecy of the activity of the spiritual reality underpinning 
physical creation and the accommodation of what is created to human cognitive capacity. There is no 
conceptual difficulty, then, in understanding how sacraments operate on the same ontological plane as the 
work of creation, performed and received. Sacramental forms are drawn directly from the universal 
sensory qualities that feature in the content of human sensory consciousness and whose actual and 
potential realizations as such content sustain the physical world, differing from ordinary experiences of 
creation only by the nature of the divine intentions they manifest and solely in virtue of the authority 
inhering in those intentions, just as miracles differ from ordinary “natural” phenomena not in terms of 
their content or “metaphysical mechanism” of occurrence but solely in virtue of the divine realities they 
reveal.
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Chapter III: Early Idealist Theories of Creation 
 
III.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will examine how the metaphysics of phenomenalistic idealism arose in historical 
context, first as a theological development from Neoplatonism and then into the vision of the cosmic 
liturgy, focusing here on the work of Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa, and pseudo-Dionysius in the next 
chapter. One of our main goals is to see how this prepares the way for the developments of both 
Berkeley’s metaphysics and a neo-patristic angelic cosmology.  
 The very possibility of the emergence of idealism in pre-Cartesian philosophy was famously 
rejected by Miles Burnyeat decades ago.
1
 The strength of Burnyeat’s claim and the persistent way in 
which he made his argument triggered a series of historical studies and a considerable weight of counter-
evidence.
2
 So much so, that I am comfortable in taking Burnyeat to be refuted and in regarding the 
positive characterizations of key figures in the tradition as exhibiting idealist commitments. Again, it is 
worth emphasizing that my primary purpose is not historiography but constructive philosophical 
theology, with the ultimate purpose of dogmatic understanding. For these purposes, I do not intend to 
settle any contention over which historical reading is best. It is enough that the idealist reading is one that 
is available and plausible. To my mind two of the most convincing cases (Scotus Eriugena is another
3
) are 
Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa, and so it is partly for this reason that they are singled out for study in this 
chapter. To say that idealism emerged in antique philosophy is not to say that it was a uniform or 
homogenous idealism which emerged. Nor is it to say that the key figures made idealist commitments for 
the same reasons. And yet there is something of a common doctrinal core, or core of content, that I will 
here seek to identify at least in part. 
One of Gregory’s main concerns in Christian cosmology is to understand how visible things are 
created by that which is invisible (Heb 11:3). He is moving against the Platonic and Origenist conception 
of a world fashioned out of matter that is coeternal with God, to set over against this “impression on a 
blank receptacle”-view of creation the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Gregory is seeking an understanding 
of the Church’s orthodox teaching on creation, using the most fitting philosophical resources available to 
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him, namely the Platonic divine ideas tradition as it existed in his own time. In the syncretic 
developments of Plotinus’ metaphysics, the sensible world of bodies and physical phenomena is a free, 
eternal emanation of soul and intellect. By a hierarchical arrangement in which individual minds with 
noetic powers (the “higher soul”4) participatorily descend (through the capacity of the “lower soul”) into 
the lower material realm, the total order of the physical world is mimetically produced.  But how exactly 
should a Christian interpret this in accord with revelation? Does it mean God creates the world through 
ideas in his own mind inasmuch as the world is nothing more than the pattern of human acquaintance 
with such divine ideas? If so, is this acquaintance fundamentally cognitive, sensory, or both
5? Is the soul’s 
descent or projection to bodies constitutive of the mimetic production of the material realm or is the 
emanation of the material realm something that ontologically precedes this descent? The language of 
projection
6
 might suggest this, and yet Plotinus is faithful to the Platonic doctrine that ontological / 
explanatory priority is correlated with relative noetic simplicity (not relative spatio-temporal simplicity). 
For as he says, it is not the soul that is in the body, but the body that is in the soul.
7
   
What I want to examine initially is how the Plotinean exposition of the Platonic doctrine of divine 
ideas, with its conception of the physical world emanating from the mind, might be developed into 
Christian idealism. Specifically, I want to show how the ontological priority relation of emanation, 
involving relative noetic simplicity and productive power, and intended to solve the one-many problem, is 
a useful analytic philosophical tool that is ripe for being ‘phenomenalistically idealized’ by Christian 
philosophy, and when done yields the kind of robust metaphysical theory needed to square with the 
traditional Christian doctrine of creation. Secondly, I want to identify Plotinus’ critique of Aristotle’s 
Categories and his argument for the immateriality of ousia as an important stage in the development of 
Platonism into idealism, one that prepares the way for Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa’s immaterialist 
view of God’s creation.  
In order to appropriate some of the concepts of idealist theology from their historical context, I 
want to fill out some of the genealogy of Christian idealism up to the work of Gregory of Nyssa, by 
showing how Plotinus’ emanation relation adapts the theory of divine ideas into an analytic tool that is in 
turn disposable for adaptation into the metaphysics of phenomenalistic idealism. Because emanation 
analytically involves virtuality, a certain ontologized mimesis relation, it is positioned to explain the one-
many relation: virtuality is a relation of exemplar causality, holding between a prior (ta protera) and its 
copies (mimeta or eidola), which it has the power to produce per se by an active principle. This feature of 
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Plotinus’ theory of the divine ideas, when phenomenalistically adapted, makes the divine ideas into the 
sort of immaterialist structuring principles that serve to sustain the existence of the physical world in its 
immanent objectivity. When the divine ideas are conceived of as rules governing the organization of 
human sensations, it gives particular sensations the right kind of relation to the organizational rules, 
namely that of being instantiations of the sensory universals that feature in the content of the rules 
themselves. The details involved here will become clearer in Ch. VI, when the sensory universals are 
formally presented within a theory of perception. In Ch.VII, I will show how the phenomenalist’s claim 
might be true—that the physical world is logically sustained by the regularities within and among sensory 
experiences—by sketching in some detail a construction of things in space and by extension the amplified 
physical world of empirical theorizing. Then, in Ch.VIII, I will consider how the sensory regularities 
might themselves be guaranteed by immaterialist laws governing the temporal distribution of qualia over 
minds.    
 
III.2  Emanation and the One-Many Relation in Plotinus’s Theoretical System 
 
‘Emanation’ as conceived by Plotinus is a relation of ontological dependence that can be understood by 
first introducing the explanatory relation of virtuality, or mimetic ontological dependence, and then 
attending to the cosmogenetic movements of proodos and epistrophe. Following the suggestion of some 
commentators
8
, I shall interpret the description of these movements in Plotinus as assertions of efficient 
and final causality. Emanation, I shall argue, is the relation of virtuality (relative simplicity, or simplicity 
pros hen, plus productive capacity) together with final causality. By favoring a non-literal reading of 
Plotinus’ theoretical philosophy—especially the account of the Three Hypostases and the relation of 
emanation existing between the noetic and the physical realms of being—I aim to show that Plotinus’s 
work takes the Platonic theory of divine ideas a significant step closer to Christian idealism.   
In the opening pages of his monograph on Plotinus
9
, Lloyd Gerson points out that the so-called 
Three Hypostases are better understood not as hypostases but as principles (archai). This is because even 
though Plotinus calls them hypostases he does not intend this to be a technical designation, since 
throughout the Enneads he speaks of the ‘hypostasis’ of a great many things.  They are rather principles 
in the sense of the Latin word principia, and have the full range of roles that ancient and medieval authors 
confer upon the word: source, origin, premise, foundation. This follows from Plotinus’ general 
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explanatory strategy, modeled on that of Middle Platonism
10
 as laid out in the Didaskalikos, in which 
these hypostatic principles are related to one another in a hierarchy of ontological dependence.  
Commentators have long been at labor to explain all of the various roles that Plotinus intends the 
Principles to have. The task is somewhat precarious because of the way Plotinus’ writings have been 
packaged for us by Porphyry, who edited the Enneads. One can find Plotinus saying different things about 
the Three Principles in almost all of the Enneads. Nevertheless we can put together a fairly thorough 
picture, extracting what seem to be the most important aspects. First among these is the One. The One is, 
in Aristotelian language, the Pure Act. It is the Transcendent, Perfect Unity, and Pre-Eternal. By an act of 
emanation (understood as we have formulated it: virtuality plus final causality), Intellect proceeds from 
the One. Intellect is variously Being, or the Forms, thought of as the external activity of the One, or being 
virtually or by participation what the One is eminently. Like the One, it is self-contained, subsistent, and 
eternal. It is also described as Perfect Vision (the vision of the One) in a reoccurring metaphor of 
intellection as a kind of vision, a vision that takes itself as its own object and that “comes about” or is 
facilitated by the Light that radiates from the One, which is of course itself.
11
 The “turning towards” 
(epistrophe) or perfect contemplation of the One is the internal activity (energeia tes ousias) of Intellect, 
the self-contained and self-abiding activity proper to itself, from which its powers (dynameis) flow.
12
 
Next, emanating from Intellect, is Soul. Soul is the Principle of Life, striving, and aspiring—that mode of 
volition which for the first time in the Chain of Being has a need, as Soul is less than perfect, not 
possessing within itself the fullness of Intellect’s divine ideas but, as Intellect’s external activity, 
possessing some or other of them virtually or by way of participation. It is the paradigm of that mode of 
contemplation that contemplates something other than itself.
13
 And if Being and the Forms are eternal, 
then Soul, the animate principle of nature (physis), is at the level of sempiternality, since even though the 
principle is permanent, the concept of time has entered at this level.
14
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 The ‘emanation’ by which the three principles proceed from one another is to be understood via 
the notion of virtuality, as I have indicated. For Plotinus, emanation is virtuality plus final causality. 
Virtuality itself is a somewhat opaque notion, not surprisingly considering the total explanatory role 
Plotinus intends it to serve, and ultimately it might best be understood as Christian idealism does. But for 
Plotinus we can at least say that it is schematically that analogous relation of ontological dependence 
holding between the three principles of being, which includes asymmetric productive capacity and 
relatively (pros hen) noetic simplicity. This means that virtuality logically includes the metaphysical 
reducibility relation holding between a transcendent universal and its concrete particulars, which it 
generates in its activity ad extra.  Insofar as it (partly) characterizes the emanation relation pertaining to 
the principles, the relative notion of productive agency involved in virtuality is—at all levels—transitively 
closed. This means that even the product of a product owes its being to, or simply is the effect of, the first 
cause; and the first, though it may be the remote rather than proximate cause, is still rightly speaking the 
primary cause.  
We begin to see how virtuality, as subsuming the one-many relation and productive causality, 
features as a stage in the development of Platonist metaphysical theory (en route to Christian idealism) 
when we consider where the categories enter into Plotinus’s explanatory picture. They enter, it seems, at 
the level of Intellect. 
     Intellect, by its intellective act, establishes Being, which in turn, as the object of intellection, 
becomes the cause of intellection and of existence to Intellect—though, of course, there is another 
cause of intellection which is also a cause to Being, both rising in a source distinct from either.  
     Now while these two are coalescents, having their existence in common, and are never apart, 
still the unity they form is two-sided; there is Intellect as against Being, the intellectual agent as 
against the object of intellection; we consider the intellective act and we have Intellect; we think 
of the object of that act and we have Being.  
     Such difference there must be if there is to be any intellection; but similarly there must also be 
identity [since in perfect knowing, subject and object are identical]. 
     Thus the Primals are seen to be: Intellect; Existence (On); Difference; Identity; we must 
include also Motion and Rest: Motion provides for the intellectual act; Rest preserves identity as 
Difference gives at once a Knower and a Known, for, failing this, all is one, and silent.
15
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
time is thereof the measure of motion. Plotinus denies that the notion of measure is in any way involved with time 
and favors the reverse order of priority, reinvoking Plato’s phrase that “time is the moving image of eternity”.    
15
 Enneads V.I.iv, Stephen McKenna’s translation and bracket insertion.  
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The ‘Primals’ are our first categories, of which Intellect and Existence are included but not exhaustive. 
From these first ‘Platonic’ categories come the derivative and more familiar ‘Aristotelian’ categories. The 
category of quantity for example is derived from Difference, and so also makes its appearance at this 
theoretical/explanatory level. We do not yet have true plurality, or real distinctness, because we still have 
the identity required for the self-intellection that marks Being and the intellectual act. But we do have the 
seed or potential for plurality, and this insofar as we have the many objects of the intellectual act (which 
are all still identified), namely the Forms. As Plotinus goes on to say,  
 
So too the objects of intellection—identical in virtue of the self-concentration of the principle 
which is their common ground—must still be distinct each from another; this distinction 
constitutes Difference.
16
 
 
At the next level, the engendered copy of this proto-quantity, with the admixture of the individual noetic 
mind, animal, or matter as the case may be, will become real distinctness and plurality. It makes sense 
that counting, or the category of quantity, presupposes being and unity. For what is counted? What is one? 
 At the level of Soul, we have that which was present at the level of Intellect but now only in 
imitation. As less perfect copies of the Forms and self-thought of Intellect, we have the reason-principles 
and forming-principles of Soul. These principles are like the pure intellective acts of the Forms but now 
with an addition of potentiality; they have a need and striving for the pure state that is their origin. The 
forming-principles (logoi) are Forms-to-be-realized. In the mythic language of the Timaeus which the 
Middle Platonists seized upon, they are the contemplative, organic seeds ‘taken’ from the Divine Mind by 
the Demiurge in order to fashion the things of the world. They also have a strong resemblance to the 
seminal principles (spermatikoi logoi) of the Stoics, a kind of “sister-notion”, which are very important in 
any attempt to explain various kinds of substantial, as well as accidental, change.
17
  
In V.1.viii of the |Enneads, we are given the historical origins of Plotinus’ explanatory system, 
with the doctrine of the Three Hypostases at its core. The first source chronologically is Parmenides’ 
arguments for i) the identification of Being and Intellect; and ii) that being/essence is necessarily self-
limiting, has “fixity”, and thus is not the unbounded cause of Being. Secondly, he finds confirmation of 
the correctness of his Three Hypostases in Plato’s Republic, with its tripartite theory of the soul, under the 
simile of the Man, the Lion, and the Menagerie of Beasts. And the doctrine of hypostatic tripartition is 
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 Ibid.  
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 See Chapter I, Section 2. Having been all but forgotten in the Meckanickal Philosophy of the Early Modern Era, 
seminal principles reappear under the name “supra-mechanical causes” in the writings of authors who attempt to 
explain certain phenomena beyond the purview of the New Physics. (Boyle, for example, cites them as necessary in 
order to explain the consistency of growth patterns across species but also such things as animal instinct—the 
solicitousness of the mother bird for her young is one of his memorable examples [Christian Virtuoso, WB 12 446].)   
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repeated in the Timaeus as well as the Parmenides. The latter is the most explicit of the Platonic sources 
in affirming the tripartition doctrine
18
 and for this reason it is the most direct influence. It speaks of a 
Primal One, which is a pure unity, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many. These principles emerge as the 
arch-categories according to Plotinus’ understanding of the unfolding dialectic in the late Platonic 
dialogues. The so-called “method of collection and division” that appears in the Sophist marks the advent 
of the categories of Identity and Difference that are introduced in Plotinus’ Principle of Intellect, which 
we now understand corresponds to the One-Many of the Parmenides. The development of the method and 
the use to which the categories of identity and difference can be put begins in the Sophist and is carried 
into the Parmenides.  
Given the particular flavor of Plotinus’ Platonism, there is good reason to think that Plotinus was 
particularly concerned with the late Theory of Forms, involving as it did the one-many problem of the 
Parmenides and Sophist. Plotinus therefore made the paradigm-copy or mimesis relation central to his 
own metaphysics. Indeed there is evidence that Plotinus took the problem of how to get a many from a 
one as the central problem of metaphysics.
19
 Plotinus’ simplicity category, and so the relation of 
virtuality, is his own take on how simultaneously to solve the one-many problem and to account for the 
archetype-copy relation.
20
  
 
III.4  The Critique of Aristotle’s Categories 
 
We have already seen how Plotinus’ derivation of the category of quantity differs from Aristotle, and this 
is characteristic of his dialectical
21
 derivation of the categories more generally, according to his distinct 
prior commitment to an understanding of noesis as primarily non-discursive and the virtual as less simple 
than its principle, by way of an ontological projection or mimesis itself caused by its ruling idea. In 
Enneads V.1 and VI.3, his treatises on Aristotle’s Categories, he criticizes Aristotle for identifying 
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 Plotinus calls it “Plato’s Triplicity”.  
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 Ennead V.1.v. The point is also discussed by Witt in the context of Plotinus’ reading of the Timaeus and how it 
differed from Albinus’ by being non-literal and by demoting the demiurge to a place below the Good of the 
Republic, now identified with the One. But now if the demiurge is demoted below the One, an account must be 
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 See John Rist, “Plotinus and Christian Philosophy” in Lloyd Gerson, ed., The Cambridge Compantion to Plotinus 
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virtuality is taken up by medieval Christian philosophers, under the guise of ‘analogy of imitation’.  
21
 Correspondingly, the expository form genre is different. Plotinus uses the diatribe form, with an imagined 
interlocutor. 
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motions (kineseis) with incomplete activities (energeiai).
22
 The identity, he thinks, fails in both directions: 
there are motions which are complete activities, and there are incomplete activities that are not motions.
23
 
One may view the criticism as stemming from the deeper disagreement over the ontological status of time 
and its relation to psychic and physical activity, as mentioned above: time enters with the psychological 
condition of striving characteristic of an ontologically dependent being that cannot rest in its own activity 
because its whole being emanates from or is participated by the activity of another, simpler being.
24
 The 
relevant simplicity here may pertain to beings within the same hypostatic domain, as well as to terms 
characterized by the very same category, such as psychic or psychosomatic events.  In Plotinus’ 
analogical reasoning the concepts of simplicity and complexity
25
 are sometimes used to signify a 
distinction relative to the category of quantity, as, for instance, Intellect is simpler than any of the Forms 
relative to quantity. But Intellect is also simpler than the Forms relative to its content and proliferation: all 
of the Forms in the intellectual realm have copies in this world, but Intellect itself has no correspondent 
outside of itself. To put it less figuratively, Intellect in contrast to the Forms is not that which makes 
something other than itself intelligible, and so in this respect is simpler than any Form. Still another use of 
the term simple is found in the assertion that the World Soul is the simplest of souls. In this case the 
relevant sense of simplicity seems to be that in which the universal is simpler than the particular.
26
 
In the case of motions and activities, Plotinus will consistently view the motions of souls as 
simpler activities than the motions of psychosomatic motions, which are themselves simpler than the 
motions of bodies. Each motion is progressively dispersed and relative in its identity to spatio-temporal 
qualifications. So for him, Aristotle’s examples of complete activities, such as seeing and living, are on 
the one hand just as temporal and so just as reasonably regarded as being incomplete (relative to the 
simpler noetic motions of the higher soul) as Aristotle’s examples of putatively incomplete activities, 
such walking and cutting. On the other hand, these and other putative motions may be properly regarded 
as complete activities when considered in themselves as concrete occurrents but without their spatio- or 
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 Phys. III, 201b 31–2; Meta. XI, 1066a 20–1; De an. III, 431a 6–7; E.N. X, 1174a 14–23. See Emilsson, Plotinus 
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 If this seems reminiscent of Augustine’s treatment of time in XI.20, 26, 27 of the Confessions, this is probably no 
accident. The fact that Augustine, like Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa, adopts an idealist view of time becomes one 
more mark by which to trace the development of Platonism into idealism. 
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 There is no one locus for reference here, but most of the significant passages of exposition occur in his doctrines 
on purely metaphysical topics, the subjects of the tractates of Enneads IV, V and VI. 
26
 That said, the terms simple and complex are pros hen analogical even along particular categorical fibers. For 
instance, from the above discussion it seems safe to conclude that the original is always simpler that its copies, 
simpler in respect of origin and order of being. But the relation of simplicity holds all the way down this fiber so to 
speak, albeit in a relative way. A copy of the original for example is simpler than a copy of itself, and simpler than 
any copy of a copy. Along this fiber, the ellipse, as an abstract conic section, is simpler than the orbital path of a 
planet, which is simpler than the figure drawn in a diagram of a planetary orbital path, which is simpler than the 
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photograph, and so on. 
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loco-temporal qualities. X pruning a tree branch Y is complete at every moment of its existence: at any 
moment the transitive event X is cutting is complete in itself and may well imply X has cut, consistent 
with its completeness.  For Plotinus, this amounts to a legitimate per se identification of the motion 
because it is the ontologically prior and relatively simple causal source of the activity that is the activity’s 
ground of being or substance
27
, not the spatio-temporal form-matter composite or the telic visible 
organization as Aristotle would have it. For Plotinus, then, all motions per se are complete, albeit 
potentially recurring, activities.  
This conclusion has important consequences for his theory of emanation and the virtuality 
condition. We saw that one way of explicating virtuality in the relation among the three principles was in 
terms of the doctrine of double activity, whereby the relatively simpler productive principle—the internal 
activity—has the mimetic copy as its external activity, which is in turn the copy’s own internal activity. 
Or as Plotinus says, "productive movement has a double existence: first, without regard for its existing in 
another thing, when this is intended by it, and, second, as existing also in that other thing".
28
 Now, in the 
context of his theory of kinesis, formulated as a critical revision of Aristotle, this wider theory subtends 
the account of the categories of action and passion, or active and passive motion, with the consequence 
that the kind of productivity involved in emanation and the generation of a many from a one is absolutely 
active motion. Once more, his conclusions are in stark contrast to Aristotle. Whereas the latter could 
regard bodily substances as variously active or passive, depending on the nature of the substance and the 
change ascribed, for Plotinus bodies, or any item determined by spatio-temporal qualities, to change is 
always to change passively.
29
 Insofar as human beings as embodied souls (or “ensouled bodies”) change, 
only those movements that are soul-initiated or psychic are productive; the motions of limbs, the 
twitching of muscles, are all passive.
30
 Thus as a piece of his wider emanation theory does Plotinus arrive 
at what becomes a canonical Neoplatonist dictum on causation, adopted by Augustine
31
 and celebrated in 
medieval and early modern Christian philosophy, that the lower in the order of real being cannot act on 
the higher and in the case of the lowest, namely material things, they cannot act externally at all but are 
merely the external activity of souls.   
Again, the root cause for this and other of the multiform dialectical positions in the treatises on 
Aristotle’s Categories is the distinctive view that Plotinus take of substance. For him there is no ground 
for taking some of a physical substance’s sensible qualities as essential and others as accidental, neither is 
it legitimate to identify the substance with its telic physical organization or composite particularity. The 
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65 
 
only viable candidate for substancehood is the relatively simple, productive forming-principle (logos) that 
is causally responsible for the unity and sequentially unfolding combinations of sensible qualities that we 
experience and so use to identify bodies. This substance, then, is a purely spiritual, sempiternal item, itself 
the external activity produced by a Platonic divine idea, existing at the level of Intellect along with the 
nous that is the ‘higher soul’ or true self of every human being. It is worth presenting the following 
passage in full, to highlight the striking parallel of Plotinus’ thinking with Gregory of Nyssa’s 
phenomenalist development of this idealist revision of Aristotle:   
 
It has been asserted regarding the qualified thing that, by intermixing and 
blending different qualities and in consort with matter and quantity, it 
effects substance for the objects of sense experience; and it has also been 
asserted that what common [as opposed to strict, or philosophically precise] 
speech designates as a "substance" is just this conglomerate of many things, 
so that a substance is no longer the particular thing itself but a qualified thing. Even then, 
however, the real existing forming-principle (e.g., of fire) 
would still indicate more the particular thing, while the shape it effects 
indicates more something qualified. Likewise, the real forming-principle of 
a human being is the particular existing human being, whereas the qualitative 
superfluance associated with corporeal nature as such is in reality an 
image of the forming-principle and exists rather as some qualified thing. Just 
as if, for example, the visible Socrates were the real human being and yet an 
image contrived in his likeness, and whose reality amounts to so much 
colour and paint, was designated to be Socrates - so too, since there exists a 
real forming-principle to which the real Socrates conforms, the Socrates 
experienced sensorially is strictly speaking not Socrates but so much colour 
and configuration of parts which in reality are imitations of real existents 
encompassed by his forming-principle.
32
 
 
III.5  Gregory’s Phenomenalistic Idealism 
 
Gregory of Nyssa may well be understood as adapting the Platonic doctrine of divine ideas into a 
Christian idealism: in his system the divine ideas become phenomenalistic creative structuring principles, 
the rules by which human sense experience is organized. There are two key moments in this. First is the 
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subsumption of the Plotinean theory of virtuality, providing the core understanding of the relation 
between divine ideas and the sensible world, into the relationship of the invisible fiat-logoi, the creative 
words of the Creator’s Wisdom, and the visible world of creation. The second moment is the continuation 
or inference from Plotinus’ revision of Aristotle on substance and coming-to-be, in which a substance is 
properly understood as the (invisible) intelligible forming-principle (logos) that unifies and causally 
grounds all of the accidental qualities that may conglomerate to the (virtual) thing as manifested in sense 
experience, including spatio-temporal qualities that Aristotle would have regarded as completed or 
essential.   
As would be the case for Augustine, Gregory takes the latent and partial truths of Neoplatonist 
metaphysics and brings them into fruitful modification by the Scriptural teaching on creation. Where 
there are elements of pagan pantheism or atheism or merely ambiguities tending towards these, Gregory 
must depart from Neoplatonism or resolve the ambiguities in favor of a Christian interpretation. Crucially, 
Gregory must develop Neoplatonist metaphysics in a way that secures the existence of the physical world 
as a reality that is both objective and wholly dependent on the sustaining power of its Creator. He wants 
to do justice to the Biblical account of an objective world created by a God who remains asymmetrically 
existentially independent of it, a God who is thus both transcendent and immanent in his relation to it. It is 
to this end that he will find Plotinean metaphysics both a useful theological resource and a philosophy in 
need of correction. Gregory takes this on as part of a larger project to understand the categories of soul 
and body, with a view towards understanding the fate of the self, the bearer of personal identity, after 
death and continuing into the bodily resurrection. This is the concern at the discursive forefront in his 
dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrection.  
 For Gregory, following his interpretation of Heb 11:3, the doctrine of creation by the invisible 
word of God (and by nothing else) is at the heart of the whole mystery of our relationship with God, 
summed up in the world ‘faith’. Knowledge, hope, and the moral law all proceed from it. In a fascinating 
train of thoughts within the dialogue, Gregory goes from considering the origin of the soul and warning 
us not to think of God creating it in any way familiar to us from our study of the composition of material 
bodies; to warning us against attempts at understanding creation altogether—leaving it as an article of 
faith because it is not logical; to stating positively that God creates purely by the supreme efficacy of his 
will and through no other intermediary (e.g. a coeternal material substrate, as used by Plato’s demiurge). 
The creative will has to be the will of a monotheistic God (rather than, say, the wills of the 54 prime 
movers in Aristotle’s cosmology). But he will not have it that in creating the soul God uses his own 
nature as material (contra the Manichees). When God creates our souls he does create something 
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immaterial or spiritual which is to that extent like His own nature since he is a spirit.
33
 On the other hand 
when God creates material bodies (which in creating us he does at the same time), he seems to create 
something utterly unlike himself, something limited, sensible, and spatial. How, then, can something such 
as matter come from something so unlike itself—namely a spirit? With the Platonic and Manichaean 
views precluded, and notwithstanding the biblical point about it being mystically understood through 
faith, Gregory meditates on the fact that all of the qualities (poiotētes) that characterize the category of 
matter and that set up the puzzle about their origin are never found alone; they cannot self-subsist and 
only when they come together do we say that there is a body. However, since those qualities are all 
mental
34
, why not say that they are all caused by (the divine) mind and that it is the mental action of 
bringing them together by the divine mind that constitutes them as a body? This explicitly reiterates 
Plotinus’ reasoning on the nature of physical substance.  
 
But even about this we can say so much: i.e. that none of those things that we attribute to body is 
itself bodily; neither figure, nor colour, nor light, … ; it is the combination of them all into a 
single whole that constitutes body; seeing then that these several qualifications which complete 
the particular body are grasped by thought alone, and not by sense, and that the Deity is a 
thinking being, what trouble can it be to such thinking agent to produce the thinkables whose 
actual combination generates for us the substance of that body?
35
   
 
 This already comes very close to saying that God causes the ideas in us and that this divinely 
willed-and-so-ordered sequence of causings is what constitutes bodies and indeed the whole sensible 
world. Notice that I am not claiming Gregory is here denying the existence of matter altogether. Rather, 
Gregory is continuing the Plotinean move of demoting matter’s existential status from something 
substantial to something derivative. In effect, Gregory has taken the Plotinean theory of divine ideas as 
noetic structuring principles whose external activity is the organization of virtual forms (that cause our 
sense experiences), and so the psychic or sensible world, and replaced matter with the divinely created 
receptive capacities of the human mind, the creaturely endowment of a capacity for sensation and a 
conceptual apparatus primed to interpret sensation in characteristic ways. On this view, it is the mind’s 
receptive capacity for sensory cognition that is the “carbon paper of the universe”, the receptacle that 
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Plato identified with space. The divine ideas contain eminently what the human mind contains virtually
36
 
by conscious experience. In the De Opificio Humanis, Gregory turns these dialogical musings of the 
character Macrina into a formally argued position:  
 
(i) There is no conception of matter beyond its sensible qualities. No one quality of a body is  
     essential to it. 
 
(ii) Each of the qualities (poiotētes) of a body can be distinguished from each other and from the  
      body.  
 
(iii) In fact, these qualities have no logical connection with each other. 
 
(iv) If you take away all the qualities there is no body remaining (no substrate). 
 
(v) Each of these qualities is intelligible-perceivable, hence mental. 
 
(vi) Therefore, it is the concurrence of mental qualities that creates a body 
 
But,  
 
if the perception of these properties is a matter of intellect, and the Divinity is also intellectual in 
nature, there is no incongruity in supposing that these intellectual occasions for the genesis of 
bodies have their existence from the incorporeal nature, the intellectual nature on the one hand 
giving being to the intellectual potentialities, and the mutual occurrence of these bringing to its 
genesis the material nature.
37
 
 
This is the full statement of canonical phenomenalist idealism, once unpacked. In the De Anima he had 
already said: “…these little souls gaze upon the world, but their eyes are blind to Him whom all this that 
we see around us makes manifest”.38 On this metaphysical view of creation, God does not  make the 
world and (then us) such that we then come along and perceive it—no, he not only makes the world, he 
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makes it manifest to us. It is not just because of him that it exists, it is because of him that we see it. In 
fact it is in making it manifest to us that he makes it, its reason for being is to be revealed to us through 
the senses—that is what the world is, a sign system, a means of communication, a language, by which 
God speaks to man. The world is the mode of communication that pertains to this human nature. God has 
chosen this way of speaking to us, and this is what our perceiving and our being perceptible through our 
own bodies means.  
We are told “The creation proclaims outright the Creator”.39 How? By its beauty or intricacy of 
design? Not so much by these as by it weaving together in union elements that are essentially opposed to 
each other; in fact, by the non-logical regularities that characterize the world as we discover it, by these 
behaving in ways that are predictable yet contrary to what would seem to be their own individual essence 
in order to form some larger purpose.  
 
We see all this [union of contraries in the physical world] with the piercing eyes of nous, nor can 
we fail to be taught by such a spectacle that a divine power, working with skill and methods is 
manifesting itself in this actual world….40  
 
How does God manifest himself in the world? Not by showing himself directly, because he is not 
identical to any part of the world. No, but by using the world as a medium of revelation to the mind of 
man: that is, by ordering the world in a way that suggests necessary connections that are not determined 
by logic or intrinsic material essences, God seems intentionally to be making manifest to man that such 
necessities are an indication of the utter dependence of the world’s character on his regulatory activity.   
Gregory is convinced that God shows himself in nature through the unity of (phenomenal) 
opposites. This is a unity found among the qualities of the world in their peculiar worldly combination 
and sequence. Biblically, it is the Book of Ben Sirach that emphasizes the point.  
 
Look upon all the worlds of the Most High; they likewise are in pairs, one the opposite of the 
other.
41
  
 
All things are twofold, one opposite the other, and he has made nothing incomplete.
42
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This unity cannot be explained from within the world system itself, since the very conceptual 
intelligibility of the world presupposes it.
43
 While Gregory himself does not extrapolate to such a 
conclusion, we may perhaps be tempted to infer such a unity from the Trinitarian operations. This would 
be to see the unity of opposites as an image of the free necessity of the Incarnate Logos, the Son of God 
who in his personal freedom as God subsists in and so glorifies what is wholly unnatural and thus 
“opposite” to Him, namely human nature and through it all finite, created being, “without confusion, 
division, or separation” (in the Chalcedonian formula). Is not the ultimate unity of opposites this “first-
fruit” of creation; and so the sacrificial philanthropy, the free identification of the powerful with the weak, 
all contained in the reality of Christ the God-man, the wisdom that characterizes the creation that is 
ordered to this glorified end? In short, the personal intelligence, omnipotence, and Providence of God are 
indicated in the unity of opposites found in nature for the very strong reason that the ultimate unity of 
opposites, the hypostatic union of the infinite and finite, is itself the foundational reason for finite being.  
 Thus following Scripture and the philosophical lead of Neoplatonism a la Plotinus, Gregory not 
only sees no need for a philosopher’s notion of a material substratum or intrinsic material essences in the 
natural world, but believes that God has “gone out of his way”, so to speak, to arrange the world 
transparently to reflect the dependence of its order on his will. It is important to emphasize here that, on 
this interpretation, Gregory is not denying the existence of matter altogether. He is not denying that there 
are physical things and facts and a physical world composed of them. What he is here interpreted as 
claiming is that the existential status of physical things is derived from divinely-instituted immaterial 
grounding principles. So he is here interpreted as denying, in effect, only the existence of matter as a 
substance.  
What then are the conditions in which the divine will acts, so as to determine the manner in which 
God brings together thinkables at the level of human experience? In his study of Gregory of Nyssa, Von 
Balthasar
44
 points out that for Gregory creation is characterized by diastasis or diastema, the aeon or 
“spacing” (espacement), or “finition” (the term I prefer). This is the logical constraint (or system of 
constraints) that makes every finite being what it is and not another thing, and also the psycho-temporal 
condition of sensible matter. One important idea here is that visible creation is providentially governed by 
the imposition of divinely-issued nomic constraints within a prephysical but temporal framework, 
something that will be constructively elaborated in Ch.VIII. This is part of the way to the linguistic model 
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of the cosmos, the Berkeleyan idea of a world as language. The other important idea is that in reflecting 
on the difference between the transcendent simultaneity of the act of creation and the prephysical but 
temporal governance of creation (the diastasis or aeon), we recognize that both are still distinct from the 
unfolding duration of that governance at the human empirical perspective. Corresponding to this last, 
Gregory recognizes the concept of the odos, the path (as found within the human creature’s empirical 
frame of reference) from the beginning to the end of creation. “It is an ordered unfolding” , a 
“manifestation” or distention45 of the members of being.46 Given his phenomenalistic understanding of the 
relation between sensible matter and intelligible or spiritual realm of being as discussed in this section, 
namely that matter is produced by the order by which God divinely decrees that qualities ‘conglomerate’ 
in consciousness, it is tempting to understand the relation between the diastema  of creation and its 
manifestation similarly.
47
  
 In the preface to his study of Gregory, Hans Boersma expresses theology’s need for a 
“participatory or sacramental ontology”, which “is essential to a genuine appreciation of the goodness of 
the created order, including the embodied, measurable world of space and time”.48 Boersma believes he 
finds more than the rudiments of such an ontology already in Gregory, and correctly identifies Gregory’s 
phenomenalistic idealism in regard to the question of the ontological status of matter as a significant part 
of what facilitates the participatory ontology. To understand matter as something synthesized by God in 
the unity of human consciousness accords it the immanence it needs to be the true object of sense 
experience that we ordinarily take it to be, to be truly ‘for us’ in its essential ontological character, truly 
‘formal’ in the sense of sacramental theology, and equally to be as objective, publically available and 
fact-bearing as we ordinarily take the physical world to be, to be truly responsive to the divine creative 
command or ‘real’ in the sacramental theological sense. Among the implications of such an ontology is 
the truth that the physical world of space, time and matter is ‘penultimate’ to borrow Boersma’s word, 
that they “require a readjustment of eschatological proportion in order to participate forever in the life of 
God”.49 In the chapters that follow I want to show how, following Gregory’s lead, phenomenalistic 
idealism can be developed so as to clarify the penultimate character of the physical world in the light of 
sacramental theology. If the contingent necessity of the natural order shows it to be a form of revelation, a 
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 cf. Augustine, Confessions XI.20, 26-7, on human psychological distentio as the essence of time. This fits nicely 
with Gregory on the odos of creation, but it also, as in other discussions, sharply raises the question of the relation 
between angelic consciousness and the construction of objective phenomenal time, a subject to be visited in Ch.VIII.  
46
 von Balthasar, Thought and Presence, Ch.1, n.37 , citing De Mortuis  III, 520 C. 
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 I will have more to say constructively about how these three levels of creation (the absolute transcendence and 
simultaneity of the divine act, the prephysical but temporal celestial governance, and “all things visilble” or the 
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in VIII.4 and IX.2. 
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vii. 
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divine language written and read in the minds of human creatures, then that language may be a medium of 
Christian worship as much as it may be received in Christian faith. One might understand miracles then, 
particularly those recorded in Scripture, in the Exodus of Israel and in the Gospels, as supernatural 
revelations about natural revelation, signs from the Creator about the status of his visible creation as 
medium of language, that he invites man to participate in the creativity of divine life with Him and that 
the language, the natural order, will be adapted to reflect the growing intimacy of its speakers.
50
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 We shall return to this point explicitly at the end of Chapter V. 
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Chapter IV:  Dionysian Hierarchy and Symbolic Theology 
IV.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter III, we took up the subject of the Christian development of Neoplatonist metaphysics. As a 
representative case study, we examined Plotinus’ ontological hierarchy founded in the three hypostases 
and the fundamental priority relation of emanation, with its constituent notion of virtuality. We saw how 
this relation was adapted into a Christian cosmology by Gregory of Nyssa. In his critique of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism, Plotinus had denied that any sensible or physical item could be a substance in the primary 
sense, arguing instead that the unity and conglomeration (sumphorêsis) of sensible qualities that we 
subsequently identify as physical items must be explained by a simpler, purely intelligible principle. 
Following this, Gregory proposes the thesis of phenomenalistic idealism as a way of understanding how 
the Christian God makes the physical world by spiritual means. In his phenomenalistic interpretation of 
the emanation relation, the supreme personal reality of the Trinity produces visible creation by bringing 
together within the unity of created minds certain characteristic combinations and sequences of 
immaterial poiotētes, sensible qualities like shapes, colors, and tones that, being themselves‘thoughts’ 
(ennoiai) and concepts (noemata), or ‘thinkables’,  are understood to be existentially mind-dependent. 
With his further emphasis on the sovereign Creator’s free organization of these phenomenal qualities in 
the order of nature—the “union of opposites—and the concepts of diastasis and odos, we begin to see the 
mutuality between the orthodox doctrine of creation and metaphysics of idealism, in which visible 
creation is virtual divine speech, the expression of words spoken from the divine mind about the possible 
courses of human sensory experience.  
In this chapter the subject of the Christian development of Neoplatonist metaphysics continues. 
Here our case study will be the symbolic theology of pseudo-Dionysius, proposed as a method of Biblical 
and liturgical exegesis, and his vision of the cosmic hierarchy as a union of the invisible and visible 
Church. In Dionysius’ vision, Gregory’s conception of the “union of opposites”, within the context of a 
Christian version of phenomenalistic idealism, sets the standard for the best way to do theology, the way 
God himself does theology, expressing himself through the activity of the Logos in Christ. On this 
picture, the incarnational reality that is Christ, in which the supreme God fully becomes what he is not, is 
the ultimate “union of opposites”. For creatures, this has an important implication. The way for them to 
become what they are not—to become divinized in Christ, the goal of the Christian life and the primary 
reason for the act of creation—is for them to receive God’s own theology in the manner in which it was 
given: firstly, to use the perceptual symbols of Scripture and the sacramental rites of the Church liturgy as 
a way to be raised up beyond the limits of our minds by obediently allowing their splendid power to bring 
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us before God, training our minds in images in order to see through them; and secondly, by participating 
ourselves in the cosmic structure that brings these images to us, taking our own part in salvation history as 
Christians by fulfilling our liturgical office in the Church’s cosmic hierarchy, from seraph and cherub, to 
bishop, to laymen and catechumen.  
Dionysius’ vision of the cosmic hierarchy is focused in the lens of worship and for him as for 
Bouyer and the 20
th
 Liturgical Movement, it is preeminently in the liturgy that we encounter the Mystery 
of Christ. We are to ascend to God the same way he descends to us, from the Transcendental Unity of the 
Godhead, to Christ, to finite intelligence and invisible creation, and finally to the human world of sensible 
appearances. The reditus path of ascent is not a Platonic myth of the soul’s migration through abstract 
realms: it is the concrete activity of the Church at worship, in which created persons share in divine life 
by administering sacred knowledge to those who depend on them.         
Dionysius’ symbolic theology takes us a step closer to appreciating the singular contribution of 
Berkeley’s linguistic model of human sense-perception, both in its theological significance and 
philosophically as a kind of propaedeutic to Christian idealism. In effect, Berkeley’s theory takes 
Dionysius’ lesson about the apophaticism of Biblical and liturgical theology and shows how the same is 
true of God’s revelatory work in nature itself. In the resulting idealism, the physical world is understood 
to be a visible language for man to learn about God’s providential intentions towards men, a natural-
nomological symbolic theology, that signals its status as such by resisting, at the psychophysical level, 
any assimilation to mathematical reasoning or a priori logical affinities. In creation, as in Scripture and 
liturgy, God condescends to order base incongruous images into words that express, transparently, their 
status as words, and so reveal the Author and his power as their Speaker. Following the Dionysian 
reasoning, this is appropriate to man’s created (sensory-cum-noetic) cognitive nature and hence 
limitations. As Dionysius says, it is characteristic of man to learn intellectual things through sense-
images; it is almost essential to or definitive of him or at least his cognitive state.  
 
For it is quite impossible that we humans should, in any immaterial way, rise up to imitate and to 
contemplate the heavenly hierarchies without the aid of those material means capable of guiding 
us as our nature requires.
1
 
 
At the same time, Dionysius develops and integrates this theology of mystical ascent alongside the notion 
of the Church as a continuous cosmic hierarchy that unifies those of heaven and earth, and so paves the 
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 Celestial Hierarchy 121C-D, p.146. All references to the Dionysian corpus are as reproduced in the edition 
translated by Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987). 
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way to integrating phenomenalistic idealism, a la Gregory and Berkeley, with angelic cosmology. The 
divine revelatory words descend to man by the power of the Spirit via a chain of mediating influences, 
from angels to prophets, apostles, hierarchs, and liturgical ministers. This cosmic, structured arrangement 
is what Dionysius, somewhat uniquely in the Christian tradition, calls ‘hierarchy’. It is the notion of the 
Church as a continuous cosmic ministry of spirits, unifying the purposive activity of heaven and earth. 
Dionysian mystical theology thus integrates angelic cosmology, Scriptural exegesis and mystagogy or 
sacramental theology. The hierarchy is a gift created by God for the purpose of bringing all rational 
creatures into conformity with the divine likeness. But this likeness is a likeness to the perfection of 
eternal life. Therefore the manner in which it is realized must reflect the end state. It must follow the 
pattern of the Incarnation, a pattern of spontaneous, sacrificial con-descension and of adoring, receptive 
con-ascension in response. In the foundational cosmic society of the hierarchy, these moments are unified 
in the movement that is the life of God in his creature, just as we saw in our focus on the shape of the 
traditional liturgy.
2
 This feature of the Dionysian world-system is also, therefore, what makes it so apt for 
synthesis with angelic cosmology and its liturgical extrapolations, to be explored in Chs.VIII and IX.   
   
IV.2  Mystical Ascent Through Incongruous Images 
 
As for others in the early Christian tradition, Dionysius regards the ascent of Moses to meet with the 
LORD on Mt. Sinai in the fiery darkness as the model for mystical ascent to knowledge of God as 
mystery. As self-transcending, it is an ‘unknowing’, not to be measured by any familiar human standard 
of knowledge.
3
 As Paul Rorem points out, for both Gregory of Nyssa
4
 and Dionysius mystical ascent is 
most concretely realized in the sacramental rites, with Moses serving as the prototype of the hierarch (or 
bishop) who must purify himself, withdraw from those who are not so prepared to receive the sacred 
mysteries, and call around him those chosen assistants with whom he will enter the altar
5
 and, through 
ritual participation, transcend the sensible (and indeed conceptual) forms of the rite to contemplate the 
hidden divine realities they present. Following the received Alexandrian formula, mystical ascent is a 
three-stage process of purification, illumination, contemplation. To practice this mystical ascent is to 
liturgically experience the ‘mystika’, the hidden divine realities, within the providential arrangement of 
the cosmic hierarchy. The administration and reception of this hidden wisdom under accommodated 
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 Ch.I, Section 3, especially pp.14-18.  
3
 Mystical Theology 1001A, p.137.  
4
 Life of Moses II, 152-170, PG 372C-380A, as referred to by Rorem (footnote, p.137). But one finds the same 
description of ascent to a knowledge of heavenly realities in Gregory of Nazianzus’ Second Theological Oration, 
Oration 28: On the Doctrine of God.  
5
 Ps. 40:2 
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representations is the “more suitable”6 theological method of “dissimilar dissimilarities” that Dionysius 
believes is the path to gnosis preferred by the great Judeo-Christian theological tradition.
7
 This method of 
ascent must be regarded for Dionysius as distinct from affirmative and negative theology, even from their 
dialectical combination.
8
 
In the Mystical Theology, Dionysius presents us with the well-known schema of affirmative and 
negative theology, as two complimentary approaches to the reality of God. These two theologies move in 
opposing directions across the metaphysical order, each beginning at the pole where the other ends. 
Affirmative theology ends in expounding “analogies of God drawn from what we perceive… of his anger, 
grief and rage, of how he is said to be drunk and hungover…these latter come more abundantly than what 
went before…”.9 The ascent of negative theology traces the salvation and glorification of humanity in 
Christ. The ascent corresponds to the Neoplatonic epistrophe, which, as we saw in Ch.III, is half of the 
double activity of the emanation relation, wherein ‘the many’ produced as the external activity of ‘the 
one’ are drawn back to their source and are constituted in this attraction as their own internal activity, 
from which their powers proceed. In Dionysius this movement of ascent becomes interpreted as the erotic 
contemplation of the Church’s liturgical anagogy, the process by which human beings, having been 
initiated into the sacred mysteries of Christ, united together as his body, are lifted up to the Father as an 
offering just as he was, joined together in sacred company. As a method of theology, it is what he 
describes as the method of “dissimilar similarities”, practiced both by the Old Testament theologians10 
and in the Christian era by the ecclesiastical hierarchy in the liturgy.  
It cannot be equated with negative theology because the method aims at a contemplation of a 
reality that is beyond negation, which after all is intelligible only within the context of discursive 
reasoning. Negative theology does not adequately deliver a knowledge of God any more than affirmative 
theology. What we can identify as a genuine “mystical” theology, however, is something different from 
both. In the opening chapters of the Celestial Hierarchy Dionysius describes it as a way of training our 
minds for self-transcendence by reaching for God in the most incongruous sensible images. Having 
                                                          
6
 CH 141A-B – More suitable, that is, in comparison with any discursive theology, whether affirmative or negative. 
7
 Rorem’s early monograph, Biblical and Liturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984), traced the lines of synthesis among angelic cosmology, Biblical 
exegesis, and mystagogy in Dionysius. See also Andrew Louth’s Denys the Areopagite (London: Geoffrey 
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8
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dialectical combination of affirmative and negative theology see Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), Denys Turner, The Darkness of God : Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), and  René Roques, L’Univers dionysien. Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le pseudo-
Denys (Paris. 1954). 
9
 MT 1033B, p.139 
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 Dionysius’ term for the prophets and authors of Scripture.  
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journeyed across the ontological landscape between the divine transcendence of God and his dependent 
worldly creatures in both directions, affirmative and negative theology jointly acquaint us with the 
inadequacy of any self-initiated movement of the human mind to God. What option remains? Only to 
leave aside any human theology whatsoever, to let God’s own theology come to us as it does in Scripture 
and liturgy, and having received it, to let it upliftingly work in and through us. This is what he means 
when at the very beginning of the Mystical Theology he instructs Timothy to 
 
leave behind you…all that is not and all that is [both negative and affirmative theology, which are 
self-driven], and, with your understanding laid aside…By an absolute abandonment of yourself 
and everything…you will be uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow.11 
 
This method, which Dionysius demonstrates in the Celestial Hierarchy and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. 
is initiated by the thearchy, by God himself. Man only receives and participates in this theology, being 
transformed into what he is not in the process. It is not carried out in isolation or by retreating from the 
sensible world, but always hierarchically mediated by the cosmic Church, the sacramental Christ. 
The purpose of theology is the self-transcending of our limited mental capacities, to share in the 
knowledge of God possessed by Christ. Theological representation at its best, is mystical representation 
that comes to us in the fullness of our sensory capacities and keeps the content of our knowledge hidden, 
that is, the pure, unmixed transcendent reality that it is 
As Dionysius goes on to describe affirmative and then negative theology in the text of the 
Mystical Theology, leaving off in the end with an apparent recapitulation
12
 of the ideal of mystical ascent 
(in the fashion of the Mosaic prototype), it is tempting to identify the ideal of mystical ascent with 
negative theology, since the latter had been the method described just before this. Furthermore, in Chapter 
Two, he seems to make this identification explicit in saying “to praise the Transcendent One in a 
transcending way, namely through the denial of all beings”.13 This tempting interpretation, however, 
should be resisted. The text ends by recapitulating the very point made in the passage quoted above, “the 
Supreme Cause…is beyond assertion and denial”. The discursive denials of negative theology, therefore, 
cannot be the route to divine contemplation. They cannot move the mind past itself, and this is as true of 
the “higher stages” of conceptual-intellectual denial as at the lower. Yet negative theology clearly has 
value as a way to praise God and to gain some discursive knowledge of the Transcendent One, however 
limited its value might be. The same must be said for affirmative theology, which Dionysius devotes 
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himself to in the Divine Names. But if neither of these is an adequate theology, there must be a preferred 
third option. And this is the method Dionysius will demonstrate in the Celestial Hierarchy and the 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. What distinguishes the theology of these texts is that they are initiated by the 
thearchy, by God himself, man only receives and participates in this theology, being transformed into 
what he is not in the process. Unlike the pagan ‘theology’ of Neoplatonism, this theology is not carried 
out in isolation or by retreating from the sensible world. It is always hierarchically mediated by the 
cosmic Church, the sacramental Christ, from the throne of the thearchy to the phenomenal elements of 
nature.    
Chapter Two of the Celestial Hierarchy explains the theological method of dissimilar 
similarities.
14
 First is the basic recognition that “The source of spiritual perfection provided us with 
perceptible images of these heavenly minds [the angels]”.15 This echoes similar statements regarding 
affirmative theology in the Mystical Theology and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, where he says “However, 
the divine ray can enlighten us only by being upliftingly concealed in a variety of sacred veils which the 
Providence of the Father adapts to our nature as human beings”.16 So far this may simply sound like a 
reminder of the value of affirmative and negative theology when used together in complementarity. Our 
limited minds with their mode of sensory cognition may require the adaptation of sensible images to 
understand God, and since negative theology balances this out, the two together might be thought 
adequate. Speaking specifically of the case of our knowledge of angels, though all these points are 
intended to generalize to a knowledge of the divine, we might think that the corrective check of negative 
theology is enough to keep us in recognition that  “We cannot…profanely visualize these heavenly and 
godlike intelligences as actually having numerous feet and faces…”.17 This seems straightforward. But: 
 
What if someone therefore thinks that the scriptural imagery for these minds is incongruous and 
that the names given to the angels have the inadequacy of a pretense?...if one looks at the truth of 
the matter…Now these sacred shapes [‘Word’, ‘Mind’, ‘Being’, the ‘higher’ conceptual names 
for God ] certainly show more reverence and seem vastly superior to the making of images drawn 
from the world. Yet they are actually no less defective than this latter [the perceptual figures], for 
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 Here as in other parts of the text, he is taking angelology as a particular branch of theology to serve as a case in 
point about theology more generally. In fact, the deliberate eliding of ‘theology proper’ and angelology comes to 
show itself as a deliberate and reflexive effort to show the indispensability of angelic mediation in hierarchical 
revelation, which all authentic revelation is.  
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16
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the Deity is far beyond every manifestation of being and of life; no reference to light can 
characterize it; every reason or intelligence falls short of similarity to it.
18
 
 
In other words, suppose that someone were to argue that negative theology is superior to affirmative 
theology or that conceptual theology were superior to perceptual theology insofar as the former in each 
case uses terms that are ‘closer’ to the reality of God, and so show greater praise for Him. Such an 
argument, says Dionysius, would commit a dangerous fallacy. Considering the complete Transcendence 
of the reality of God, there is no human conception, conceptual or perceptual, affirmative or negative that 
is adequate to him. In relation to the divine infinitude, there is no sense in regarding any finite discursive 
or analogical theological conception as ‘closer’ to the reality of God than another. In fact, to keep the 
mind resistant to that very trap, Dionysius introduces us to the following idea, something the Old 
Testament theologians and early Church Fathers, chiefly the Apostles themselves, already knew: “Then 
there is the scriptural device of praising the deity by presenting it in utterly dissimilar revelations”.19 This 
inverts the logic of the would-be argument above. To keep us from the illusion of thinking that there is 
something about perceptual symbols that make them unfit for representation of the Deity and what is 
godlike generally, including the angels, we might well think that the cruder and more corporeal, the more 
incongruous, the images the better. Any would-be objector forgets that the purpose of theology is the self-
transcending of our limited mental capacities, to share in the knowledge of God possessed by Christ. 
Theological representation at its best, is mystical representation that comes to us in the fullness of our 
sensory capacities and keeps the content of our knowledge hidden, that is, the pure, unmixed transcendent 
reality that it is:    
 
Since the way of negation appears to be more suitable to the realm of the divine and since 
positive affirmations are always unfitting to the hiddenness of the inexpressible, a manifestation 
through dissimilar shapes is more correctly to be applied to the invisible. So it is that scriptural 
writings, far from demeaning the ranks of heaven, actually pay them honor by describing them 
with dissimilar shapes so completely at variance with what they really are that we come to 
discover how those ranks, so completely removed from us, transcend all materiality. Furthermore, 
I doubt that anyone would refuse to acknowledge that incongruities are more suitable for lifting 
our minds up into the domain of the spiritual than similarities are….High-flown shapes could 
well mislead someone into thinking that the heavenly beings are golden or gleaming 
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men…Indeed the sheer crassness of the signs is a goad…So, then, forms even those drawn from 
the lowliest matter, can be used, not unfittingly, with regard to heavenly beings.
20
 
 
  In the context of Dionysian mystical theology, the method of dissimilar similarities is good 
Biblical and liturgical theology because it follows the logic of Divine Wisdom in creation. Paul tells us 
that Divine Wisdom is human foolishness, and we see this not just in the Passion of Christ and the 
response of the baptized who join their sacrifice to his in what looks like folly to the world (the death of 
martyrdom), but already in the pattern of creation which, as described by Gregory,  brings together 
opposites. Dionysius makes the christological abduction of the phenomenal “union of opposites” clear 
and explicit. The primary wisdom on which creation is patterned is the Incarnation, and this is the 
ultimate incongruity, the ultimate application of a dissimilar shape to the invisible, the God who 
transcends being becoming what he is not so that what is not may become him through the grace of this 
mysterious love. It is the sacramental present in which we live as much our eschatological hope. It is the 
way we are to do theology, the way we are to worship and contemplate, moment-to-moment and once for 
all time. This is an instance of self-similarity across scales within the created order. As the ultimate union 
of opposites in the Incarnation is the primary reason for creation, this pattern is repeated even within the 
visible side of creation, and not accidentally, since it is in this that its symbolic or linguistic or 
representative character consists, a cosmos as liturgy. In the Old Testament this insight belonged 
exclusively to Israel, now to the universal Church. In short, the hierarchical movement of proodos and 
epistrophe in creation already reflects the liturgical dimension of salvation in being a union of opposites 
on different scales. Love is a “divine madness” says Socrates in the Phaedrus and Paul speaks of the 
divine foolishness of the Cross that is wiser than the wisdom of men and appears to pagan philosophers as 
folly.
21
 The incarnate love of God in Christ is divine but looks like madness to human beings. Indeed 
because of our sinful nature, it looks like madness because it is divine. Divine Wisdom is human folly, 
and mystical theology is good theology because it internalizes this precept. This is the truly mystical 
theology of scriptural revelation and Church mystagogy, superior to merely negative discursive theology, 
and which transfigures any dry, ponderous or overly discursive affirmative theology in its light. 
 
IV.3  The Cosmic Hierarchy 
 
An understanding of the method of dissimilar similarities for mystical ascent cannot be separated from the 
Dionysian notion of hierarchy. It will be foundational for my own elaboration of the metaphysics of 
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Christian idealism and of great importance in establishing the overall coherence of the argument for it as 
an argument from liturgical theology and particularly from a theology of the Eucharist.
22
  
As any careful, reflective theologian would be, Dionysius is quick to disclaim
23
 any pretense to a 
knowledge of the inner workings or relationships among angelic society, their inner life or the nature of 
their interaction with God. Nonetheless, with so many scriptural references to angelic society, and indeed 
reference to their society as a qahal or ecclesia, the oft-referred to liturgical assembly
24
 of God and those 
angels closest to him
25
, we are encouraged to believe that God desires that we know something about 
these inter-workings and relationships and has already revealed much about them to us. For as he says, 
not only this but God has revealed to us that we are to be like the angels
26
, fellow-workers (syndouloi) 
with them
27
, in serving God liturgically with them in one cosmic Church by ministering to those ranked 
below us (the lowest being those outside the Church altogether), which is characteristic of liturgical 
action, celestial or ecclesial, in imitation of Christ.   
 
He made the heavenly hierarchies known to us. He made our own hierarchy a ministerial 
colleague of these divine hierarchies by an assimilation, to the extent that is humanly feasible, to 
their godlike priesthood.
28
  
 
But what exactly is a hierarchy? If were are not careful, we are likely to superimpose our own everyday 
understanding shared with secular culture. For Dionysius, by contrast, what is characteristic of 
hierarchy—besides the fact that it is a divinely instituted gift as the core structure of the diastasis in which 
the empirical odos of creation enfolds—is that in it two superficially contrary movements are united in a 
single dynamism, anagogy through oblation, according to the figure of Christ.  
 
If one talks then of hierarchy, what is meant is a certain perfect arrangement, the image of the 
beauty of God which sacredly works out the mysteries of its own enlightenment in the orders and 
levels of understanding of the hierarchy, and which is likened towards its own source as much as 
permitted. Indeed for every member of the hierarchy, perfection consists in this, that it is uplifted 
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to imitate God as far as possible, amore wonderful still, that it becomes what scripture calls 
“fellow workman for God” and a reflection of the workings of God.29 
 
Thus it is the hierarchy, the communal, personal reality at the heart of the structure of the cosmos, the 
hypo-structure and characteristic arrangement of the divine oikonomia that facilitates and conditions the 
method of dissimilar similarities. It seems to be God’s own work in creation that is revelation in and 
through the hierarchy. Each member is “uplifted to imitate God” by ministering to those below him in the 
hierarchy, just as in the overall movement of the divine economy the divine nature of the Logos, likeness 
to which members are being conformed, is condescending from simplicity to complexity in proclamation, 
and anagogical in the offertory life of the Risen Christ.  
 
Think of Melchizedek. He was filled with love for God and he was a hierarch…They [the 
“experts in sacred learning”] described him as a priest so as to make clear to sensible men that his 
task was not simply to be returned to the true God but, rather as a hierarch to lead others in their 
uplifting toward the one true God.
30
 
 
Chapter Three of the Celestial Hierarchy concludes with an exhortation to those practicing mystical 
ascent through the hierarchy’s liturgy to follow the pattern of purification, illumination, and perfection, 
the very pattern that Dionysius had described in the Mystical Theology as the way of unknowing for 
which Moses’s ascent on Mt. Sinai is prototypical.    
The work of theology is one way of describing the ministerial office of the hierarchy. It is as 
much prophetic and Scriptural as it liturgical and ecclesiastical. Just as the angels transmitted knowledge 
to those “near the angels”, so these men in turn transmitted knowledge to other men below them in the 
hierarchy, becoming what we call prophets, in the case of Zechariah, Ezekiel, Daniel
31
, or apostles, 
bishops, martyrs, and saints in the Christian era. If we take seriously the suggestion that the cosmic 
hierarchy, so understood, is foundational in the cosmos, in accordance with the thesis of the absolute 
primacy of Christ, we have an additional insight into references to ‘natural’, pre-Christian revelation in 
Scripture
32
: such revelation was already an instance of the hierarchy at work, drawing all men to Christ 
through the angelic ministry and its distributive chain.    
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And here is another item for your understanding of the hierarchy. It was revealed to Pharaoh by 
the angel presiding over the Egyptians and to the ruler of the Babylonians by their angel that there 
is a concerned and authoritative Providence and Lordship over all things. Servants of the true God 
were established as leaders for those nations, and the manifestation of things represented by the 
angelic visions were revealed by God through the angels to certain sacred men near the angels, 
namely Joseph and Daniel. For there is only one ruling source and Providence in the world, and 
we must not imagine that the Deity took charge of the Jewish people alone and that angels or 
gods, on an equal footing with him or even hostile to him, had charge of the other peoples…The 
single Providence of the Most High for all commanded angels to bring all peoples to salvation, 
but it was Israel alone which returned to the Light and proclaimed the true Lord.
33
  
 
This suggests to us a particular reading of the historical development of Israel’s election and the corollary 
judgment of the other nations, to which Paul makes reference in Romans. Judgment is contingent on a 
free response to a call that God, under the universal scope of his Providence, makes to all people. And, 
furthermore, this call is made through the mediation of the angelic ministry, which apparently includes, 
per Dionysius, a hierarchical presiding of spirits over nations as social groups.
34
 In fact, the content of the 
angelic revelation is, at least in part, the reality of the cosmic hierarchy of which their ministry and 
particular revelations are an instance. What better way to show pre-Christian peoples that the true God is 
one sovereign Lord over the whole cosmos, than to have this message conveyed by the very structural 
framework that exemplifies this sovereignty? The purpose of this structure is to move intelligent creatures 
to their absolute Creator through a transmissive chain of personal knowledge and charity, in which 
upward movement is achieved by ministering to the lower, in which ascent is achieved by descent, 
following the divine Wisdom, the primal pattern of Christ the God-man. 
 If we synthesize the idea of angels presiding over nations and so revealing to them the 
sovereignty of the one God with Paul’s reference to pre-Christian natural revelation, we are led to the 
conclusion that the same celestial-hierarchical mediation responsible for the visions to “sacred men” was 
responsible in a more regular and quotidian way for the mediation of the knowledge of God “clearly 
visible in the things that have been made”. In other words, so the suggestion goes, there is a continuity 
between i) the special, individual revelatory visions given to Jacob, Joseph, and the prophets of the Judaic 
kingdom; ii) to the special, individual revelatory visions given to rulers of gentile nations; and iii) the 
phenomenal regularity that is given to all in the immanent yet intersubjectively coherent sensory 
experiences of ordinary waking life. They are all manifestations of the mediating angelic governance of 
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human sensory consciousness within the divinely instituted cosmic hierarchy, instituted for the purpose of 
uplifting all intelligent creatures in a communal movement of shared knowledge and love of God. This 
conception of the continuity of angelically-mediated natural and supernatural revelation is something a 
fully developed idealist metaphysics can hope to make coherent and specific in its details.         
 
IV.3  The Celestial Hierarchy and the Visible Creation Economy 
 
Angels move in circular, straight, and spiral paths, indicating their various offices of receiving divine 
instruction and knowledge, ministering and mediating that knowledge to creatures, and yet never ceasing 
to be drawn after the “Beautiful and the Good”.35 All three motions correspond to movements of the 
human soul to God through different types of knowledge.
36
 The meeting place of human and angelic 
movements is indicated by the straight line paths. For the one (the angel) is ministering, while the other 
(the human) is being ministered to, and, tellingly for Dionysius, via the sense-images of Scripture and 
liturgy. What I propose is that it is consistent with such an understanding of the hierarchy to extrapolate 
from the ministerial use of these images to the external sensibles of the physical world itself, the 
qualitative scenes that feature in our sensory experience and that we recognize as thematically world-
suggestive. This lesson makes sense if the phenomenal workings of nature, the governance of the physical 
world, are included within the angels’ ministerial office. Yet just as Dionysius is, as should be any 
orthodox theologian, we have to be clear that all movements and indeed all being, in the “realm of what is 
perceived” or elsewhere, have their origin, preservation and goal in the Beautiful and the Good.  
We know that on account of their proximity to God in the hierarchy, the angels possess relatively 
simple and universal knowledge of the divine plan for creation:  
 
Their thinking processes imitate the divine…since it is they who first are granted the divine 
enlightenment and it is they who pass on to us these revelations which are so far beyond us.
37
 
 
Would it not seem fitting, then, that these revelations be natural ones in particular, in addition to the 
supernatural ones, the scriptural theophanies? If the primary reason for creation itself is the glorification 
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of a human nature in Christ, then the orders of nature, grace, and glory are all unified in the three-fold 
ministry of Christ as Priest, Prophet, and King. As imitators of Christ in the hierarchy, angels and men, by 
different degrees, share in this threefold office. For the angels, as for us, this ought to mean that their 
prophetic role in the ministry of salvation is one with those of priest and king. Following the same 
reasoning applied to the case of the supernatural visions of the prophets of Israel, the content and manner 
of revelation of the Mosaic Law should exemplify something of the hierarchy that delivers it. As 
Dionysius says, 
 
these ordinances [the Mosaic law] are themselves a copy of the divine and the sacred. Yet 
theology quite clearly teaches that these ordinances were mediated to us by angels so that God’s 
order might show us how it is that secondary beings uplifted through the primary beings.
38
  
 
Part of what God revealed in the Law is the sacred moral order of the cosmos, the cosmic hierarchy with 
its anagogical function. What better way to learn this than to receive the Law of God by angel spirits? In 
this way, characteristic of the “mimesis theology” of the early Church’s understanding of its sacraments39, 
and the traditional view of orthodox tradition since, the image or sign exemplifies the reality it signifies. 
The form is transparent to the radiating splendor it mediates, so that whoever perceives it—and 
understands it with the same Spirit whose beauty radiates to her—is not set at a remove from it but 
instead becomes a transparent sacred vessel for the same splendor; the perceiver is transformed into what 
she receives and so magnifies the same beauty, which, in the divine logic of the hierarchy, grows in the 
sharing. 
One more reason to think that the angelic salvation ministry is collectively achieved in the 
hierarchy together with the governance of the phenomenal order is the way knowledge and power are 
distributed in the celestial ranks. The order of the hierarchy parallels the structure of revealed knowledge. 
As we have seen in the previous sections, God’s own theology in the work of creation is facilitated by the 
transmission of knowledge downward through the hierarchy:  
 
And this first group passes on the word of that the Godhead is a monad, that is one in three 
persons, that its splendid providence for all reaches from most exalted beings in heaven above to 
the lowliest creatures of earth.
40
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The order of angels is in analogy with the earthly ecclesiastical order—priests uplifting laity, and so 
on
41—a threefold group forming a “single hierarchy”.42 Directness of participation seems to be spelled out 
by the degree to which they share his activity, which depends on power, which depends on degree of 
conformation to the divine.
43
 In Dionysius’ schema (again, something he attributes to his teacher 
Hierotheus) there are three ranks of angels, and three orders within each order. In the same spirit of 
Plotinus’ virtuality relation, with its relative analogical notion of intellectual simplicity, and Dionysius’ 
mystical theology as described above, the cosmic hierarchy exhibits self-similarity across different scales. 
So each triadic rank of angels is effectively a mikro-hierarchy in itself, with all angels participating in it 
possessing a common liturgical-ministerial charism possessed by all of the orders above but none of the 
orders below. This is in accord what we might call a “hierarchical principle of eminence”. As he says:  
“the superior ranks possess in eminent degrees the sacred attributes of their inferiors”.44  
In accordance with the arrangement characteristic of hierarchy, each rank receives instructions 
from the beings above who possess greater knowledge, or the same knowledge in a more eminent way, 
and in turn transmit that knowledge to the ranks below them, with plurality and complexity proceeding in 
the descent.  All together from highest to lowest the orders are: seraphim, cherubim, thrones, dominions, 
powers, authorities, principalities, archangels, angels. The fact that the seraphim are described by Isaiah 
as “many-eyed” indicates the universality of their conceptual knowledge of creation.45 The name 
‘dominions’ (or ‘lordships’, kyriotes) for the first order of the second rank is an example of the method of 
dissimilar similarities at work, as they possess none of the harsh or tyrannical character that the name 
would suggest to us, challenging us to rethink or repent of our notion of true dominion. 
 
The divine source of all order has established the all-embracing principle that beings of the 
second rank receive enlightenment from the Godhead through beings of the first rank.
46
  
 
If this is true and phenomenalistic idealism is true
47, then ‘angelic phenomenalistic idealism’ would seem 
to follow as a consequence since creation is revelation and angels reveal according to their office.  Like 
covenantal theology, phenomenalistic idealism blurs the lines between natural and supernatural 
revelation: Old Testmaent angelic theophanies, then, would not be discontinuous from the normal 
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governance of the natural world—they punctuate and would make obvious the constant angelically-
mediated regularities “in the background”.  
As argued in the section above, the angelophanies recorded by Ezekiel and Daniel show the inter-
celestial references of the orders to each other, the inseparability of their annunciatory office from their 
liturgical office—as in, e.g., the cherubim who wears a “holy stole”.48 “This [internal] arrangement is 
copied by our own hierarchy…”. The process of establishing the earthly hierarchy—itself the theological 
work of the celestial hierarchy—began in Exodus with the instructions to Moses and Aaron on the 
construction of the tabernacle and the rites of the priesthood. What we must now consider is that, given 
the division of labor within the celestial hierarchy, the special, miraculous work of the angelic salvation 
ministry in human history is but so many conspicuous instances of the work of the higher angelic orders, 
which must be coordinated with the more natural and everyday regulatory activity of the lower orders. 
Such is fitting to the character of a hierarchy, provided as a divine gift for the primary purpose of 
sanctifying creatures in Christ, governed by the principle of eminence. So then, as noted, the visions of 
the prophets and righteous would be special miraculous cases of the ordinary, natural revelation 
coordinated by the angels, perhaps with the lowest “guardian” angels causing those ordinary visions—or 
generally conscious sensations—the organization of which constitutes the world. It is this angelology that 
will inform our analytic treatment of idealist metaphysics in Ch.VIII. 
The angelic ministry brings men to salvation by facilitating—in very holistic sense, across macro-
historical and micro-physical scales—the Incarnation. They do this by participating with God in the 
governing of a visible world that unfolds at the human empirical perspective, by which it appears to us as 
progression from star dust to organisms, to human beings, to Israel, to Christ. If the work of this 
sacramental economy is shared by the celestial hierarchy, we should expect that the work itself, in its 
manifestation and purpose, should reflect the hierarchy, which is internally organized by descending 
degrees of divine knowledge and corresponding power and freedom. Thus those closest to God and 
highest in knowledge should have the widest scope, the most senior managerial oversight (or 
‘presidence’49), in the participatory work of the visible creation economy, the divine project of preparing 
the Church, as maiden attendants preparing the bride of Christ.
50
  
 
So, then, the most primordial rank of those intelligent beings in God’s company is hierarchically 
ordered by enlightenments coming from the source of all perfection, and they rise up to it with the 
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help of no intermediary. For them…Such lights are all the more hidden because they have to do 
with what is all the more conceptual, and they bring all that much more simplification and 
union…Then by this rank [of angels] the second one, and by the second the third, and by the third 
our hierarchy is hierarchically uplifted, in due proportion and divine concord and according to the 
this regulation of the harmonious source of order, toward the source beyond every source and 
consummation of all harmony.
51
 
 
In accord with this picture, then, I might, however speculatively, suggest the following schema for 
thinking of the hierarchical division of governance within the visible creation economy:  
 
      God 
              _/                    \_                
World Order    Celestial Hierarchy 
   Moral, Socio-Historical  -- First Triad 
   Physical   -- Second Triad 
   Phenomenological  -- Third Triad 
 
The ranking is from highest knowledge to lowest knowledge, from seraphim, to powers (dynameis), to 
angels. ‘Dynameis’ means variously powers, potentialities, hosts, and miracles in Scripture. The name of 
the angelic order suggests that these are really all attributed to the same source, namely the pure spirits of 
heaven.  
 Since the whole purpose of the hierarchy is the divinization of intelligent creatures, the 
distribution of the divine light to them through each other as a cooperative ecclesia, it follows that man—
and especially man-who-has-not-yet-received-the-Gospel—is the lowest order in the hierarchy. But notice 
that this implies that the inanimate physical world has no categorical rank within the hierarchy 
whatsoever. This makes sense if the physical world represents or simply is the odos, the dynamic 
unfolding revelatory communication of the angelic messages to the human within the scope of their 
ministry, just as phenomenalistic idealism claims. In contrast to the Neoplatonist ontic hierarchy that has 
matter occupying the lowest place but with qualities eerily similar to the attributes of God (infinitude, 
eternality), Dionysius’ personalist, Christian, cosmic hierarchy has no place for impersonal matter. On 
this view, matter, material things, or the total ordered collection of them that we call the world have not 
been left off the hierarchy, they have been assimilated to the status of revelatory work through images, in 
the same category with the content of prophecy and liturgical rites.  One commentator, Dom Denys 
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Rutledge, confirms as much in discussing the Dionysius conception of man as microcosm, a creature who 
as embodied spirit already contains within his being the being of other bodies. Rutledge states: 
 
Similarly for Gregory of Nyssa, considered by some to have been one of the principal sources of 
the pseudo-Denys; all reality is essentially spiritual, the material, sensible character of this world 
has no existence apart from man, yet though it will be finally resumed into the spirit, in the sense 
that it will be ‘spiritualised’, it will still remain.52  
 
In a way I hope is clearer now than before (for example., when discussed in Chapter II), we see that the 
development into phenomenalistic idealism is almost anticipated in the doctrine of the absolute primacy 
of Christ. Of course it is not surprising that Christology impacts the doctrine of creation, just as it impacts 
theological anthropology. If the primary purpose of creation is the glorification of human nature in Christ, 
the final marriage of the lamb and the Church, then the rest of creation must find its subordinate place 
within this plot, either facilitating it cooperatively with the Trinity via the gift of intelligence, or being the 
effect of such intelligent cooperative facilitating, either being the messenger or the message.  
The common source of the angelic and human hierarchies is the Trinity and their common goal is 
divinization.
53
 Their common “High Priest” is Jesus, king of men and angels, whom God exalted above 
every rank and name.
54
 Thus the common dynamic movement of the unified, cosmic hierarchy is the 
administration, the execution of the commands of Jesus Christ, under the unity of the offices of Priest, 
Prophet, and King.
55
 How does the Trinity provide for us, for our divinization, through the cosmic 
hierarchy with Jesus at its head? “…by means of the variety and abundance of composite symbols”.56 
Dionysius is here referring to the outward signs of the sacramental rites, in which the sacred knowledge of 
Church hierarchs is revealed to us “through the means of verbal expression and thus corporeal but at the 
same time more immaterial [more than that of the prophets and Scripture authors] since it is free from 
writing”.57 The spiritualizing progression from the written theology of Scripture to words and images of 
the liturgy is itself paralleled, in proper fashion according to the reflective logic of Dionysian hierarchy, in 
the division of the eucharistic synaxis into a Liturgy of the Word and a Liturgy of the Eucharist. The 
second is, on the cosmic scale, the response to the divine generosity that has brought us into existence and 
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given us a hierarchy, a response whose sacred elements, the symbols, have been hierarchically provided. 
This use of perceptible symbols, both for con-descending theological expression and con-ascending 
theological response, could well be described as a “making human” or “making theology human”, as it 
represents an accommodation of divine revelation to our sense-perceptual nature but in a way that is 
mystical, so that what it holy and spiritual abides in itself and remains hidden.  As had other Church 
Fathers before him
58
, Dionysius believes the hierarchical pattern of ecclesiastical revelation is reflected in 
sacred history, in the transmissive conduit of the Apostolic kerygma, which is simultaneous with the 
establishment of Christian liturgical practices and the creation of the early churches. In this way too the 
hierarchy “made human what was divine”.59  
Thus do the perceptible symbols take on a beatific sense in the light of Christ and what he reveals 
it is to be human. The logic that confirms the superiority of Dionysius’ theological method of dissimilar 
similarities follows from the logic of Christ’s condescension. The Paschal Mystery with its Ascension and 
Pentecost finalizes and seals this idea: the inferior is lifted up and put above every other, and the Holy 
Spirit is Himself directly poured out on the human hierarchy. The Church is not only what hierarchically 
distributes this truth, this divine Word made human, across time and space, it is, in her Eucharistic liturgy, 
the final encounter, the perfection contemplation of Word in flesh, sacrifice and thanksgiving, memory 
and communion. This is a communion of the holy things for the holy people of God, men and angels. The 
angels and the invisible Word enact the mystery of Christ through an analogue of the Mass, only they use 
us, our sensory consciousness to make the words material, to make them sacraments, an activity 
completed when we in turn offer them back to the Father through the priesthood of Christ.  
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Chapter V: Berkeley and the Immaterial Language of Embodiment 
 
V.1  Introduction 
 
It is a remarkable idea that the existence of the physical world, in its empirical immanence and 
objectivity, might be logically sustained by the way God organizes the unity of sensory consciousness and 
decrees the succession of sensory conscious episodes in relation to human volition. As we have seen, the 
idea does not emerge whole cloth with Berkeley. It can be understood as a Christian development of 
Platonic thought in a line from Plotinus and Augustine, both of whom seized on the key thesis of the 
immateriality of ousia; and it was more or less explicitly stated by Gregory of Nyssa in his effort to 
interpret Scriptural revelation about the nature of matter and work out its eschatological implications. Yet 
Berkeley is the one who first makes the idea—which is a synthesis of the Christian doctrine of creation 
with the thesis of phenomenalistic idealism—the centerpiece of his metaphysics and theoretical 
philosophy.  
As with the ancient figures who exhibit idealist commitments, Berkeley should not be read as a 
subjective idealist (where this refers to Kant’s interpretation) or as denying matter altogether (where this 
would include matter in the vulgar sense).
1
 It is a mistake to read Berkeley this way or to understand my 
own constructive position to be developed in Chs. VI-VIII as advocating anything similar.
2
 This is one 
reason for introducing Berkeley in Ch. V as a working scientist and author of the Theory of Vision, rather 
than an airy metaphysician, and for emphasizing his commitment to a principle (introduced in V.4) which 
allows him coherently to accept matter and material causes in the vulgar and even scientific senses while 
denying it in the philosophical. It is one of the express goals of the thesis to resolve these and other 
ambiguities critical to the formulation and appraisal of its idealist position, a lesson explicitly drawn from 
Berkeley. Berkeley’s view of the physical world and the phenomalistically reductive anti-realism about 
the physical world of the kind the thesis advocates are not versions of physical nihilism nor ‘subjective 
idealism’ in Kant and Hegel’s sense, a reduction of the physical world to an arrangement of particular 
ideas in individual minds. 
In order better to understand this view and the ideas that lie at its heart and how they put us in a 
position to appreciate the linguistic organization and ontological priority relations among the things God 
produces in the act of creation, I want to consider in some detail the context in which Berkeley himself 
presents them, the arguments he makes to promote them, and how his scientific and theological 
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commitments are affected by them. Rather than diving straight in to Berkeley’s mature writings on 
theoretical philosophy, chiefly his A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, I want to 
show Berkeley first as a scientist and perceptual psychologist, as the author of An Essay Towards a New 
Theory of Vision, his first major publication.
3
 The merit of such an approach is that it provides us with a 
wider range of understanding of Berkeley’s thought as a whole, as many of his metaphysical conclusions 
are anticipated in those of his vision science, but not conversely. The Theory of Vision shows Berkeley 
variously engaged in both descriptive and theoretical natural science
4
 as well as metaphysics, albeit the 
latter less so and in a manner more musing and tentative than in the Principles. This puts on display 
something quite significant for understanding the whole of Berkeley’s thought, namely how the various 
intellectual disciplines, applied and theoretical, are interrelated. The Theory of Vision thus serves as an 
instructive prolegomenon to the metaphysics of the Principles, though not because this was his purpose in 
the Theory of Vision, as an earlier generation of commentators interpreted him.
5
 To the contrary, as a later 
generation of commentators has corrected
6, Berkeley’s immaterialist metaphysics helpfully may be seen 
to stand on work in the theoretical science of perceptual psychology, work whose insights are independent 
and indeed still relevant.
7
   
 
V.2  The Language Model of Vision 
 
Berkeley advocated for a strong form of natural revelation in which the triad of God, man, and 
world are interrelated as speakers to a language. His natural theology built on his early work in optics and 
perceptual psychology, which had inaugurated a revolution in the science of vision. On the received 
paradigm
8
, the structure of visual space was thought to be perceived through a process of a priori 
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geometric calculation, of the mind’s taking certain abstract data of spatial measurement from visual 
sensations and arriving at a conscious idea of perceived distance, size, and dimension by the use of reason 
in accordance with relevant mathematical theorems. Through a profound and still influential critique, 
Berkeley developed an alternative theory on which visual sensations in themselves entirely lack spatial 
qualities and only seem to have them because of their experiential association with tactual and 
kinaesthetic ideas. These tactual ideas have no common content, resemblance, nor any logical connection 
with colors and eye movements, but because of the association enforced by experience as regulated by the 
phenomenological “laws of nature”, we “read into” vision the ideas of tangible space as we read into the 
shapes of ink on the printed page the ideas of a story.
9
  
This is the so-called “language model” of vision, and from it Berkeley extracts two principles that 
become the foundation of his immaterialist metaphysics and natural theology. One is that physical space 
is really tangible space, something that is only intelligible insofar as it enters into human sense 
experience; the second is that, just as the sense-modal qualities of vision linguistically signify to us what 
motor and tactual sensations we can expect to have, so more generally the regular sequence and 
coherence of our experiences—the order that leads us to take them as evidence of a three-dimensional 
space of physical objects in which we are mobile occupants—has the same distinctively linguistic 
significance. The patterns of natural phenomena are not logically necessary yet they exhibit a fixed, 
regular order that does not depend on our own will. In the fourth dialogue of the Alciphron
10
, Berkeley 
uses this insight to make one of the most original contributions in the history of natural theology. Relying 
on the widely accepted Augustinian treatment of the problem of our knowledge of other minds, Berkeley 
points out that the same inference from analogy applies to our knowledge of the divine mind: God speaks 
to us in a visible language; he prescribes a regular pattern to our experience, an act that not only creates 
for us an objective sensible world but a medium of communication, a language by which he signifies his 
presence, majesty, rationality, and providential ends, a language that we too may use to bring our lives 
into conformity with such ends. Creation is not a work of design, an abstract form applied to an insensible 
substrate: creation is revelation, the product of directly inspired mind-to-mind speech.  
The position Berkeley takes in elaborating his New Theory of Vision is much more subtle and 
consistent with later developments in vision science than is usually recognized.
11
 Not only does Berkeley 
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deny that distance is a visual quality or that there is any quality in the visual field causally connected with 
distance; he also denies that we have visual ideas or sensations of any spatial quality, neither distance 
(which is the basis of geometrical relations that characterize space, including concrete physical space), 
nor orientation, nor direction (the basis of “handedness” or chirality), nor size, shape, motion or 
dimensionality. Physiologically, the organs of vision are only adapted to the reception of optical 
sensations of light and color. Colors are presented with a concrete set of values that vary across several 
dimensions (hue, saturation, brightness) and thus in this way do possess some degree of ‘purely visual’ 
qualitative structure.  But any physically significant spatial structure and articulation can only be the 
result of the way these qualities and their variation are normally connected with tangible interpretation, 
through psychological associations with kinaesthetic sensations, tactual sensations of resistance, pressure, 
gravity, pleasure and pain. This includes foreground-background relations, segregation, blending, 
interposition, surrounding, and symmetry, as well as perceptions of figure, number, and motion. None of 
the purely visual qualities overlap in content with that of our tangible sensations; and these alone furnish 
us with ideas of space and present the qualities mentioned above, viz., distance, size, and direction. For 
Berkeley, the key association seems to be that of tangible extent with visual extent
12
, so that tactual 
homogeneity of resistance is associated with homogeneity of color, yielding the tactuo-visual concept of 
‘surface’ as the exterior of volume.  
As Schwartz and Atherton point out
13, Berkeley’s disagreement with the “optic writers” or vision 
scientists of his day was not over whether the perception of space was direct or indirect—all writers 
agreed it was indirect. The disagreement arose through Berkeley’s contention, contra the optic writers, 
that the nature of the psychological derivation by which visual sensations were processed into ideas of 
space did not consist of abstract geometrical reasoning from pure visual sensations. Instead the processing 
involved the contingent connections of visual information with tangible ideas of space through learned 
associations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cognitive Brain (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991) not to mention the fact that Berkeley’s empiricist associationism is 
the indirect inspiration for the currently fashionable “enactive” approach to perception as a function of sensorimotor 
intentionality. The link in the chain is the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of 
Perception, Colin Smith, trans. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965)). The former in particular, in his Thing 
and Space: Lectures of 1907. Volume VII of Husserliana (Kluwer, 1997), adopted a rather canonically Berkeleyan 
approach to the idealist construction of space and spatial objects via the sequential coordination of kinaesthetic 
sensations. Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical, C. M. 
Williams, trans. (La Salle: Open Court, 1984), and his influence over Gestalt psychology and theories of perception, 
represents another important transmitter of Berkeleyan phenomenology.   
12
 Though this is something of an oversimplification because, as we will see, even the perception of tactual 
extension is synthesized in the unity of consciousness through the coordination of various data such as the orienting 
datum of the downward pressure of gravity, the feelings of pleasure and pain and the kinaesthetic data of freedom 
and resistance of bodily movement.  
13
 loc.cit. 
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 Beyond their different empirical consequences, the old optic theories and Berkeley’s New Theory 
also impute a different epistemological status to space. If we need nothing more than our visual sensations 
plus certain geometrical ideas to experience space, it must be because visual sensations are apt data for 
the application of spatial reasoning. If geometrical relations apply to them directly, then even if our 
distance perceptions are not direct, there must be some inherently spatial qualities presented by our visual 
sensations and therefore some immediate knowledge of space through vision. Common content between 
geometry and vision, or rather the direct visual perception of (Gaussian) distance, would imply the 
existence of unoccupied space or what Berkeley calls “pure space”. This would make space substantival 
and hence external (ontologically mind-independent). It would contradict the claims of Sec. 116 of the 
Principles, “that we cannot even frame an idea of pure space exclusive of all body”. For Berkeley, pure 
space is an abstraction, a verbal substantive with no idea or concrete apprehension answering to it. All 
ideas of space are in fact ideas of potential kinaesthetic freedom or resistance, as the space is variously 
empty or occupied.
14
 Also, if the language theory of vision were false, then this would encourage the 
belief that natural necessity were just logical necessity and that we could infer the structure of the world 
through a priori reasoning on the basis of sense-data or see it directly. Either way the result would be that 
the physical world would be self-significant or self-interpreting, that it could be conceived and understood 
in its empirical immanence apart from the context of divine revelatory action, apart from the creature’s 
immediately occurring relation to the authority of a creative, intelligent, governing spirit. And this 
Berkeley thinks, as well being disconfirmed by reflection on the phenomenological and scientific facts, 
leads to atheism or idolatry.  
 
V.3  The Heterogeneity of the Senses and the Confinement of the Sensibles 
 
With the reader now having some understanding of what is at stake philosophically and 
                                                          
14
 In the thought experiments by which Newton sought to argue for the explanatory necessity of absolute space 
(Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII), he asks us to imagine water swirling in a 
spinning bucket or two metal spheres attached by a rope spinning around each other. At the same time we are to 
imagine that all other objects are annihilated. The swirling water is turning with and so stationary with the spinning 
bucket, and the metal spheres are uniformly rotating around and so stationary to each other. With no other objects to 
which the motion could be relative, unless we conceive of space as itself absolute it would seem that we are forced 
to say the swirling water and the rotating spheres really are stationary. But the observable effects tell otherwise, for 
centrifugal force causes the water to rise at the edges of the bucket and the rope between the spheres to become 
taught. A Berkeleyan would point out, however, that when we imagine the rope being taught and the water rising at 
the edges we are imagining sensible effects observed from our first-person, embodied perspective. We have not then 
imagined the annihilation of all other bodies. Even “supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own 
body”, if it seems to us that “pure space” remains this only means “that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my 
body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance: but if that too were annihilated, then there could be no 
motion and consequently no space”. For a more in-depth discussion of Newton’s “bucket argument” see Nick 
Huggett, From Zeno to Einstein (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp.122-124. 
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theologically, consider again the central point Berkeley makes in developing his language theory of 
vision, that there is only an arbitrary, contingent connection between visual ideas (as signs) and the tactual 
ideas they give rise to in our minds (including ideas of perceiver-relative space). This proposition seems 
counterintuitive to us at first, since the regularities of this connection are constantly affirmed in 
experience and most people rarely reflect on the connection
15
; but when we do, we recognize the 
qualitative dissimilarity between the two and the possibility of alternative correlations. Some examples 
include the experiments with orientation-inverting goggles
16
 and, perhaps more interesting from a 
practical and theological perspective, the use of “reverse perspective” in Eastern Christian iconography 
(particularly Byzantine and Russian).
17
  
Berkeley himself has several quick points of consideration that are at least kernels of arguments 
for the contingency of the connection between touch and vision. One is that, given the distinctness of the 
respective sense organs and the contingency of human physiology more generally, there is no reason to 
suppose that the minimum visibile, the physiological threshold of optical sensitivity, might not have been 
less than the minimum tangibile. In his own words, 
 
Because our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to be able to see nothing but what 
were less than the minimum tangibile. In which case it is not impossible we might have perceived 
all the immediate objects of sight, the very same we do now: But unto those visible appearances 
there would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes that are now. Which shews the 
judgments we make of the magnitude of things placed at a distance from the various greatness of 
the immediate objects of sight do not arise from any essential or necessary but only a customary 
tie, which has been observed between them.
18
 
 
                                                          
15
 Berkeley himself is careful to address this difficulty. See, e.g., sec. 66 of the Theory of Vision where he compares 
the phenomenological situation of visual signs relating to the tactual ideas they signify to one where there were only 
one universal human language: despite the arbitrariness of the connection between words and objects, we would 
easily but mistakenly come to think of the sound of the word as somehow necessarily connected with the object it 
signifies. 
16
 Or imagine simply looking through a spy glass and trying to stab an enemy with a sword, like Don Quixote tilting 
at windmills.  
17
 The use of reverse perspective is a very compelling way to demonstrate Berkeley’s point about the language 
theory and what we learn about the immaterial nature of space from our perception of it, because the icons are 
widespread in geography and history, and, nowadays, universally accessible. A similar expository use can be made 
of the phenomenon in early Flemish painting of using color cues for distance. Once one becomes accustomed to the 
significance of these cues (which happens surprisingly quickly) one can see the “non-standard” perspective effects 
with ease. Such effects serve to remind us of the same contingency pertaining to standard perspective, which goes 
unnoticed because of its very regularity.  
18
 Theory of Vision, 62, p.194. 
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Another simple observation is that there is actual variation in vision (including visual extent) without 
corresponding variation in touch (including tactual extent), thus demonstrating the possibility of their 
dissociation.
19
 Additionally, perceptual judgments of size and distance may be dissociated from visual 
sensations but not from tactual ones as a result of the application of conceptual categories, so that a castle 
is judged to be far away if it takes up a small portion of the visual but not the tactual field. A castle is thus 
judged to have the same constant size ultimately as a function of tactual determination, even when it 
varies in visual extent.
20
 More generally, even the customary non-tactual cues such as faintness and 
blurriness that we take to be significant for visual spatial perception are easily recognized to be logically 
independent from the spatial qualities whose synthesis they coordinate.
21
 Why could not faintness and 
blurriness of the visual sensation as easily signify proximity and small magnitude as distance and great 
magnitude?
22
 Is there anything in the nature of the sensations themselves that would permit this or is it 
only the prejudice of experience that tells against it? Given their physiological nature, sight and touch 
present us with qualitative sensory content of two distinct kinds, which is confirmed on introspection. 
They are both human ways of sensing. But apart from this what intrinsic qualitative connection could they 
have? What have light and color to do with the kinaesthetic feelings of the body? Berkeley will make this 
“heterogeneity of the senses” the core insight of his perceptual psychology. 
In expounding the New Theory, Berkeley stepwise considers the classical problems of space 
perception, refuting the purported solutions of the geometric theory and establishing the explanatory 
success of his own linguistic alternative. These include the Moon Illusion, the Barrow Illusion, and the 
Inverse Problem. Space is defined by orientation (or direction) and distance among units of qualitative 
content (of some sort or another). Thus the main topics for a theory of space perception are distance and 
situation, with size, figure, number and motion being relevant as entering into the change of distance and 
situation or the nature of spatial occupancy.  
 If Berkeley can show that essential attributes of space and the spatial qualities of objects (and 
even therefore of ‘objecthood’ itself, which is spatially individuated) are constructed through transmodal 
associations in conscious experience, then he will not only have established the explanatory success of his 
theory, he will have shifted the preponderance of evidence towards phenomenalistic idealism and away 
from physical realism in the domain of metaphysics. This is what emerges from Berkeley’s work in vision 
science, as charted below. 
 
                                                          
19
 54-61, pp.190-193. 
20
 cf. 57, although Berkeley’s example here is of a tower. 
21
 58, p.192. 
22
 Berkeley makes the comparison with facial expressions as signs of emotions (65). Anger and shame could be 
indicated as well by wide eyes and smiles as by a furrowed brow and blushing.  
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New Theory        Geometric Theory 
 
Input  Psych. Mediation Output     Input  Psych. Mediation    Output 
 
Faintness, Association with Distance Visual lines, Application of         Distance 
blurriness, tangible ideas    visual angles geometric ideas, 
convergence,        calculations 
accomodation 
 
Faintness, Association with Size  Visual angles, Application of  Size 
blurriness, tangible ideas    distance geometric ideas, 
convergence,        calculations 
accomodation 
 
Color  Association   Situation Visual lines, ….           Situation 
variation,      visual angles 
eye & head  
movements, 
kinaesthetic 
sensations of 
resistance and 
gravity 
 
In summary, the New Theory denies common sensibles of figure, extension, motion, and number and 
asserts the heterogeneity of the pure sensibles and the “confinement thesis” (explained below). The 
geometric theory assumes common sensibles, recognizes heterogeneity of some pure sensibles (such as 
audible tones and tangible distance) but not others (such as visible extent and tangible extent); it 
recognizes a confinement thesis for some pure sensibles (such as tastes and pains) but not others, such as 
visual figure, extension, and motion, as these are thought of as common content between vision and 
taction. Consequently the New Theory supports a replacement of the ‘substance, attribute, mode 
ontology’ of physical realism, which the geometric theory supports. In its place it establishes an idealist 
physical world ontology of logically (mutually) independent pure sensibles, which must be synthetically 
constructed in the organization of perceptual consciousness. Whereas the geometric theory had it that 
sensory ideas represent non-sensory substances, attributes, and modes by means of necessary 
99 
 
mathematical connections or real resemblances, implying the double exemplification of a common quality 
in both a sensation-dependent and sensation-independent way, the New Theory claims that sensory ideas 
represent nothing more than other sensory ideas through logically contingent connections in the 
metaphysics of the mind. These connections/associations, as the “laws of nature”, are analogous to the 
relations among words and sounds, bespeaking an Author of nature who acts as such by decreeing the 
causal order of our sensations.      
 To recognize the confinement thesis for a particular set of sensibles is to recognize that these are 
incapable of instantiation or realization apart from the subjective mental act of sensing, that they are 
‘confined’ to acts of sensing and indeed to the sense-modal realm of which they are pure sensibles. For 
this to be true means that the sensible qualities are ways of sensing or ways of ‘being sensibly appeared 
to’, that they therefore cannot manifest themselves outside of particular episodes of sensory 
consciousness, as features of the content of sensory awareness within those episodes. To put it more 
reflectively, it follows from the confinement thesis about sensible quality X that X is existentially 
dependent on episodes of sensation. This is not to say that X itself is particular rather than universal, only 
that it is concrete and immanent rather than abstract and transcendent. It also means that X is, in its 
fundamental ontological character, entirely mental rather than physical or material, because it is asserted 
to be incapable of concrete mind-independent realization. But this is not to say that from the perspective 
of a subject undergoing an episode of sensory consciousness that X presents itself in its sensory 
realization as something thus mental. It may be that to grasp this fact about X’s true ontological character 
requires further intellectual reflection.  
Whereas it is uncontroversial that some sensible qualities like tastes and pains fall within the 
scope of the confinement thesis, it is not generally agreed to in regard to others, particularly visual 
qualities. Why are we tempted to deny the confinement thesis in regard to these in a way we are not so 
attempted when it comes to tastes and pains? No one would think that headaches were the sort of thing 
that could exist apart from episodes of headache-experience, or tastes of bitterness outside of particular 
episodes of subjective gustatory experience.
23
 What it is that is different about visual sensing that makes 
us more inhibited or even biased against endorsing the confinement of visual qualities, particularly 
(visual) figure, motion, and number?
24
  
                                                          
23
 Note that no claim is being made here that such confined qualities can only be realized within veridical 
experience.  This would certainly be false, as hallucinatory experiences may serve equally well to acquaint subjects 
with the nature of a sensible X. My use of the terms ‘sensory experience’ and ‘episode of sensory awareness’ is 
intended to be neutral with respect to veridicality status.  
24
 Notice that these are the qualities that are (abstractly) thought to ‘resemble’ the traditional Lockean ‘primary 
qualities’ of (abstract) geometric figure, motion, and number. Berkeley’s exposition consistently takes on this very 
contention in his direct engagement with Locke. See Secs. 130 and 132 of the Theory of Vision, but also Secs. 9-20 
of the Principles, where as a part of his argument for metaphysical immaterialism Berkeley attacks any conventional 
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Part of the answer lies in the phenomenology of visual experience which, in order to function 
well, encourages the bias against the confinement thesis. Berkeley both acknowledges and explains this 
by his linguistic theory, as any theory of perception must. Part of the defense of his position on the 
confinement thesis for vision rests on the relative explanatory success of his model versus that of the optic 
writers in regard to the range of problems of perception that any theory must solve. Another part of the 
answer lies in the illegitimate use of abstract terms as if there were real abstract ideas corresponding to 
them. Berkeley’s case against this use rests on his wider case against abstract general ideas in explanatory 
discourse.
25
 To imagine that there is some common content of figure or motion that is equally well 
instantiated in vision and tactition, or in vision and in some mind-independent way outside of sensory 
experience, is to posit an abstract (and indeed transcendent) universal quality of figure or motion. 
Berkeley does not think there is any credible reason to suppose such entities exist and that the mistaken 
conception of such abstract universals is a pernicious source of philosophical confusion and even 
infidelity. Beyond all of this, Berkeley will embark on a direct argument for the confinement thesis in 
regard to visual qualities of figure, motion, and number in the Theory of Vision and even more pointedly 
in the Principles. The heart of the argument is an appeal to the concrete phenomenology of vision, in 
which the supposedly spatial primary qualities are inseparable from (the ‘secondary quality’ of) color as 
regards phenomenal organization. But even here the positive position of Berkeley’s theory—that the pure 
sensibles of vision and tactition are utterly heterogeneous—contributes its force. The final area of 
resource for a denial of the confinement thesis comes from the confusion of the distinct domains of 
explanatory discourse and their relations of explanatory priority. 
 
V.4  Analogous Fields of Discourse: Or Odos and Diastasis Revisited 
 
One of Berkeley’s first tasks in refuting the “optic writers’” geometric theory of vision is to expose the 
spurious grounds that lend their theory the deceptive air of plausibility. Among these is the failure 
adequately to separate the explanatory domains of optics and physiology from the domain of psychology. 
Scientists tend to use words like ‘image’ and ‘extent’, but also ‘eye’, ‘retina’, ‘thing’, ambiguously to 
mean something in the external physical environment or something that explains the psychological 
process of perceptual consciousness. In the former meaning the item in question may be physically 
proximal but nonetheless posterior to the psychological process of perceptual consciousness; such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lockean foundation for a primary / secondary quality distinction. Locke had supported this by combining a 
perceptual direct realism about spatial qualities with a representative theory (perceptual indirect realism) about 
colors and bodily sensations, and so the main of Berkeley’s effort is directed at this basis. The dialectic is explored 
in more detail in the first of the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.   
25
 This “anti-abstraction” argument is most carefully expounded in the Introduction to the Principles, but also more 
briefly in Secs. 127 and 130 of the Theory of Vision, and Secs. 1-5 and 22-24 of the Principles.  
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environmental items are explananda of the psychological process so on pain of circularity cannot directly 
contribute to the explanation of that process.  
Berkeley’s point here is more generally relevant and worth pausing to consider. There seems to 
be a persistent confusion in the history of psychology of identifying the “retinal image”—so-called—with 
some visual sensation. The problem is that sensations are states of phenomenal consciousness, the retinal 
image is not. Confusion is encouraged by the use of the word “image” to describe the pattern of light that 
strikes the retina, in accordance with seemingly analogous cases of optical images, such as “mirror 
image” or photographic “image”. Again, the difference is that the retinal image, unlike any other 
environmental optical image, is supposed to be a stage in the process by which sensations of visual 
awareness come about; it is not itself an object of visual awareness, nor could it be. Under special 
circumstances the image may become visible, but such awareness would not be awareness of the retinal 
image. The retinal image would remain a precondition for visual awareness of the retina, but itself 
invisible. The same confusion can occur in regard to other (external) optical “images” insofar as they are 
considered as transmissive conditions on which the state of  visual sensations depend.    
Even in Berkeley’s own writings there seems to be some discrepancy between the 
phenomenalistic description of physical objects and the equal status of visual and tactual ideas in the 
Principles and the asymmetric weight given to tactual ideas in the New Theory. Happily, though, it is a 
discrepancy that Berkeley himself addresses and explains, making the reader’s task of interpretation a 
relatively straightforward one. Since the New Theory was concerned to explain vision only, it was 
sufficient for Berkeley to give us a psychological account of visible ideas and their objects of awareness. 
With his agenda turning explicitly to a defense of the metaphysical thesis of immaterialism, Berkeley 
must now be ready to address the status of sensory ideas and their objects more absolutely and 
fundamentally. There, but not in the New Theory does it become appropriate for him to explicate a proper 
understanding of the nature of physical space and the status of the objects of tactition,
26
 Throughout his 
work Berkeley consistently adheres to certain methodological maxims that justify shifts in explanatory 
agenda corresponding to shifts in disciplinary domain. The one we must single out here in particular is 
what I would like to call the Principle of Analogous Fields of Discourse (PAFD).
27
 
                                                          
26
 See, e.g.,, his arguments again the modernist notion of ‘pure space’ or absolute space, and the positive argument 
for the immateriality of space in Secs. 116 and 117 of the Principles. Here Berkeley very quickly but incisively 
argues, in particular, for the kinaesthetic significance of physical space. 
27
 This is a conscious modification of the term “Principle of Autonomous Fields of Discourse” coined by Bertil 
Belfrage, “The Scientific Background of George Berkeley’s Idealism”, in Gersh and Moran (2006). The author 
highlights this as a relevant systematic principle of Berkeley’s thought. I prefer my modification because it is more 
faithful to the way technical explanatory terms such as ‘cause’, ‘effect’, and ‘principle’ are used—internally 
autonomously, yes, bur more accurate to say--analogously across explanatory-semantic fields.  
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He articulates the principle most precisely in his treatise on motion, where he is concerned to 
show that while in the study of physics, both ancient and modern, causal properties are attributed to 
objects of nature, this is only in a secondary sense. The attribution is coherent within the mundane 
framework of understanding but thereof constrained by that same framework, so that “The thing is 
explained physically, not by assigning the really acting and immaterial cause, but by demonstrating its 
connexion with a mechanical principle”.28 Thus mechanical explanation only requires subsumption under 
a law, e.g., Newton’s third law of motion in the case of bodily collision. 
 
A body in motion is dashed against another at rest; but we use an active mode of expression, 
saying, that the one impels the other, and not improperly in mechanics, where the mathematical 
rather than the actual causes of things are considered.
29
  
 
Real causes are the content of metaphysics and theology, mathematical hypotheses are the content of 
mechanics. Whereas “In physics, sensation and experience, which only reach apparent effects, are 
admitted”, “in mechanics, the abstract notions of mathematicians are admitted” and “In primary 
philosophy, or metaphysics, we treat of immaterial things, causes, truth, and the existence of things”30. 
Ordinary discourse, mathematical natural science, and philosophy therefore all represent three distinct but 
hierarchically related explanatory frameworks, with three analogously related notions of cause 
corresponding. We can sketch this methodological picture as follows: 
3 Kinds of Cause in Science: 
(A) Secondary or Corporeal Cause as treated in physics, employing merely a phenomenal notion 
of succession or experienced order. 
(B) Mechanical Principles, e.g., axioms, postulates, or other mathematical hypotheses which are 
‘causes’ of physical phenomena in the sense that, when the physical descriptions of 
phenomena are categorized using abstract mathematizable concepts, the mechanical 
principles may entail them as logical consequences.  
(C) Real Primary Causes, as considered in metaphysics and theology, which must always be 
spirits or otherwise immaterial entities.  
The three kinds of cause correspond to three hierarchically ordered fields of inquiry and explanatory 
discourse, viz., descriptive, theoretical, and sacred science. The first two might be thought of more 
generally as ‘natural science’ or the last variously as philosophy, metaphysics, or theology. Each field 
                                                          
28
 De Motu, 69. 
29
 70, emphasis is mine. 
30
 71. 
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represents an internally consistent explanatory enterprise, and one moreover that is analytically or 
conceptually ‘autonomous’ in the sense that its conceptual content cannot be exhaustively analyzed, 
translated, or defined in terms of some other field. There is no discursive reducibility relation between 
them. However, and crucially, the fields are not wholesale independent. From the conceptual-explanatory 
framework of philosophy itself, metaphysics can be understood asymmetrically to set limits on the 
explanatory power of natural science (just as natural science itself sets limits on the explanatory power of 
ordinary, pre-theoretical folk explanations). Natural science’s explanatory significance is asymmetrically 
dependent on explanatory achievements in philosophy. Berkeley makes this clear in his discussion of the 
relation between physics and metaphysics. The notion of ‘cause’ shared between them is an analogous 
one such that the semantic field of its use in physics acquires both its power and limits from its semantic 
field in metaphysics. More specifically, for instance, one finds that the pair of explanatory terms ‘cause / 
effect’ are related across the internal nesting structure of the discursive fields in such a way that the 
‘cause’ of the lower or more restricted field becomes the effect of the one above it. Descriptively, the 
regularity of succession in experience prompts us to say that one when one object collides into another the 
first causes the motion of the second. But in the theoretical science of mechanics we say that both motions 
are effects of a relevant mechanical principle (of gravity or motion, say). Finally in metaphysics we 
recognize that even the applicability of mechanical principles is but an abstractly descriptive regularity 
and as such an effect of some spiritual agency (that is, from the phenomenalistic perspective, a higher-
order organizational effect a spiritual constraint on human sensation).  
Berkeley’s Theory of Vision shows us the PAFD in action. For Berkeley’s linguistic model, as an 
alternative to the geometric one, proceeds, and he believes improves, on the subject of vision by carefully 
distinguishing the relevant fields corresponding to optics (theoretical science) versus physiology 
(descriptive science) versus psychology (a theoretical science autonomous from optics) versus philosophy 
(in which the ontological nature of the sensible objects of perception is regarded). The causes of one field 
become the effects of the other, via an analogous semantic chain running through the discursive fields. 
Other terms are also discourse-specific such as minimum visibile and image. Most of the Theory of Vision 
is carried out in the field of psychology, with optics and physiology thus providing relevant information 
to the investigation of such questions as psychological effects and givenness in perception. The 
psychological conclusions themselves then provide material for the philosophy of the Principles, in which 
‘causes’ described in psychology are regarded as effects.  
The geometric theory of the optic writers could seem plausible only when the inferential steps of 
the mechanics of optics could pass into conclusions about the physiological and psychological processes 
of perception, or where lines and angles could be assumed to characterize the psychological data of 
vision. On the one hand the optic writers took for granted the spatio-structural articulation of the visual 
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stimulus—exactly the organizational effect that perceptual processing is intended to explain—and on the 
other hand they wanted to pretend as if the non-mathematized descriptive physiological processes of 
vision could be capable of carrying out the same geometrical calculations that only the writers’ 
themselves, as scientists, were reflectively capable of. Berkeley’s rigorously defended methodological 
commitments exposed the illegitimacy of these putatively explanatory perceptual models.
31
 They also put 
him in a position to offer a credible alternative, one that in consistently adhering to such commitments 
could recognize that not only are size and distance not visually sensed, but that there is no common 
content, spatial or otherwise, between sight and touch. In particular, what we think of when we think of 
physical space, or make spatial judgments, or even when we introspect the apparent spatial character of 
visual awareness is really a kinaesthetic-relative space, one that is significantly our space, the space we 
inhabit, only because of the contingent way in which the content of our sense-modalities are brough 
together and succeed each other in consciousness.     
 
V.5  The Idealist Construction of Space 
 
To my mind, and for the present purpose of continuing development of Christian idealism, the central 
insight of Berkeley’s Theory of Vision is that all spatial organization in perception is the result of 
contingent associations between heterogeneous and confined sense-modal contents and the special 
‘coordinating data’ of kinaesthetic sensations.32 If alternative structures of association between visual 
sensations and the spatial content of tactile sensations are possible then the association must be contingent 
and hence visual space is not immediately perceived. Berkeley’s theory of vision shows how visual space 
and objects are mediately perceived by being physiologically and psychologically constructed. If we 
follow Berkeley’s scrupulous methodological commitments—as represented in the PAFD—then we 
cannot simply take for granted the givenness of spatial segregation and unitization in the visual field, 
since this is to attribute qualities to visual sensations that are properly tangible. It is to confuse the pure 
visual sensibles of color pattern with the pure sensibles of kinaesthetic pattern.
33
 By making this mistake 
we are led to believe that visual figure, number and motion are common between vision and tactition, 
                                                          
31
 As mentioned, along with the thesis of the heterogeneity of the senses this is the heart of his critical treatment of 
the consensus regarding the solutions of the classical problems of the moon illusion, the inversion of the retinal 
image, and others.  
32
 In addition to Atherton and Schwartz, see Gary Hatfield, The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial 
Perception from Kant to Helmholtz (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), Ch.2, for an examination of Berkeley’s New 
Theory. While Schwartz is the most sympathetic to my own evaluation of Berkeley’s idealist insight, all 
commentators agree on the present interpretation of what is central for Berkeley.  
33
 In a sense, this is as much an error in explanatory order as the geometric theory’s attribution of angles to visual 
input and mathematical reasoning to visual processing. Here we are talking about the synthesis, the association, the 
conscious unity of visual signs and tangible ideas, but in both cases an explanandum, something that should be 
regarded as a psychological product, is assumed in the description of the optical-physiological input 
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rather than the mediated heterogeneous sensibles of total perception in which the sense-data of vision and 
tactition are co-presented, associated, and phenomenologically unified in consciousness. Not only is this 
true for the organization of sensible qualities into discrete units and hence figure and motion, but even for 
the structure of space. 
The experience of coexistence within the sense of touch is foundational for the idealistic 
construction of space. In Berkeley’s analysis visual sensations provide ideas of space only indirectly 
through imaginative associations with tactile sensations. Tactual sensations themselves acquire spatial 
significance indirectly through imaginative associations with each other. But there is a basic sensational 
quality proper to the sense of touch that enables all other spatial qualities. You could call it a quality of 
tactile extension, but this is already a kind of non-basic abstraction from it. Really it is a sensation of 
kinaesthesia, of the body’s immediate responsiveness to the subject’s will. It is the fact that certain acts of 
will, sensorimotor intentions, are directly coordinated in a certain way with sensations of resistance and 
free motion that provide the subject with the experience of the body’s spatial extension through their 
(those of the kinaesthetic sensations) relations with each other. And through the same organization of 
sensorimotor intentions and kinaesthetic sensations that systematically yield the experience of a unified 
spatially mobile body, other qualitatively segregated items are discovered mediately through the body as 
being sources of kinaesthetic resistance. When coordinated in certain patterns of temporal succession 
these sensations are imaginatively associated to yield total, trans-modal sensory experiences of surfaces 
lying in definite spatial relations to the perceiver’s body and so to each other, yielding the interpretation 
of a spatially unified environment and ultimately, at the intersubjective level, of a spatially unified world.   
 Take for example Berkeley’s explanation of how we perceive situation, that is, the place an object 
is located. He takes this up as a challenge of the classical “inverse problem”, or the problem of showing 
how we visually perceive objects as erect and in their perceived right-to-left orientation when it is the 
horizontal and vertical inverse of this visual image that ‘appears’ on the retina. In line with the linguistic 
model of distance and size perception, Berkeley’s solution is to claim that we do not visually sense 
situation at all, not any more than we visually sense distance or size. Strictly speaking (that is, descriptive-
scientifically, in accordance with the PAFD) we only visually sense color variation, as a careful 
attendance to a physiological description of sensing demands (this optical information alone is what our 
eyes are sensitive to). Rather we have learned to associate certain color patterns with the kinaesthetic 
sensations of certain eye and head movements and to coordinate these with the proprioceptive experience 
of the rest of our own body and its attendant feeling of the downward resistance of gravity. So it may 
visually appear to me as if there is bird perched on a tree branch above me and to my right. But speaking 
psychologically this is the result of mediating psychological processing, namely the co-existence or co-
presence of a visual sensation of a certain characteristic ‘bird-on-tree branch’ color pattern, with 
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kinaesthetic sensations of my head and eyes turning in certain characteristic ways with respect to the 
longitudinal axis and downward orientation of my body, established by the sensation of resistance under 
my feet.    
More generally, in Berkeley’s phenomenalistic idealism the physical world of space and objects 
is constructed by ‘coexistence’, ‘succession’, and ‘suggestion’, in a detailed account of divine 
psychophysical linguistics, the theoretical study of the language in which the physical world is created as 
a divine-human dialogue. It is the ‘co-ness’ of coexistence, the togetherness, the ‘belonging to’ of 
phenomenal experience, that is the key to objective worldly reality. This is characteristic of the way, for 
instance, visual figure is presented together with and inseparably from termination of relative 
homogeneity of color (intramodal coexistence), or the sight of the coach in the window with the sound of 
the engine (transmodal coexistence), or the way the visual appearance of the coach in imagination is 
suggested by the sound of the engine (suggestion), or the way the simultaneous visual appearance of the 
coach and a loud sound of the engine follow upon the faint sound of the engine (succession). But notice 
that this notion is dependent on human capacities of sensation and the actual successions of sensation we 
experience, per the divine ordinances. Despite their contingency, these regularities are as much 
regularities for different subjects as they are for the same subject at different times. I would suggest that 
there is something typically communal, participatory, and ecclesial about this feature of reality, with 
revelatory-faith
34
 dialogue at its heart. The ‘co-ness’ or togetherness that gives the world its objective 
character is both a co-ness for me and for you, which, when discovered
35
 makes of the two of us an ‘us’, 
that is, a pair of minds united in our receptivity. The togetherness of the subjects follows logically from 
the togetherness of the experienced sensory qualities and the fact that they are themselves 
intersubjectively available and actually experienced in qualitatively similar ways across subjects as they 
are across different times by the same subject. So when in my conscious experience I find qualities trans-
modally presented as together, say a color quality and a quality of tactile solidity, this spatiotemporal 
coexistence becomes the phenomenal binding glue that prompts me to interpret my sensations as of a 
stable, persistent entity, or in common parlance ‘an object’. This same source of the objectivity of the 
physical world, the way the phenomenal experience of the human mind is externally organized, is also the 
medium of association among human subjects themselves, as their respective natures, situation, and 
relations to one another unfold in the context of the possibility of shared experiences, which qualitatively 
match each other in content and structurally match each other in successive organization. Whatever else 
                                                          
34
 Following the logic of the exposition of faith in the opening of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chapter 11, faith is the 
converse side of the (asymmetric) relation of revelation that characterizes the God-man relation, which includes 
creation, in which the visible is made from the invisible (11:3).   
35
 Which may well be ab initio in some given episode of life, say a child learning a name by the ostension of a 
parent 
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we might be able to conclude about the source and nature of the external control that governs our 
experience, we know that with respect to the sensory character and organization of our conscious lives, 
we are treated and addressed with equal intention and can take this for granted in expressing ourselves 
and communicating with each other. This is what it sounds like to describe and metaphysically theorize 
about the very mundane fact (the most mundane, literally?) that we possess a common world.
36
                                                          
36
 For most of our lives we operate in a mundane framework of understanding, from an empirical perspective within 
the physical world, so that we take it for granted in scientific and everyday discourse. In metaphysics and theology it 
is appropriate that we no longer take the subsistence and organizational unity of the physical world for granted and 
seek to explain it. 
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Part B – Christian Idealism: An Analytic Exposition 
 
Chapter VI: The Nexus of Mind and Matter in Perceptual Consciousness  
 
VI.1  Introduction 
 
At this stage in the overall argument we are still concerned to develop the central thesis of Christian 
idealism, the idea that the existence of the physical world, in its empirical immanence and objectivity, 
might be logically sustained by the way God organizes the unity of sensory consciousness and decrees the 
succession of sensory conscious episodes in relation to human volition. In Chapter V we explored 
Berkeley’s unique contributions to and applications of this thesis. In particular we explored his language 
model of vision, in which the spatial content of vision, including distance, magnitude and direction, is an 
idealist construction afforded by the regular and thematic way in which certain visual and kinaesthetic 
sensations are experienced together in consciousness, so that with the aid of memory, imagination, and 
other cognitive capacities, ordinary visual sensations come to signify tactual ones and so acquire spatial 
meaning. We also examined Berkeley’s claim that there is no common content among the pure sensations 
of the various sense-modalities (the “hetereogeneity of the senses”); the claim that all sensory qualities 
are existentially confined to sensory consciousness and not merely those traditionally regarded by Locke 
and others as the appearances of secondary qualities (the “confinement thesis”); and his Principle of 
Analogous Fields of Discourse (PAFD), in which the mind-world nexus is stratified into three 
hierarchical explanatory domains, the metaphysical, the physical or natural scientific-descriptive, and the 
mechanical or natural scientific-theoretical.  
In V.4 we considered Berkeley’s account of the idealist construction of space in psychological 
terms, adhering to the methodological stricture imposed by his PAFD, which precludes attribution of 
spatial arrangement and unitization to sense-data, the core sensory qualities pertaining to a given sense-
modality. With these results in mind let us turn to the task of providing an exposition of the idealist theory 
of perception and then show how the structure of the physical world may be understood to be 
metaphysically reducible to the nomological organization of human sensory experience. 
It is important for theologians to appreciate the relevance of philosophy of perception to 
metaphysics and therefore to understanding the doctrine of creation. In the study of metaphysics we are 
seeking an account of how the categories of mind and matter are related, and more generally of what 
within creation is ontologically prior to what, or of which created existents are basic and which are 
derivative. Such an account is a proper part of the exposition of the doctrine of creation, of professing 
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how the cosmos God creates is ultimately arranged and organized. In sense perception the categories of 
mind and matter, the two candidates for possessing the status of being ontologically basic, come together 
in the most frequent and conceptually salient way. While memory, imagination, and judgment are ways in 
which the mind may be in conscious relation to the physical, it is sense-perception that constitutes the 
individual subject’s foundational access to the physical. In the creed we confess our belief in God the 
Father, who creates all things, visible and invisible. Already here we have a clue to the fundamental status 
of the perceptual modality to our basic metaphysical categories. Dogmatics must give an exposition of 
visible creation as it is actually presented to us in perceptual consciousness, as that which has significance 
for us at our empirical viewpoint. Conversely, any systematic understanding of what God creates must be 
coherent with an account of how we can have perceptual—and thus cognitive—access to creation as it is 
conceived dogmatically.   
This is more challenging than theologians often recognize. Most of the time we take for granted 
that the sensible appearances presented to consciousness place us in cognitive contact with physical 
objects. Pre-critically, we assume that these objects are both genuinely characterized by the sensible 
qualities presented to consciousness and non-mental “things”—persistent, space-occupying entities with 
their own distinctively physical intrinsic attributes and independent causal powers. In fact, however, when 
we reflect on the phenomenological features of perceptual experience and the factors relevant to a 
scientific explanation of how they are produced, it becomes very difficult to maintain the pre-critical 
position. In the present chapter, I introduce this “problem of perception” along with an idealist solution 
that involves an ontology of sensory universals, or qualia, and a definition of physical objecthood in 
terms of nomic and phenomenal relations among qualia. Such an account of objecthood also allows us to 
give an elegant account of the mundane causal order of perceptual experience across normal and deviant 
episodes in a way that explains why genuine physical objects and events are taken to be causally 
efficacious in producing perceptual episodes.   
 
VI.2  Realism, Idealism, and Perceptual Theory 
 
Any theory of perception must be aimed at treating the “problem of perception”. There are two 
aspects to the problem which must be distinguished and yet recognized to be connected and to exhibit 
parallels. Metaphysically the problem is to determine the relation between the immediate object of 
perception and the physical items that enter into our physical theories, ordinary or scientific.
1
 Set up in 
                                                          
1
 The metaphysical version of the problem of perception is structurally similar to the epistemological version, which 
emphasizes the corresponding complications that arise from the purported justificatory gap between the information 
that is strictly available to the subject from introspection of the subject’s experience and the implications carried by 
the perceptual judgments that the subject is prompted to make on the basis of these experiences.     
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this classical way, the problem is what G.E. Moore described as that of determining the ‘belonging to’ 
relation.
2
 Moore introduced the term ‘sense datum’ to refer to the immediate object of perception, as 
presented to sensory awareness within a conscious mental episode. Until a theory of perception 
determines what the belonging to relation is, the sense datum retains a metaphysically neutral status, 
neither mental nor physical, neither public nor private, capturing only what sensibly appears to the 
perceiving subject, whatever is available within the content of sensory awareness for conscious attention. 
Moore’s own example involved that of a white, rectangular array in the visual field (the sense datum) and 
an envelope (a physical item). On account of our practices of conceptual interpretation and perceptual 
judgment, we would all agree that there is at least some practically significant relation of ‘belonging to’ 
between these two items, whatever it turns out to be on investigation. Even at this bare conceptual level of 
description the items are different enough that the relation cannot be one of identity. The qualitative 
character of the sense datum, as sensibly presented to Moore on a particular occasion, is dependent on the 
perspective from which he views it. Its color and shape would both visually appear differently under 
suitably variant conditions of lighting and situation. But the envelope, as a physical item, is not conceived 
to be thus perceiving-relative. Moreover the envelope, as a 3-D continuant, is conceived of as existing at 
places and times when the sense datum need not be. The envelope is conceived of as having a reverse side 
even when this side is not given to sensory awareness, and the frontal side of the envelope, which is 
given, is conceived of as temporally persisting (together with the spatially-whole envelope of which it 
forms a spatial part) through times at which it is not viewed, at times, for example, when Moore turns his 
head away or before he comes into the room.
 3
 The sense datum may for all that be determined, on 
investigation, to be identical to the frontal face of the envelope, as it would be on a so-called “naïve” or 
“strong direct” realist theory, but still in that case it would not be that the sense datum was identical with 
the total envelope itself.     
Perceptual theories fall into two broad categories according to their determinations in regard to 
the ‘belonging to’ relation: (ontologically) direct theories and (ontologically) indirect theories. Direct 
theories take the relation to be an ontologically intimate one such as constitution, existential instantiation 
or the mereological relation of part-whole. Indirect theories take the relation to be some ontologically 
weaker relation of resemblance, causal dependence, or even some combination of the two (perhaps with 
                                                          
2
 Moore (1910). 
3
 To express it in Husserl’s terms (see Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und 
phänomenologische Philosophie (Husserliana Volume III, 1976), the point of Moore’s exercise is to note the 
difference between the naïve or “natural attitude” of everyday life in which we pass unreflectively from what is 
immediately given in the structure of sensory consciousness—the sense datum—to our interpretation of that datum 
as an envelope  But in the phenomenological attitude of “transcendental philosophy” we can suspend interpretation 
and judgment and reflectively attend to the qualitative character of the sensory given. In result, we discover that the 
envelope and sense-datum are two non-identical objects of consciousness.  
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the addition of further factors as well). Direct theories in turn divine into those that are paired with the 
metaphysical thesis of physical realism and those paired with the thesis of (phenomenalistic) idealism. 
Recall that physical realism claims that the physical world (consisting of physical space, time, items, and 
facts) is ontologically fundamental and independent of the human mind, while idealism denies both 
claims. For this reason, while potentially agreeing as to the nature of the ‘belonging to’ relation, direct 
perceptual theories may differ significantly as to their claims about the metaphysical status of sense data. 
For instance, a direct (physical) realist will claim that, being ontologically intimate with realistically 
construed physical items, sense data inherit the mind-independence of the physical items to which they 
belong; whereas the idealist will claim that physical items are logical constructions from the phenomenal 
presentations in which the (thus mental) sense data that belong to them occur, so that, because physical 
items need not be capable of an ultimate non-mental existence, there is no barrier to their being derived 
entirely from the actual and potential phenomenal presentations that belong to them.   
Bearing in mind the difference between physical realism and idealism, we may usefully recognize 
the broad three-fold division of perceptual theories as direct, indirect, and idealist. Notice that while it 
would be logically permissible to combine an indirect perceptual theory with the denial of physical 
realism, it is very difficult to conceive of the motivation for doing so. The reason for dissenting from a 
direct theory would be some inferred incongruity or mismatch between the nature of sense data and the 
nature of physical items. But without the belief that physical items, or the physical world more generally, 
form part of ultimate reality, what could prompt one to discredit the intuitive pre-theoretical commitment 
formed on the basis of experience that physical items genuinely possess the qualities that they are 
phenomenally presented to us has having? Indirect theories come at the cost of attenuating our perceptual 
and hence primary epistemic access to the physical world. For this reason, historically significant 
examples of indirect perceptual theories, such as those of Descartes, Locke, and the 20
th
 century ‘critical 
realists’4, are always paired with physical realism, while phenomenalistic idealism is always paired with a 
direct perceptual theory.  
A theory of perception must not only answer the question posed by the problem of perception in 
Moore’s sense, that of determining the ‘belonging to’ relation. It must also give a satisfactory account 
more generally of how perceptual contact with physical items is achieved in a way that accommodates the 
known phenomenological and scientific facts. On the phenomenological side, a perceptual theory must 
show how contact is achieved through a sensory appearance that is both qualitatively appropriate to the 
kind of item perceived and respects the potential qualitative indistinguishability of a given item-
                                                          
4
 See Michael Ayers, “Ideas and Objective Being” in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds., The Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),  Locke: Epistemology 
and Ontology (London: Routledge, 1991), and Durant Drake et al. Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study 
of the Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan & Co., 1916). 
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perception with episodes of illusion and hallucination. On the scientific side, a theory must show how 
phenomenologically appropriate perceptual contact is compatible with the scientifically described 
conditions of causal production, distal and proximal.  
Let us reflect on each of these two desiderata in turn. Imagine a case where every time I look at a 
yellow school bus I have a perceptual experience as of a red balloon, or an experience presenting me with 
the sensory quale of a red balloon. Obviously, in light of the gross mismatch between the phenomenal 
content of my experience and the true sensible character of the yellow school bus, such an experience 
cannot be considered a genuinely perceptive one. Failure of perceptual contact would remain even if 
every time I looked at a yellow school bus I had the same red-ballon-type sensation. We may suppose 
further that when I looked at a red balloon I had an experience as of a yellow bus, and in particular a 
yellow-school-bus-type sensation. In that case even despite the unique one-to-one correspondence 
between objects and the phenomenal content of my experiences I could not be credited with seeing either 
the yellow school bus or the red balloon. The reason simply is that, although there may be evidence that I 
am ‘tracking’ the yellow school bus and so in some sense psychologically in an information-bearing 
relationship with its spatial presence, I am not registering the presence of the school bus in a way that is 
phenomenologically appropriate to its sensible character. There may be systematic covariation and thus 
grounds for recognizing such ‘tracking’ to amount to a form of cognitive contact, but this is analogous to 
case of radar detection, not perception. While we speak loosely in everyday language of an operator 
seeing an airplane when he looks at certain blip on a radar screen, strictly speaking we recognize a 
significant difference between this and genuine perceptual contact.  Phenomenologically appropriate 
perceptual contact must allow us to understand certain basic facts about perceptual contact, namely that it 
enables demonstrative identification (even if this is just pre-conceptual, bare selective attention or 
discrimination and recognition under varying contexts), and that it puts certain aspects of an item’s 
sensible appearance on display in a way that makes them available for cognitive scrutiny. These 
conditions are not met in the cases above.     
For a perceptual experience to be phenomenologically appropriate to its object, some non-
veridicality may be tolerated among the sensory qualia presented to me, some (though not total) mismatch 
between the object’s sensible character and the phenomenal content of the experience. If, due to whatever 
pathology, I were to see the yellow school bus as red, or the red balloon as yellow, I would still be 
credited with seeing these objects, as long as there is some sufficient amount of the object’s true sensible 
character that does match the phenomenal content of my experience so that at least some of its sensible 
character would be available for demonstrative identification and cognitive scrutiny, say the object’s 
shape or spatial relationship to my body and other environmental objects. 
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On the other hand, consider a case of hallucinating a certain circular patch of orange and then 
looking at an actual orange before one at the breakfast table in such a way that the hallucinated orange 
patch spatially overlays the actual orange. Or consider a case of seeing a mirror image of a stone pillar in 
a museum, where the image spatially overlays a real pillar
5
. Here the problem is not that the sensible 
appearance consciously presented to the subject is inappropriate to the object’s own sensible 
appearance—indeed, by hypothesis there is a perfect match between them—rather the problem is that the 
object does not seem to be causally responsible for the experience in the right way. In the case of the 
orange, one problem is that the actual orange on the breakfast table is not the initiator of the causal 
process that is responsible for my hallucination. The neural process that is the proximal cause of my 
experience was, say, initiated by the ingestion of a psychotropic substance instead. Similarly in the pillar 
example, even though there is no hallucination involved and even though the phenomenal content is 
appropriate to the would-be perceptual object, the pillar perceived is only the mirror image of the one 
behind the subject, not the one in front of him. Interestingly, even when the would-be object is the 
initiator of the causal chain leading to the phenomenally appropriate experience, we would still be loath to 
credit the subject with perceptual contact because of the possibility of “deviant causal chains”. Suppose 
through a sufficiently clever configuration of mirrors, the pillar visually displaced by the mirror image is 
the very same one in the mirror image. In that case, the optical conditions of the transmissive process 
intervening between the candidate object and the subject’s neural process are too deviant to credit the 
subject with perception. One potential problem is that the candidate object and the phenomenal content of 
the subject’s experience may lack the appropriate patterns of counterfactual dependence: slight changes in 
the subject’s position might result in drastic changes in phenomenal content or even eliminate the pillar as 
the initiator of the causal chain altogether. At the very least then we can say that the object targeted for 
perceptual awareness must be the initiator of a nondeviant causal chain and must stand in a relation of 
systematic covariation with other possible experiences possessing appropriately matching phenomenal 
content
6
.    
The challenge for a theory of perception is to offer an account that shows how perceptual contact 
it achieved with physical items under the appropriate sensible appearances and through the appropriate 
(object-initiated, nondeviant) causal chains. The difficulty of providing an account of how this is possible 
is what generates the “problem of perception”. It consists in the mutual incompatibility among the 
following three propositions, each of which seems well-supported: 
                                                          
5
 H.P. Grice, “The Causal Theory of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 
(1961), pp. 121–52. 
6
 While necessary, even these conditions are not sufficient to ensure that the causal process leading to an experiential 
episode if of the appropriate type for perceptual contact. For more on examples like those above and how they 
should be treated theoretically, see David Lewis, 'Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision,' Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1980): 239-249. 
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(i)   Perceptual access to physical items is unmediated. 
(ii)  Physical items are mind-independent.  
(iii) Sense data (the immediate objects of sensory awareness) are mind-dependent.   
 
Any two together are tenable, but not all three. Direct and indirect realism agree on (ii). Direct realism 
and idealism agree on (i). Indirect realism and idealism agree on (iii). (i) and (ii) capture the most intuitive 
features of perceptual experience based on its phenomenology, which we are inclined to accept prior to 
philosophical reflection and analysis. The main support for (iii), which puts pressure on the theorist to 
give up either (i) or (ii) is from the fact that the qualitative appearances by which physical items are 
presented to sensory awareness are in various ways dissociated from the items of which they are putative 
presentations. Some of the factors that contribute to this dissociation come from the familiar facts of 
illusion and hallucination, other factors come from the way modern science has come to describe the 
physical properties of observable items in terms of micro-structure, energy distribution and, ultimately, 
abstract mathematical properties, so that the significant features of the physical environment that feature 
in causal explanations of organism’s perceptual episodes make no reference to the phenomenal content of 
sensible appearances. A perceptual theory may therefore account for informational contact with the 
physical in terms of tracking or systematic covariance between environmental and psychological features, 
but with no account of how such tracking counts as genuinely perceptual contact, with contact achieved 
through the phenomenal qualitative features that an item is presented as having in sensory awareness. 
Alternatively, a perceptual theory may account for phenomenologically appropriate contact by attributing 
subjectively presented qualitative features to physical items, but with no plausible account of how such 
features play a perception-appropriate causal role in cases of veridical and seamlessly indistinguishable 
illusory cases.  
The assumption that prohibits a  perceptual theory from accomplishing both accounts in a 
harmoniously unified way is that of physical realism, which takes physical items to be non-mental and 
ontologically basic, part of an ultimate account of what there is. If physical items are non-mental, how 
could they have the apparently mental qualities which are presented as belonging to them in sensory 
consciousness? And if they are ontologically basic, how could they fail to be responsible for producing 
perceptions of them and for imprinting their qualitative character on the content of perception? Science 
cannot be expected to help the realist address the problem of perception. To the contrary, the very scope 
and method of scientific investigation limits it to a discovery of physically-functional structure rather than 
intrinsic content, be it of space-time or matter. The very success of science is due to the fact that it limits 
the scope of its theorizing to what is either directly empirically detectable or what may be shown to have 
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empirically detectable logical consequences. This important point is one that I shall return to in a further 
evaluation of realism in Chapter VII.  
In the sections that follow, my aim is to sketch a Berkeley-inspired idealist theory of perception 
that attempts to solve the problem of perception by providing an account of how phenomenologically and 
causally appropriate perceptual contact with physical items is made. In Ch.VII, my ambition will expand 
to a broader consideration of how the physical world is idealistically constructed. The idealist theory may 
be argued for recognizing the following Berkeleyan theses, familiar from Chapter V. First, the thesis of 
the heterogeneity of the senses: this forces us to recognize intrinsically dissimilar sensory qualities for 
each sense-modality, most significantly colors (hue, saturation, and brightness, or even just hue), sounds 
(or even just pitches), tactual uniformity and variegation (though even these require an admixture of co-
presented kinaesthetic sensation), in addition to proprioceptive qualities such as kinaesthesia and (foot-
ward) gravitational pressure. Kinaesthetic components combine in consciously experienced simultaneity 
(of durational extent) to produce tactual sensations of uniformity or variegation (intuitively roughness and 
smoothness), resistance and penetrability. This leads to the thesis that kinaesthesia and proprioception 
when co-presented with pure visual sensations of color pattern spatially organize the visual field into 
up/down and right/left hemispheres and ultimately to an egocentrically forward depth dimension, yielding 
complex visual sensations of shape, contour, distance, occlusion, symmetry, and other ‘higher-order’ 
gestalten, or ‘transposable’ stabilities invariant under various temporally extended environmental actions, 
including sensorimotor changes in bodily position, route of approach, and reversing of route of approach.  
The heterogeneity of the senses forces us to recognize that the concomitance and regularity of the 
sensory qualities which feature in the content of sensory awareness are the logical product of the way the 
pure, intrinsically unrelated sense-modal qualities are unified in consciousness and sequentially related in 
ways that are regular at the level of experiential order. If, furthermore, we adjoin to this the confinement 
thesis, and recognize that the sensory qualities themselves are incapable of an ultimate non-mental 
realization, then we have a compelling alternative to physical realism. Rather than thinking of the 
physical environment as causally imposing its own mind-independent structural order and imprinting its 
own qualitative character on experience, these two theses in combination invite us to consider the 
alternative hypothesis of phenomenalistic idealism, that the regularity and thematic character of the 
physical world is the logical product of the systematic causal constraints on human sensory experience, 
deriving the qualitative nature of its very spatio-temporal and material core from the way sensible 
appearances are disposed to present themselves to human consciousness.  
 
VI.3  An Ontology of Sensory Universals 
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Now that it is clear what demands a theory of perception must meet, how does an idealist theory 
propose to meet them? Idealism takes the state of perceptual consciousness to consist in act of sensory 
awareness and a qualitative given presented to the conscious subject. Additionally, under standard 
circumstances the sensory-qualitative given will be schematized under some interpretation, typically 
involving the deployment of conceptual resources. This interpretative element need not be voluntary nor 
the result of conscious reflection. So, like a sense-datum theory, idealism takes perceptual consciousness 
to admit of an act-object analysis; and furthermore, it takes the phenomenally conscious (intentional, not 
‘real’ in the Scholastic sense) object to feature a minimal core of sensory-qualitative content and typically 
an interpretative element as well. The sensory core of perception will consist in what Berkeley calls the 
“pure sensations”, namely those qualities confined to a certain sense-modality, which may be structured, 
coordinated, and syncretized in variously complex ways, including various higher-order relations, which, 
when presented as a unified totality, is coextensive with the total intrinsic character of sensory awareness 
and is a candidate for an interpretation as a physical scene. 
To my mind, the most promising strategy for explicating an account of sensible creation in 
phenomalistic-idealist terms and simultaneously for providing an adequate theory of perceptual 
consciousness, is to introduce an ontology of sensory universals and to regard total appearances as 
complexes of sensory universals
7
, bound together synchronically and diachronically by the structure of 
consciousness. This account will allow us to understand in some detail how the physical world of space, 
time, and objects is constructed out of the elements of sensory experience. More specifically, in 
accordance with Berkeley’s confinement thesis, our preferred strategy is to define sensations as ultimate 
realizations of a quale, a sensory type or concrete universal. With the sensory realization of a quale as 
fundamental, we may then define sensory awareness of a quale as merely just such a realization (indeed 
an ultimate realization) of a quale in an episode of conscious awareness, the intrinsic character of the 
quale being self-revealed insofar as it is of the nature of episodes of conscious awareness to be so self-
revealing.  
For a given sense modality S, let us say an S-modal quale is a determinate S-modal sensation-
type: it “forms or has the capacity to form”8 the content of an S-sensation. In addition to the commonly 
recognized five sense modalities, this definition will hold for the special class of bodily or somatic qualia, 
                                                          
7
 It should be understood that the individuation conditions for sensory universals are determined by the intrinsic 
qualitative character of what is given in sensory consciousness, which includes primitive sense-modal qualities that 
are intrinsic-qualitative rather than spatiotemporal ones, so that if there are two copies of the same Munsell color 
chart on the table, with each chart containing 50 color squares, then there are still only 50 color qualia instances on 
the table and not 100 (of course not counting the color border of the charts, the color of the print and the color of 
table surface itself). 
8
 Here my exposition follows that of Foster in Chapter 6 of The Case for Idealism, but also The Nature of 
Perception,  pp.188-195. 
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which feature so centrally in the idealist construction of space. In accordance with Berkeley’s claim about 
the heterogeneity of the senses, it is important to start by first defining the S-modal qualia. This done, we 
define total sense qualia from S-modal sense qualia in a straightforward way, as complexes of S-modal 
sense qualia unified by phenomenal co-consciousness, or “co-existence” to use Berkeley’s term. In this 
way, a total sense quale is a determinate total sensation type forming or having the capacity to form the 
content of total sensory awareness within a given phenomenally unified episode of sensory awareness. It 
follows that (*) ultimate non-sensory realization of sense qualia is impossible and that a quale exists (as 
the sensory universal that it is) if and only if it is capable of sensory realization, or of forming the content 
of sensory awareness within a conscious episode of sensation. As Foster points out
9
, this same strategy, 
while respecting the confinement thesis, also enables us to distinguish sensing from imaging not 
functionally but intrinsically, deriving imaging from sensing: to image a quale is to form a transparent 
conception of a quale. This explains why the capacity for imaging a certain quale essentially involves a 
perspectival conception, a knowing of what it is like consciously to sense such a quale.  
 The present definition and theory of qualia owes many of its details to the theory of A.J. Ayer’s 
mature phenomenalism, which was itself a late-flowering development of the long-standing British 
phenomenalist tradition of Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and Russell.
10
 Ayer in particular gets credited for 
embracing the move from sense-data as particulars to sense qualia as universals—a move pioneered by 
the American pragmatist tradition of C.S. Peirce, William James, C.I. Lewis, and Nelson Goodman
11—
and adopting it for phenomenalist theoretical purposes. In his own words,  
 
Anything counts as a quale that a person is able to pick out as a recurrent or potentially recurrent 
feature of his sense-experiences, from a two-dimensional colour expanse to a complex three-
dimensional gestalt”.12  
 
With this definition Ayer allows qualia to be both simple and complex, primitive and derived, intramodal 
and transmodal. Goodman, he notes, would have restricted visual qualia to the primitives of color, place, 
and time and what can be defined wholly in terms of them. Because Ayer is interested in the theory of 
knowledge rather than developmental or perceptual psychology, he allows himself a greater—indeed 
total--range of sensory pattern to come under the scope of his technical term. Qualia are moreover neutral 
                                                          
9
 In loc. cit., pp.102-107 
10
 See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Mill (1865/1967), Russell’s Analysis of Mind and Analysis of Matter.  
11
 See James, An Essay on Radical Empiricism. Lewis, Mind and World Order, Goodman, The Structure of 
Appearance.  
12
 A. J. Ayer, Origins of Pragmatism (London: Macmillan Press, 1968), p.309. 
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with respect to explanatory theorizing, whether everyday or scientific theorizing, so their “reference is 
solely to the quality…irrespective of provenance’.13  
We noted above that it is important to distinguish the class of somatic qualia because of their role 
in the idealist construction of space and what I will call the ‘somatocentricity’14 of qualia or of the total 
(transmodal) sense field. As we saw with Berkeley’s New Theory, the somatic qualia of downward 
gravitational resistance and kinaesthetic sensations of eye, head and limb movements act as coordinating 
data for the somatocentric organization of other (putatively environmental) sensory qualities. Because of 
the way (tangible) spatial and somatic (in particular kinaesthetic) sensory types are concretely inseparable 
as such (in virtue of what they intrinsically are, in a self-revealing way in consciousness), there is no 
ultimate non-sensory realization of tangible spatial types. Because of the way visual spatial types are 
concretely inseparable from tangible spatial types, there is no ultimate non-sensory realization of visual 
spatial types. From the above it follows that there is no ultimate non-sensory realization of physical 
spatial types. This means that, again in accord with the Berkeleyan theory, physical space is a 
nomological construction or coordination among the concrete sensory experiences of human beings.  
What we soon would like is to be able to show how it is reasonable to suppose that there is such a 
nomological organization of sensory qualia.
15
 This would establish the coherence of idealism and shift 
critical attention to the question of the coherence of realism. Even in the domain of perceptual theory, the 
idealist can feel confident that he has a leg up on the realist. For it is by rejecting the realist assumption 
and by adopting a phenomenalist definition of physical objecthood that the idealist can solve the problem 
of perception. The very coherence of the account thus acts as an onus-generating rejoinder to the would-
be physical realist, a challenge to account for our perceptual access to the physical world understood as 
something ontologically primitive and independent of the facts of human sense experience. Given the 
explanatory success of the idealist account, the challenge to the realist now presents itself as one that 
leaves him with a burden to achieve the same success but with resources of only dubious value. This 
challenge will become sharper in the next chapter, when we move out from an account of perceptual 
access to a wider consideration of the idealist’s construction of the physical world. Once the theory of 
everyday or commonsense physics is shown to be logically sustained by facts of an idealist kind, facts 
having to do with the thematic character and organization of sensory experience, it strikes one that a 
physical realist alternative would have to avail itself of facts of a rather abstract kind, facts stipulating 
entities that enjoy an ultimate non-sensory realization. But given the truth of the confinement thesis, such 
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 Ibid., p.310. 
14
 Borrowing the term from H.H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen, 1935), Ch.1. 
15
 This will be taken up in two stages over Chs.VII-VIII, first by showing how the nomological organization of 
sensations is sufficient together with our conceptual endowment for logically creating the empirical world; and 
second, by showing how there could be such a prephysical nomological organization.  
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entities (and therefore the facts involving them) would not resemble anything found in the content of 
sensory experience and therefore would not be things of which we can form any transparent conception 
through sense-imagination or memory. This strongly suggests that the only conceptual resources to hand 
for such a project would be those of an a priori genesis or of a highly abstract nature. Either way, being 
non-phenomenal they would have a hard claim to being physical (they would probably have to be logical 
or mathematical) or even physically relevant, since either way they would be theoretically inert with 
regard to empirical evidence.  
 
VI.4  Perceptual Error and Objecthood 
 
On an idealist theory, partial and total hallucinations are regarded as episodes in which a subject 
is in an unmediated psychological relation to sensible qualities—i.e. individual sensible attributes—that 
lack the kind of unity that characterizes the object of perception. The (potential) subjective 
indistinguishability of such episodes is then explained by the qualitative similarity among the qualities 
themselves. This is an ontological solution and an “object-side” solution. It is an object-side solution in 
that it seeks to explain the similarity of perceptive and deviant episodes by appeal to a genuine qualitative 
similarity located in the object of awareness. On such a view, we maintain that the psychological relation 
of awareness is exactly the same across perceptive and deviant episodes, being unmediated in both cases, 
in accord with (i) above. It is an ontological solution because it accounts for the structural difference 
among perceptive and deviant episodes in terms of the contrasting ontological status of their objects: 
perceptions are episodes that involve a direct relation of awareness to sensory qualia that belong to a 
collection of such qualia that are so related to each other that they possess a qualitatively replete and 
endurant structure; whereas illusions and hallucinations involve the same direct relation of awareness to 
impoverished collections of sensory qualia, possessing relatively less coherence and endurance. The 
difference is a matter of degree on such an account, and this is desirable since it puts us in a position to 
explain the fact that there can be subjectively seamless transitions between hallucinations, illusions and 
veridical perceptions. Indeed, the subjective seamlessness of the transitions would be explained by the 
fact that the ontological status of the respective objects itself differs only by degree.
16
  
                                                          
16
 The need for a theory of perception to account not only for the subjective indistinguishability of perceptions and 
deviant episodes but also the possibility of seamless transitions between them is brought into focus by Foster (2000), 
who makes the difficulty of accounting for such seamlessness the point of an aggressive attack against strong direct 
realism (Part Two, 4, III). But see Mark Johnston, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination,” Philosophical Studies 
103 (2004):113-183, for a thoughtful direct realist defense to this challenge. He takes other naïve realists and 
disjunctivists—and in particular Hilary Putnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999)—to task for being dismissive of this explanandum. Johnston himself goes on to offer a non-
disjunctivist solution that is also both ontological and object-side; it involves a hylomorphic ontology of sensible 
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The phenomenon of illusion and hallucination suggest that the sensible natures of things can be 
mimicked, or dissociated from the physical particulars that possess them. On reflection this is already 
obvious from the phenomena of mirror images, wax statues, and artificial flavors, among others. If the 
sensible appearance of a thing can be dissociated from it, then either sensible appearances are universals 
that are multiply instantiated, or what we regard as ‘things’ are merely constituted by individual sensible 
qualities that bear certain nomic (phenomenological) relations to each other and can recombine to form 
multiple ‘things’. In fact I shall consider and endorse both options. On the view I propose, a physical 
object just is a lawfully related series of potential appearances that trace out a continuous and fairly 
enduring path through space-time, with a fair amount of structural coherence (relative to surroundings) 
among its constituent appearances. A ‘dissociated appearance’, such as one finds in illusion and 
hallucination, is just a collection of appearances (or possibly even a single one) that is less enduring and 
less structurally coherent. What hallucinations suggest is only that just as dissociated appearances can 
arise from optical activity, so too can they arise from nervous activity. Just as a mirage, Fata Morgana, or 
mirror image arises from interference with the rectilinear propagation of light waves, so can interference 
with the working of neural processes give rise to an appearance qualitatively similar to ‘an appearance of 
x’ where this is no x, i.e. a complex of sense qualia qualitatively similar to but ultimately lacking the unity 
of the complex that we identify with x.  
Customarily, we assume that an appearance is always an appearance of some spatiotemporal 
particular (or a complex scene of such particulars). But this can be understood in one of two ways. On a 
hylomorphic conception, there is a substance with a material substrate that allows the substance to gain 
and lose attributes over time while maintaining its unity and identity. But there is an alternative 
conception, on which the substance is constituted by, and is nothing over and above, the individual 
appearance qualities that would manifest themselves under certain conditions to suitable observers. This 
is what is sometimes called a “phenomenal conception”17 of physical objects. Though it may be paired 
with physical realism to yield a “phenomenalist direct realism”, we shall be endorsing the phenomenalist 
view in connection with idealism.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
universals that are fully instantiated, partially uninstantiated, and totally uninstantiated by physical particulars in 
veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination respectively. Though I am sympathetic with Johnston’s 
understanding of the dialectical situation and his strategy against the disjunctivist, he leaves unanalyzed and 
unexplained what it is for a physical particular to “instantiate” a sensible universal, and so crucially to account for 
how this is different from the way such universals feature in the presentational content of hallucinations while 
remaining “uninstantiated”. Because the idealist has no intention of distinguishing instantiation in the content of 
sensory awareness, veridical or otherwise, from physical instantiation, he is untroubled by this problem.   
17
 Though one finds such a conception in Berkeley, and even earlier as we have seen in Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Scotus Eriugena, the term was introduced by the nineteenth century psychologist Gustav Fechner. See Michael 
Heidelberger, “The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical 
Parallelism” in Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon, eds., Cogprints (Pittsburgh University Press, 2003), 
pp. 233--262.  
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 Insofar as the conscious character of hallucination is accounted for by a description of the object-
side of the perceptual relation
18
, our sense qualia version of phenomenalistic idealism is similar to a 
sense-datum theory. Veridical perception is distinguished over and against illusion and hallucination by 
what the mind is phenomenally aware of, just as we naively or pre-philosophically assume to be the case. 
Perception is distinguished by the ontological nature of what falls on the object-side of the awareness 
relation, namely a complex of sensory qualities having the kind of enduring qualitative stability or 
completeness characteristic of physical continuants. The same psychological relation of awareness and 
similar sensible qualities obtain in subjectively similar perceptions and hallucinations. There is no shell of 
attributes covering the material kernel of the physical item that would keep perception from reaching all 
the way to it. Instead of an insensible material substrate, there is a characteristic structure, a lawlike 
organization of sensible qualities by closely-knit phenomenal spatiotemporal relations, perception of 
which induces us to identify the structure as a physical item and to classify it in various ways according to 
our concepts, theories, and customs.  
The sensible appearances presented in experience are typically sense qualia possessing the 
complex structure of a total scene. They are structured in the sense that they involve intrinsic qualities 
(colors, textures, but also spatial qualities such as shape, size, etc., and temporal duration), relational 
qualities (being before me and to my right, being oriented away from me by such and such degrees, 
surrounding color c, being articulated against color c, etc.), and higher order relations constructed out of 
both of these. Notice that relational qualities can be constructed out of individual n-ary relations with up 
to n – 1 places of the relation occupied by particulars, e.g. relations such as x_surrounds_color_c, where x 
is a variable but c is a constant term, i.e. a name.  
The sensible appearances that form the content of awareness in hallucination are also complex 
qualia; only in hallucination they are structurally impoverished, lacking the coherence and consistency of 
genuine physical continuants, that is, the qualia brought before the mind are not sensibly spatiotemporally 
related to other qualitatively similar qualia so as to form a maximal collection of lawfully related qualia. 
By lacking such coherence and consistency, such hallucinated appearances lack the nomic potential for 
availability at different times and places. It is this that makes them relatively less objective and public and 
so less likely to be attributed causal properties or feature in the content of physical theory. 
                                                          
18
 The need for an object-side solution is imperative given the fact that hallucinations can be a source of new 
knowledge by acquaintance, new sensible quality apprehensions. This is also emphasized by Johnston as one of the 
motivations for such an account. In a sense, however, the fact that hallucination as well as perception can be a 
source of new knowledge by acquaintance was already emphasized in Herbert Feigl’s “The ‘Mental and the 
‘Physical’” in Vol.II of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1958), where he claims that sense qualia can be objects of knowledge by acquaintance and gives an early 
statement of the “knowledge argument” against materialism.  
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Like Ayer’s sense qualia, I want to conceive of sensory universals as structured and determinate 
qualitative characteristics of the given, and I want to claim that these form the object of sensation in 
perception as well as the object of sensory consciousness in deviant episodes. The content of sensory 
awareness in various deviant episodes is formed by organized qualitative wholes, just as it is in 
perception, the difference again being that only the complexes that are the content of perception possess 
the organizational features that allow us to construct physical continuants out of them. So in this respect, 
too, idealist perceptual theory has an affinity with the sense qualia theories of Lewis, Goodman, and Ayer 
generally: phenomenalistic idealism embraces the claim that sense qualia are immediate objects of 
experience in a way that physical continuants are not. But, and this must be strongly emphasized, the fact 
that idealism grants such immediacy only to the qualia and not to the larger physical continuant does not 
compromise the directness of perceptual experience nor the idealism of the physical world so perceived. 
It does not compromise the directness because, in accordance with idealism’s metaphysically reductionist 
view of the physical, physical continuants are just persistent collections of lawfully related actual and 
possible appearances (i.e. qualia); so the relation between a certain appearance, or quale, and the physical 
continuant is rather ontologically intimate, indeed it is mereological. So though I posit a form of 
perceptual mediation in the perceptual consciousness of physical particulars, i.e. that we perceive physical 
particulars by or in virtue of perceiving (or, if you prefer, ‘sensing’, to emphasize the conscious 
immediacy) a sensory quale, this is no more dramatic a form of mediation than that involved in perceiving 
a house by perceiving one of its facades or perceiving a table in virtue of perceiving its surface. In deviant 
episodes, where the quale does not belong to a maximal collection of lawfully related qualia, sensing can 
never pass into perceptual consciousness but must remain hallucinatory or otherwise deviant. There is no 
threat to idealism on this view because the sensory qualia are mental; they are sensory types that entirely 
depend on being present to a mind for their realization, in accordance with the confinement thesis, and 
may well be qualitatively affected by other qualia to which they are sensibly related in a total episode of 
sensation, e.g., as in the phenomenon of color contrast, and this will typically be understood in terms of 
phenomenological or perceptual-psychological laws (e.g., laws of perspective), or laws that determine 
sense-qualitative presentational / organizational effects given sense-qualitative conditions and 
arrangements.  
By consenting to the sense qualia theory in claiming that sensible qualities are concrete sensory 
universals or repeatable attributes of the content of sensory awareness, idealism takes as primitive 
something that is apt to be public and objective, something that may be identical across temporally 
distinct episodes of consciousness for the same subject as well as for numerically distinct subjects. Indeed 
one of the chief advantages of taking sensible qualities to be universal is that are thereby not essentially 
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private.
19
 The other reason for taking sensible qualities to be universals is to explain the similarity of the 
given across different experiences. This, of course, requires taking the unity of the universal as primitive. 
To return to a point made in Ch.II, logically constructing the physical world from an ontology of sensory 
universals also has the theological advantage of allowing us to understand the physical world as a 
protosacramental medium of participation.  
The ontology of sense qualia allows one to develop a phenomenal conception of particular 
physical objects because it allows one to account for the unity of the physical continuant that is the 
perceptual object in terms of structural features that obtain among a certain class of appearances, features 
that are lacking among the otherwise qualitatively similar appearances that are the content of awareness in 
hallucination. These structural features, whether spatial, temporal, or qualitative, are themselves either 
actually sensed or imaginative projections from the (possible) sensory qualitative presentations of those 
that are actually sensed. In this way we can explain the distinctive unity of the physical particular that is 
the perceptual object without appealing to a material substrate that would threaten the directness of our 
perceptual contact with physical items or the reductive idealism of our metaphysics.   
 
VI.5  An Idealist View of Physical Causality 
How does the idealist’s phenomenal conception of physical objects, as applied to the account of 
the subjective indistinguishability of veridical perception and deviant episodes, link up with the analysis 
of the causal conditions of perception? It turns out that the structural attributes that make a collection of 
appearances those of a unified physical object are the very same attributes that account for its distinctive 
role as initiator of the causal chains that lead to perceptual experiences of it.  
Here it will be necessary to invoke the distinction to which we have had frequent recourse, that 
between metaphysical and scientific explanatory frameworks, as explored in Berkeley’s Principle of 
Analogous Fields of Discourse and Gregory’s of Nyssa’s distinction between the diastasis and odos of 
creation, the transcendental perspective of how creation of the physical world comes about and the 
perspective of how creation unfolds as empirically presented to one embodied within it. We know that 
from within the empirical perspective of creation, whether in everyday of scientific mindset, the 
nomological regularity of our sensory experiences is suggestive of a physical world of three spatial 
dimensions in which we are embodied mobile occupants along with other persistent physical entities and 
properties. But the systematic organization of our experience is also suggestive of a world in which these 
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 This is strategically desirable in itself, but it also seems necessary to account for the fact that hallucinations are no 
more essentially private than veridical perceptions. The documented phenomenon of folie a deux, a type of shared 
psychosis, independently suggests this. See Enoch and Ball, Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes (London: Arnold 
Publishing, 2001). 
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objective entities and properties are themselves objectively conformed to certain discoverable patterns of 
causation. In fact it is hard to imagine the sensory qualitative stability and coherence of physical 
continuants without also imagining their conformity to certain standard patterns of causal influence and 
sensitivity. The very somatocentricity of the organization of the field of sensory awareness and the 
corresponding idealist construction of physical space already implicates the mind and body in a certain 
relation conforming to identifiable patterns of psychophysical causation. The regularity of the sequences 
of volition/kinaesthetic sensation pairs, the way sensorimotor volitions result variously in co-presented 
sensations of tactual resistance or the continuity of kinaesthetic freedom is, as we have argued, what 
coordinates the spatial organization of the field of somatic qualia (i.e., what constitutes the spatial 
extension of the body) and eventually that of the total sense field. The same sensorimotor patterns suggest 
both the causal influence and responsiveness of the body in relation to the mind. And the same more 
widely-projected, regular sequences of somatocentric sensations in which we instrumentally use the body 
to explore the stable, persistent qualities of the environment are at once suggestive of regular causal 
patterns not only between distal objects and the body but between distant objects themselves and their 
dispositional properties. As a subject moves around the scene before her, the shape, size, position, color, 
sound, and appearance generally of various objects in the scene change in actual ways as manifested in 
the subject’s successive sensations and also suggest further possible changes in the subject’s imagination. 
These same changes typically result, deliberately or not, in the interpretation of the objects, precisely on 
account of the same stability and coherence that make them continuants, as being endowed with certain 
causal properties, certain dispositions to effect and be effected by certain conditions, whether of objects’ 
surfaces to project or reflect light, of objects to move and be moved (or resist being moved) by others 
with certain velocities (are lack thereof), etc.  
The locally maximally (qualitatively) coherent and maximally (nomologically) consistent 
collection of appearances that constitutes a physical continuant will have the causal power to effect 
human perceptual experience precisely in virtue of the same structural features that give it its stability and 
endurance. The technical notion of causation that will be of use for an idealist understanding of physical 
causality is a variant of the late counterfactual theory of David Lewis
20
, on which causation is understood 
via the notion of influence. According to Lewis, 
 
where c and e are distinct events, c influences e if and only if there is a range c1, c2, … of 
different not-too-distant alterations of c and a range e1, e2, … such that if c1 had occurred, e1 
would have occurred, and if c2 had occurred, e2 would have occurred, and so on. 
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 “Causation as Influence”, Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000):182–97. 
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The alterations are supposed to be changes in whether, when, and how an event occurs. Lewis then 
formulates a notion of causation as a relation between events such that there is a chain of influences 
between them. 
The notion of causation that I have in mind is parallel to Lewis’ notion of influence in certain 
ways. Here I am expressly interested in the way within the mundane explanatory framework we might 
speak of causation between appearances (temporal stages of portions of physical objects) and perceptual 
episodes.  So, in addition to alterations of whether and when, we should consider qualitative alterations of 
the actual appearance and corresponding alterations of the perceptual episode. For any actual appearance 
of an object there will be a (indeed, an indefinitely large) range of qualitatively similar appearances that 
are alterations of the actual one by size, shape, brightness, etc.. This follows from the way we have 
constructed physical continuants from sense qualia, in which the continuants relate as spatiotemporally 
divisible wholes to qualia as their spatiotemporally indivisible parts. If the object to which the actual 
appearance belongs is a genuine continuant, then all of these alterations will also belong to the very same 
continuant physical object. This follows from its local maximal coherence and maximal consistency and 
to some extent its endurance. Now the fact that the alterations belong to a single object means that, 
speaking physically, the object itself is the truthmaker for the corresponding counterfactuals, if c1 had 
occurred, e1 would have occurred, …, etc, even if speaking metaphysically we know that whatever 
explains the collective qualitative unity of the object is the ultimate truthmaker.  
According to the account of the phenomalistic idealist, the qualitative unity of continuant objects 
and their appearances is, like every other sensible feature of the physical world logically sustained by the 
nomological organization of human sensory experience. But this is a statement from the perspective of 
metaphysics, a claim about how things stand in an ultimate account, sub specie aeternitatis. From this 
perspective, according to Berkeley’s PAFD principle, only minds are causes. At present however, in the 
context of perceptual theory, we are considering how things stand from within the mundane perspective 
of what gets idealistically created, speaking not about the system of control over the course of human 
sense experience, but the empirical order of what that system of control gives rise to as we interpret it in 
everyday and scientific discourse. From that perspective we can indeed say that the physical object is the 
cause of a given sensation, that it is the truthmaker of the relevant counterfactual claim, even if 
metaphysically we acknowledge that this a logical consequence of facts that are wholly nonphysical. 
Speaking in physical terms we can say with John Stuart Mill that the object is the cluster of the 
“permanent possibilities of sensation”21, even if we recognize that a nonphysical order governs the 
clustering and permanence, so that metaphysically what sustains the object and constitutes it in its identity 
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 Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865) in J. S., Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
vol.9, J. M. Robson, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967). 
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are facts of a nonphysical kind. As with the distal environmental object, so similarly for other physically 
mediating conditions and processes. The transmissive process and the other conditions on the (physical) 
causal chain between the appearance and the perceptual episode are still conditions on which the 
perceptual episode depends. But they are all only (physically) causally responsible for a given pair of 
appearance-perception alterations. In other words, given that this or that appearance alteration (including 
the actual one, of course) had occurred, the intervening transmissive conditions and neurophysiological 
response would be conditions on which the occurrence of the corresponding perceptual episode 
counterfactually depends. The appearance alteration will be an alteration along some dimension of where, 
when, or a qualitative dimension; as such, it will determine a corresponding change in the perceptual 
episode, which will counterfactually depend on suitable intervening conditions, suitable relative to the 
alteration. So the causal relevance of the intervening conditions is by way of the sensory qualitative 
appearance or candidate object in question; they are causally relevant in that they are nomically necessary 
for the selection of that appearance as opposed to another. But the object itself has a distinguished causal 
role in that it is (speaking physically) the nexus of the possibilities that support the various counterfactual 
statements concerning the alteration pairs. It is in this way that an idealist can allow there to be a causal 
influence of the physical object on perceptual experience, an influence flowing from its particularity. In 
the perspective of metaphysics we can say that this particularity is logically sustained by facts of 
nonphysical sort, even if in ordinary and scientific discourse we ignore this sustainment and focus instead 
on the empirically immanent order that is idealistically sustained.   
In denying that the physical world is in any of its aspects ontologically primitive or mind-
independent the idealist is at odds with our everyday intuitions, and this may seem to make him 
vulnerable to certain objections arising from the specific ways in which his claims may seem to conflict 
with what pre-philosophically we take ourselves to know about the physical world. Pre-philosophically 
we tend to assume that the physical objects we perceive around us exert a causal control over our sensory 
experiences. More specifically, we believe that the immediate causes of our sensations are the neural 
states of our brains. By contrast, idealism holds that all physical objects and the behavioral patterns that 
they exhibit—including our brains—are themselves created by a transcendental or non-physical system of 
causal control over our experiences. But we have already seen how the idealist can accommodate our 
everyday intuitions and scientific commitments with this core metaphysical commitment. By following 
Berkeley’s PAFD we can distinguish the metaphysical explanatory framework in which the idealist thesis 
is operative from the various subordinate theoretical frameworks in which we are interested not in the 
causal order of ultimate reality but merely the causal order of the idealistically created physical world as it 
is manifested and interpreted within the system of appearances at the human empirical viewpoint. If we 
prescind from metaphysics, in which we regard physical facts as ontologically derivative of mental facts, 
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we are free to regard some physical facts as secondary truthmakers for others and even for some psychic 
facts, such as those pertaining to the psychic states of a biological organism. The same strategy serves the 
idealist in dealing with questions about the status of the physical world prior to the historical existence of 
human organisms or questions generally about the status of the physical world in remote spatiotemporal 
regions. An account of physical causation in terms of chains of suitably covariant transmissive conditions  
and phenomenalistically identified candidate objects allows us to move naturally across different 
explanatory frameworks—regarded now as analogous fields of discourse—depending on our mode of 
inquiry and explanatory purposes.
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Chapter VII: The Construction of the Physical World 
 
VII.1  Introduction 
 
It is time to take stock of what we have accomplished so far by developing the idealist theory of 
perception in Ch.VI, en route to a full-fledged Christian idealist understanding of creation. Christian 
idealism is a metaphysics or theory of ultimate (contingent) reality according to which the distribution of 
qualia over minds at times as governed by a suitable nomological framework logically creates the 
physical world, so that the physical world is not itself ultimate but something that derives its ontological 
status from mental facts. So far we have demonstrated that the metaphysics of Christian idealism can 
deliver a coherent account of our perceptual experience of physical items and our attribution of causal 
powers to them in appropriately matching ways. More specifically, by adopting an ontology of sensory 
universals, or sense qualia, and a phenomenalist conception of physical objecthood, we may claim that the 
sensory qualities constituting the phenomenal content of sensory awareness are the same qualities that 
constitute the spatiotemporal parts of genuine physical continuants, so that our perceptual contact with 
physical items is unproblematically direct, being compatible with the facts of illusion and hallucination, 
as well as the scientifically theorized patterns of psychophysical causation. The key to the success of this 
explanatory strategy was the fact that the idealist, unlike the physical realist, is free to embrace a 
phenomenal conception of objects, taking the qualitative features of what we immediately perceive to be 
features that genuinely characterize the physical items of which we standardly take them to be 
presentations.  
Still looming, however, is the deeper question of how the central thesis of idealism could be true. 
How could it be that the physical world is logically created by mental facts? More specifically, given the 
shape our development of idealism has taken, how could a phenomenalist ontology of sensory qualia and 
their logical or qualitative relations as conscious experiences be a sufficient set of resources for erecting 
the ordinary word that we take ourselves to inhabit? How could the organized distribution of such qualia, 
enriched with whatever further mental factors, be enough to sustain the extensive variety and robust 
objectivity of physical existence? To address these questions, I will propose a series of syntheses within 
the temporal patterning of successively unified conscious states, where the “pure” sense-modal sensations 
are organized into the various regularly associated themes that characterize the experience of things in 
space. The concepts appropriate to this everyday physical world can be understood as descriptively 
encapsulating the various world-suggestive themes, as we find them, and presupposing their regular 
associations. This notional physical theory of persistent things in 3-D space indispensably interprets and 
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is prompted by the regularities of qualia distribution within sensory consciousness. So too, we may 
plausibly suppose, do the more refined theories of empirical science interpret the regularities of the 
notional theory using their own definitions, concepts and hypotheses. In VII.2, I will present the series of 
constructive syntheses that take us to the level of the notional physical theory and consider the logical 
structure of empirical theory more generally in VII.3. Finally, we will be in a position to express a 
forceful critique of physical realism by contrast in VII.4, and discuss the import of our conclusions for 
systematic theology in VII.5.    
Let us begin by recalling our definition of sense qualia. For a given sense modality S, we defined 
an S-modal quale to be a determinate S-modal sensation-type, and we defined total sense qualia as 
complexes of S-modal sense qualia unified by phenomenal co-consciousness or “co-existence”. In this 
way, a total sense quale is a determinate total sensation type forming or having the capacity to form the 
content of total sensory awareness within a given phenomenally unified episode of sensory awareness. 
The confinement thesis immediately followed from this: an ultimate non-sensory realization of sense 
qualia is impossible and a quale exists (as the sensory universal that it is) if and only if it is capable of 
sensory realization, that is, of forming the content of sensory awareness within a conscious episode of 
sensation. Acknowledging that sense qualia exhaust the ontologically immediate content of sensory 
awareness, together with the negative implications of the confinement thesis, already moves one away 
from the tenability of a direct physical realism. But notice that the confinement thesis has the positive 
implication that qualia may exist without being actually sensed; it is enough that they have the potential to 
be sensed.  
As we prepare to elaborate on the details of idealism’s central claim, one thing seems clear: if the 
physical world is to be logically constructed from relations among actual and potential sensations, the 
unitive power of the conscious mind, that of the personal subject to whom a quale might be given, must 
play a fundamental role. The customary concomitance of certain tactual and kinaesthetic qualia with 
certain visual qualia is, in virtue of our definitional scheme, tantamount to an associational basis in the 
experienced unity of sensory consciousness. For if qualia are sensation types as described above, then the 
regular ontic conjunction of certain qualia is thereby the experienced concomitance of certain qualitative 
features as the content of sensory awareness. But the converse is also true, because of the biconditionality 
of the confinement thesis.  
We noted, too, in the previous chapter that it is important to distinguish the class of somatic 
qualia because of their role in the idealist construction of space and the ‘somatocentricity’ of qualia or of 
the total (transmodal) sense field. To articulate this construction in the manner outlined in V.4, we may 
further distinguish these somatic qualia into proprioceptive, tactual, and kinaesthetic qualia. The body, as 
an individual is constituted as a complex of stable somatic qualia and thus as a tactual/kinaesthetic/visual 
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continuant. Its ‘centricity’ consists in the fact that it alone of all the sense qualitative continuants in the 
course of my experience has an immediate connection with a subject’s will, as well as having a 
representative or member quale realized in every one of my tactual experiences. More specifically, we 
recognize the (contingent) fact that certain volitional states are immediately succeeded by certain somatic 
sensations in regular way; and it is this regularity which is primarily operant in the subjective discovery of 
the stability and persistence of various other complexes of qualia. Using the regular concomitance of 
volition-somatic sensation pairs and sequences, experience presents the subject with various 
configurations of qualia, unified by conscious compresence. Those with maximal (local) qualitative 
coherence relative to others suggest themselves not only as stable—and therefore as segregated items or 
objects—but also as a continuous spatial projection of qualia within a subject’s present sense field. As we 
saw with Berkeley’s New Theory, the somatic qualia of downward gravitational resistance and 
kinaesthetic sensations of eye, head and limb movements act as coordinating data for the somatocentric 
organization of other (putatively environmental) sensory qualities.   
It is interesting to note how the present theory, though different in many respects from William 
James’ psychological theory, is nonetheless similar to it in several important ways. For one, James as a 
radical empiricist in the tradition of Hume sought to ground the spatial unity of sense qualia in the 
temporally extended compresence of phenomenal awareness, reflected in affording the possibility of joint 
attention:   
 
Whatever sensible data can be attended to together we locate together. Their several extents 
become one extent. The place at which each appears is held to be the same as the place at which 
the others appear. They become in short so many properties of one and the same real thing.
1
 
 
This means that a spatially unified transmodal sense field is constructed from the mental subjective unity 
of coexistent sensations. Spatial unity among qualia is logically derived from the fact that they are
2
 co-
presented within a single durational period of phenomenally experienced time, what James famously 
called ‘the specious present’. Notice that co-location of qualities as grounded in the potential for joint 
attention may serve as the relation that in turn grounds the individuation of unified concreta, what in 
common parlance we call ‘physical objects’ or simply ‘objects’, and what James calls ‘one and the same 
real thing’. This serves the idealist strategy of explaining the real existence of physical things, but as 
things nonetheless derived from facts of a non-physical kind. Furthermore, James takes the objective 
                                                          
1
 William James. Principles of Psychology.  pp.182-184, as quoted by Ayer (1968). 
2
 Or, as we will want to assert more carefully, “could be co-presented”. 
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reality of sensory qualitative spatial extension to be grounded in the projection of the temporally patterned 
sensibly given via the suggestions of imaginative associations, much as Berkeley had. 
 
We get to conceive of the successive fields of things after the analogy of the several things which 
we perceive in a single field. They must be out and alongside of each other, and we conceive that 
their juxtaposed spaces must make a larger space.
3
  
 
and  
 
through these constant changes [retracing eye, head, and body movements] every field of seen 
things comes at last to be thought of as always having a fringe of other things possible to be seen 
spreading in all directions round about it.
4
  
 
We can accommodate these same insights, just as Ayer had in his discussion of James, and helpfully 
regard them as internalized in the present elaboration.  
 
VII.2 The Logical Construction of Things in Space 
 
The phenomenalistic idealist proposes that physical space and its qualitative occupants are the 
logical product of the systematic way in which the subjective experience of space is coordinated between 
subjects. The subjective experience of space is in turn the product of the intermodal spatial organization 
of the tactual and somatic fields, and the intermodal spatial organization of the visual and tactual fields. In 
the former case, spatial organization of the tactual and somatic fields is the product of the qualitative 
overlap among temporally successive fields and their temporally structured components, so that facts of 
spatial extension are constituted by facts of qualitative persistence through temporal extension. Finally 
qualia from the other sense-modalities are spatially referred to the visuo-tactual field, yielding a spatially 
unified, total subjective sense field. The spatial organization of subjective experience thus breaks down 
into the stages of constructive synthesis to be described below, facilitated by the phenomenological facts 
of coexistence, succession, and suggestion, as befits the Berkeleyan strategy sketched in V.4. Due to their 
organizational importance, it is worth pausing at the outset to reflect on each in turn.  
 
                                                          
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid., p.186. 
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Phenomenal Coexistence refers to the fact that some sensations, whether from the same or different sense-
modalities, are jointly experienced within the same durational (temporally extended) span of sensory 
awareness. Given the above definitions of sensations as temporally individuated realizations of qualia and 
of qualia as determinate sensation types that are presentational, or objects of awareness, in virtue of being 
self-revealing in regard to their intrinsic character, we can say that phenomenally coexistent qualia are co-
presented within a single episode of sensory awareness, or that they are strictly co-conscious. By being 
co-presented and yet qualitatively distinct aspects within some more complex sensed pattern, 
phenomenally coexistent qualia are thus potential objects of joint attention, though this need not mean 
that they are experienced as simultaneous, as a single act of sensory awareness is able to take in a 
temporal spread of phenomena. In being co-presented, phenomenally coexistent sensations are 
components of a single total experience, be it intra- or trans-modal (it is total in the sense of being 
maximally inclusive, so that there is no larger [intra- or trans-modal, respectively] experience of which it 
is a part). Phenomenally coexistent qualia are thus components in a more complex quale having a 
determinate temporal pattern, realized within the time field of a single sensation.  
 
Phenomenal Succession refers to the phenomenally experienced quality of succession, or the sensed 
relation of ‘coming-immediately-later-than’ in some presented temporal pattern. Like phenomenal 
coexistence, this relation can hold between qualities within the same sense modality as well as across 
different modalities. Qualia that are experienced as successive are a special case of those experienced as 
coexistent. Instances of the former are always instances of the latter, though not conversely. For this 
reason, successive sensations will be experienced within a single span of awareness (a total sensation) 
whose content forms a determinate temporal pattern, one that includes the relation of succession between 
component sensations within its structure. Unlike coexistence, however, which is symmetric, succession 
is anti-symmetric: if quale y succeeds quale x then x does not succeed y. In fact we can introduce the 
converse relation of precedence or of ‘immediately coming before’ so that we can say if y succeeds x, 
then x precedes y.  
  
Let us consider three examples that will serve to illustrate the phenomenon of succession in various ways, 
and which we may develop further in ways that will serve to illustrate other constructions.   
 
For a given sense modality S, let S1, …, S10 be sensations. Let S1^S2 represent the coexistence of the 
sensations S1 and S2, and let S1 > S2 represent their succession (to be read ‘S2 succeeds S1’). 
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Example 1: I hear a diatonic C scale, C-D-E-F-G-A. My hearing of the scale consists of the series of total 
auditory sensations (A1, …, A5), each of which consists of, say, two notes of some temporal duration 
ordered by phenomenal succession, so that  
 
A1 = C > D  
A2 =     D > E  
A3 =            E > F 
A4=        F > G 
A5 =    G > A 
 
Example 2: I see the flight of a bird from one tree branch to another. My viewing of the bird’s flight 
consists of the series of total visual sensations (V1, …, Vn), each of which consists of, say, the durational 
presentation of change of a ‘bird-color pattern’ in a way that is temporally continuous, so that the changes 
of visual quality are presented as temporally patterned in such a way that change of visual quality has 
immanent temporal flow of direction and succession. So we have 
 
V1 = Bird-color pattern1 > Bird-color pattern2, …., Vn = Bird-color patternn-1 > Bird color patternn 
 
Example 3: I stand at the back of a room and see a wall in front of me, with a picture in the center and a 
door to the left. As I walk forward the picture becomes larger but continues to occupy the center of my 
visual field while the door too becomes larger but also moves leftward to the edge of my visual field and 
eventually disappears. My movement within the room consists of a series of total (transmodal) sensations 
(E1, …, En), each of which consists of a component kinaesthetic sensation of walking (or of standing in 
the first and last instance) with a co-existent visual sensation of the wall with the picture and the door (or 
really a ‘wall-’, ‘picture-’, and ‘door-color pattern’) succeeded by another component kinaesthetic 
sensation of walking with a co-existent sensation of the wall with the picture and door (or merely of the 
wall with the picture in the last instance). So we have   
 
E1 = (K1 ^ V1) > (K2 ^ V2), …,  En = (Kn-1) ^ Vn-1) > (Kn ^ Vn) 
 
In the examples above although we are supposing that each total sensation contains merely two 
component sensations ordered by phenomenal succession this is for the sake of simplicity of exposition 
and not intended to be an accurate description of the complexity of an actual case, either in its 
compositional or transmodal paucity. 
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Using the notion of phenomenal succession, it is helpful to introduce two further phenomenological 
notions, that of qualitative overlap and qualitative continuity. 
 
Phenomenal Overlap refers to the relation among total sensations of possessing some third sensation as a 
common component, corresponding to the common structural component of the qualia of which they are 
realizations. The relevant total qualia may be intra- or trans-modal. But they must be internally structured 
by (phenomenal) succession, and thus must present some subqualia as standing in the relation of 
succession. We then say two sensations x and y overlap if and only if there is some third sensation z such 
that z is a component of x in which it is presented as succeeding some other sensation but not being itself 
succeeded by any sensation, and a component of y in which it is presented as being succeeded by some 
component sensation but not itself succeeding any other component sensation.  
 
In Example 1, each successive pair of total auditory sensations exhibit overlap. So A1 and A2 both contain 
a component auditory sensation of D (the second tone of the scale), which is presented as the 
phenomenally successive tone of A1 and the phenomenally predecessive tone of A2. For similar reasons,  
A2 and A3, A3 and A4, and A4 and A5 all overlap, but no other pairs overlap.  
 
Example 2 and Example 3 are also examples of overlap. In Example 2, because V1 = Bird-color pattern1 > 
Bird-color pattern2 and V2 = Bird-color pattern2 > Bird-color pattern3, V1 and V2 overlap in virtue of 
having Bird-color pattern2 as the common component, smoothly “bridging them” and an important part of 
the reason why the series of sensations counts as seeing the flight of the bird as a continuous motion, 
rather than some staccatic sequence of motions. The same is true for Example 3 for similar reasons, 
prompting the following definition.  
 
Phenomenal Continuity refers to the condition of sensations that stand in the ancestral relation or 
transitive closure of phenomenal overlap. In other words, two sensations are phenomenally continuous if 
and only if there is a series of sequentially overlapping sensations (realizations of overlapping total 
qualia) of which they are the first and last members.     
 
Again in Example 1, any two total auditory sensations in the series A1…, A5 are continuous with each 
other, being connected by a series of successively overlapping sensations. So A1 and A5 are continuous 
because they are connected by the series of successively overlapping total auditory sensations A2, A3, and 
A4. The same is true for A1 and A4, A2 and A5, and indeed for any (unordered) pair in the series A1, …, 
A5. Similar considerations apply to Examples 2 and 3. 
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Suggestion refers to the imaginative projection of a quale along some phenomenally continuous 
qualitative dimension. It involves a kind of interpolation or extrapolation of relations experienced among 
coexistent or strictly co-conscious sensations within a total sensation to relations among total sensations 
themselves, just as continuity involves a kind of extrapolation from overlap, which in turn extrapolates or 
analogizes from succession experienced within a total sensation to a relation between total sensations. 
The imaginatively projected relations may be relations of succession or of mere coexistence, and so may 
be projections of overlap and continuity. If suggestion is an imaginative projection of qualitative 
continuity under a relation of coexistence, it may furnish the idea of location at a place where the subject 
is not; if it is an imaginative projection of qualitative continuity under a relation of succession, it may 
furnish the idea of being at a time (when) the subject is not.   
 
At each synthetic stage, the principles of synthesis are similar, the effects being as described 
below. Notice that in accord with the thesis of the heterogeneity of the senses, sensations in different 
sense modalities cannot themselves overlap, as they have no common qualitative components (no color is 
a component of an auditory sensation, no sounds is component of a visual sensation, and so on). Yet once 
they enter into sensed temporal relations, then these temporally patterned total (transmodal) sensations do 
become capable of overlap in respect of their transmodal components. This is the key to understanding 
how the unity of the conscious mind and its phenomenological organization may furnish the physical 
world with its logically basic stock of facts, exploited by the idealist’s explanatory strategy.  
In general there need be no fixed a priori bound on the complexity of a total sensation nor of the 
complexity of an overlapping component or series of (potentially all different) overlapping components. 
Supposing that An, Vn, and Tn are names for auditory, visual, and tactual sensations, the total sensations  
 
E = (A1^V4^T2) > ((T8^T3) > V2) and E’ = ((T8^T3 > V2) > (T1^T5^V10)  
 
will overlap in respect of the common component (T8^T3) > V2 forming the last component sensation of E 
and the first component sensation of E’. Notice that, as in the case of Example 3, this common component 
is itself temporally structured and transmodal. Such complex overlap is the key to understanding how 
qualia from one sense modality may, through suggestion, acquire the organizational effects of qualia from 
other modalities. This is what will allow us to pursue the Berkeley-inspired tactical line of regarding 
spatial organizational of the visual field as acquired from that of the tactual-somatic field, in virtue of the 
way the two are co-presented and (phenomenally) temporally organized in sensory consciousness.    
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The Tactuo-Somatic Synthesis 
At this stage the various somatic qualia that are coexistent, kinaesthetically successive, and qualitatively 
overlapping through successive kinaesthetic sensations are organized via these relations into a 
qualitatively integrated somatic field. Per Berkeley, the somatic field acquires spatial significance through 
the distinct qualities of kinaesthetic and tactual sensations, especially of gravitational pressure or 
conversely egocentric downward resistance (or ‘foot-ward’ resistance), but more generally the distinct 
qualities of enactive freedom and resistance. By being coexistent, successive, and qualitatively 
overlapping with these sensations of free and resisted movement the integrated complex of somatic qualia 
acquire orientation around a subjectively central (intuitively, a longitudinal, head-to-foot) axis. They are 
distinguished as those sensations possessing qualitative overlap of kinaesthetic freedom and resistance 
amid successive acts of sensorimotor volition, thus experienced as being (more or less
5
) under the 
immediate causal control of the mental subject. By being distinguished in this way and subject to the 
effects of suggestion, these sensations establish a domain of potential somatic sensations ordered by 
orientation and distance, conceptualized as a single physical continuant that is the subject’s body. 
 
The Tactuo-Visual Synthesis 
At this stage the color patterns presented by visual sensations, which are themselves organized into a 
unified field through relations of coexistence, succession, and qualitative overlap, become spatially 
organized through their sensed relations with tactuo-somatic sensations. By entering into the relations of 
coexistence and succession with tactuo-somatic sensations, sensations of the visual field become co-
presented and temporally organized with those of the spatially organized body. Color patterns are 
experienced together with sensory awareness of the determinate spatial extension of the subject’s body, so 
that both visual sensations of color patterns and somatic sensations of bodily location and movement 
become components of total (transmodal) sensations.  
At this stage the body is further distinguished by the fact that the visual qualia which belong to it 
are those “occupying a series of spatial positions which, in relation to the positions occupied by other 
overlapping sets of qualia, differ only minimally”6 in successive time-fields (temporal patterns of total 
tactuo-visual sensations).  
In many cases the visual and tactuo-somatic sensations will be co-presented as temporally 
successive, particularly in cases where changes in color pattern are sensed to succeed  kinaesthetic 
                                                          
5
 The relevance of this modifier is to allow for the fact that some parts of my body are not under a control that is as 
immediate as other parts. I cannot move the ulterior bone of my finger without moving the bone proximally joined 
to it. Other parts I cannot move at all but are so frequently coexist and overlapping with it in regard to somatic 
sensations such as pain, pleasure, heat, and cold (not to mention visual continuity with the moveable parts) that they 
are conceptualized as so many parts  that form a continuous whole.   
6
 Ayer, 1968, p.324 
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sensations of eye and head movements. Such temporally organized tactuo-visual sensations will 
themselves stand in relations of phenomenal overlap and so of continuity. Through such temporally 
structured qualitative continuity, tactuo-visual sensations will suggest imaginative projections of still 
greater continuity both of succession and coexistence, so that the same spatial organization of the body 
itself is consciously related to the visual field. This has two effects. One is analogously to extend the same 
continuities that attend tactuo-somatic spatial relationships to pairs of sensed and unsensed visual qualia. 
The other is to introduce spatial relationships to co-presented visual qualia and so to spatially structure 
total visual sensations themselves. It is in this way that the visual field acquires the significance of being 
in fronto-parallel position with respect to the eyes and so of having a correspondingly determinate spatial 
relationship to the rest of the body, in terms of distance as measured by tactual extent and orientation as 
measured from an a somatocentric and hence egocentric origin. This is the way, per Berkeley, visual 
sensations come to acquire the status of being tactually significant cues or signs that we read as a visible 
language.    
Consider the tactuo-visual sensations in which kinaesthetic components of hand movement are 
co-presented with tactual components of resistance and co-presented with visual sensations of the same 
color pattern. When these overlap each other as complex component sensations, the resulting continuity is 
a continuity of coexistent tactuo-visual sensation
7
, which suggests an imaginative projection that serves to 
ground our conception of surfaces and also of suggesting the organizational effects of tactual uniformity 
to visual uniformity, ultimately leading to the covariation of visual and tactual extent. This is what 
happens when I run my hand along a desktop. The successive co-existence of tactual and visual 
homogeneity, of solid cold smoothness and (relatively) uniform color pattern, yield imaginatively 
projected tactuo-visual continuity. Then, even with eyes closed and hand resting on the desktop I 
experience not a singular source of resistance but a surface extending in various direction and affording 
so many possibilities of further sensed resistance. Or again, with eyes open and hands at my side, I 
interpret the visual homogeneity before me as something solid, cold, and smooth, something thus 
possessing the same tactuo-somatic and hence spatial significance as the desktop I felt with my hand.   
The outcome of the tactuo-visual synthesis is the spatial projection of tactuo-visual qualia into the 
future and the present, in accordance with the stability of certain sensory routes in which kinaesthetically 
coordinated and overlapping tactuo-visual component sensations play a decisive role. Future spatial 
projections will be prompted by tactuo-visual qualitative continuity within a stream of experience over 
some kinaesthetically driven sensory route, temporally extending already-experienced relations of 
succession. Present spatial projections will be prompted by repetition (tolerant of some minor variations) 
                                                          
7
 This is what psychologists call “haptic perception”. See M. Grunwald Human Haptic Perception – Basics and 
Applications (Basel: Birkhaueser, 2008). 
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of some continuous tactuo-visual pattern in response to the reversal of a sensory route, temporally 
extending already-experienced relations of coexistence to unsensed locations, that while unsensed are 
nonetheless simultaneous with the content of current sensations. In this way, the spatiotemporal 
projections of suggestion should be understood to involve the aid of memory as well as the imagination.  
By way of illustrating the first point, consider again Example 3, in which I see a wall in front of 
me, with a picture in the center and a door to the left. From my initial position I experience the picture 
and door as co-presented within a single total visual sensation. As I walk forward the door continues to 
move leftward (as well as become larger) in my visual field in what may be much the same way that the 
flight of the bird moved across my visual field in Example 2. But in contrast to the case of the bird, the 
overlapping visual sensations in this case are coexistent with tactuo-somatic sensations of walking, itself 
an experience of motion (indeed of overlapping kinaesthetic sensations), so that, perhaps after reversing 
and retracing my sensory route and finding that the same series of total sensations results, I will not 
interpret the door as moving as I did the bird. What is more, at some point in my forward trajectory the 
door will have disappeared beyond the leftward edge of my visual field. But because of the continuously 
overlapping way in which my visual sensations succeeded each other, I will, in accordance with the 
imaginative projection of the space of my current visual field, come to interpret my position and visual 
sensation of the picture as one that is physically coexistent with the unsensed door.  
 Through such actual and suggested qualitative continuities, the concept of physical coexistence 
has its effects more pervasively, so that sensation components come to have their “fringe of other things 
possible to be seen spreading in all directions”. In this way the unified coordination of tactuo-visual space 
comes to acquire the significance of being the phenomenal, logically unbounded 3-D space that we 
interpret as physical space. And its occupants come to acquire the significance of being 3-D continuants, 
stable in their sensory affordances and potential for re-identification and perceptual scrutiny. 
 
Synthesis of the Total Sense Field 
Finally at this stage qualia from other sense modalities are incorporated into the spatiotemporal 
framework of tactuo-visual continuants and form with them the content of physical theory, the notional 
physical world of our everyday mindset. It is not as if all along the subject was bereft of sensations in 
other modalities, only that as a matter of logical priority, those modalities that furnish the richest set of 
data for our spatial concepts, the somatic, tactual, and visual, must already have established an egocentric 
and transmodally integrated spatial framework in which sounds, smells, and tastes may then then be co-
located and interpreted as belonging to tactuo-visual continuants.   
 
VII.3  Idealism and the Logical Structure of Physical Theory 
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By so many constructive steps we hope at least preliminarily to indicate the ways in which, by 
being thematically regular and consistently ordered, and so suggesting a programmatic interpretation, 
sensory experience both logically creates the notional physical world and epistemically warrants our 
beliefs and theories concerning it. The notional physical world is a world of qualitative continuants in a 
unified 3-D space that we ourselves inhabit as mobile occupants, a world of objects that are observable at 
different times and places and by different observers, and that can exist unperceived. Of course while our 
beliefs in such a world are evidentially supported by our sensory experiences they clearly involve 
commitments that go beyond anything strictly contained within the content of our sensations. This is clear 
from the fact that our constructive syntheses have been facilitated not only by the content of what we 
actually experience but certain imaginative projections suggested by the qualitative patterns of what we 
experience. Or indeed, to put it in other words, this is simply the point, by now familiar, that our 
descriptive physical theory is conceptually autonomous. There is no way, by demurring from what we 
already take ourselves to have warrant for endorsing on the basis of our sensory experiences, deductively, 
analytically, or in any other a priori manner to establish either that our sensory experiences genuinely 
exhibit the fully specified characteristic orderliness we customarily take them to exhibit, or that such a 
notional world as satisfies our physical theory exists. Nonetheless, we are justified in claiming that the 
organization of sensory experience (retrospectively
8
) logically creates the notional physical world.  
For one thing, our experiences ordinarily will be perceptual experiences in addition to being 
sensory ones, in which we not only sense qualitative content but interpret the content of sensory 
awareness using conceptual resources of the physical theory (of the notional world), whether innate or 
acquired. For each physical concept there will be a standard collection of sensory experiences in which 
the concept legitimately may be deployed. It will be this collection of experiences that individuates the 
concept, a collection such that the subject is credited with possessing the concept if and only if for some 
critical number of experiences contained in the collection, he deploys the concept when having those 
experience and does not deploy it in others.
9
 Such concepts may be thought of as bare recognitional 
capacities enabling demonstrative identification, which may be proto-linguistically structured and 
holistically sensitive to other concepts of physical theory in various ways. The details of such a typology 
of experiences for the purposes of a theory of concepts do not concern us here. The point is that, by 
                                                          
8
 That is, only after we have accepted its existence and character as we ordinarily do. As long as we are not nihilists 
about the physical world, and do not pretend to be satisfying the radical skeptic on his own terms by, e.g., showing 
that any of our perceptual judgments possess indefeasible certainty, then in the absence of defeating evidence we are 
free to use the assumption of the existence and ordinarily accepted character of the world as a means to gather the 
kind of information about the regularities of sensory experience recorded by the physical theory. See Foster (1982, 
pp.229-32). 
9
 Perhaps some small number of ‘false positives’ may be tolerated. 
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presupposing the effects of suggestion in our constructive synthesis, such concepts will transcend aspects 
of the sensory order that prompt them and make further aspects of the same order newly discernible. And 
thus, relative to such a theory of concept possession, the thematic regularities and consistent orderliness 
of sensory experience will be sufficient to warrant certain of the perceptual judgments in which these 
concepts feature. But what is more, as long as they are guaranteed by a suitable nomological framework, 
we may claim that the sensory regularities together with the interpretive resources of our concepts 
logically create the physical space, time, items, properties, and facts that feature in the notional physical 
world.     
The regularities of the notional physical world, thought of as an interpretive theory of sensory 
experience, will themselves be refined in precision and enriched in descriptive resources by scientific 
theory. In accordance with the PAFD, the relationship between the regularities posited by scientific theory 
and those of the notional physical world will be structurally analogous to that between the notional 
physical theory and the most immanent core of the physical world, the stratum of sensory regularities. 
Altogether then we may think of physical reality as stratified into (at least) three conspicuous levels of 
organization, phenomenological, notional, and scientific. Each higher level being an interpretative theory 
of the kind of orderliness exhibited by the level below it, a level that in turn logically creates it relative to 
some suitable framework of law and endowment of human conceptual resources.  
Notice too that the details of the logical syntheses closely resemble those contained in the 
definitions of ‘coherence’ and others that were relevant to the criteria of objecthood and perceptual 
causation that were stipulated in connection with the idealist theory of perception developed in Ch.VI. 
This is no accident. The criteria were deliberately chosen to allow the idealist to take advantage of the fact 
that, unlike the realist, he can allow the sensible qualities that form the ontologically immediate content of 
our sensory awareness to feature as basic ingredients of physical objects as well. He can thus vindicate the 
forceful impression, accepted by common sense, that sensible qualities genuinely belong to the objects as 
they appear, that redness, heat, solidity, rectangularity and smoothness genuinely pervade the surface of 
the brick exposed to the sun, as it appears to me when I hold it in my hand and examine it. But if the 
idealist vindicates one claim of common sense he can do so only by abandoning another: he does not 
require that perception reach beyond the mind in order to make contact with physical objects. He can 
allow a physical object to be identified by the sensible qualities it presents because he takes a physical 
object to consist in a set of potential appearances, nomologically organized in respect of their qualitative 
and spatiotemporal relations.  
This was the strategy pursued in the context of developing an idealist perceptual theory, and we 
saw how it allowed the idealist to solve the “problem of perception”, of providing a coherent theory of 
how we succeed in perceiving physical objects that accords with the empirical facts of causation and the 
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phenomenological facts of standard and nonstandard appearances. We are now in a position to see how 
this explanatory strategy is an adjunct of the central claim of the idealist’s metaphysical position, that it is 
the nomological organization of sensory experience that logically creates the physical world. For our 
constructive syntheses show how, accepting the very same ontology of sense qualia, the sensed relations 
among qualia presented within sensory awareness may be thought of as projected or analogized to 
relations between total sensations themselves. Most crucially, these projections allow us to formulate 
straightforward logical constructions that do not require us to accept anything conceptually physical or 
non-mental. The constructions were formulated only with the use of logical and phenomenological 
concepts, in particular the three key concepts of coexistence, succession, and suggestion. In this way the 
syntheses gave the facts we took for granted in our definitions of perceptual object and physical 
continuant a rigorous footing. But, thereby, they also show how purely mental facts (involving 
phenomenological content, relations, imagination, memory, and concepts) may be bridged to a coherent 
theory of physical object perception, and so with the notional physical theory and empirical theory more 
broadly given the stratified layers of dependence we noted among these.  
What this all means, finally, is that if we can show that there could be a suitable nomological 
framework that guaranteed sensory experience to be organized in the way it is as characterized by our 
physical and more broadly empirical theories, then we will have established idealism as a coherent 
metaphysics, a coherent theory of ultimate (contingent
10) reality. To be ‘suitable’ means such a 
nomological framework would have to be idealistically acceptable and so appeal only to facts and entities 
that are wholly nonphysical. Given what we have established in our syntheses, it would be enough to 
show that there could be laws governing the distribution of qualia over minds at times in ways that 
globally conformed to the world-suggestive pattern characterized by the logical constructions of our 
physical theory. The syntheses themselves showed how physical space and its occupants could be an 
idealist construction, or logically sustained by the organization of experience. In seeking a nomological 
framework to guarantee the relevant distribution of qualia, all the idealist need take as ontologically 
primitive would be qualia of the various sense-modal and temporal sorts. Crucially, of course, he will 
have to exploit the immanent durational content of sensory awareness and the binding relations of 
phenomenal coexistence and succession. Note that phenomenal time, as the durational content of sensory 
awareness or the temporal pattern in which qualia are presented, is different from physical time and 
mental time. Physical time is only discernible in the notional and scientific physical world in connection 
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 The qualifier here is especially important for theologians. Christian metaphysics will make use of premises drawn 
from articles of faith, doctrine, and Church tradition, but its subject is the ontological structure of creation, of that 
created reality that is ultimate and as it stand to that which is derived. For creation to be ultimate is for it not to be 
created through the mediation of something else. Created spirits, for example, may be ultimate while remaining 
contingent, that is, without thereby being such as to possess an absolutely necessary existence.  
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with a standard of measurement fixed by some recurring physical process. Mental time is the time in 
which sensations occur and are themselves temporally extended. These distinctions will become clearer in 
the context of elaborating the idealist nomological framework in Ch.VIII. 
  
VII.4  Against the Claims of Physical Realism 
 
Before turning to the subject of the nomological organization of experience explicitly in the next chapter, 
it may be helpful to pause and consider in more technical detail the import of the idealist claims both 
positively and negatively. Positively the idealist claims that physical facts and entities are constituted by 
mental facts. Negatively he claims that physical realism is incoherent. To make this and related claims 
more perspicuous, let me define the following terms.
11
 One set of facts F is said to constitute another set 
of facts F’ if and only if the set F’ holds in virtue of the set F and is nothing over and above F. Intuitively 
the notion of fact constitution captures the notion of ontological mediation, so that if F constitutes F’, 
then exhaustively the obtaining of F’ is by means of the obtaining of F. Any instance of fact constitution 
would entail an instance of logical consequence, since if F’ is constituted by F then any possible world in 
which F obtained would be a world in which F’ obtained. As with logical consequence, the relation of 
fact constitution may but need not be analytically transparent or even a priori discernible; it need not 
entail deducibility, even supposing complete information. T Let us say that if F’ is the fact that x exists, 
then x is logically created by F if and only if F’ is constituted by F. If a fact (or facts) is not constituted 
by any other set of facts than it is basic, and an entity is ontologically primitive if the fact of its existence 
is basic. Notice that a basic fact need not be logically necessary. What exists and what does not may well 
be effected by logical creation, but logical creation need not be supposed to be the only type of creation. 
As another special case of fact constitution, let us say that F is nomologically selected if it is at least 
partly constituted by facts about the obtaining of certain laws.   
The idealist claims that the basic core of physical facts is constituted by mental facts and that in 
particular physical space and its occupants are logically created by mental facts. The phenomenalistic 
idealist claims that the basic core of physical facts (those that are basic relative to the set of physical facts) 
are constituted by facts about the nomological organization of human sensory experience, together with 
other facts about human psychology (e.g., that we are endowed with certain conceptual resources that 
enable us to interpret sensory experience in the way characterized by our physical theory). He thus will 
say that the existence of the physical world is nomologically selected by the laws of phenomenological 
organization. Let us call these laws the laws of creation. 
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 The definitions more or less follow those of Foster (1982, pp.5-7). 
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We made reference to the basic core of physical facts. This is to take notice of the fact that the 
physical realist (and the idealist) may well be committed to nomological selection or logical creation 
within the physical realm itself, by taking either the everyday or scientific image of the world as basic and 
the other as derivative. In the latter case, the most likely candidates for basic entities are facts about fields 
and energy distributions, conservation laws, the geometrical structure of spacetime, or something still 
more exotic. In one sense this is just another way of describing the stratification of physical reality into 
dependent levels. But the realist is likely to regard the direction of ontological dependence as being 
inverted from the epistemological direction in which the idealist regards it. He will come to see the 
advance of empirical theory from the notional to the scientific not merely as progressively interpreting the 
organization of experience but as an expansion of our ontology in the direction suggested by a realist 
construal of the scientific theory. After all, the orderliness of experience calls for explanation, and the 
physical realist will see the postulates of physical theory as items to which we are justified in attributing a 
mind-independent and (in some scientifically refined cases) fundamental existence  on the basis of an 
inference to the best explanation (IBE), as providing the best causal explanation for the outcomes of 
experiential organization, even if it is only on the logical basis of experience that empirical theory can 
develop. It is intuitively plausible to believe that the increasing conceptual sophistication of empirical 
theory gives us a reason to use it as a guide to metaphysics and so to posit a reality ontologically 
independent of its sensory origins, which in our ‘critically sophisticated’ moments we identify as the 
physical world. Yet despite this intuitive plausibility, when pressured in certain ways I think this makes 
the physical realist liable to the charge of incoherence.
12
 
  The definition of fact constitution, and so of logical creation and nomological selection, should be 
seen as well motivated from the start, since even within the realm of physical facts there are clear and 
intuitive examples, some trivial, and some more substantial. So, for example, the fact that this object 
behaves gravitationally is constituted by the facts that this object is a golden bowling ball and the fact that 
all golden bowling balls behave gravitationally. None of these facts is even physically basic, however. 
The latter fact is itself constituted by the fact that all golden bowling balls are bodies and all bodies 
behave gravitationally, or more specifically that they behave in accordance with the Law of Universal 
Gravitation, F = G *( m* m’ ) / r * r. This latter fact is physically basic, at least according to our best 
empirical theories. This same basic fact nomologically selects the fact that, neglecting friction, all bodies 
accelerate in a gravitational field at the same rate relative to the center of mass; and this nomologically 
selects the fact that a golden bowling ball and a golden golf ball both dropped from the top of Tower of 
London will hit the ground at the same time. To take a more interesting case, one could reasonably claim 
within the framework of physical realism, as indeed many philosophers do, that the fact that an object 
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 Discussed below, p.147ff. 
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possesses a color is constituted by the fact that the object possesses certain microstructural properties, the 
fact that these have certain effects on the way the object reflects and absorbs light and the way this in turn 
has certain actual and potential effects on human observers. Obviously, the realist who pursues such a 
strategy will want to make similar claims for other sensory qualities that we ordinarily ascribe to objects 
in accordance with our everyday practice.
13
 The realist can concede the conceptual autonomy of the 
everyday physical theory, and so the truth and analytic irreducibility of our everyday physical ascriptions, 
while insisting on the obtaining of genuine relations of ontological dependence between the truth-making 
facts (that an object possesses a certain color, say) and those facts discovered through scientific theorizing 
which prove to enter into the ultimate scientific explanations.  
To take a final example of fact constitution, even as a physical realist, one might reasonably claim 
that the existence of material bodies is constituted by the existence of space, certain space-pervading 
intrinsic qualities
14
, and a set of laws governing the arrangement and dynamic distribution of these 
qualities over time. The idea would be that as long as the laws ensured that (i) the quality pervaded 
regions of space remained exhaustively non-overlapping (geometrically) and (ii) that changes in quality 
distribution were spatiotemporally continuous, then the quality pervasion of space would coincide with 
the notion of material occupancy of space. In this case, the existence of matter would be nomologically 
selected. This possibility is afforded by the fact that space and matter are so intimately associated, matter 
being individuated by the region of space it occupies. A metaphysical theory that made this claim would 
count as a version of physical realism, but one in which only space and not matter was ontologically 
primitive.
15
   
Notice that in each example the possibility of nomological selection within the explanatory 
framework of physical realism is a consequence of that fact that empirical theorizing only permits us to 
infer the existence of structural properties, either of composition and arrangement, or disposition, 
including disposition to effect human experience. In the case of the logical creation of color (and so of 
other appearance properties) this is what motivated the suggestion the color was constituted by facts about 
microstructure and disposition to effect human sensation, since these and not facts about appearances are 
what enter into its ultimate scientific explanation. Pushed to its logical terminus, the realist’s explanatory 
strategy requires us to identify the physical world with something increasingly removed and eventually 
inaccessible to observation. Yet due to the limited scope of empirical theory, the realist can offer no 
transparent conception even of what a candidate ontologically primitive physical thing might be. The 
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 See, e.g., Frank Jackson, “The Primary Quality View of Color”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (1996): 199–219. 
14
 The ‘pervasion’ of a spatial region by a quality may be understood simply as the instantiation (at a moment in 
time) of the quality by all points within the region.  
15
 Indeed, it could be that facts (i) and (ii) are themselves nomologically selected, so that the existence of matter 
would be logically created by the existence of space and some (other) basic set of laws.  
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shape of this tendency, however, is at odds with something that any metaphysical theory about the 
physical world must be prepared to recognize, something I will call ‘the indispensability of the 
psychophysical link-laws’ (IPLL thesis): the physical world must possess its psychophysical laws 
essentially, since if did not it could not be our physical world, the world that forms the ontologically 
immediate content of experience and empirical theorizing. This unhappy combination of commitments—
realism combined with the epistemic limits of empirical theory and the IPLL thesis—can be shown to 
lead to incoherence. For the realist, the psychophysical laws (those determining effects on human 
experience) must be only contingently attached to physical reality. For he believes, in accordance with his 
realism, that physical space, time, objects
16
, and properties are ultimately and mind-independently 
realized. But if they are mind-independently realized then the fact that they cause certain sensations in us 
cannot be essential to their existence. But if they do not cause sensations in us then, contra the IPLL 
thesis, they cannot be the content of our perceptual experience, our physical concepts, and physical 
language. And yet, if the external reality of the physical realist is not necessarily identical to the one that 
forms the content of our experience, then it is not the one that forms the content of our experience in the 
actual world (since identity in the actual world implies identity in any possible world).
17
 
The realist must still see psychophysical laws as the way in which his external world, believed in 
on faith or an IBE inference, projects itself on to the human empirical viewpoint and so makes epistemic 
contact with the dependent levels of physical reality that we have described. But rather than viewing these 
in the straightforward manner that this pattern of discovery suggests, he will see the lines of epistemic and 
ontological dependence running in reverse directions. The idealist sees them as running in the same 
direction, in accordance with the PAFD, and the phenomenological and cognitive syntheses described 
above by which the physical world of experience is constructed. The status of psychophysical laws takes 
a different complexion on these contrasting positions, but only one of them is consistent. 
What makes the realist particularly vulnerable to the charge of incoherence is something that 
follows from the limited scope of empirical theory, in combination with the IPLL thesis. Our physical 
concepts and language are not only required to make perceptual-causal contact with the physical objects 
and properties they are about, they also are required to serve the needs of scientific theorizing. And 
science is an enterprise whose whole methodology consists of observational tests, observational 
predictions, and structural explanations that are typically abstract and become meaningful only by 
standing in logical relations with the observable. Science requires that its claims have empirical relevance. 
Any claim about the unobservable must, through some chain of derivations, stand in a formally logical 
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 Or at least objects would be included in this list barring the space-selective version of realism considered above.  
17
 Foster (1982) has drawn attention to the particularly sharp way in which this indispensability problem manifests 
itself in connection with the realist conception of space (which as a space must have its geometry essentially, but as 
our physical space must physical geometry contingently, a claim he calls ‘the nomological thesis’).  
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relation to a proposition about the observable. The realist thus becomes torn between two incompatible 
claims about the world that is the object of empirical theorizing: on the one hand that, per physical 
realism, it has its psychophysical laws contingently; and on the other hand, per the IPLL thesis, that is has 
them essentially. In regard to space, and therefore its occupants, the realist must insist that physical space 
has its geometry essentially (as does any space) while also maintaining, per the IPLL thesis and the nature 
of empirical theory, that it has its geometry contingently, as whatever geometry is nomologically selected 
by an ultimate set of laws, including either as consequences or primitive members the psychophysical 
laws by which the regularities of human sensory experience are selected.
18
 The problem for the realist, in 
regard to physical space and the greater physical world, is that the stricture of his realism precludes him 
from recognizing that the sensory origins of empirical theory together with its epistemically limited scope 
requires that the physical world possess modal properties that track the modal properties of the sensory 
organization rather than the modal properties of a fundamental and mind-independent reality. Because of 
the way in which it identifies this parity of modalities, among the sensory and physical, the IPLL thesis 
helps articulate this problem in a manner especially acute. Without taking into account the essential 
relation with experiential effects and thus the way in which we actually experience space or the greater 
physical world of which it forms a part, the realist has no way to account even for an inferential epistemic 
relation between experience and our conceptual constructions, notional or scientific, regarding physical 
space or the physical world. This undermines the justificatory account of how the postulates of empirical 
theory should be given a metaphysically realist construal. Prior to experience and theorizing in response 
to it, there is no independently conspicuous way to understand what the intrinsic nature of the physical 
world is or how it could be conceived.  
The situation might be different if the realist could insist that we have, or at least could look 
forward to having, some transparent conception of space and its occupants in non-sensory but still 
concrete terms, a conception that would allow us to conceive of it as the kind of thing for which a distance 
metric is necessary for its identity and yet for which causing a certain pattern of experiential effects is 
merely contingent to its identity. We might think that we have such a conception of space, but this is due 
to the fact that we so frequently operate in the everyday mindset, in which we assume that color, tactuo-
somatic extension, kinaesthetic freedom and resistance, and egocentric orientation genuinely characterize 
the same space that features in the mathematical hypotheses of modern physics and that is causally 
responsible, together with its occupants, for the pattern of our experiential effects. In other words, we tend 
to assume that the sensible appearance of space is ultimately and mind-independently realized. That is, 
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 Even if one thinks that space is essentially relational, with dimension and metric as its invariants, distance at least 
is nomologically selected, and indeed by those laws which refer to experiential effects; all told, the physically 
relevant geometry is the one that comes closest to achieving nomological uniformity, or constant nomological 
relevance of each distance relation over all pairs of points for which it obtains. See Foster (1982, pp.130-75). 
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our everyday intuitions support the suggestion that we can transparently conceive of a substantival space 
precisely because our everyday intuitions tend in the direction of physical realism. But once we critically 
reflect on these assumptions and recognize them as unfounded, we are forced to recognize that all of the 
qualities by which we transparently conceive of space are sensory qualities, whose realizations are 
confined to the mind. Another candidate option might be the abstract geometric properties of space. But 
being abstract, they tell us nothing about how such a thing is capable of being a medium for material 
occupancy in the concrete way that we experience occupancy immanently within the content of our 
sensations. The geometric characterization is therefore opaque and of no help in forming the kind of 
transparent conception that the realist would need. Finally the realist might try to appeal to the more 
theoretically refined qualities of particle mass, charge, or spin which may seem to be intrinsic 
characterizations of matter, and then claim that space is the kind of thing that serves as medium for 
occupancy for such intrinsically characterized matter. The idea here would be that even though such a 
description of space on its own would be opaque, when combined with the characterization of matter in 
the explanatorily primitive terms of scientific theory it becomes indirectly transparent. The problem with 
this suggestion, however, is that on closer scrutiny the properties attributed to matter by scientific theory 
are either interpretive place-holders for abstract mathematical properties or properties that characterize 
matter in purely relational or dispositional terms or both. In the case of mass, for example, while 
superficially intrinsic, it is strictly defined as that property, whatever it is, by which material objects 
attract other massive objects in accordance with the Law of Universal Gravitation.
19
 
 
VII.5 Realism and Idealist Theology of Visible Creation 
The realist’s position is incoherent because he has no way, while insisting on his realism, to 
explain how we make perceptual contact with physical items, realistically construed. Without doing this 
he has no credible way to explain how we make epistemic contact with them. The idealist, as we have 
seen, has a coherent way to account for this. The realist’s account of perception would proceed by 
abandoning the confinement thesis and allowing sensible qualities to be ultimately realized outside of 
sensory experience. But then, within the framework of realism, this would be to give up on explaining the 
empirically discovered causal facts about how sensory experience is produced in a way that allows us to 
attribute a causally productive role to the sensible qualities perceived (a position we called
20
 
‘phenomenalist direct realism’). Alternatively the realist could accept that the immediate objects of 
sensory awareness are confined for their ultimate realization to sensations, but insist that we still have 
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 A similar analysis applies to the other examples—charge is a disposition to attract or repel other charged particles, 
in accord with the mathematically described Coulomb force, and so on.  
20
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epistemic access, however opaque, to an ultimate physical reality through an IBE inference, as that 
causally potent structure that controls the course of our sensory experience, so that the order of the latter 
reflects at least some structural features of the order of the former (indirect or representative realism). 
There are also hybrid versions of the two.
21
  
As noted, the realist’s best argument will begin by pointing to the fact that the orderliness of 
sensory experience is not self-explanatory, for one thing because the order itself is only specifiable in the 
conceptually independent terms of physical theory, as “the kind of order that would be imposed by a 
world that was ultimately realized in the way the terms of our physical theory are actually sensorily 
realized”. Secondly, the realist will insist, quite correctly, that the orderliness exhibited by sensory 
experience is too great, too much a deviation from the expectations of a random distribution of qualia, not 
to require an explanation. And since the explanation of the orderliness cannot come from the experiential 
realm itself, the only (sic) and therefore putatively best alternative is to construe the terms of physical 
theory or scientific theory or some combination of both in a metaphysically realistic way, so that we 
ought to commit ourselves not just to the (however indispensable) descriptive adequacy of empirical 
theory but to its ultimate metaphysical truth, to an ultimate non-mental world  
As we have now shown, it is claiming the physical world to be ontologically basic and 
independent of the human mind that puts the realist in the difficult theoretical position of explaining how 
the physical world, construed as thus ultimate and independent, contributes to the character and regularity 
of human sensory experience. Naively or pre-philosophically we tend to assume that the causal properties 
by which physical objects effect our experiences are intimately related to the sensory qualities by which 
they are presented to us within the content of those experiences, so that the objects are stamping or 
impressing their own character on us via the perceptual experiences that they cause. This would mean that 
the physical objects and properties, together with the psychophysical laws under which they causally 
influence our experience, are what logically sustain the order and character of those experiences (this in 
turn would give reductive physicalism about the mental an air of plausibility). But our anti-realist 
argument shows that these assumptions, when critically evaluated, prove to be incoherent. The idealist, 
however, is quick to point out that a certain (reversed) structural analogy suggests a more fruitful 
explanatory approach. Insofar as empirical theory is epistemically limited to functional structure and 
prescinds from intrinsic content but is constructed on the basis of ordinary sense experience, why not 
regard the existence and identity of physical items as nomologically selected by purely phenomenological 
laws? After all, if the intrinsic nature and internal organization of what is logically mind-independent are 
only relevant to empirical theory in virtue of imposing appropriate constraints on our experience—the 
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 Here we are more or less retracing the dialectical stages of the realist Hylas’ response the critique of Philonous, 
the idealist in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.  
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constraints that yield the systematic course of actual and potential experience from which we construct 
our knowledge of the physical world—then we are free to explain these causal constraints by any 
contingent nomological framework that logically entails them. This is the option we shall explore.  
Curiously, idealism can be understood to rescue realism in this regard, salvaging part of what 
lends it its intuitive plausibility. Realism seeks to justify the conceptual autonomy and singularity of 
physical theory as the only empirically adequate way of interpreting the thematic regularities of our 
sensory experiences. But realism’s effort undermines the empirical immanence of the physical world. For 
all its conceptual autonomy and theoretical expediency, physical theory never ceases to be a way of 
interpreting something ultimately nonphysical, viz., our human sensory experiences. Thus, when it is 
metaphysically theorized to the point of putatively providing an ultimate explanation of the sensory 
regularities it is forced to misidentify the real physical world with something possessing a mind-
independent and logically basic existence which is, thereof, no longer permitted to terminate in the 
features of sensory experience in the description of its intrinsic and categorical content. The physical 
world never ceases to be a logico-theoretical construction about the regularities of experience. Being 
subordinate to the ends of human observers, its ontological status remains bound by the limits of 
accessibility to the human empirical perspective. At the same time, the descriptive resources of physical 
theory strictly outrun those that are available at the phenomenological level, and do so, crucially, by 
presupposing the effects of imaginatively projecting the qualities of experience in inexhaustibly complex 
ways, and thus building into themselves conceptual commitments to publically objective times, places, 
entities and events. But this conceptual autonomy should never be mistaken for ontological independence 
and fundamentality. Yet with no explanatory alternative this is exactly what happens in practice. The 
physical world is expanded into an ultimate external realm that includes the experiential realm. This is the 
intuitively compelling viewpoint of physical realism. It takes the physical world to be enclosed within 
itself. This is what makes it so congenial to metaphysical naturalism and so incongruous with traditional 
Christian theism.  
Careful philosophical reflection shows that physical realism, while intuitively compelling on its 
face, is in the final analysis self-undermining. But it is here that Christian idealism comes to the rescue of 
physical realism. Christian idealism can do justice to the conceptual autonomy of physical theory and its 
commitments to a public and historical world of objective facts and forecasts without having to divorce 
them from their ontological intimacy with experience. Without compromising the world’s empirical 
immanence, idealism can say that the analytically irreducible complexity of the physical world described 
in its own objective terms is, not the way ultimate reality is, but merely the irreducibly complex way that 
sensory experience is organized. Given that such a reality is what gets presented at the human empirical 
viewpoint, the idealist takes physical theory to be ultimately only the best description of the way in which 
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experience is orderly and systematic. It is organized as if such a physical theory were as the realist 
imagines. But it is only thus appropriately descriptive because God in his wisdom and providence has 
systematically ordered human experience in this physically described way, precisely because it is just 
such a world that he intends to create for us by decreeing that experiences conform to this world-
suggestive pattern.  
This way of construing the relationship between a physical theory that internally presupposes that 
experiences are as if realism were true and a sensory organization that logically sustains it is something 
we have already come to accept in connection with Berkeley’s Principle of Autonomous Fields of 
Discourse, which was applied most recently in accounting for physical causation within the context of an 
idealist perceptual theory.
22
 The principle was motivated by the need to account for the relative structure 
among different domains of explanatory discourse, those that are conceptually autonomous but which 
stand to each other in metaphysically determinative relations. In particular we accepted that the truth of 
descriptive natural science was delimited by the truth of metaphysics, just as the truth of theoretical 
natural science was in turn delimited by descriptive natural science, and further that the domains were 
internally nested so that what are regarded as causes within the delimited domain are regarded as effects 
within the proximally delimiting domain. Regarding the empirical domain not only metaphysically but 
theologically, as the visible creation, application of the PAFD corresponds to the distinction between the 
diastasis and the odos, between visible creation viewed from the ultimate or external perspective in which 
it is understood to be created and creation viewed from the epistemically original or internal perspective 
of that which is created.
23
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 These two perspectives are not to be confused with the notions of creatio originalis and creatio continua. Both are 
properly theological notions that are as such creation-external, being relevant to the explanatory domain of Christian 
metaphysics. Creatio continua must not be confused with what is pursued in the discursive framework relevant to 
the creation-internal perspective, such as theories of evolutionary biology or other empirical theories, e.g., when 
Jurgen Moltmann states “This means the theory of evolution has its place where theology talks about continuous 
creation…” in God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (ET London: TCM, 1985), as reprinted in 
Problems in Theology I, p.196. If we are trying to understand what God creates, then empirical theory, the theory we 
take up within the internal perspective of what is created, is relevant to addressing this question. But when we 
address this question we are not addressing ourselves to how God creates, and we are not taking up the perspective 
and discursive framework relevant to inquiring after creatio continua. The distinction needed to understand creatio 
continua is not between one or another kind of empirical theory, even between natural science and a sophisticated, 
humanistic social or historical theory. The relevant distinction is between empirical and transcendental perspectives 
of creation itself in toto. 
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Chapter VIII: The Ultimate Reality as a Community of Minds 
 
VIII.1 Introduction 
 
Recall that positively the idealist claims that physical facts and entities are constituted by mental facts; 
negatively he claims that physical realism is incoherent. My goal has been to argue persuasively that the 
negative claim is true, that the positive claim is offers a coherent answer to a dogmatic question of 
traditional Christian theism: how is God’s creation productively ordered?. The negative claim involved 
several stages. First we noted the conceptual difficulty surrounding the realist’s burden of accounting for 
the fact of perceptual contact with physical items in a way that is phenomenologically and causally 
appropriate. Given the confinement of qualia and their irrelevance to scientific explanations of perceptual 
causation, it is difficult to conceive of how conscious awareness of qualia can enable perceptual access to 
physical items construed as mind-independent and ontologically basic. Further pressure was applied to 
this difficulty by highlighting the epistemic limits of empirical theory from which physical realism makes 
its hypostasizing ontological leap. Finally these difficulties were brought to a head by noting the 
incompatibility of realism with the IPLL thesis. Altogether we concluded that realism is incoherent.      
Our sketch of the logical construction of the physical world via the synthesis of qualia, prompting 
the interpretive empirical theories of the notional and scientific levels of physical reality, accomplished 
half of the task of showing the coherence of the idealist thesis. The sensory regularities together with the 
human psychological endowment are sufficient to logically create the physical world. But the sensory 
regularities themselves call for explanation. With the incoherence of the realist strategy of taking these 
regularities to be causally controlled by the same physical world they sustain, the idealist is now 
dialectically free to entertain spiritual and indeed theological explanatory hypotheses. What is needed is a 
way of understanding how there might be a prephysical nomological framework within which human 
sensory experience is organized. This requires an ontology of human minds as ontologically basic 
subjects, a prephysical temporal dimension, a source (or sources) of non-human rational, spiritual agency, 
and a systematic way of ensuring that individual human experiences are collectively organized in a way 
that is intentionally guaranteed to be harmonious. It will be the purpose of this chapter to show how there 
could be a prephysical nomological framework composed in this way.  
Idealists and realists agree that our experiences are organized in a distinct manner—marked by 
the “constancy and coherence” highlighted by Berkeley and Hume—a way that not only differs from a 
random distribution but one which renders them systematically and conspicuously amenable to physical 
interpretation, in terms of the regularity both of the thematic character within and the sequential relations 
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between episodes of sensory experience. These were the regularities exploited in the syntheses that we 
used to demonstrate how the notional physical world, and by extension the scientific physical world, were 
logically created by facts about these sensory regularities. As we noted, however, the realist offers an 
alternative explanation of the sensory regularities. He will say that they are causally controlled by objects 
and properties that are the reification of features of the descriptive scientific theory. viz., that the sensory 
regularities give us an IBE inference to a realist interpretation of the scientific physical theory. By 
contrast, the idealist will say the sensory regularities that logically sustain the physical ones are 
themselves causally controlled and logically sustained by facts of a nonphysical—in fact, mental—kind. 
We recognized that physical theory is epistemically limited to relational structure, consisting of 
ascriptions of causal-functional profiles to physical items that only terminate in transparent descriptions 
of intrinsic content when referring to abstract mathematical features or the qualitative content of sensory 
experience. This means that there is an explanatory asymmetry between empirical regularities and the 
regularities of sensory experience: the latter may be understood (retrospectively) to entail the former as 
logical consequences, whereas the converse relation does not hold. When it is the facts of sensory 
regularity that logically sustain the physical regularities, it is viciously circular to see these as grounded in 
turn by physical ones, even if they are from a physical order on a different compositional scale; even the 
spatiality of the physical is one more regular feature logically sustained by the sensory facts.  
The IPLL thesis helped to bring this point into focus. Since the facts described by physical theory 
are an interpretation of the sensory regularities that prompt it, physical facts are logically sustained by the 
sensory regularities; and so the identity of physical theory’s subject matter remains bound by that logical 
connection. By reason of the way in which it is logically constructed from its phenomenological base, the 
physical world inherits the modal properties of the immanent world of the human empirical perspective, 
not the (quite different) modal properties of the abstract putative “world” that is the reification of 
scientific theory. Whereas the latter could be, the physical world that is the subject of our empirical 
theorizing could not be the world that it is if human sensory experience were organized differently or not 
at all. One way to state this lesson is to say that we must account for the special, nonrandom distribution 
of qualia over minds and times as an order of natural necessity that is metaphysically prior to the physical 
order of necessity.   
 
VIII.2 Christian Theism and the Problem of Creative Laws 
 
To explain this order requires appeal to facts of a nonphysical kind. The order in question would 
require knowledge and causal power with respect to the mind. This leads to the hypothesis of supernatural 
mental agency, and it is at this stage that theism and Christian doctrine explicitly enter into our 
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explanatory discourse. The Judeo-Christian God is one who is supreme in the perfections of knowledge 
and power. He is an almighty Spirit, the Father immensae maiestatis, and is said to possess an eternal 
Wisdom, with Whom He creates the world
1
 that would otherwise have no existence.
2
 In the New 
Testament this hidden wisdom is moreover preached to have been ordained by God “before the world 
began, unto our glory” (1 Cor 2:12), and identified with the mystery of Christ, in whom the pre-ordained 
creative plan is revealed and brought to fulfillment. The Christian God is therefore appropriately 
attributed and positioned with respect to human minds to act as their maker and governor, to issue wisely 
intentioned creative ordinances that take their effect in the organization of human experience for the 
purpose of creating a world for us, forming us “unto our glory”. Following the same Nyssan, Dionysian, 
and Berkeleyan vision that we have traced in the early chapters, the theologian Louis Bouyer puts it thus: 
the nomic regularities of the cosmos are linguistic, depending on “a personal God who remains absolutely 
transcendent and who therefore, in his activity ad extra, his creative activity, can combine contingency 
and rationality”.3 
The Christian God is uniquely well-suited to play the role of guaranteeing the (contingent) nomic 
necessity of the phenomenological laws of creation posited by idealism. The question now is, how are we 
to imagine that God uses the phenomenological laws in the genuinely creative way that idealism 
describes? There is an important sense in which the same question arises for any theistic account of God’s 
world-creative activity that accords a creative role to fundamental laws of any sort, even ultimate laws of 
nature, as would be envisaged by the physical realist. If there are any basic nomological facts, then, 
certainly for a theist, they nevertheless must be contingent along with the whole of creation itself, 
something that need not exist but does in virtue of God’s free creative activity. But it is also of the nature 
of laws, as opposed to merely accidental patterns, that they impose regularities on things within the world. 
While leaving open the specific ways in which things and events must conform to them, laws constrain 
the possible courses of events, and are such creative. Thus the challenge for the Christian theist is to 
understand divine creation in such a way that provides for the world-internally constraining and so 
creative aspect of the laws themselves.  
The challenge is to find a way in which God creates a world that not only happens to conform to 
the sorts of laws posited by empirical theory (or our best-confirmed empirical theories, whatever these 
happen to be), but a way in which God creates the world so that the laws themselves play a creative role. 
This is important for (at least) two reasons. First, as mentioned, only if the laws are creative in the sense 
that they impose constraints on the physical universe’s possible courses of development do laws even 
                                                          
1
 Prv 8:22-23.  
2
 Job 26:7, 2 Macc 7:28, Rom 4:17. 
3
 Bouyer, Cosmos, p.111, emphasis is mine. Bouyer credits Whitehead and Collingwood with first having this 
insight into the history of science, and Duhem and Jaki for developing it. 
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exist as such. A universe that merely happens to instantiate a pattern that conforms to a generalized 
description is not thereof governed by a law; and a law that does not govern is no law at all. Laws must 
exert the force of non-absolute or world-internal nomic necessity on wordly things and events. Second, 
only if there are genuine laws that are operative in this constraining way is it the case that items in the 
world possess dispositions and thus physical natures. The point is brought out by thinking of the physical 
causality possessed by physical continuants on the idealist theory of perception we developed in Ch.VI. In 
virtue of the sensory regularities, the physical continuants logically constructed from them (as illustrated 
by the syntheses of Ch.VII) could be attributed causal powers within the notional physical theory (and 
thus within the world-internal empirical perspective). By the PAFD, the attribution of these causal powers 
is relative to the empirical perspective and in particular to the notional physical theory, but nonetheless 
meaningful and apt for truth. The analysis we provided was in terms of the notion of ‘influence’, 
consisting in a chain of counterfactual dependence running from cause to effect. Even though there may 
be theories of causation that demand stronger conditions for causation, most popular theories will demand 
that counterfactual dependence be at least a necessary condition or a logical consequence of causation. 
Yet, given the epistemic limits of empirical theory, that it cannot deliver a conception of intrinsic physical 
content
4
, without genuinely governing laws it is not clear what could sustain the truth of world-internal 
counterfactual claims of any sort, let alone the claims of counterfactual dependence necessary for a theory 
of physical causation. The explanatory challenge to account for dispositions within physical creation takes 
on an especially grave aspect in light of the reasoning of Ch.VII for the IPLL thesis. If there were no 
dispositions in nature, then there would be no dispositions to cause human experience and so, per the 
IPLL thesis, no physical world at all.  
As noted by Foster
5
, the theist does have the option, rather than seeing laws as causally powerful 
concrete entities in their own right
6
--which is incoherent as laws consist in facts about the non-strict 
necessity of certain regularities--of taking the laws to be constituted by the facts about God’s intentional 
causal policies, policies to which God has committed in his supremely rational creativity. The problem 
with this suggestion is that this seems to eliminate facts about dispositions of things in the world rather 
than create them. We want to know in what sense can the abstract facts of natural necessity be understood 
to be dispositions of things rather than dispositions of God. On the view of physical realism, it would 
                                                          
4
 As argued in VII.4. 
5
 The Divine Lawmaker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.151-65. 
6
 This is, in effect, the currently popular view that physically fundamental particles are no more than mobile 
spatially-located clusters of causal power—the so-called “powers thesis”. See, e.g., Brian Ellis, Scientific 
Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Stephen Mumford,  Laws in Nature (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), and Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). By treating 
physically fundamental properties as essentially dispositional, the thesis attempts to concretize abstract facts of 
causal necessitation.  
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seem that God either would have to create the laws as concrete entities, which is incoherent—for laws 
must generate nomic necessity within the world by causally constraining worldly states-of-affairs, and 
how else can we imagine that states-of-affairs are causally constrained?—or adopt a set of intentional 
causal policies that cover all of the relevant counterfactual cases, not of worldly states-of-affairs, but of 
his own creative decisions. What other options remain? If one gives up altogether on the existence of 
laws, in what meaningful sense does genuine natural necessity obtain in the world? Without such 
necessity in what sense is there a rerum natura, a course of nature? And without these, in what sense is 
there an objective physical world at all?      
While any Christian theist must ensure that the world God creates is one genuinely governed by 
laws, so that certain actual and counterfactual states-of-affairs are world-internally guaranteed and objects 
may be attributed dispositional properties, the idealist has an especially attractive way in which to 
understand the creative role of laws. It is attractive because it does not require laws to be either facts 
about divine dispositions or concrete causally powerful entities. It can posit a prephysical nomological 
framework that causally constrains the world by causally constraining human sensory experience, in 
accord with the idealist thesis. Such a prephysical framework would involve a prephysical temporal 
dimension and a society of supernatural rational agents (together with the collection of human minds). 
This would be to accept the traditional and Biblical view that there is a hierarchical divine government in 
which ministering spirits are accorded “powers of nature”. On the idealist view, the powers of nature 
would be executed in accord with laws that prescribe a plan for how human sensory consciousness is to 
be organized, in participation with the divine wisdom.     
If God enacts these phenomenological laws alone then the order in which he decrees them would 
have to be regarded as a temporal one. The main reason for this is that on the idealist position, facts about 
physical regularities are constituted by facts about actual and possible human sensations; indeed, given 
our development of idealism, by facts about how qualia are to be nomologically distributed over minds at 
times. This means that the prephysical phenomenological laws of which the physical laws are constituted, 
the “laws of creation” as we labelled them, must be executed within a prephysical temporal medium and 
must be understood logically to create a prephysical order of time in which human minds are temporally 
related as a community.
7
 If they really are to be laws, then they would have to satisfy the above 
characterization, causally constraining worldly states-of-affairs in a way that creates a genuine form of 
nomic necessity in the world. As stated above, if God acts in creation alone then the only way to make 
sense of laws is to think of them as derived from God’s volitional policies—the idea the God commits to 
                                                          
7
 The distinction between the prephysical temporal medium in which the laws are executed and the prephysical 
temporal relations among human minds that the laws create will be made clearer in the details below, as well the 
reason why the  two must be isometrically related, or, more specifically, isomorphic with respect to their temporal 
order and distance relations.  
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certain policies of causal interaction with human minds. The laws would then be constituted by these facts 
about God. Dispositions of things in the world would then be understood as ultimately derived from 
God’s own dispositions. On this view it is difficult to conceive a there being any genuine created order, 
any objectivity to the world that is not illusory. But there is an alternative view that does not collapse the 
created order. Instead, it takes the ultimate “laws of nature” to be the dynamic arrangement for 
intersubjective causation among created minds, their being brought together into a participatory society, a 
hierarchy, a liturgical assembly or ecclesia. The physical order and its internal “laws of nature” would 
then genuinely exist, only not as something ontologically ultimate but as derived from the lives of rational 
creatures in their causal interaction. This is the Christian idealist view that we have been working to 
develop and now aim to complete by specifying how there could be a system of ultimate, prephysical 
laws establishing a co-creative causal framework among created minds, what we have called the 
phenomenological laws of creation.  
As noted, the idealist has not as yet had recourse to theological notions or to forms of 
supernatural agency. With some modifications, our development so far has made use of the 
phenomenalist constructions of the empiricist tradition of Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell, and Ayer. With 
Ayer in particular we have had entrée into the technical phenomenological resources of William James’ 
“radical empiricism” and the American pragmatist tradition, most significantly, the recognition that 
certain relations (and in particular temporal relations) between sensed data are themselves sensed. By 
analogizing the temporal relation sensed within the duration of a sensation to a relation among sensations, 
in accordance with James’ approach, we can understand how higher-order qualitative organization—that 
which is systematically world-like—may be logically constructed from phenomenological qualia. This 
invites us to consider the idealist metaphysical strategy of regarding the regularity characteristic of the 
physical world as logically created by the distribution of qualitative content over minds at times.    
 
VIII.3 The Augustinian-Cartesian View of the Soul 
 
Key to this metaphysical strategy is that our Berkeleyan version of idealism has from the beginning 
assumed a Cartesian view of the soul as an ontologically basic mental subject, which already makes it 
unlike all other versions of empiricism and naturally opens its ultimate ontology into the category of the 
mental or spiritual more comprehensively.   
Unlike the physical realist, the idealist is required to adopt the Cartesian view of persons as 
primarily basic mental subjects and only secondarily as embodied. Since idealism accords all bodies, not 
just organismic ones a derivative ontological status, one logically sustained by mental facts, the 
explanatory strategy of his metaphysics requires him to accept that persons are primarily basic mental 
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subjects and enables him to say, in line with his more general thesis, that the embodied person, the 
organism, is a derivative subject. This is desirable for many reasons, not least of which is that it furnishes 
us with an ontology of basic mental subjects who, unlike organisms, may be coherently attributed with 
powers of agency and hence free will in the strong, libertarian sense. It also better accords with the view 
of the soul in the Old and New Testament, which emphasizes the prophecy of the resurrection and the 
more general potential for personal existence after death, though of course this will be debated.
8
 The 
Cartesian view, which emphasizes the indivisibility and real distinctness of the soul from matter, is a 
Platonic view of the soul and its relation to its body, one that was crucial to the development of idealism 
from Platonism as we have traced it, in Plotinus, Nyssen, Augustine, and Dionysius.
9
  
Taking the unity of the mind, or the mental subject, as foundational is a sound metaphysical 
strategy because the mind’s unity, expressed as that which is accessible to a single center of introspective 
awareness, has such priority and transparency in the order of human knowledge. What could be better 
known to me or more intimately related to my essence as a human person than the fact that I am a single, 
unified center of mental power and activity, of thought, will, perception, and imagination? When I reflect 
on my own acts of conscious awareness, though I can form no objective image of my self, I aware of my 
mental act of image-framing, as I am of so many other mental acts, as one that belongs to me, that I 
engage in, voluntarily or not.  
Consider Augustine’s classic treatment of the issue in Book X of the De Trinitate. According to 
Augustine what he finds in careful reflection is that he is certain that he exists, is alive, and understands, 
and that he remembers and wills. By contrast, he is not certain that he is fire, air, or any material body. He 
reasons that if he can doubt his identity to a body but cannot doubt his power to remember, understand, 
and will (since even these are implicated in doubt), then his essence consists in the power that unifies 
these operations. Finally, he concludes, therefore, that he is not a body since a body has no such essence 
as this. In a similar line of reasoning he says that when he is thinking of a body a sense-image is used. But 
this is not so in those reflective cogitative acts whereby he is certain of his power of willing, 
understanding, and remembering. The latter are known in themselves.
10
 They are examples of a type of 
thought having a special epistemic status, a point that Descartes takes up twelve hundred years later. 
Having deliberately, it seems, reproduced Augustine’s reasoning on the nature of the soul11 and its real 
distinctness from matter, Descartes expands the point concerning the special epistemic status of the soul’s 
                                                          
8
 Cf. Is 14;9-11, 26:19, Ez 37:1, Dan 12:2 2 Macc 7:14, 23, Mt 10:28, Lk 20:36, 1 Cor 15:45,  2 Cor 5:1-8, 2 Tim 
1:16-18, Phil 1:23, 1 Pet 3:19, Rev 5:8, 14:13. 
9
 On also finds the view paired with metaphysical theories other than idealism, e.g., with those of Malebranche, 
Leibniz, and Kant. Though less pervasive in 20
th
 century philosophy, the view is to be found in the thought of G.E. 
Moor, Husserl and the early to middle-period Sartre.  
10
 I have summarized the argument that spans Book X, Chapters 10-12, Sections. 13-19. 
11
 While leaving aside, it should be noted, Augustine view of the soul’s operations and power of memory. 
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self-knowledge in occurent ‘self thoughts’.12 There are ‘cogito-type’ ‘self thoughts’ such “I think”, “I 
exist”, “I doubt”, and so on, and there are ‘ontological argument-type’ ‘God thoughts’ such as “God 
exists” or “God necessarily exists”, or “a supremely perfect being necessarily exists”. They all have a 
special epistemic status in virtue of the way their content relates to the activity of the mind itself: it is not 
just that they are noninferential or that they are immediately known or warranted (not known or warranted 
on the basis of something else); they are in fact impossible to form falsely.
13
 As for Augustine, so for 
Descartes the mind enjoys special powers and capacities for various operations, including cognition-
relevant activities such as knowing, judging, and understanding. There is a kind of reflective unity and 
simplicity to these operations such that the soul’s self-knowledge, and knowledge of itself as the kind of 
thing that is capable of these operations, is necessarily implicated in its use of these operations to know 
anything else.  
But nothing is at all rightly said to be known while its substance is not known. And therefore, 
when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance; and when it is certain about itself, it as 
certain about its own substance. But it is certain about itself, as those things which are said above 
prove convincingly; although it is not at all certain whether itself is air, or fire, or some body, or 
some function of body. Therefore it is not any of these. And to that whole which is bidden to 
know itself, belongs this, that it is certain that it is not any of those things of which it is uncertain, 
and is certain that it is that only, which only it is certain that it is…..But if it were any one of them 
[something conceived through a sense-image], it would think this one in a different manner from 
the rest viz. not through an imaginary phantasy, as absent things are thought, which either 
themselves or some of like kind have been touched by the bodily sense; but by some inward, not 
feigned, but true presence (for nothing is more present to it than itself); just as it thinks that itself 
lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills. For it knows these things in itself.  And if it 
attaches nothing to itself from the thought of these things, so as to think itself to be something of 
the kind, then whatsoever remains to it from itself that alone is itself.
14
    
                                                          
12
 Principally in the Meditations on First Philosophy (see AT VII 78 for one version of the real distinctness 
argument). As the Letter to the Sorbonne and Synopsis published at the beginning of the work make clear, one of its 
main motivations is to convince contemporary “irreligious” intellectuals who are impressed with the method of 
geometric demonstration that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are absolute certainties, equal at 
least to those of geometry.   
13
 Note that this does not imply the stronger and dubious assertion that belief in these propositions is irresistible. 
Indeed resistance to such beliefs is a commonplace. It requires a disciplined, meditative direction of the mind to 
realize such insights about itself, its operations, and ideas.   
14
 De Trinitate, X.10.16. Compare this insight with what Augustine says in the Confessions, VII.2, about his earlier 
failure to realize it: “I therefore being thus gross-hearted, nor clear even to myself, whatsoever was not stretched 
over certain spaces, nor diffused, nor crowded together, nor swelled out, or which did not or could not receive some 
of these dimensions, I judged to be altogether nothing. For over such forms as my eyes are wont to range did my 
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I should emphasize here that I am not making a simple or ahistorical comparison of Descartes and 
Augustine. Instead I am making the claim that Descartes found in Augustine’s discipline of self-
contemplation a mode of reasoning and doctrines that he accorded a certain value and deliberately 
reproduced. It is this discipline and these doctrines that I am interested in, namely those concerning the 
metaphysics of the human person as mentioned above: that a human person is an active spiritual 
substance or ontologically basic immaterial soul whose essence consists in mental activity, as discovered 
through meditative reflection on the unity and structure of the soul’s mental operations. I am making no 
further claim made about their respective motivations, purposes, or points of emphasis, nor would I wish 
to. It is obvious enough that the Augustine and Descartes belong to very different contexts of intellectual 
culture historical circumstances, and that they had very different intellectual programs and wrote with 
very different purposes. And once again, I am not primarily engaged in an close exercise of historical 
exegesis but rather in establishing the value of certain ideas and insights by examining their function in 
actual historical cases. I am confident in making the limited interpretive claim I do on the basis of the 
evidence I cite and on the back of the substantial work that has already been done to establish that the 
reading is plausibly available.
15
   
The Augustinian-Cartesian insight that sees in the singularity of subjective ownership over 
conscious experiences an image of the divine simplicity, freedom, reflective knowledge, and so ultimately 
of the personhood of the divine spiritual substance is rationally defensible on philosophical grounds and 
theologically corroborated by its systematic relations to other Christian doctrines as established in the 
tradition.
16
 There is an introspectively discoverable essence or basic attribute of the mind that provides the 
subject with a transparent conception of her status as an ontologically basic existent, her thisness, and 
how, so characterized, she is the sort of thing for which her more specific psychological attributes, mental 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
heart then range; nor did I see that this same observation, by which I formed those same images, was not of this kind, 
and yet it could not have formed them had not itself been something great.” (emphasis mine) 
15
 See Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Garreth B. 
Matthews, Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). Matthews’ study 
includes a comparison of the two thinkers on the Cogito and the nature of the mind, whereas Menn is more 
historically focused on Augustine and how and why Descartes used resources in Augustine the way he did. Menn 
directly challenges the conclusions of Gilson and Gouhier that Descartes’ thought is radically anti-Augustinian. See 
Henri Gouhier, La Pensée religieuse deDescartes, 2
nd
 ed. (Paris: Vrin,1972) and Etienne Gilson, “The Future of 
Augustinian Metaphysics,” in A Gilson Reader: Selected Writings of Etienne Gilson (New York: Image Books, 
1957). One outcome of Menn’s study is the separation of otherwise confused issues: Descartes may be “anti-
Augustinian” in his conception of the value of reason apart from grace or in how he conceives of the project of 
philosophy while at the same time reproducing Augustine’s contemplative discipline and many of his doctrines.  
16
 For good arguments in support of this position the reader is referred to Richard Swinburne’s The Evolution of the 
Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), John Foster’s The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian 
Dualist Conception of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Geoffrey Madell, The Identity of the Self 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), and Alvin Plantinga’s “World and Essence” in his Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The latter in particular offers a more robust 
version for the argument for real distinctness found in Augustine and Descartes.  
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conditions, and temporally realized states and activities are just that, states owned by her as their 
underlying basic subject. To repeat a by now familiar point, there is no similarly transparent conception of 
the intrinsic essence of matter.
17
 The closest such candidate would be matter’s determinacy of spatial 
position, the fact of its occupying a determinate and contiguous region of space. And indeed this is the 
ordinary criterion or principle of individuation for physical particulars. The Berkeleyan idealist critique of 
spatial realism, however, has shown this conception to be either futilely opaque in virtue of the epistemic 
limitations of physical theories or one that reduces to facts about the constraints on and regularities among 
human sense experiences. It is the irreducible unity and simplicity of the mind as a spiritual substance or 
basic subject that allows for facts about what it experiences to logically sustain facts about the existence, 
identity, and persistence of physical items.  
What determines the identity of experience is its intrinsic qualitative character, the time at which 
it occurs, and the subject to whom it occurs. Given that all of these can be fixed in ways that make no 
appeal to the physical, and given that the physical is either the empirically accessible or ontologically 
derivative of what is empirically accessible, the idealist’s strategy of explaining the physical as something 
metaphysically reducible to the mental presents itself as a viable option. That the theoretical situation with 
respect to the physical is asymmetric—there is no analogous strategy for reducing the mental to the 
physical—makes it a first option. For this reason, a systematic theologian wishing better to understand 
what it means for God to create the world does well to consider the metaphysics of phenomenalistic 
idealism as a means for articulating the faith content of the doctrine of creation. In metaphysics we try to 
adopt a God’s-eye perspective of the categories of existence. And if our best theory of metaphysics tells 
us that the existence of physical items and facts is logically sustained by the organization of human 
sensory experience, then this provides the systematic theologian with an opportunity for clarifying the 
mystery of creation
18
, of what it means to believe that God creates all things visible and invisible, right 
now, from nothing, through word and wisdom. 
 
VIII.4  The Logical Construction of Time 
 
This explanatory-theoretical option is uniquely available to the idealist. The realist must suppose the 
world to be an ontologically fundamental, mind-independent reality whose existence and character we 
infer from the content of our minds. We saw that this position makes our very perceptual access to the 
physical world problematic in light of the phenomenological and scientific facts about perception. And 
we also saw that realism is incompatible with the IPLL thesis, the claim that whatever the physical world 
                                                          
17
 And here of course the idealist breaks with the Cartesian philosophy quite decisively. 
18
 Not to be read as dissolving the mystery, but as clarifying it as mystery. 
161 
 
is it must be our world, that it could not be the world it is if it were not manifest at our human empirical 
viewpoint in the nomologically characterized way of our actual experiences. Realism is inconsistent with 
this thesis because it (mis)identifies the physical world with something that, in being fundamental and 
mind-independent, would have different modal properties from the actual empirical world. Whereas it can 
only be accidental to a realist physical world that it has any connection with human experience, it is 
essential to the actual physical world that it does so. Idealism internalizes this lesson by offering an 
account of sensory regularities as explanatorily prior to physical regularities, so that the order of empirical 
inquiry and determination runs in the same direction as the order of ontological priority. The idealist’s 
logical constructions are intended to show how the beliefs of physical theory are a warranted and self-
endorsing response to a sensory organization that already exhibits its own phenomenologically 
characterizable thematic regularities and order, which prompt the initial stages in physical theory 
construction.  
The phenomenally temporal relations that served to synthesize space and its occupants—
phenomenal coexistence, succession, overlap, and continuity—are the same ones that can be used to 
construct mental time and the temporal framework of phenomenological laws that determine the 
distribution of qualia and so encode the physical world. This insight serves to motivate the project of this 
section, to logically construct a conception of mental time that will serve the purposes of the idealist’s 
explanatory strategy. However, it might be useful to begin by re-examining what the idealist means to 
propose by such a ‘construction’. The following definition will be of service. 
In general, by a ‘logical construction of X (from Y)’ I mean a definition of a system of concepts 
adequate for the specification of facts Y, such that either, (the prospective case) one could establish the 
constitution of X from Y given knowledge of the facts Y alone, or (the retrospective case) given an 
independent knowledge of the obtaining of X, one could establish the constitution of X from Y. Here I 
refer to the relation of fact constitution defined in the previous chapter, namely, that X holds in virtue of Y 
(its obtaining is through and by means of Y) and is nothing over and above Y (Y’s ontological mediation is 
exhaustive for X). In the retrospective case, the clause concerning ‘independent knowledge of X is 
important and relates to what has been previously stressed in regard to retrospective logical creation, as 
opposed to any a priori or analytic reduction. If one only knows the facts Y, there may well be facts X that 
cannot be logically constructed from Y, without already and independently knowing of the obtaining of X. 
Once again, take our example of retrospective logical creation from within the physical realm. It may be 
that facts about the possession of color properties by physical objects are constituted by facts about 
microstructural properties of object surfaces, facts about the way these properties cause patterns of optical 
reflection, and facts about the way all of these factors in turn cause certain kinds of sensations in sighted 
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subjects.
19
 But without independently knowing what colors are and the fact that they obtain from 
introspection of our own experiences, there would be no way to establish the existence of colors or the 
obtaining of facts of color possession by physical objects,  no matter how much we know about the 
scientific facts.
20
 Color possession by physical objects would not be definable, analytically reducible, or 
in any way conceptually derivative of the scientific facts, while still being retrospectively logically 
created by them.
21
   
Having defined the notion of a logical construction in this general way, we should understand that 
the idealist proposes to offer a logical construction of mental time accordingly, from facts about 
phenomenal time and (prephysical) nomological facts, with the construction involving the positing of 
definitional schemes and concepts adequate for the specification of these facts. The mandate to provide an 
account of mental time is incurred by the idealist’s claim that the physical world is constituted by 
nomological facts about the distribution of qualia over minds at times. The relevant notion of time in this 
metaphysical reduction obviously cannot appeal to facts about physical change or the measurement of 
physical time. But this does not mean the idealist must prescind from facts about phenomenal time or 
from prephysical nomological facts. We want to understand the nature of the temporal medium that minds 
“inhabit”, the continuum in which mental states and acts are temporally arranged; and while this medium 
will be different from the time that we experience, it may well be logically constructible from it in part. 
Recall that in the syntheses of our logical construction of things in space, we appealed to the 
phenomenological relations of coexistence (strict phenomenal co-consciousness), phenomenal succession, 
and suggestion. From these sensible relations among component sensations within a total sensation, we 
constructed analogous relations between total sensations themselves, including those of phenomenal 
overlap and continuity. Crucial to this strategy was the fact that sensations are temporally patterned, 
having a spread of durational awareness and a gestalt structure of (phenomenal) succession and 
(phenomenal) simultaneity. We then took the temporal and qualitative patterns that formed the content of 
sensory awareness to be constitutive of the physical world’s core of intrinsic content, with the notional 
physical theory of 3-D continuants employing concepts that exploited our imaginative projections of 
actually sensed relations.  
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 This example is taken from Foster, “In Defence of Phenomenalistic Idealism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 54 (1996): 509-29. 
20
 This is the fact exploited in the so-called ‘Knowledge Argument’ against analytically reductive physicalism in 
Frank Jackson (1986), “What Mary Didn’t Know,” Journal of Philosophy, 85(6):291-5, and Feigl (1968), in loc.cit.,  
21
 It is important to recognize here that we are considering the case of one kind of physical fact—color possession by 
a physical object—being retrospectively logically created and so in particular being constituted by other kinds of 
physical and psychophysical facts—about surface microstructure, optical and physiological conditions. This should 
not be confused with a putative case in which a mental fact—say the existence of color as a quale or sensory type—
were putatively constituted by physical facts, a possibility that the idealist will deny. Indeed the very consideration 
above in regard to physical color is an a posteriori consideration against any such possibility: physical color 
ascription is in part constituted by facts about actual and potential color sensations.  
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What we must now do is show that we can follow this same strategy, using the same 
phenomenological ‘building blocks and mortar’, to construct a conception of (prephysical) mental time.  
We can use the same concepts of phenomenal coexistence, succession, overlap, and continuity. The first 
step will be to show that we can construct a notion of mental time for a given subject using phenomenal 
concepts and nomological facts about how individual sensations are caused. The second step is to show 
how individual temporal dimensions can be harmoniously arranged to form a communal mental time by 
appealing to nomological facts about intersubjective mental causation. As none of the facts and concepts 
are physical, we will have achieved the goal of logically constructing a temporal medium in which the 
ultimate laws of creation may be enacted among mental subjects.  
The details of my exposition closely follow those of Foster
22
, whose ideas were a development of 
the theory of temporal consciousness such as one finds it in James, Husserl, and C.D. Broad. Husserl and 
Broad recognized that the ‘pulse theory’ of A. N. Whitehead and the early James was inadequate in 
relying solely on memory together with the temporal patterns within experiences to establish a subjective 
temporal order among experiences. Their solution—the “two-dimensional model” of temporal 
consciousness—eliminated the role of memory in favor of variable quality of experienced ‘presentness’ 
attending the temporally presented qualia themselves. Being variable in intensity, the differences in this 
quality are supposed to create the impression of temporal flow within a stream of consciousness. But this 
impression is an illusion because, while each experience may possess a different degree of presentness 
within its content and so retain a different residue of content, there is still no phenomenal bonding 
between the end of one sensation and the beginning of the one that is supposed to follow it on the two-
dimensional model. Given this inadequacy, Foster’s pivotal insight was to recognize that the conscious 
act of phenomenal awareness not only takes in a temporal spread of qualitative content—the ‘specious 
present’ in which, say, a C-note is heard to be followed by a D-note in the beginning of a tonic C scale—
it is itself of some durational extent
23
; and this extent, however it is to be unitized, will be proportional to 
the extent of the temporal pattern sensed, the phenomenal time presented to the subject in the act of 
sensory awareness.
24
   
We have defined sensory qualia as self-revealing determinate sensation types and therefore 
sensations as instances or realizations of qualia. We noted that these may be S-modal for any sense 
modality S or transmodal for any two or more sense-modalities, e.g., the qualia realized in tactuo-visual 
sensations. In either case, sensations may be component sensations or they may be total sensations in 
which case there is no larger sensation of which they are a component. A sensation s is a component of a 
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 John Foster (1982, pp.254-272). 
23
 We presupposed this hypothesis in our definitions of phenomenal overlap and continuity. 
24
 See Barry Dainton, Time and Space (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), Ch. 7, for a good introduction to the development 
of theories of temporal consciousness that I have just summarized.  
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sensation t when t is the realization of a single temporally patterned quale that includes within its sensible 
structure the sensory type that is the quale of which s is a realization.  
Once we acknowledge that episodes of sensory awareness are not literally momentary or 
temporally punctal but that they take in a temporal spread of phenomenon, then we are also 
acknowledging that the temporal pattern, the time-field, realized by a total sensation will have some 
determinate unity (of apperception), some fixed durational extent, within which every component 
sensation is phenomenally coexistent with every other component sensation, being strictly co-conscious, 
susceptible of joint attention, jointly accessible to a single introspective act. But the temporal pattern 
realized in the sensation is one thing and the time in which the sensation is realized is another. The 
temporal pattern presented to the subject as an object of awareness is an instance of phenomenal time, a 
species of sensory qualia similar in kind to other types of S-modal sensation, a way of ‘being sensible 
appeared to’, so that just as we are sensibly presented with visual, auditory, and somatic qualia, so too are 
we presented with temporal qualia. This was assumed in our syntheses when we introduced the notion of 
phenomenal succession, which involves the presentation of qualities over a temporal spread, that is, 
qualities as being temporally successive of each other within a single act of awareness.
25
 What we are 
now interested in is not this phenomenal time as such, but the mental time in which sensations themselves 
occur, the temporal medium of the mind in which the sensations are arranged in order and distance, not 
the times of which we are aware but the time in which the acts of awareness are played out.  
 Let us return to one of our familiar examples. We supposed that when I hear a diatonic C scale, 
C-D-E-F-G-A, my hearing of the scale consists of the series of total auditory sensations (A1, …, A6), each 
of which consists of two notes of some temporal duration ordered by phenomenal succession, so that 
 
A1 = C > D, A2 = D > E, …, A6 = G > A 
 
where, again, ‘C > D’ is to be read ‘C followed by D’. The temporal patterns of the qualia that the 
sensations realize will have some determinate durational extent which will be a function of the extent and 
number of the temporal subpatterns of its component sensations, in this case the sensations of two notes.
26
 
Though in reality they need not be, let us suppose for simplicity of exposition that the notes have a 
constant temporal period, call it φ (for ‘phenomenal time’). Then each auditory sensation A1,…, A6 would 
be a realization of a time pattern of 2 units of φ. Now as states of an underlying basic mental subject the 
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 As in our examples of the visual experience of a flight of a bird, or the auditory experience of a scale or melody.  
26
 Here in our example we are ignoring any contribution from silence, but silence, as well as the ‘internal’ (self-) 
awareness of our own mental activity is temporally patterned. This was something Augustine noticed in the 
Confessions (XI.20, 26-27) and was an important reason for his rejection of the Aristotelian realist view of time as a 
function of physical change in favor of a phenomenalistic view. Time, for Augustine, is a threefold present 
constituted by the distentio of the mind, the durational ‘stretching’ of the mind as consciously experienced. 
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series of sensations A1,…, A6 would themselves be realized within a dimension of time—subjective 
mental time—in which they would have their own durational extent measured by some corresponding 
unit, say µ (for ‘mental time’).   
We can use the facts of phenomenal overlap and continuity to define order and distance in mental 
time for any sensations so related. We say that a stream of experience is a maximal series of 
phenomenally continuous sensations, or a largest collection of sensations such that any two are 
phenomenally continuous. A stream of experience thus corresponds to our everyday notion of a period of 
waking consciousness, uninterrupted by unconsciousness or dreamless sleep. We can define mental time 
within a stream by saying that: For any two sensations S1 and S2, S1 is streamally earlier than S2 if and 
only if the two are phenomenally continuous, with S1 the first and S2 the last of some series of 
phenomenally overlapping sensations.  
The internal, phenomenal temporal order thus determines by extrapolation the order of mental 
time within a stream. We can measure the temporal distance of a stream or substream, streamal distance, 
by defining it to be the sum of the mental time measures µ of each its member sensations minus the sum 
of the periods of overlap for each phenomenally overlapping pair of member sensations. So in our 
example above, the temporal distance of the series A(1),…, A(6) would be 6(µ) – 5(φ) = 6(µ) – 5/2(µ) = 
7/2(µ). 
Now that we have defined mental time for streams and substreams of experience by defining 
temporal ordering and temporal distance relations for them, we need to extend the definition to cover 
cases where sensations of the same mental subject fall within different streams, being separated by 
periods of unconsciousness. The fact that sensations are states of an underlying basic mental subject 
means that even sensations that are not co-streamal have the potential for being co-streamal relative to the 
system of laws that govern the organization of human sensations. We can appeal to this fact in 
constructing mental time within an individual subject’s mental biography.  
Having already defined phenomenal continuity and mental time for a stream of experience, we 
can define the closely related notion of one series of sensations being a continuation of another, i.e., of co-
streamality: a series of total sensations y is a continuation of a series of total sensation x just in case every 
total sensation in x is earlier than every total sensation in y, and every total sensation that overlaps with 
any but the first sensation in x or the last sensation in y is itself included in the series x or the series y; i.e., 
x and y are adjacent substreams within a single stream or co-streamal. Having defined co-streamality, or 
what it means for one substream to be the continuation of another, we can introduce the notion of 
potential or nomologically possible co-streamality in a straightforward way: a series of total sensations y 
is a nomologically possible continuation of a series of total sensations x if and only if, for some distance µ 
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it is nomologically necessary that, if y were to remain the same and x were to have some continuation z of 
length µ, then y would be a continuation of z. Finally, we can define subjective time in the following way: 
Definition of Subjective Mental Time. For any two sensations S1 and S2, S1 is subjectively earlier than 
S2 if and only if it is streamally earlier than S2, in which case the subjective temporal distance between 
them is the streamal distance of the substream between them, or S2 belongs to a stream y that is a 
nomologically possible continuation of the stream x to which S1 belongs, in which case the subjective 
temporal distance between them will be the streamal distance of the substream between them in the 
nomologically possible case in which y is a continuation of x.
27
     
The definitions of this constructive apparatus are quite straightforward and intuitive. Consider the 
case of a basic mental subject, Archibald MacLeish. In the course of a Sunday evening, MacLeish eats 
dinner, repairs to the lounge for a drink of whiskey, reads a chapter of a novel, then goes to bed. After a 
night of dreamless sleep, he awakes on Monday morning to the sound of his alarm clock, goes downstairs 
to his study and begins writing. There will be a stream of experience in his mental biography that will 
include the gustatory sensations of his Sunday dinner followed by the postprandial whiskey, the visual 
sensations of the printed page, along with various other occurrent thoughts or flights of fancy, terminating 
in, say, the sound of the wind rapping against the bedroom window. Now there is another stream in 
MacLeish’s mental biography that begins with an auditory sensation of the sound of an alarm clock 
ringing, and so on. Does this stream, call it y, come before or after the stream previously described, call it 
x, the one terminating in the auditory sensation of the tapping? Our intuitions tell us that y must come 
after x. After all, is it not obvious from the description? But here we must be careful. Even though our 
intuitions lead us to the correct answer, they do so by relying on the descriptive information that was 
specified in the terms of our notional physical theory, in particular our ordinary notional theory of 
physical time, measured by clocks and calendars. Our intuitions are based on the knowledge that Sunday 
evening comes before Monday morning. But of course, in line with the broad idealist explanatory strategy 
and the PAFD, our definition of one sensation being subjectively earlier than another does not rely on 
such physical notions. Based on our definition of subjective temporal ordering, what makes it the case 
that x comes before y is that, relative to some (as yet unspecified) system of prephysical causal laws, y is a 
possible continuation of x in virtue of the fact that, if y had remained the same then it would have been a 
continuation of any continuation of x having some fixed streamal distance. In other words, if (however 
implausibly) y had remained a fixed stream in his mental biography and if Macleish had not gone to bed 
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 That is, more precisely, the streamal distance between S1 and S2 will be the sum of: the streamal distance from S1 
to the end of (the last non-overlapping component sensation of) x, the streamal distance of the hypothetically 
intervening stream z that is a continuation of x and that is in turn continued by y, and the streamal distance from the 
beginning of (the first non-overlapping component sensation of ) y to S2.    
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when he did, after reading his novel, but had instead lied awake in bed listening to the sounds of the 
phonograph, then stream x would have been continued by a substream consisting of auditory sensations of 
the recorded music, which would in turn have been continued by the first sensation of y, MacLeish’s 
auditory sensation of the alarm clock. Even if his wife or anybody else had a stream of experience 
beginning with an auditory sensation of an alarm clock, even one realizing exactly the same quale, such a 
stream would not be a continuation of any of MacLeish’s conscious streams. Such is the unitive power of 
the mind as a basic mental subject. MacLeish’s conscious streams are joinable or nomologically possibly 
continuable in way his and his wife’s are not.  
We have now defined subjective mental time, or what it means for any two consubjective (that is, 
both belonging to the same basic subject) sensations to belong to a single temporal dimension. But what 
about sensations belonging to different subjects? If we can define a temporal ordering and distance 
relation for these which, like our definition of subjective mental time, made no appeal to physical 
concepts, then we will be able to construct an intersubjective mental time appropriate for understanding 
the temporal conditions of the idealist’s prephysical nomological framework, the posited system of 
harmoniously coordinated causal constraints on human sensations in which the laws of creation are 
enacted.  
The first thing to notice at this stage is that although we have defined a subjective temporal 
ordering only with respect to sensations, these can easily be extended to cover all phenomenally 
conscious episodes. We can think of subjective mental time as a temporal dimension, an ordered 
continuum (without endpoints) whose points (or moments) are the positions of actual and (nomologically) 
possible sensations. Then all we have to do is say that any conscious state c occurs at a moment m in the 
subjective time dimension just in case there is an actual or nomologically possible sensation s at m that is 
or would be phenomenally co-existent with c.
28
   
 
Intersubjective Causation 
Defining subjective mental time not only for sensations but for all phenomenally conscious mental 
episodes allows us robustly to speak, as we did informally in the last example, of the temporal ordering of 
states such as volitions, emotions, passions, moral and aesthetic sentiments, thoughts, musings, and 
generally all that we take to be part of our inner lives and personal identity. In particular, we can now 
speak of the temporal position in subjective mental time of volitional states, active mental episodes of 
desiring, willing, intending, and such.  
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 That is, the two are or would be accessible to introspection within a single act of awareness. 
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From the immediate experience of our own causal power as mental subjects, to frame ideas, to 
direct our attention, or to move our limbs we have a basic knowledge of what it means for one of our 
volitional states to cause another. This experiential knowledge is immediate and as well-founded as any 
knowledge we have. The immediacy of the knowledge in this case is proportionate to the immediacy of 
what we reflect on introspectively, the causal efficacy of our minds volitional power with respect to its 
own activity.
29
 Given the centrality of our experience of mental causation in ourselves, we have no 
difficulty in conceiving of intersubjective mental causation, of a volitional state in one subject causing a 
sensation not in the same subject but in another. I have no difficulty conceiving of what it would be like 
to cause a sensation in another, because this is already involved in my pre-reflective, everyday conception 
of how I relate to other people who possess minds like my own, that I can wave at, speak to, or embrace 
another person and in so many ways cause sensations in them. Normally I imagine that my causal 
influence over the experience of others is mediated and constrained by physical factors, including the 
motion of bodies and the transmissive conditions on which, from within the empirical perspective, I 
suppose sensory consciousness to depend. All that we must recognize here is that, in accordance with the 
PAFD and the distinction between the empirical perspective and metaphysical perspectives, we can 
conceive of intersubjective causation that requires no physical mediation but is entirely mental or 
spiritual, on analogy with the experience we have our own intrasubjective mental causation. Furthermore, 
a moment’s reflection reveals that this conception is quite independent of any conception of a common 
intersubjective temporal medium. Whereas ordinary intersubjective causation requires that subjects be 
embodied organisms inhabiting a common environment and so a shared public space and time, from the 
metaphysical perspective intrasubjective, and hence intersubjective mental causation, requires no such 
assumptions.
30
  
The concept of causation itself already entails an asymmetric directionality in the relation of 
cause to effect, so that a cause, in order to be a cause, must precede its effect ontologically. And while it 
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 Again compare this with Augustine’s insight in the Confessions, VII.17, where he attains to (self-)awareness of 
his own soul as an invisible unity and active spiritual power, not as something that comes before his mind as an 
object of awareness, but as the subject who is aware, who reflectively feels the power of awareness in exercising it.  
30
 Without focusing so much on the epistemic primacy of mental causation, Richard Swinburne makes the point that 
the temporal priority of events is ontologically derived from the potentiality of causation and its logically necessary 
strict directionality. Swinburne makes it into a principle of his metaphysics, what he calls the “Causal Theory of 
Time” (see The Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.81-90). D.H. Mellor Real Time 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1981), Ch.10, has a similar argument for the causal theory. When the 
Causal Theory is combined with Swinburne’s theistic ‘argument from temporal order’ (The Existence of God. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch.8)) there is an interesting synthetic effect. The argument from temporal 
order is one of Swinburne’s interpretations of the teleological argument: temporal organization of events in the 
universe—and in particular “phenomenal regularities” (though here, as a realist, Swinburne makes no distinction 
between the phenomenological order of consciousness and the order of notional physical phenomena)—must be 
explained by mentality. When brought together with the causal theory, this pushes one in the idealist direction of 
explaining temporal order, and especially the temporal order of phenomenal regularities, by appeal to the 
prephysical nomological organization of mental causation.    
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may be that this conceptual fact about causation is in turn derived from introspective experience of the 
immanent directional flow of phenomenal time within a subject’s stream of consciousness, so that the 
order of ontological priority or precedence of cause to effect must coincide with the order of subjective 
mental time, the point here is just that the concept of intersubjective mental causation does not require any 
supposition regarding further facts about the temporal relations between the minds causally related. 
Conceptually it is only required that for a state of one mind to cause a state of another the cause must 
exist before its effect in some sense of ‘before’ that matches subjective temporal order and so the order of 
phenomenal time for the agent. In recognizing that intersubjective causal priority is both independent of 
any notion of intersubjective time and yet constrained by facts about subjective time, we thereupon 
recognize the option of defining intersubjective time from the concepts of subjective time and 
intersubjective causal priority.  
The further notion we need is that of nomologically possible intersubjective causal priority, or 
what we might call PV-priority
31
 (for ‘potential volitional priority). Just as we understand what it means 
for my volition to cause and so be prior to your sensation, so we know what, relative to some prephysical 
nomological framework, it means for some possible volition of mine to be causally prior to some possible 
sensation of yours. With respect to a collection of mental subjects, we suppose that the relation of PV-
priority behaves so that the individual subjective temporal dimensions, with their various subjective 
‘earlier than’ relations and temporal distance relations, are all mutually coincident; that is, that the relation 
of PV-priority always coincides with the relation of ‘subjectively earlier than’ for each of the subjective 
temporal dimensions it relates. We can think of the relation of PV-priority as establishing an ordered path 
across lines of potential causation from one subjective temporal dimension to another, bundling them into 
a unified temporal community.  
Finally, we thus have;  
Definition of Intersubjective Mental Time. For any mental events E1 and E2 (which need not be 
consubjective), E1 is intersubjectively earlier than E2 if and only if either: (i) E1 is subjectively earlier 
than E2 or (ii) E1 is PV-prior to E2 or to some E3 that is subjectively earlier than E2 and E2 is not PV-prior 
to E1 or to some E4 that is subjectively earlier than E1.  
For any two mental events E1 and E2, belonging to subjects M1 and M2, if neither is 
intersubjectively earlier than the other and if no mental event of M1 subjectively later than E1 is 
intersubjectively earlier than E2, and no mental event of M2 subjectively later than E2 is intersubjectively 
earlier than E1, then E1 and E2 are intersubjectively simultaneous.  
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 This follows Foster’s (1982, p.269) terminology, though I have modified its content somewhat.  
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Just as we have supposed that subjective temporal ordering relations are commensurable and 
coincident with the relation of PV-priority, so too we must suppose that subjective distances are 
proportional. If the prephysical nomological framework relates subjects through the potential of 
intersubjective causation in some way that ensures proportionality of intersubjective temporal distance, 
whatever it is, to subjective temporal distance and that ensures transitivity of simultaneity within the 
community of minds, we can say that if E1 is intersubjectively earlier than E2, the intersubjective temporal 
distance between them is, relative to the subjective temporal dimension of some subject M, whatever 
measure of distance would be computed by taking M’s unit of subjective temporal distance as the unit of 
measurement.  
The basic idea then behind the construction of intersubjective time is that the intuitive notion of 
intersubjective mental causation imposes a kind of directional order among the mental states of subjects 
who stand in the appropriate relations of potential causal influence and receptivity to each other, as 
guaranteed by some system of causal laws. This order is already quasi-temporal, and, being refined 
according to the clauses of our definitions, so long as the order of potential intersubjective causation 
globally respects the subjective temporal orderings it relates, then it may inherit the temporality of those 
subjective dimensions.  
The construction of subjective mental time from phenomenal time involved recognizing the 
potential for continuity among consubjective streams. Here we referred to a prephysical system of laws to 
anchor the potentiality in the constraining force of what the laws guarantee. Potential intersubjective 
causation also referred to a prephysical system of law to ground its own modality. Were we able to posit a 
common nomological framework that guaranteed these modal facts, it would allow us to understand 
human minds as bound into a prephysical temporal community. And if we could conceive of the 
nomological framework as the same which logically creates the sensible world by causally constraining 
the distribution of qualia over minds at times, then we could imagine this framework to have the global 
harmony it would need to have to guarantee the objectivity of the physical world as we know it in our 
empirical perspective.       
VIII.5 The Laws of Creation 
We have now defined a prephysical, intersubjective mental time which may serve as a common 
temporal framework or medium for the causal constraints on human experience that the idealist supposes 
logically creates the physical world by determining the distribution of qualia over minds at times. These 
causal constraints must have the force of law in order to be genuinely creative, as explained in Section 1. 
They will be, then, not only causal constraints but causal laws, regulating the occurrence of certain types 
of sensory experience (qualia) in human minds. The specification of intersubjective mental time itself 
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relied on definitions that presupposed a system of prephysical causal laws. We referred to these in 
defining potential streamal continuity within the mind of one subject, and potential intersubjective 
causation of conscious episodes between two subjects.  Thus whatever prephysical nomological 
framework that the idealist supposes to be or constitute the laws of creation—that is, the laws of qualia 
distribution—should be the same nomological framework that yields32 intersubjective mental time.   
The goal of this section will be to specify this prephysical nomological framework of causal 
constraints on sensory experience in the explanatory context of Christian theism. By constraining the 
possible course of human experience in an intersubjectively harmonious way that conforms to the divine 
wisdom, these prephysical laws are to logically create the nomic regularities of the physical world, 
including embodiment and the wider, intersubjectively organized distribution of qualia over (mental) 
times. It is this nomological distribution that the idealist sees as sustaining the regular features and 
character of the physical world. In accord with the doctrine of creation, the Christian theist can avail 
himself of this theoretical discovery and use it to interpret the doctrine. The nomological distribution of 
qualia over minds and intersubjective mental times will consist of a rational system of commands decreed 
by a supernatural mind. If these decrees are to have the rationality, scope, and power sufficient to yield an 
objective world, one characterized by its own modal facts, then the supernatural mind that decrees them 
must be absolutely supreme in power, knowledge, and moral authority, and hence unique. This will of 
course suggest itself to the Christian theist as being exactly aligned with what he already believes about 
the Creator and so as furnishing him with a helpful expository device for understanding and meditation on 
revealed teaching.  
The idealist regards the laws of creation as a regulatory framework of causal constraints on 
human minds. In order to conceive of these causal constraints as genuinely creative laws there would 
seem to be but two explanatory options available to the Christian theist, in line with the reasoning detailed 
in Section 1 above: either the laws are causally powerful entities in their own right, which seems absurd; 
or the laws must be somewhat reductively construed as God’s own volitional policies in reference to how 
he will causally interact with human minds
33
, policies to which he commits about how so to interact. This 
reduces the dispositions of physical items in the course of nature to dispositions about God, and his 
creative commands to self-directed commitments. Is there an alternative to these two options? In line with 
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Using the terminology of Ch. VII, the laws of creation should be such as to ‘nomologically select’ intersubjective 
time, constituting the intersubjective temporal facts together with the facts concerning  intersubjective causation and 
facts about the subjects themselves, per the Augustinian-Cartesian view. 
33
 Notice that this same dilemma arises for realism in the context of Christian theism, only instead of regarding 
God’s causal interaction with human minds as creative, the realist will regard his causal interaction with a 
realistically construed space, time, and matter as creative. Unlike the idealist, however, the realist cannot plausibly 
appeal to angelic participation to escape this dilemma. As pure unembodied intelligences, angels are better disposed 
to mental causation than to realistically construed physical causation. Angelic mental causation is also a better fit 
with the traditional conception of the cosmic hierarchy. I will return to this point in Chapter IX. 
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the literal sense of Scripture, perhaps the idealist should regard the laws of creation as just that, as 
ordinances issued to a liturgical assembly of God-like intelligences, rational, pure spirits who receive and 
transmit the creative commands, executing them by causally constraining human experience through their 
power for mental causation. In this way the idealist’s prephysical causal constraints would have the 
regulatory force of law on account of the divine sovereignty while still allowing them to enjoy the 
‘relational logic’ of laws, as things that are executed by being obediently received and adhered to by 
rational creatures.  
What should now suggest itself is that the Biblical revelation on angelology, as traditionally 
developed in Augustine, Dionysius, and Aquinas, may become an explanatorily potent hypothesis in the 
hands of the idealist. If the Christian theist is to suppose that the idealist laws of creation are transmitted 
commands decreed by the divine Logos, then the regulatory power and rational creativity of these 
commands may be dynamically transmitted among intelligent creatures through the arrangement of the 
cosmic hierarchy, heavenly and earthly. As finite unembodied intelligences, possessing power and 
knowledge proportionate to their liturgical office within the divine economy and a ministry of salvific 
revelation to human beings, the angels are perfectly suited to the play the explanatory role of executing 
the causal constraints on human consciousness within the idealist’s explanatory strategy. This is to 
introduce the hypothesis of angelic participation into Christian idealism, or what we might simply call 
“the angelic hypothesis”. Besides allowing the idealist to provide an account of creation in terms of laws, 
it will turn out to have other (surprising) considerations in its favor.
34
  
The angelic hypothesis invites us to suppose that God’s creative activity and purpose is 
something he shares with creatures instrumentally, allowing their freedom, power, and knowledge to be 
used in participation with his creative ends.
35
 Just as we should be prepared to accept that divine activity, 
on account of its radical transcendence over creatures, is not contrastive or competitive with human 
freedom of action, so we should be prepared to accept the same non-contrastive or participatory model of 
divine and angelic freedom.  
The idealist must provide an account of the prephysical nomological framework in which the 
system of causal constraints on human sensation, the “laws of creation”, are enacted. Since the laws 
govern the distribution of qualia over minds at times, the prephysical nomological framework must be 
temporal. The notion of ‘time’ here is that of the temporal order in which sensations occur within the 
personal biography of individual mental subjects. To provide an adequate framework for the laws of 
creation, the nomological framework must be able to coordinate individual subjective dimensions of 
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 The details of the alignment between traditional Christian angelology and the present hypothesis are to be 
explored in in Ch.IX. 
35
 There is no incompatibility between this suggestion and the orthodox view that nulla creatura possit creare 
(Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia.45.5), that God alone is omnibus causa essendi.  
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mental time with each other and with the external component whose organization and causal links with 
human mentality yield the laws of creation. This would involve thinking of prephysical mental time as a 
kind of order-continuous manifold equipped with charts that isometrically map regions within it into 
corresponding dimensions of subjective mental time.  
Just as we have defined streamal time for human mental subjects, in terms of phenomenal time 
and relations of overlap and continuity, so we may define streamal time for any mental subject who has 
experiences of some phenomenal time or other. In particular, we can define streamal time for angelic 
subjects on the supposition that they possess experiences of phenomenal time. We do not need to suppose 
that angels have sensations in order to experience time, since after all, not only our sensations but our 
experience of our own mental activity in introspection is presented within a phenomenal time field.  The 
highly plausible assumption that the angelic minds, being pure intelligences, are reflectively conscious, is 
enough reason to credit them with experience of phenomenal time. Beyond this bare assumption, nothing 
further need be supposed about the quality and condition of angelic mental life. Yet this being so, we 
quickly realize that because angels are unembodied and have no need of sleep, there is no reason to 
suppose that their mental lives are interrupted by periods of unconsciousness. This means that for each of 
them individually streamal time is just subjective time. With no gaps in consciousness, there is no 
question as to the joinability or potential continuation of streams: each individual angelic mental life 
would be one continuous stream. Furthermore, it follows that angelic intersubjective causation is much 
easier to define since there can be no circumstantial failure of one angelic mental state potentially to cause 
that of another.  
With the angelic hypothesis in place, the Christian idealist may now propose how it might be that 
by creating minds and an ultimate system of causal laws of wholly spiritual nature, God both creates and 
governs all things visible and invisible. By creating pure spiritual intelligences who minister in his 
presence, and human minds who have both intellectual and sensory capacities, and arranging for the two 
to be nomologically linked in appropriate ways that both provide for and constrain their causal interaction 
to conform to his wisdom, God does everything he must do to create our world. In more detail, the 
proposal is as follows. 
Ultimate (contingent) reality consists of: 
A set of human minds H. 
A set of angelic minds A. 
A set of laws (alpha-laws) concerning the causation of events in A by other events in A, and (perhaps) 
divine influence, so as to establish a common inter-angelic (and of course prephysical) temporal 
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dimension T.
36
 We can think of these laws as providing for the conditions in which angels speak to one 
another.  
A set of laws (beta-laws) concerning the causation of H-sensations by A events. We can think of these 
laws as providing for the conditions in which angels speak to us.  
A set of laws (gamma-laws) concerning the causation of A events by H-volitions. We can think of these 
laws as providing for the conditions in which we speak to angels. 
We suppose that alpha-laws organize the angelic minds into a society of causal influence and receptivity 
with respect to each other so that their (alpha-relative) potential streams of experience comprise a 
temporal continuum T, that is, an intersubjective temporal ordering of angelic mental states according to 
angelic PV-priority that coincides with angelic subjective time in (directional) order and proportional in 
distance.  
While we need not speculate as to the full range of types of angelic mental states, we may 
suppose that there is one type, “E-type” (for “experience”) that causes sensations in a human mind, and 
another type, “V-type” (for “volition”) that is in turn caused by human volitions. Though we label them 
by letters indicating the types of human mental states that they cause or are in turn caused by, in the 
general pairing arrangement enforced by the beta- and gamma-laws they would relate to their human 
causal correspondent as its active-passive counterpart. Thus E-type states, or more simply E-states, are 
active in relation to the passive human sensations they cause; and V-states are passive in relation to the 
human volitions that cause them. We are free to suppose that intersubjective causal interaction among the 
angels themselves, provided for by the alpha-laws, involves V-states or some other sui generis type of 
state.     
We suppose that beta is such as to ensure a 1-1 correlation of human minds with a subset of the 
angelic minds and a general 1-1 correlation of angelic E-states with human sensation types (qualia) such 
that each for each angelic E-state φ there is a unique quale q that it directly causes; and such that each 
quale q is uniquely caused by some angelic E-state φ. We suppose that the beta-laws satisfy two further 
conditions: (β1) two H-streams are consubjective if and only if the E-streams that cause them (by causing 
the total sensations they serially contain) are consubjective, belonging to the same angelic mind; and (β2) 
two consubjective H-streams are of the same streamal extent if and only if the consubjective E-streams 
that cause them have the same extent (in T).  
By satisfying these conditions, the 1-1 pairing of angelic and human minds affected by the beta-
laws nomologically ensures that if two H-streams are consubjective then one will be a possible 
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 For historical reasons we can call this temporal dimension the “aeon”. 
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continuation of the other in the manner required by the definition of subjective mental time. For the 
identity of a stream is fixed by its intrinsic qualitative character (the qualia of which it is a realization), the 
subject to whom it belongs, and the identity of the mental states  that causally generate it. Like any 
identity, the identity of a stream will remain fixed across possible worlds, and so the identity of human 
and angelic minds as ontologically basic subjects (per the Augustinian-Cartesian view), the temporal 
conditions of angelic minds, together with the causal pairing achieved by the beta-laws, is sufficient 
nomologically to guarantee (mental) temporal facts about subjects.   
The causal pairing of angelic and human minds achieved by the beta-laws not only nomologically 
selects the temporal facts about human subjects, it allows for a more general correlation of subjective 
temporal dimensions between angels and humans. When Archibald Macleish is unconscious, say in 
dreamless sleep, what makes it the case that his post-dormitive sensations are later than his pre-dormitive 
sensations is that his beta-counterpart angel would be the cause of any intervening sensations in a 
counterfactual case in which Macleish had not been unconscious; and moreover his angel would have 
done so with mental states that, as streamally continuous, would have been as directionally ordered  as the 
states they would have (counterfactually) caused, and in such a way that kept the subjective distances of 
the causally generative angelic states and causally receptive human states proportionate. For this reason, 
we can think of angelic and human mental time as equivalent for practical purposes, as the beta-laws 
ensure that they are both related in a common nomological framework, in which every moment of a 
human subjective temporal dimension is correlated with one of angelic time T, and the mapping preserves 
temporal order and proportionality of distance.    
To see that this same framework ensures the potentiality for intersubjective causation among 
human minds, and so is able to nomologically select facts about intersubjective mental time, consider the 
consequences of the gamma-laws. These will ensure that for each human volitional state ψ in a human 
there is a unique angelic V-state (in the angelic mind that is paired with it under beta) that it directly 
causes. Together with the alpha-laws that determine the causal interaction among the angels themselves, 
the gamma-laws will nomologically ensure the potentiality for intersubjective causation among human 
minds and indeed VP-priority, in accordance with the definition of intersubjective mental time. For so 
long as angelic minds are receptive to the volitional states of their human counterparts (per gamma-laws), 
receptive to the mental states of other angels (per alpha-laws), and able to cause appropriate sensations in 
their human counterparts (per beta-laws), then one human subject may cause a sensation in another by the 
intervening causal influence of their respective angelic counterparts. When Macleish kisses his wife, his 
intention to do so is (or issues in) a volitional state that causes an experience in his angelic counterpart 
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(gamma), which causes an experience in his wife’s angelic counterpart (alpha), which causes a sensation 
of being kissed in his wife (beta).
37
  
This completes the analytic exposition of Christian idealism. At this stage we have achieved the 
goal of presenting the prephysical nomological framework (the alpha-, beta-, and gamma-laws) that 
constitutes the temporal facts about minds, arranging them into a prephysical community within which we 
may conceive of the laws of creation to be executed. More particularly, by introducing the angelic 
hypothesis and showing how laws that met certain conditions would provide for an appropriate causally 
interactive pairing of human and angelic minds, we showed how the laws of creation may be established 
through the regulation of such interaction. Simply put, the claim was that the causal constraints on human 
sensory consciousness that the idealist takes to logically create the physical world are executed by the 
angelic minds within the system of prephysical laws, in conformity to the divine wisdom. Qualia are 
distributed over human minds at times in a way that conforms to a world-suggestive pattern, a pattern 
that, at the human empirical viewpoint, is subject to the idealist’s constructive syntheses and interpreted 
by the concepts of empirical theory. The realist regards empirical theory as committing us to a 
metaphysics of an ontologically basic and mind-independent space, time, and matter, that in turn causally 
explain the primitive sensory regularities at the empirical viewpoint. The idealist breaks out of this closed 
circle and regards the physical world as ontologically derivative from the sensory regularities that are in 
turn causally constrained by the angelic government in free conformity to the divine wisdom.
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 We may suppose that the angelic experience caused by his motor intention also causes a tactual-kinaesthetic 
sensation in him, in addition to causing an experience in his wife’s angelic counterpart. This would be consistent 
with the general pattern of sensorimotor intentionality in which (human) motor intentions cause angelic experiences 
that in turn cause (human) kinaesthetic sensations. 
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Chapter IX: The Cosmic Liturgy 
IX.1  Introduction 
 
Starting from within the ordinary, world-internal perspective we can raise the metaphysical question of 
whether or not the existence of the physical world is something ontologically fundamental and mind-
independent, and, if not, what further facts and entities could be responsible for logically sustaining its 
existence. Pursued philosophically, this inquiry takes us to a world-external perspective of thought and 
finally, as we followed it, to the phenomenalistic idealist position that the physical world is the logical 
creation of the regularities among and nomic constraints on human sensory experience. On this view, the 
physical world does indeed exist but in a derivative way, as something whose existence is not ultimate but 
derived from something else, the theistically-mandated system of causal-control over the course of human 
sensory experience, which we can now understand to consist in both a rational system of decrees about 
how sense qualia are to be distributed over minds at times as well as a particular system of causal 
governance to execute the realization of the content of these decrees.
1
  
But we can also pursue the metaphysical question of the status of the physical world 
theologically. And in this way, too, we are taken to a world-external contemplative framework in which 
we recognize that the physical regularities that characterize the world as we know it empirically are 
sustained by the divine wisdom, by God and His word of power. We are led to believe, in the 
transcendental perspective of faith, that the kind of regularities which the world exhibits are necessary, 
yes, but necessary only relative to the intentions of the God who in His infinite majesty has given life to 
creatures, marked and measured the earth, sky, and seas, arranged seasons and times, to the final 
predestined purpose of reconciling all things in Christ, making peace by the blood his Cross.
2
 This is 
revealed to us by God both in his scriptural word and in the participation of his sacraments. In both cases 
this revelation is liturgical, mediated to us through the Christocentric-hierarchical activity of the cosmic 
Church under the guidance and teaching of the Spirit.  
With this theological perspective, we can see that the kind of physical universe that God intends 
is one that has its meaning and value within a creation economy originating in the Mystery of Christ. It is 
the world that God provides as the scene in which the drama of the Christ-event is played out, in which 
human beings in their essential ‘God-relatedness’ are provided with the conditions for their flourishing, 
by authorizing the works of the Spirit within them as members of the body of Christ, his Church. This 
means that the physical universe must be responsive and subordinate to the purposes of the predestined 
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 As we proposed in VIII.4, collectively this consists of the aeon, the angelic and human minds, and the prephysical 
nomological framework represented by the alpha-, beta-, and gamma-laws. 
2
 Col 1:20. 
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plan of election, justification, and sanctification.
3
 It must be something that is subject to human 
consecration or desecration, something that falls in consequence to man’s disobedience to the divine 
word
4
, and something transfigured through the transfigured glory of the human Jesus, the risen Christ. In 
this sense the physical universe must be anthropocentric. But it must be so in accordance with all the 
specific instrumental intentions by which the glory of Christ was to be realized in salvation history, in all 
days and ages, biblical and sacramental. Just as it is created by divine command, it must be essentially 
contingent on his economic purposes as the ‘message-system’ in which these are manifested at the human 
empirical viewpoint, whether in the plagues of Egypt, the wanderings of Israel in Sinai, or the institution 
of the eucharist.  
 This chapter concludes our study of what God produces in creation, how it is ontologically 
ordered and providentially governed. We have supported our idealist answer to the leading question of 
Chapters I and II regarding the kind of space, time, and matter that God has to make in order to make the 
Eucharist. The physical realm of space, time, and matter is ontologically derivative of the liturgical 
activity of the celestial hierarchy. In order to make, govern, and dwell within visible creation, God makes 
an invisible kingdom of minds and prescribes their possible modes of interaction in accordance with the 
predestinate plan in Christ. The visible world is the product of the invisible kingdom. After detailing how 
much of traditional Christian cosmology is hereby recovered (Sec.2), I consider the further challenge to 
physical realism posed by angelic cosmology in particular (Sec.3), and end with a summative statement of 
the theological case that harmonizes the different voices to which I have sought to be responsive, from 
eucharistic theology to the Platonic tradition (Sec.4).  
 
IX.2  The Celestial Scope of Natural Theology 
 
In Chapters VI-VIII, we sought to establish the coherence of phenomenalistic idealism with the help of 
the theistic and angelic hypotheses. The idealist claims that the physical regularities of the natural world 
are logically created by the sensory regularities of human consciousness and that these in turn are 
logically created by the way God has arranged for the causal control of human sensations within the 
larger nomological framework of communication among the (prephysical) community of minds. What we 
now want to notice is that, in the course of elaborating his position and demonstrating its coherence, the 
idealist thus recovers three traditional Christian teachings concerning celestial creation: angelic 
government (within the arrangement of the celestial hierarchy); the existence of the aeon (a prephysical 
but created temporal dimension); and the role of the divine ideas in the creation economy (interpreted as 
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 Rom 8:29 
4
 Rom 8:23 
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God’s rational ordinances communicated to the angels about how to organize human sensory 
consciousness).  
Consider how a traditional conception of the aeon is recovered via idealism. The general form of 
the argument structure is this. In accordance with the specification of Christian idealism in Chs. VII-VIII, 
 
 (i) If phenomenalistic idealism is true, then there is a prephysical, intersubjective temporal order. 
 (ii) God is a atemporal and so time is created. 
(iii) Therefore, from (i) and (ii), if phenomenalistic idealism is true, there is a non-divine, and 
thus created, but prephysical temporal order. 
 
But, as we have also seen,  
 
(iv) If there is a prephysical, intersubjective time, then, given the “problem of creative   
       laws”5, this would be best explained by a one-to-one causal-nomological pairing of  
       human and angelic minds (beta- and gamma-laws) and a causal-nomological   
       organization of angelic society itself (alpha-laws).  
 
Thus given the explanatory power of the angelic hypothesis within the context of idealism
6
, not only does 
the metaphysics of idealism tell the Christian theist something useful about physical creation, it tells him 
about spiritual creation as well. It tells him that there is explanatory demand for a purely spiritual 
dimension of time and a nomologically ordered domain of minds that causally interact within in it, which 
matches, or is at least compatible with, what the patristic tradition understood in the exegetical doctrines 
on the angelic ministry, their hierarchy, governance, guardianship and reception of the divine ideas. 
The traditional patristic notion of the ‘aeon’, as the prephysical temporal order of the purely 
spiritual created domain, is something that can be recovered and further received within the natural 
theology of Christian idealism. The aeon may well be identified with the prephysical or mental time in 
which created minds are located and causally paired under the nomological constraints that encode the 
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 VIII.2 
6
 In addition to the utility already mentioned, there is another explanatory value to the angelic hypothesis. With 
phenomenalistic idealism and Foster’s account of the prephysical nomological framework, an angelic cosmological 
model can explain the asymmetry of the causal relation as guaranteed by the same prephysical nomological 
framework that generates volitional priority—hence physical time. Dainton (p.109), commenting on the connection 
between the “overlap model” of temporal consciousness and theories of the metaphysics of time, says: “Dynamic 
presentism is in some ways the precise analogue of it [the overlap model]”. The aeon and intersubjective mental 
time are directional dynamic presentist because they are logically constructed from phenomenal time. This is the 
only problem-free theory of time, and as McTaggart understood only the idealist may regard it as such. 
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physical world (the laws of creation). As our analytic exposition has just shown
7
, the temporal order of 
the aeon may be logically constructed from phenomenal time and phenomenological laws of creation with 
the framework of God’s alpha-, beta-, and gamma-laws that harmoniously arrange and causally link 
angelic and human society.   
Again, as we have shown, the prephysical laws and the temporal order of the aeon logically 
sustain the temporal facts about personal identity (by ensuring the joinability of consubjective 
psychological streams in a sensibly continuous way) for each human mental subject and consequently the 
subject’s temporal embodiment (as expressed at the human empirical viewpoint in psychophysical laws), 
and, through the collectively organized embodiment of subjects, a wider objective causal order, including 
the nomic necessity of empirical causal facts, and their temporal directionality. This allows us, as 
theologians, not only to recover a coherent account of the traditional role of angelic society in the divine 
government, but also particular details, one such being the traditional conception of an order of guardian 
angels who are everlastingly paired one-to-one with human beings from the moment of human conception 
(or whenever one believes the soul or basic mental subject is created). With the system of Christian 
idealism expounded here, this provision falls within the greater hierarchical arrangement of angelic 
society into ranks and choirs according to the scope of their share in the knowledge of the divine wisdom.   
Furthermore, on an idealist theory of the ultimate contingent reality, there is a theoretical role for 
divine ideas, conceived of, per the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas, as God’s own knowledge of 
creation, the exemplar existence that created items possess in the divine mind. On the idealist theory, it is 
the knowledge that God possesses in the divine ideas that he communicates to angels as creative 
commands about how causally to regulate human experience.  Within the provision of the cosmic 
hierarchy, these creative commands can be understood as liturgical and ministerial, and their execution as 
part of the way God governs the world through participatory mediation. Items of divine knowledge of 
creation (morning knowledge) and regulatory power are obediently received and transmitted through the 
cosmic hierarchy as the creature’s free response to the divine word. Angelic knowledge of creation 
(evening knowledge) and regulatory power is elevated into a participation in divine knowledge according 
to the manner in which they receive and transmit the same knowledge to the human creatures to which 
they minister, and similarly for them as they minister to each other. This represents the full indwelling of 
the message (logos tou Christou) in creation, as St. Paul describes it.
8
 It unifies the ministries of creation 
and redemption in Christ, the revelation of the Logos, the divine noetic Wisdom through, in, and for 
whom God creates all things.  
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 Ch. VIII. 
8
 Col 3:16. 
181 
 
What the realist thinks the physical world as ultimate reality must explain, viz. the sensory order, 
the idealist theologian can attribute to the angelic reception of the divine ideas, interpreted as the 
phenomenological laws of creation, the many commands that God communicates to the angels about how 
to interact with human minds, within the nomological provisions of the hierarchy. In the context of 
Christian idealism, the divine ideas become the intentional plans, the blueprints for the kind of world that 
God wills to create as encoded by a system of causal constraints enacted within a pre-physical and 
temporal nomological framework. This provides the theologian with a concrete interpretation of another 
piece of the traditional bequest that fits together with the conceptions of the aeon and the celestial 
hierarchy, one that shows the divine ideas to be a source of explanatory power in theistic metaphysics, a 
privileged way to account for the objectivity and empirical immanence of the world that is the subject of 
our empirical theorizing. 
 
The Aeon  
 
The aeon, or ‘aion’, is derived from ‘aes on’, which means ‘ever-being’. Just as with the Biblical 
‘everlastingness’ or ‘from age to age’, there is an ambiguity in the tradition as to whether the aeon refers 
to God’s atemporal eternity or an ever-perdurant temporality. In the latter case, the aeon would thus refer 
to a kind of creaturely analogue of the divine eternity, a sempiternal ‘everlastingness’. Von Balthasar, 
writing of the received patristic notion as it was inherited by Maximus the Confessor says “the temporal 
being of created intellect lies in its participation in the “eternity of God”9, that is, completeness or 
perfection of life without extension (adiastasis). According to Von Balthasar, whereas this understanding 
of the aeon was the view of John of Scythopolis as well as that of Maximus, Gregory of Nyssa and 
Scripture see the aion as the “totality of the world’s time, including the pure intellects’. On this view there 
is thus a clear distinction between the adiastasis of God and the diastasis of the aeon, and as we would 
now elaborate it, of the prephysical nomological framework for which the aeon is the medium. Notice 
how this distinction between God and his creation dovetails with the distinction we have made, following 
Gregory of Nyssa, between the diastasis and odos of creation, or (physical) creation viewed from the 
transcendental perspective of  how it is created versus the empirical view within what gets created.  
Significantly, for Gregory, the Creator-creature distinction is tracked by the distinction between 
the immeasurable and the measurable, the diastemic (even that which is subject to ‘espacement’), or we 
might say ‘orderable’, including the temporally orderable. Alden Mosshammer, paraphrasing Gregory on 
the creation of the aeons states: “As the measure that contains all things, the diastema of time is the 
essential characteristic that distinguishes created activity from the unchanging and unmeasured being of 
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God”.10 Gregory, it seems, arrived at this insight through theological reflection on the created significance 
of time as it is revealed in the Biblical wisdom literature. In the 7
th
 homily on Ecclesiastes, Gregory says 
creation is the diastema (of time); and in the 6
th
 homily he had already said that the diastema of time is 
equivalent to some kind of measured space, and that all created things are measured by time (chronos). 
As Christian idealists, we could interpret this as a description of the aeonic mental time that we logically 
constructed in Ch. VIII, and say that by ‘measure’ he refers to the fact that the aeon is an ordered, 
directional continuum. The ultimate reality of the aeon, with its pairings and dynamic arrangement of 
minds, is an invisible reality; but it is nonetheless a temporal reality that, in being created is still lacking 
its intended final consummation; it remains a site of salvifically significant action.  
As Mosshammer goes on to explain, “In meditating on the movements, and tensions of the mind 
as the way to moral ascent above the limitations of the physical, Gregory seized on the temporal 
dimension of creation as emphasized in Ecclesiastes as the resolution: time rather than place is the 
essential dimension of all becoming”, and “Thus he accomplishes by combining the spatial and temporal 
usages of diastema to generate a new kind of space which imposes on intelligibles the same kind of limits 
he had once imposed on the sensible order”. Mosshammer notes that this idealist move, correlating space 
exclusively with the physical/sensible, is corollary to his phenomenalism about the natural world. The 
move reinterprets by way of analogy what Gregory had said about the diastema in the Apologia in 
Hexaemeron.
11
 There he had defined the firmament as that which separates the intelligible, to which the 
diastema do not apply, and the sensible, to which they do. In that sense the diastema are relative to the 
empirical order of human sensory consciousness, which is temporal, yes, but also spatial and sense-
modally qualitative. In the Homilies on Ecclesiastes, the diastema comes to be regarded as that which is 
the result of ‘nomological order’, as we might put it, or of measurement. In both ways, this applies to the 
aeon of the angelic and human minds, which is analogously organized and temporally ordered in virtue of 
a system of divine laws, just as that nomic arrangement generates the empirical order in turn. Gregory’s 
‘diastema’ is thus congruent with the prephysical nomological framework, generating mental time, and 
allowing for specific idealist governing ordinances to be couched within it.    
Idealist natural theology shows us how the time of the aeon actually has the dynamism that we 
want it to have as it is logically constructed from our own phenomenal time, with its immanent directional 
flow, and the way in which God has nomically arranged for causal interaction—and indeed 
communication—among rational creatures. Perhaps in the eschaton this flow is without the single 
directionality into the eschaton, but in all directions out to God and reciprocally of Him back into us. 
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 Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on Ecclesiastes, An English Version, ed. Stuart George Hall (Walter de Gruyter, 
1993), p.262. 
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 PG 44, 81C-D 
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Reading Heb 11:3 in the original Greek and staying close to the letter of the text, we can say that the 
aeons were ‘formed’  (katērtisthai) by the rhēma of God, the visible things were ‘generated’ (gegonenai) 
from that which has no appearance (that which is not itself ‘phenomenal’). Note the difference in verbs 
and the way each verb is paired with a different subject-object pair: God forms the aeons by his word of 
power; the invisible things generate the visible. This might be taken to suggest the ontologically 
mediating role of the aeonic invisible realm in the bringing forth or generation of the visible realm, the 
aonic itself having priority and being the product of a correspondingly different mode of divine creation. 
The relation of aeon and diastasis might well correspond to that between angelic time in the 
external reality of the prephysical nomological framework—the celestial hierarchy and its reception of the 
divine ideas—and the intersubjective mental time that is constituted by facts about potential subjective 
and intersubjective sensory consciousness which are thereby nomologically grounded. Recall from VIII.4 
that we formally distinguished the temporal dimension T of angelic time organized by the alpha-laws and 
the intersubjective time in which human mental events occur, as organized by the beta-laws. In the theory 
of Christian idealism, the two temporal frameworks are order-isomorphic and commensurable. Indeed, 
through the causal-nomological pairing of angelic and human minds, they are correlated so as to be 
coincident in all temporally relevant respects, so that their subjective moments can be regarded as 
formally identical. 
The idealist theologian can say that the temporality of the aeon is the order in which God offers 
participation in his eternal life to the angels. Their response is the playing out of the hierarchical 
transmission of knowledge to us in the form of natural and supernatural revelation. The alpha-laws can be 
thought to correspond to the created conditions of angelic life, including the conditions of God’s offer to 
the angels to participate in an aeonic continuum, an abiding that is the creaturely version of eternal 
immutability (Augustine’s “heaven of heaven”, where dwell the company of saints12), the rest and peace 
that we await (and which also forms the content of the angelic eschatological hope, since, per Aquinas, 
their state is blessed and graced, but not fully perfected until the consummation of all creation in the 
eschaton). The beta- and gamma-laws also express the conditions of this offer to the angels, providing 
them with an opportunity hierarchically to realize their perfection in righteousness by ministering to more 
limited creatures, sealing their conformity to the likeness of the Son of the Most High who stooped to 
share the condition of men and rose as the first among them “above all rule and authority and power and 
dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this age (aeon) but also in the one to come”.13 The 
concrete execution of the beta- and gamma-laws on the part of the angels is the exterior activity, the effect 
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of their liturgical praise, their eucharist to God, made through the cooperative sustaining of visible 
creation together with Him.  
Given the truth of idealism, for God to make the physical world is for Him to make it in the way 
that idealism claims it is made—that is, by enacting a system of prephysical causal constraints on human 
sensory experience that encodes the structure of our physical world (i.e, the world as revealed at our 
empirical viewpoint and described by our topic-neutral physical theory). This means that if angelic 
governing activity is to fall within the scope of angelic liturgical activity, such governing activity must 
include the execution of the prephysical causal constraints as liturgical commands. In other words, what 
we would be inclined to believe about angelic governance as falling within the scope of angelic liturgical-
ministerial function within the cosmic Church harmonizes with what idealism tells us about creation of 
the physical order, that causally constraining human sensory experience has centrally to figure in it. This 
is something that, as it turns out when idealism is developed, the angels are well-suited to do, as finite 
pure intelligences (as unembodied, free mental agents) who can be matched one-to-one with human 
mental subjects in direct causal laws.  
 
The Aeon as the ‘Day’ of Creation 
 
As a Christian metaphysics disposed for the theologian’s purpose of Biblical exegesis, Christian 
idealism may be regarded as a contemporary recasting of Augustine’s interpretation of Genesis, with 
Neoplatonism ‘updated’ to phenomenalistic idealism. There are remarkable parallels between the 
explanatory details of Christian idealism as elaborated especially in Ch.VIII and Augustine’s interpretive 
creation metaphysics. What Augustine identifies as the ‘day’ of creation (Gen 2:4) would correspond to 
the idealist’s ‘ultimate created reality’; alpha-laws would correspond to morning knowledge; beta- and 
gamma-laws would correspond to evening knowledge. This is of interest for several reasons. Firstly, it 
supports the historical narrative of I.2, in which Christian idealism can be seen to be a continuous 
development of Christian Neoplatonist metaphysics, here emphasizing the stream through Augustine. 
Secondly and relatedly, it shows the intimate congruity between traditional, orthodox Biblical exegesis 
and the kind of project in creation metaphysics that we have here undertaken, the mutuality of their 
interests and the reciprocity of their endeavors  
 We have already noted briefly in Ch.I (and in the section above) that Augustine espoused a 
psychological theory of time in Book XI of the Confessions, according to which time is a threefold 
present constituted by the distention of the mind. Augustine clearly distinguishes this theory from the 
Aristotelian view that time is a measure of the motion of physical things, since the mental subject 
experiences the passage of time even when she withdraws from the senses, in the act of introspective 
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consciousness. The idealist theory of Ch.VIII derives temporal facts from facts about phenomenal 
duration, succession, continuity and potential intersubjective mental causation. While Augustine’s view is 
not straightforwardly identical with this, his understanding of the primitiveness of phenomenal time
14
 and 
his adherence to a strict Platonic topdownism in which causal influence is correlated with noetic power of 
comprehension
15
 allowed him to recognize that the angelic minds inhabit a temporal medium that is 
ontologically prior to the physical world.    
In an Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, Section VIII, Augustine offers a (brief) 
argument for angelic time as mental time, as a solution to an interpretive puzzle of whether time is created 
before the angels or with the ‘lights’ of the heavens.16 He would go on to expand this argument in a later, 
complete work on the subject. Recognizing such texts as “For the power to act is available to you 
whenever you will” (Wis 12:18) and “The one who abides forever created all things simultaneously” (Sir 
18:1), he insists that in relation to God who does not change the act of creation is singular and atemporal. 
Yet Augustine also knows as well as anyone that God’s creative activity must also be understood from the 
creaturely perspective as continuously successive. What God creates is temporal and described in 
Scripture as the work of a sixfold liturgical procession (Gen 1:31), indeed one that continued until the 
time of the historical Jesus, “For my Father is working until now” (Jn 5:17). Why does God choose to 
reveal the truth about his creation to us in this way? Accepting that what we hear and read in Scripture is 
not metaphor, an indirect way of talking about something else, but a matter of historical fact, this 
introduces the main interpretive puzzle that Augustine talks up in his The Literal Meaning of Genesis.  
Part of the solution involves importing the Stoic metaphysical machinery of spermatikoi logoi 
(rationes seminales). On analogy with the way seeds evidently contain the determinants of the growing 
plant’s morphology, the suggestion is that God creates all things at once, but within what he creates are 
intelligent guiding-structures, like software programs, that constrain the possible successions of created 
states-of-affairs. Notice that this is roughly commensurate, adjusting for different historical and hence 
theoretical contexts, with the introduction of the theoretico-explanatory device of laws of nature. We 
introduced the “problem of creative laws” in VIII.2 and noted how laws can and, in a certain sense, must 
be understood as the instruments of God’s continuing creative activity. But we also made this observation 
into a step in a larger chain of reasoning. For God to create the kind of empirically objective world that 
we are already conceptually committed to when we think of the world we inhabit, he must create a world 
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 See XI.20, 26, 27. The resemblance to the idealist theory is that he takes the data of temporal consciousness as 
basic of a logical construction of objective and non-phenomenal time.   
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 Recall that for Augustine, as for the idealist, material things do not have powers of efficient causation, only 
spiritual beings do, since causal power requires voluntary agency. See City of God , V.9.  
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 This and the argument discussed below for angelic time as deriving from the liturgical organization of their 
governing causal activity is presented summarily in City of God, XII.16.   
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governed by laws. Only in this way can created things possess genuine dispositional properties
17
, without 
which they would lack the integrity to merit the title as such. But then we seem to face an unsatisfying 
dilemma. For in order to govern—or introduce a force of necessity among worldly outcomes—it would 
seem that either they would have to be concrete entities in their own right, causally influencing worldly 
states-of-affairs, or reducible to dispositions about God. The first option seems absurd and the second 
compromises the goal of introducing laws in the first place. We want to understand how laws of nature, as 
universal facts of world-internal necessity, derive their force of necessity from something causally 
powerful yet other than themselves. The solution, as we have seen, is to have explanatory recourse to the 
supernatural. On the theistic hypothesis, the traditional Judeo-Christian God has the power, wisdom, and 
creative purpose to create a world that is governed by laws. Taking the idealist interpretation of creation 
together with the angelic hypothesis allows us to understand the existence of laws, a system of divine 
government (what we have called the prephysical nomological framework of alpha-, beta-, and gamma-
laws) as a literal truth. Laws must be understood as issuances or directives given and received within a 
prior community of rational agents. 
Augustine understood the interpretive problem of simultaneous versus successive creation to 
include the explanatory demand of distinguishing between the atemporal act of divine creation and the 
temporal activity of the divine government of creation that is shared with other rational agents. The key to 
understanding the unity of these two divine operations, creation and government, is to see creation 
idealistically, as working at the mental level, and, crucially, as including the transmission of the eternal 
divine ideas into the minds of the angel spirits who in turn transmit them to the minds of men. So while 
Augustine does adopt the device of rationes seminales, this is only a part of larger apparatus in which a 
celestial community of intelligent spirits who in accordance with their finite, temporal conditions receive 
the ‘eternal ideas’ of the divine Wisdom, the ‘day referred to in the Biblical text ”All things were created 
in the day” (Gen 2:4). Augustine wants to understand this as literally true as well.    
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 Of course there are other options such as dispositional essentialism, which claims that at least some properties are 
essentially dispositional, in that their identity conditions are fixed entirely by their functional profile under a given 
theory (e.g., a complete description of their potential causes and effects). If there are any essentially dispositional 
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together with certain optical and psychophysical laws. Dispositional essentialism obviates the need for laws, then, 
only by claiming that certain nomic facts, facts about the relations between causes and effects or stimuli and 
manifestations, are metaphysically necessary. In our arguments against physical realism in Ch.VII, we have seen 
how any such claim is untenable. More to present purposes, because dispositions concern potentialities and thus 
relate nonexistent conditions, dispositional essentialism seems committed to there being a mind-like feature of 
intentionality, a self-governing  power of intelligence, built into the structure of the world as a bare fact. This is 
theologically unacceptable to a traditional Christian theist.  
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For this reason, since the holy angels with whom we shall be equated after the resurrection, if we 
keep to the way (which Christ has become for us, right to the end), always see the face of God, 
and enjoy the Word of God, his only-begotten Son in his equality with the Father, and since in 
them wisdom was created as the first of all things, there can be no doubt that they have first come 
to know the universal creation, in which they themselves were first to be established, in the Word 
of God himself, in whom are the eternal ideas even of things which were made in time, as in the 
one through whom all things were made (Jn 1:3).  
 
Notice here in this brief passage the references to many of our major themes, the angelic dimension of the 
human spiritual life, their role in the consummation of the trinitarian Mystery of Christ, and their share in 
the government of physical creation by receiving the divine ideas following the arrangement of the 
Christocentric cosmic hierarchy. Augustine continues to explain that the angels come to know the order of 
creation by first knowing the divine wisdom, and that this movement of knowledge is part of the activity 
of their heavenly administration.  
 
Only after that do they know creation in itself, by glancing down below, as it were, and then 
referring it to the praise of the one in whose unchangeable Truth they originally see the ideas 
according to which it was made. So they see it as it were in daylight, which is why their 
wonderfully harmonious unity by sharing in that truth is the day that was originally created, while 
here they see it as if in the evening twilight; but then straightaway morning is made (this can be 
observed in all six days) because angelic knowledge does not linger in what has been created 
without straightaway referring it to the praise and love of the one in whom it is known…So then 
the angels know the creature in itself in such a way that by free and love-inspired choice 
(electione ac dilectione) they prefer to that knowledge their knowing the creature in the truth 
through which all things were made, in which they have been given a share….in whom they 
contemplate the eternal ideas according to which things were created, and in that wonderfully 
harmonious contemplation are themselves the one day which the Lord has made; to this may the 
Church be joined…18 
 
Thus for Augustine the world that God makes is telescopically contained in a hierarchy of causal power 
and wisdom whose movements are ordered liturgically. The visible world is made in the invisible Church. 
But the passage also prompts the question: “granted that this angelic company, this unity of the one day 
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 Augustine, de Gen. ad Lit. IV.24-25, quoted from The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Edmund Hill, trans. (New 
York: New City Press, 2002), pp.265-266. Emphasis is the author’s.   
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which God originally fashioned, performs all these intellectual acts simultaneously now, did it also do this 
simultaneously then, at the time it was all being created?”19. His answer, following the literal 
interpretation of the haexemeron, is‘no’. “Instead, that ‘day which God has made’ is itself repeated 
through his works not in a bodily circular motion but in spiritual knowledge”.20 
To solve his interpretive puzzle of simultaneous versus successive creation, Augustine thus 
exploits the fact that succession is appropriate to the activity and perspective of a finite intelligence, with 
which God intended to share the work of governing through a knowledge and causal power over lower 
creatures in turn:  
 
Or were they all happening simultaneously even then, since there was no question of intervals of 
time such these days mark, when the sun rises and sets and goes back to its place to rise again, but 
was a matter of the spiritual power of the angelic mind, comprehending all that it wished in a 
simultaneous knowledge with the utmost facility—even so, not thereby without any orderly 
linking of preceding and following causes?
21
 
 
Though posed as a question, Augustine is here employing a rhetorical device to texture the assertion. This 
possible answer comes last and is restated in summary at the end of Book IV.  
 
And so the human mind first experiences through the senses of the body the things that have been 
made and from there gains such knowledge of them as its human weakness allows; and next it 
looks for their causes, if by any manner of means it may attain them where they abide 
primordially and unchangingly in the Word of God, and may thus come to an understanding of 
his invisible things through those that have been made (Rom 1:20).
22
  
 
Augustine here takes the opportunity to explain the connection between the angelic governance of visible 
creation through the transmission of the divine ideas and the way this structure is reflected in the pattern 
of human natural theology. Natural revelation of the mind of God to human beings, by which they know 
about the invisible God by knowing his providential visible effects, works in the opposite order of natural 
creation, in which the angels know providential visible effects by first knowing the divine ideas. Just as 
for God to know and to make are indivisible, so analogically for the angels, for a visible thing to be made 
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is for it to be made known to them by God, “in its nomic potentiality” (as we might interpret it 
idealistically):  
 
The angelic mind, on the other hand, adhered in unalloyed charity to the Word of God, after being 
created in due order before all the rest, …, they were first made in the knowledge of that mind, 
when God said, “Let them be made.”…When, however, this was done, there was something else 
to be made and known, with God saying, Let it be made, so that once again it would be made in 
the knowledge of the angelic mind, and again scripture could say, And thus it was made.’23 
 
So “to be made”, as referred to in the text of Genesis, is to be made known to the angels, because “this 
day which God made in the first place—if it is the spiritual and rational creation, that is, the supercelestial 
angels and powers—was presented with all the works of God in a sequence or order which is the order of 
knowledge”.24 
The subject of Book V is the literal interpretation of a key text in the second creation narrative: 
“When the day was made God made heaven and earth and all the greenery of the field before it was upon 
the earth, and the hay of the field before it sprang up” (Gen 2:4-5). Augustine has done the work to 
interpret the statement that heaven and earth were made in a ‘day’, which evidently contains in 
potentiality such empirical phenomena as “the hay of the field before it sprang up”. When God makes the 
celestial order of the angels and gives them a shared knowledge of the divine ideas so they can govern, he 
has already provided for the unfolding phenomena of nature as human beings experience them 
empirically. Summarizing the whole discussion up that point, Augustine goes on to distinguish the 
various roles that the divine ideas, angelic knowledge and government, and seminal principles in their 
systemic relation within the whole metaphysical scheme: “So then, the unchangeable formulae for all 
creatures in the Word of God are one thing, another those works of his from which He rested on the 
seventh day, yet another these which carrying on from those he is working until now
25
; and of these three 
it is the one I put last that is known to us through the senses of the body and our familiarity with this 
life”.26 
God “works until now” by way of government or providence, not by way of creating.27 What we 
experience is the execution of creative commands he has already given at the level of the aeon. What 
emerges from this discussion is thus the following picture. We have a threefold distinction between God’s 
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timeless act of creating, the celestial and temporal diastema of his creating minds in time, and the odos of 
creation, the empirical projection of it at the human mind. That is, we have 
 
    
  unchanging   God       Divine Ideas 
{                             -------------------------------------------   < creation  ------------------------- 
     changing  
      invisible aeon, angelic & human minds                angelic ideas  
  {        -----------------------------------------   < government  ---------------------    
      visible physical world     empirical ideas 
 
This schema can be faithfully mapped onto the idealist schema we have outlined in VIII.4. And 
so we can think of the work we have done in elaborating Christian idealism as recovering through natural 
theology what accords with Gregory and Augustine’s systematic Biblical exegesis. Altogether, idealism 
has the effect of recovering the explanatory value of the teaching on angels, in Scriptural revelation and 
the broader Church tradition. Following the specification of the phenomenological syntheses, the logical 
construction of things in space, and the logical construction of mental time, all from a simple stock of 
metaphysical, phenomenological and nomological concepts, the idealist is in a position to offer a coherent 
account of how the physical world is derived from a prephysical system of organizing human-angelic 
causal interaction. The temporal projection of actual sensible continuity to potential sensible continuity on 
the basis of a prephysical system of nomological control over individual streams of experiences comes in 
the form of explicitly causal constraints, in fact a unified system of causal links established between 
angelic and human minds. In order for the prephysical causal system to be such as to logically sustain a 
physical world with a public, objective unified space, time, and physical continuants (including 
organismic bodies), there must be causal pairings of human and angelic minds as well as a supra-angelic 
coordinating mind, the divine Wisdom, who has the requisite rational agency to enact this system as a 
whole.  
 
IX.3  The Challenge to Physical Realism from Angelic Cosmology 
There is at least an ambivalence in Augustine on how to think of the relation between the ‘day’ that God 
creates and the empirical world. Is the angelic reception of the divine ideas, what we can call the ‘angelic 
ideas’, a knowledge of the same forms he has implanted in physical substances (the realist option), or are 
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they a knowledge of how to regulate the phenomenal world by causally constraining human sensory 
experience (the phenomenalistic idealist option)? 
Emphasizing the theoretical role of ‘seminal principles’ perhaps leads to a kind of Neoplatonic 
vitalism or at least a mental realism rather than Nyssen (phenomenalistic) idealism. The tension between 
these two tendencies played out in Thomas’ conflicted adherence to syncretic Neoplatonism, Augustine, 
Dionysius, Biblical revelation, doctrinal orthodoxy, and secular science. In the narrative I have been 
encouraging, it is Berkeley in the modern period who takes the decisive step of re-establishing the Nyssen 
idealist development of Christian Neoplatonist metaphysics.
28
   
Augustine’s literal interpretation of Genesis is compatible with a Platonic and idealist 
development that amalgamates it with Dionysius’ cosmic hierarchy. In Thomas’ reception, his 
hylomorphism, a type of physical realism, prevents him from receiving traditional angelic cosmology 
along these same lines. This theoretical situation is repeated in other Scholastics. In basic terms, Thomas 
is a Platonist about angelic knowledge and an Aristotelian about human knowledge and the mechanics of 
angelic government, though inconsistently, as he also is faithful enough to Augustine and Dionysius to 
recognize angelic power over the human soul, in inducing sense-impressions, images, and even 
intellectual illumination. However, in these cases, angels have to work by material means and so 
indirectly. They can only act on matter by condensing it
29
, moving the mind by moving the bodily organs 
and humors. Even if this already seems awkward and inelegant, there is a more generic problem: he wants 
to maintain the strictness of the Platonic(-Dionysian) explanatory hierarchy in saying men do not affect 
angels, yet allows material things causally to affect men; material causality thus occupies a pride of place 
in the divine government that is incompatible with adherence to the Platonic explanatory hierarchy.  
 Aquinas is clear that “All corporeal things are governed by the angels”30, and adheres to the 
Augustinian and Dionysian tradition of understanding angelic participation in the governing work of 
creation through a hierarchical transmission of the divine ideas. He explicitly preserves Augustine’s literal 
interpretation of genesis, with the ‘day’ of creation referring to the celestial hierarchy and its reception of 
the divine ideas, and the six days referring to six classes of things known.
31
 Aquinas develops this, 
however, within his own hylomorphic ontology. His conception of angelic knowledge is that of a 
knowledge of intelligible species that is simple, universal, prior, hierarchical and connatural, that is, as 
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innately complete within the angelic nature, following Augustine and Dionysius. This much is 
consistently Platonist and compatible with idealism. But in his description of the angelic administration of 
the divine government, and especially his description of the way they must compete for causal influence 
with material things, we can see the way his desire for fidelity to the Christian Platonist tradition is in 
tension with his hylomorphism. This is representative of the Scholastic tradition and contrasts with 
Berkeley’s return to the phenomenalist line of Platonic development in Gregory of Nyssa.  
In Question 110 of the Summa, de praesedentia angelorum super creaturam corporalem, Aquinas 
positions himself to endorse patristic angelic cosmology. Citing the words of Augustine
32
  and Gregory 
the Great
33
, he argues that the angels possess a direct control (immediatam praesidentiam) “not only over 
the higher heavenly bodies, but also over the lower material things”.34 In a roll call of patristic sources, he 
cites Augustine’s claim that “Each visible thing in this world has an angelic power set over it”.35 But 
Aquinas will not allow that angels causally control material things merely by mental causation. 
Interestingly, he is explicitly aware that such a claim would be supported by a ‘Platonist’ view that “the 
forms in matter are caused by immaterial forms”. Aristotle, he says, corrected this view with his 
hylomorphism, and because he, Aquinas, sides with Aristotle’s hylomorphic view of material things, he 
cannot allow that angels move them as that would be to allow that angels endow matter with form. This, 
he believes is something only God and (lest one think his motivation here is against idolatry) other 
material things can do.
36
 Neither will Aquinas allow any overdetermination of causes in regard to material 
change. “Nothing stops certain natural effects that take place through angelic power from occurring 
through the power of material agencies”.37 In line with physical realism and against the tenets of Platonic 
topdownism, Aquinas regards spiritual and material causes as on the same ontological plane in regard to 
causal power, so that the one must compete for influence with the other; and more often than not, material 
agency wins the competition.  
Here we see the clear divergence between the strict Platonism maintained by idealism and the 
hylomorphic physical realism of the Scholastics. In the latter, material agency is accorded a causal-
explanatory priority to the immaterial agency of the angelic spirits. Aquinas does believe that angels can 
act on material things directly in regard to local motion (not in any way but in accord with the material 
thing’s rationones seminales), and in this way can be themselves ‘located’ at the places that they exert 
causal control over local motion. He will allow such control to be understood on analogy with animation, 
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the way a soul moves its body.
38
 By moving things in space, Aquinas allows angels to have their effect on 
human souls, through the mediating causal agency of the bodily organs and humors. “So angels 
communicate intelligible truth to men by means of objects apprehensible by the senses”.39  
Because it puts angelic causal governing activity in competition with the agency of material 
things, physical realism is a poor match with the angelic cosmology of the Platonic tradition. Historically, 
the de facto conclusion for theologians and Christian philosophers was that traditional angelic cosmology 
failed to admit of a rational, coherent account and so had its place, if anywhere, only at the speculative 
margins of faith. But our work has shown that the Scholastic struggle to make sense of the angel-body 
relation should be read as a reproach of the realist conception of body, not of angelic cosmology, which is 
any case inseparable from biblical theism. 
Lombard, Aquinas, Bernard and Alexander of Hales all inquired into the status of the angelic 
relation with bodies and concluded that they are not embodied by nature, but that since our natural 
evidence for them comes from the motion of the heavens they must be able to move bodies and so be 
located.
40
 Furthermore, we know that there is miraculous evidence of angelic “embodiment” in the 
prophetic and other Biblically attested appearances of angels in bodily form. Within a physical realist 
metaphysics, the only way to make sense of such apparitions is the model of embodiment provided by 
animation. Later theologians interested in reviving patristic angelology inherit this problem.  
Consider the case of Cardinal Newman. With the tradition, he sees the angelic role in the cosmos 
as ecclesial, governing physical phenomena as a religious duty, and as the practice of charity: “Its 
(nature’s) works are duties”.41 And indeed as Scripture says “All ye works of the Lord…praise Him 
forever”42, with the clear context that the materials of creation are moved liturgically by angels and men 
in blessed concord.  As had the Scholastics, Newman seems to think that in the celebration of the cosmic 
liturgy “angels move” those portions of the natural world which seem to be animate, as “our souls move 
our bodies”. But this is a very odd suggestion. It makes items in the physical world relate to angels on 
analogy with something like ensoulment, so the items really are in a sense animate; even though they do 
not move themselves qua physical, they do move themselves qua ensouled angels. Another problem is 
that, ironically, on this view our bodies would cease to be part of the natural world, unless they too are 
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moved by angels in the same way angels move others things (that is, through something analogous to 
ensoulment). But in that case how could they remain our bodies? Newman is correct to think, with 
Berkeley, Augustine, and the Neoplatonists, that only a volitional mind has (transcendental
43
) causal 
agency; but the mind-body analogy is the wrong one for thinking about the relation between angels and 
the phenomena of nature. We can still “refer the movements of the natural world to them (angels)”44 on 
the phenomenalistic view, which has among other advantages that of showing how the angelic ministry 
not only moves certain things, but, by executing “according to Thine ordinance”45, continuously governs 
all physical things or sustains the created character of the physical world; not through circular local 
motion or the condensation of matter, but through interaction with the human mind. 
Another problem with Newman’s Scholastic “animation model” for angelic governance is that the 
psychophysical connections themselves would need to be supported through causal agents, resulting in a 
regress or gratuitous first hypothesis. If I strike a match, I may be the one moving the match, but who or 
what grounds the disposition of the match to ignite when struck? The angel may have imparted to the pool 
of Siloam its medicinal quality, but who imparted to it its cleansing and thirst-quenching qualities? And 
how moreover did the angel so impart the medicinal quality?
46
 Through some transmissive influence 
through contact action (conceived on a material model)? Newman’s answer would be along the lines of 
the mind-body volitional model.  
This way of thinking about angelic power over nature would seem to be inherited from Aquinas’ 
discussion in the prima pars of the Summa, where angels are described as being spatially located and 
mobile and operative within a physical world that is in many ways on the same ontological footing. This 
explanatory framework abandons the PAFD and mixes the explanatory terms of metaphysics and physics. 
The idealist correction along the lines of Christian idealism as here presented reestablishes a Platonic 
ontological hierarchy such as one finds in Plotinus, Nyssen, and Augustine, in which all body-body causal 
interaction within the physical world is derived as a kind of projection from an explanatorily prior 
because noetically simpler mind-mind causal interaction. On this view, one can speak of physical, intra-
mundane causation only because it is logically created by more basic idealist nomological facts about 
how angelic and human minds have been arranged to be in causal interaction.   
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All thoughts about causal agency “in the world” (or really any place else) depend on the notion of 
an “incorporeal substance”—this is what people use when they “represent to themselves” or think of self-
motion in the world or the motion of causal chains. And because causation is so intimately connected with 
the concept of substance—since it is originative and immanent causation that makes a thing a thing as 
opposed to a pseudo-process, like a shadow-puppet—this is where the mistaken idea of material 
substance arises. As idealists we can say that the world-suggestive organization of sensory experience is 
in particular suggestive of a world of three-dimensional spatial occupants, things, a spatio-temporal 
collection of qualities distinguished by their separation from the other qualities and internal qualitative 
density but also by their apparent capacity to feature in causal chains that make up the regulatory order of 
the world. On account of all this, as Berkeley pointed out, it is tempting to misuse analogy with our 
subjectively known experience of volitional agency as incorporeal substances to think that, therefore these 
apparently “active” things, that feature in causal chains and are governed by the regulatory order, are 
substances.  
Interestingly, Newman himself was a professed Berkeleyan
47
, and attributes this to the early 
influence of reading Bishop Butler. One can find passages in Newman’s writing where he makes 
theoretical use of the idealist thesis.
48
 But Newman did not apparently uncover the way coherently to 
integrate Berkeley’s phenomenalism, and especially the tactual-visual language model of perception, with 
angelic cosmology. Newman’s neo-patristic angelology was taken up by Bouyer, his spiritual son and 
intellectual disciple. Bouyer in particular realized the potential it afforded for founding the exegesis of 
creation doctrine on a theology of the Eucharist. We can agree with Newman that “every breath of air and 
ray of light and heat, every beautiful prospect, is, as it were, the skirts of their garments, the waving of the 
robes of those whose faces see God”49, and with Bouyer that “the Kingdom of God is accomplished in the 
adoring and loving acknowledgment on the part of creatures, and the entire world becomes a harmony by 
attuning itself to God”.50 Neo-patristic angelology, developed rightly, does help us to see that all created 
things are made to be lifted up in the Christian Eucharist. Having developed a Christian idealism that 
enriches Berkeley’s theistic phenomenalism with the angelic hypothesis, we can make this point clear in a 
way they could not.  
 
IX.4  Unity in the Angelic Administration of the Mystery: A Eucharistic Cosmos 
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We have discussed the Christian tradition’s reception of revelation on the nature of the celestial hierarchy, 
its temporality, and the teaching on angelic governance (praesidentia) of the physical world in accordance 
with the divine ideas and guardianship (custodia) of human beings. We have demonstrated the 
explanatory value, consilience, and elegance of idealist metaphysics in that its truth entails these same 
teachings and furnishes them with a degree of clarity and detail they might otherwise lack. The final point 
to make in completing our theological argument is to recognize how, in articulating the linguistic nature 
of sensory experience—per the Berkeleyan syntheses by which the physical world is logically 
constructed—idealism facilitates a systematic theological account of how divine, angelic, and human 
interaction is liturgically unified in the Mystery of Christ. This is the notion of the cosmic liturgy, the 
understanding that the various works of the divine creation economy are sacramentally holistic. It stems 
from the Biblical teaching that God creates through speech, through spoken words, and that the order of 
the world is dependent on the purpose of this speech. It is inseparable from other Biblical teachings, 
concerning creation as covenant, the relation between creation covenant and social life, the new song of 
salvation, angelic mediation in the sacramental economy, the Old Testament temple theology
51
, and 
repetition of patterns of Divine creation through speech in the Church’s liturgy, summative in the Mass. 
Development of the notion of a cosmic liturgy, of a world-made-in-and-for-the Eucharist is facilitated by 
the metaphysical and theological implications of Christian idealism.  
The early Fathers developed this notion to different degrees. Modern theologians with affinities 
and sympathies for patristic sources have sought to emphasize it through historical scholarship, 
commentary, and exegesis, like Daniélou
52
 and Von Balthasar
53
. Others like Newman and Bouyer
54
 have 
tried to let the doctrine serve as an influence in their own systematic theological thinking. The way to do 
justice to it, to adopt it as a reasonable and coherent worldview, is to interpret it within the metaphysical 
framework of phenomenalistic idealism. Modern theology combined with the metaphysics of physical 
realism is incoherent and modern theology on its own is too vague on just the cosmological questions that 
matter most: How is the world something that God creates through liturgical speech now and at every 
moment? And how is it a medium of sacramental participation between all of creation and God? How is it 
made for the Eucharist?  
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Combined with the idealist view, God and the angels may be understood to co-govern by 
cooperating in the active organization of human sensory experience. Given its requirements for mental 
time and the prephysical nomological framework, an idealist theory of creation requires a bare minimum 
of a temporally-ordered continuum and individual streams of experience that through their one-to-one 
systemic correlation with human minds and inherent causal power can generate subjective and 
intersubjective time. This bare minimum is that which is most uncontroversially revealed about the 
celestial order in Scripture: insofar as the angels are collected as a liturgical assembly of word-bearing 
ministers, an ecclesia, the celestial order has a collective unity founded on the economy of the Word
55
; 
and insofar as the angels are individual persons they also as pure intelligences have individual identities. 
Still, whether conjoined with physical realism or idealism, there is something about the 
hypotheses of angelic cosmology that would seem to call for justification. We could call it the problem of 
“angelic hiddenness”, with the deliberate intention of invoking the analogy with the so-called problem of 
divine hiddenness for Christian theism. Insofar as our elaboration of Christian idealism has made use of 
the angelic hypothesis, it has perhaps attracted to itself the same justificatory onus. Recall the oddness of 
the idealist’s suggestion, e.g., in the instance of MacLeish kissing his wife, that, from the theological 
perspective of transcendent metaphysics, our bodily causal interaction with each other is, like all physical 
causation, dependent on a system of angelic governance, in which the chain of causes runs from human 
subjects to angelic subjects and back to human subjects. Here it is helpful to remember the oddness of 
such a description is explicitly recognized by idealism in the sense that it entails the proposition that our 
access to the kind of sensory order that the angels, following divine instruction, affect is for all everyday 
purposes through terms and concepts of the notional physical theory. Idealism recognizes the conceptual 
autonomy and descriptive indispensability of physical theory. It is in the perspective of the physical 
theory that we think, judge, and act on physical facts, including facts about embodiment, the objectivity of 
physical space and time and the possibilities for physical causation. The familiarity of this perspective is a 
good thing, indeed providential, and worthy of praise; but it also, by reason of its very familiarity, keeps 
hidden the more basic phenomenological order and the explanatory metaphysics that we have proposed in 
connection with it
56
. In this way, angelic hiddenness provides us with an opportunity in relation to the 
Christian moral and spiritual life that might be considered in a manner similar to that in which its relation 
to divine hiddenness has been considered.  
The angels are revealed in Scripture as practicing a kind of kenosis or condescension of selfless 
love: the angels who did not fall are they “who did not love their own souls to the point of death”.57 Their 
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hidden pairing or partnership with us is an indication that they are meant to share in a common liturgical 
fellowship with us.
58
 In all “legitimate occupation” man finds a fellow-laborer: “I am a fellow-servant 
with you and the prophets”59, the angel tells the revelator. With an idealist theology, we can suppose that 
angelic causation of human sensations in the manner necessary for imposing constraints that produce 
physical space is done voluntarily in accordance with causal laws that God has decreed but not coerced 
the angels to execute, commands they perform “under the sweet compulsion of adoring love”.60 Albeit 
limited in understanding, angelic knowledge of the future, as exemplified in the oracles of Zechariah and 
Daniel, is explained by the distinction between the temporal order of the aeon they inhabit (mental time) 
and physical time that they help to create idealistically. For by this distinction, idealism can explain how 
angels can know the future of our world history (or universal history) without doing so in a temporal-
transcendental manner akin to the way God knows the future. Following our idealist continuation of 
Augustine’s interpretation of Genesis, transcendentally God creates in a single act all possibilities—and 
we might say all (immaterial) hypostases. But empirically and in the order of angelic knowledge, he 
presides in a hierarchically distributed way, preserving creation hexaemerally. When God draws near to 
physical creation, he does so through angelic mediation, “riding on their wings”.61  God’s eternity is an 
adiastasis, so the end of the aeon and the final bequest of God’s own life, in all and for all, is still 
something that the angels await together with us. Following the Orthodox theologians, we can say that 
this end is not simply the annihilation of time, or the aeon, but the plenitude of God’s eternal life in the 
aeon: the union of eternity and duration, an unending perfect experience.
62
  
The cosmic hierarchy of angels and men, united in the sacramental economy, is the providential 
arrangement for the administration of the Mystery of Christ. Paul’s tells us that his mission is “to make 
plain to everyone the administration of this mystery (oikonomia tou mysteriou), which from the ages (ton 
aionon) was kept hidden in God, who created all things. His intent was that now, through the church, the 
manifold wisdom of God should be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly realms, 
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according to the purpose of the ages (prosthesin ton aionon) that he accomplished in Christ Jesus our 
Lord. In him and through faith in him we may approach God with freedom and confidence”.63 
We have already seen that the subjective mental time dimensions of Ch.VIII may be thought of as 
infinitely extended in both directions because subjective volitions and sensations are located within a 
larger temporal arrangement of points that are in a 1-1 correspondence with an infinitely extended 
temporal order. This makes sense of Scriptural passages, such as Psalm 139:15, Jer 1:5, and Wis 8:19-20, 
which refer to the human subject’s pre-birth notional existence. As object of the divine mind, this is 
naturally interpreted by our technical concept of the joinability of conscious streams, which is nomically 
guaranteed by the beta-laws. At the same time, this brings out the angelological dimension of passages 
such as Ps 16:7: “…even in the night my mind will teach me wisdom..”; that is, even when I am 
unconscious you guard me and enlighten me with knowledge through my guardian angel.  Ps 18 shows us 
the continuity-in-development between the creation law, the Mosaic law, and the New Law. We know 
that the latter two are subject to angelic mediation, per the hierarchic structure of the Kingdom. Therefore, 
we may infer that the creation law is subject to angelic mediation as well, on pain of rupturing the 
continuity-in-development of Old Testament theology and the Hebrew tradition, and of the intimate 
relation of creation and redemption, nature and grace.  
The Song of the Three Young Men
64
 is a liturgical hymn of praise that first invokes the angels 
and the heavenly creation, then natural phenomena, weather and season, then birds and beasts, and then 
finally men, Israel in its hierarchical aspect, and “souls and spirits of the just”, then finally the three 
young men themselves. This progression reflects the order of creation. It may well confirm the 
interpretation of the creation narrative of Genesis on which the angels are created first. If they are created 
first, then, putting this together with other creation accounts such as Proverbs 8:22-31, John 1:1-14, 
Colossians 1:12-20, Rev 4-5, and Heb 11:3 it would seem to follow that the angels are free instrumental 
agents hierarchically mediating the work of liturgically governing the physical world. Idealism’s 
insistence that physical regularity be explained by sensory or phenomenal regularity subordinates  
physical phenomena to the execution of liturgical duties, performed by free, rational mental agents. Could 
a personalist Christianity accept anything else? Can participation be construed in any but an ultimately 
personalist way and still be relevant to Christian sacramental theology or its doctrines of creation and 
redemption?  
The angelic knowledge of creation is meant to come to us, with the Law and the Gospel, as one 
‘message’ in the sense of James 1:18, “By his own choice he made us his children by the message of the 
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truth so that we should be a sort of first-fruits of all that he had created”65, and of John 6:68 – “you have 
the message of eternal life”. In receiving it we are meant to respond by joining in the work of the same 
administration that brings it to us, hierarchically sharing God’s theology, which takes the form, in its 
creative-redemptive dimension, of mercy-working, wonderworking, or presiding over sacramental rites, 
according to our gifts and vocations. Similarly, if visible creation is a ‘message’, as Scripture insists, then 
it would seem to follow that the ‘messengers’ are cooperators, participatory agents in the work of 
creation. The fact that they are themselves created and recipients of the message but also called, in that 
same creative act, to transmit the message is way of stating the same point made by Dionysius’ 
understanding of the hierarchy, and more modern theological conceptions of the Church as God’s 
sacrament of Christ to the world.  
Idealism shows us that through our thoughts, desires, acts of longing, imagination, and 
conscientious reflection, we are at all times to pray
66
 – such constant inner prayer is to become the very 
fabric of our psychological lives and so, idealistically, to condition the place where we are meant to dwell 
in the presence of the Lord, who “discerns my thoughts from afar” and is “intimately acquainted with all 
my ways”67, ”And indeed, what great nation is there that has its gods so near as the Lord our God is to us 
whenever we call to him?”68, for “the just shall live in the presence of the Lord”.69 Our thoughts 
determine our lives, our dwelling (or not) in the presence of the Lord. All are meant to communicate a 
response to God hierarchically that is meant to translate itself into the sharing of the work of bringing 
God’s kingdom into our midst, by manifesting transparently its power and effects at work in us, so that 
the visible world he made for us in Christ, the place where we dwell, is taken into the sanctuary where he 
dwells forever and expanded into its immeasurable horizon.  
Angelic society is revealed in Scripture as a liturgical assembly, an ecclesia, with a hierarchy of 
ministerial offices. In the annunciation of the Gospel to Zechariah, the angel identifies himself in this 
way: “I am Gabriel, who stands in the presence of God…”70; and similarly in the Book of Tobit we hear 
“I am Raphael, one of the seven angels who stand ever ready to enter the presence of the glory of the 
Lord…” 71. This hierarchy is referred to repeatedly by Paul.  Speaking of eucharistic worship, he says 
“Because of this ought the woman to have authority (exousian) over her head on account of the angels”72; 
that is, to uphold the dignity of the hierarchy, including the angels (among whom are the heavenly 
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authorities’ [exousia] of Eph 3:10), all of whom are assembled together in the liturgical sacrament, it is 
fitting that this divinely instituted pattern be embodied in the earthly Church. The religious duty of 
maintaining hierarchical order and integrity is one of the most consistently emphasized exhortations in 
Apostolic writings. It is the central purpose for the author of 1 Clement, who writes to reprove and 
instruct the Corinthians who have taken it on themselves to depose their bishop. It is probably the major 
theme of Ignatius’ epistles that the unifying power of the Church is concretely realized in the local bishop, 
whose power and authority is indissolubly linked with the credal faith of those he instructs and initiates 
and ultimately with the unity of Christ in the eucharistic sacrament. The Didache contains the same 
theme, as do the pastoral epistles of Paul. The Shepherd of Hermas makes a similar point directly in 
regard to the ranks of angels and martyrs as the foundational stones of the tower in the shepherd’s vision 
of the Church.  
In Ch.II we have already mentioned the texts of Scripture that reveal the angelic power over 
nature. On that basis alone we might well think the exercise of angelic power in nature is diverse enough 
to infer total control. Hence, as one turn of the century Anglican divine observed, “It is much more 
consistent with our knowledge of the stability and continuity of the natural forces, to suppose that the 
angelic dominion of nature is permanent and complete, than to regard it as special and occasional. The 
splendid constancy of the natural laws then becomes a visible demonstration of the unerring and unresting 
diligence and faithfulness with which the ministers of God execute his sovereign will”.73 This is an 
important part of the argument for angelic governance in Christian cosmology: to limit the role of angelic 
mediation in revelation risks separating natural and supernatural revelation; it risks a view of creation that 
is not Christocentric and fundamentally oriented to the eschaton. It is part of the still unfinished work of 
nouvelle theologie to overcome the divide between nature and grace.  
In speaking creation into existence through the Word and Spirit, God reveals himself to creation 
by natural illumination, the law to angels, by the Mosaic Law, the law to men, which is prepared in nature 
and so by the angels naturally and supernaturally, and finally in his Christ, which is prepared by men
74
 
and angels together in nature and the law. Part of what Jesus reveals is not only the Father, but the fact 
that the Father has chosen to reveal himself, in Christ, through a particular historical salvation economy, 
in which angels have been at work from the beginning. His own prayer “let thy will be done, on earth as it 
is in heaven” makes much less sense without an angelic cosmology. How exactly could the Father’s 
will—the same will that Jesus does and reveals to us again and again—be done on earth as it is in heaven 
if heaven is unpopulated by creatures or if they were not organized under a charitable covenant, a ministry 
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of gift and eucharist? Jesus is revealed as the commander of nature
75
 who stills the waves and the winds, 
the master of nature who transmutes the essences of objects
76
, and the transcender of nature who reveals 
to man the status of nature as the contingently-and-mutably necessary order of visible creation, the 
dynamic open-endedness of nature as a perceptible language, something to change in reflection of the 
dynamism of the relation between man and Creator.
77
 Man, like Peter in the storm-tossed boat, is called 
out to participate through faith in the transcendence of the order of the natural world.
78
 That such 
transcendence is included in the inheritance of divine sonship is implicated in the Ascension of Jesus, 
who as man resurrected from death superseded the ranks of heaven, who are also “sons of God”, to whom 
the rule of nature is entrusted.    
The angels are themselves formed into an ecclesial body through the creation covenant in which 
they are called to participate in the work of creation and, through it, in the divine economy of salvation 
and ultimately in the secret wisdom of the mystery of Christ, though this is unknown to them until its 
historical revelation.  
 
The heavens proclaim your works, O Lord, the assembly (qahal, ecclesia) of your holy ones 
proclaims your truth. (Ps 89:5)  
 
 A God to be feared in the council of his holy ones (Ps 89:7).  
 
In the presence of God and of Christ Jesus and of the elect angels I charge you to keep these rules 
without prejudging, doing nothing from partiality." (1 Timothy 5:21) 
 
The visible world gives the angels the realm in which to have their creative input and from which, 
through Christ, they have their sacramental output. This is paradigmatically so in Christ through the 
Mass, but also through the catching of souls in baptism, human procreation and death (and to some extent 
in ordination, as one more “joins their ranks”, yet all, including laity, are called to be like them albeit in 
different modes). Like Jeremiah, we must have the Lord’s angel-borne words in our mouths. Only then 
can we effect any prophetic change or testimony, any offering or good work. For when his word is with 
us he is with us. The words turn us into the body of Christ. They are not abstractions; they are the names, 
the instructions that contain the active power of the living God. They are the expressions of the mind of 
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Christ
79
 that create all things anew. We are to know him as we have been known by him, calling him in 
praise as he has called us in love.  
We are made in the image of the Son
80
 through baptism in the Spirit; the angels are pure spirits 
who are also called sons of God. Their likeness to the Father is mediated by the coeternal Son; our 
likeness to the Father is mediated by the risen Jesus; both are mediated through the Spirit of Sonship, one 
through the medium of the invisible world, one through the medium of the invisible and the visible. The 
absolute primacy of Christ as the original plan for the glory of a human nature, means that angels are also 
glorified in Christ, through their service to his human nature. The various human natures that have been 
or will be in the world are Christ’s human nature, and by ministering to these, the angels minister to 
Christ.
81
 They do this idealistically, sense-experience organizationally (though not exclusively this way), 
“by the words of their testimony”82, which would mean not only the angelic oracles in the Old Testament 
theophanies, but all sense experience, which negatively or mystically, through the method of dissimilar 
similarities, is “angelic theophany”, divine-angelic co-speech of the one Truth of Christ. This is what 
defeats the dragon “by the blood of the lamb”.83  
Using Christian idealism’s Berkeleyan language model of sensation we can think of the angelic 
administration of the rules of human sensory experience as akin to the inscription of texts by the prophets. 
The physical world is written in the angel fire of mental causation. The divine ideas in reference to 
potential human volition sequences are the providential knowledge they receive or “take down” as divine 
commands, responding in turn by causally organizing human sensation as a ministry of worship, just as 
Moses inscribed the Torah in stone on Mount Sinai, with the voice of God directing him. In Amos 4:13 
we learn that “He who forms the mountains, who creates the spirits, and who reveals his thoughts to 
mankind
84
, who turns dawn to darkness and treads on the heights of the earth – the Lord God Almighty is 
his name”. This important passage indicates that the God who creates all natural phenomena does so by 
revealing his thoughts to man, which is otherwise awkward but very naturally interpreted as a statement 
of the thesis of phenomenalistic idealism. Moreover, the passage goes a step further to connect the 
thoughts that God reveals to man, and by means of such revelation creates—those very thoughts are 
comprehended and personified in the Divine Wisdom that is Christ, the Anointed One who comes in the 
flesh to assume lordship over the earth by making himself its most humble and passionate servant. God 
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reveals his wisdom to men through angelic mediation, in the New Covenant, the Old, and in nature—one 
salvation economy, and therefore one angelic ministry of salvation.  
In Ezra 9:11 we are presented with an analogy for the cosmic liturgy in which the sons of God 
sung with praise and joy at the making of earth
85
, just as do the Levites in laying the foundation of the 
temple. This helps us read the divine ordinances for the priesthood in Exodus as a mystical figure for the 
cosmic liturgy: the priests are dressed in apparel of “glory and beauty” and are to use trumpets, just as the 
angels are described as doing in Revelation.
86
 In the New Testament, the Church is founded with the same 
hierarchical dynamism centered around the activity of preaching, praying, and the liturgical celebration of 
the sacraments. The apostles and ministers of the Church are “para-angels”, serving God in loving 
obedience by bringing his transforming word to others (indeed to the whole visible creation), ministering 
to their salvation and so liturgically cooperating in the coming of his kingdom. This gives us a deepened 
understanding of the ecclesiastical mysteries and a theology of the eucharist that is more closely 
integrated with traditional Christian cosmology and the doctrine of creation. In a text such as 1 Pet 1:10-
12, we find that the movement of the apostolic preaching follows the same hierarchic pattern as the 
cosmology that contains it, just as we saw
87
 in studying Dionysius’ conception of the hierarchy. It begins 
with God working mystically through angels and prophets. It continues manifestly, telically in Christ 
working through the apostles, then continues working through the bishops, saints, and martyrs of the early 
churches and so successively down through the ages. The transmission of the deposit of faith is carried 
and distributed through the centuries by the hierarchic structure of the church. This structure is in place 
first and foremost for liturgical purposes, for the hierarchic movement of the high lifting up the low. The 
fact that the apostolic preaching is transmitted through its actual ministerial structure is one more 
consequence of this.  
That such an administrative role in God’s economy could be served by a liturgical community of 
finite, pure spiritual beings in a participatory liturgical role, mediating God’s creative operations in a 
hierarchy, is an opportunity that God would not miss given his Trinitarian essence and plan for creation in 
Christ, the Incarnate Word who is the Royal Priest of creation. Such a mediating cooperative role for the 
celestial hierarchy magnifies the finite image of divine love because it realizes a further opportunity for 
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 Job 38:7 
86
 cf. also Ez 3:10-11: “When the builders laid the foundation of the temple of the LORD, the priests in their 
vestments and with trumpets, and the Levites (the sons of Asaph) with cymbals, took their places to praise the 
LORD, as prescribed by David king of Israel. With praise and thanksgiving they sang to the LORD: ‘He is good; his 
love toward Israel endures forever.’ And all the people gave a great shout of praise to the LORD, because the 
foundation of the house of the LORD was laid”. 
87
 In Ch.IV. 
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Son-Logos-Pneuma imitation in creation, as the angels freely condescend
88
 to minister to creatures below 
them in knowledge and power.  
Bouyer had recognized that: “The glory given to God by the Seraphim’s singing of the Qedushah 
is the reflection of divine glory returning to its source. But in them it is a conscious reflection expressed in 
song, just as in God the igneous light is that of the Spirit expressed in the Word”.89 It is indeed expressed 
as the song of creation, which is for idealist theology quite literally, in its sustaining effect, the word of 
man’s sensory experience ignited by the angelic mind and written in the fire of his. The manifest liturgy 
of the eucharist, with its sanctuary, altar, incense and lamps, is the manifestation of the hierarchically 
encompassing liturgy. Man’s liturgy is joined with the angelic cosmic liturgy in the Mass because the 
human eucharist is hierarchically contained in the angelic, as is all human environmental activity. Though 
in this special form of public work the angelic and human interact in the way they were intended to, with 
man collaborating in praise and thanksgiving, and using the superiority of the office of the angel as a 
logical, continuous extension of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to help his song and above all—in the 
Mass—his sacrifice be brought to God. The sacrifice of course is itself the gift of the Trinity, which again 
(or rather, firstly) is mediated by the angelic government. The gift first descends down the angelic 
hierarchy to man, as the world is created, as Isaiah’s vision unfolds90, as the Incarnation proceeds 
(through the annunciation of Gabriel to Mary of the descent of the Shekinah into her womb), as the Holy 
Spirit baptizes, and finally as the worldly event of the Mass unfolds, then ascends up the angelic hierarchy 
from the people who bring the antitypes of bread and wine, to the deacon, the hierarch, to the ministering 
spirits presiding over the Mass
91
  who bring the consecrated oblation directly before the presence of God. 
In the Mass are the words fulfilled, “You will see the angels ascending and descending on the Son of 
Man”, as Jacob foresaw and as Jesus promised Nathanael. God creates angels and together with them 
creates the physical world of earth, air, water, plants, and seeds in the mind of man (in organizing the 
pattern of his experience by speaking to his mind in the regular way God prescribes). Man’s collective 
and temporally extended labor then produces from these bread and wine. Man then continues this public 
work as eucharist, bringing the bread and wine to the celebration of the Mass as offertory gifts; they are 
consecrated with the collaboration of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and then ultimately through the angelic 
mediation brought into the immediate presence of God in his heavenly court, at the foot of his heavenly 
                                                          
88
 The reality of the angelic condescension in their ministry fits with the explanation of the fall of Lucifer who would 
not serve. It was not just his ambition to be God, it was his offense at “abasement” in sacrificial/’host’-form to bring 
forth gifts of praise and thanks through men. The idealist theory explains why the demons in thwarting us from 
glorifying the Creator by getting us to glorify ourselves actually make us slaves to them.  
89
 Eucharist, p.65 
90
 As Dionysius explains it, with the lower angels speaking to Isaiah (Is 6:6) on behalf of the seraphim, who in turn 
speak on behalf of the Logos. 
91
 Recall from Ch.I that in the words of the Roman Canon the priest explicitly invoke the mediation of the angels in 
the Canon, after the consecration. 
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throne. This is an interpretation of the angels ascending and descending on man in the cosmic liturgy via 
the Dionysian theory of hierarchy and the metaphysics of Berkeleyan idealism. The recognition of the 
angelic intermediary role in the eucharist should flow out from the model of the Mass to all man’s 
organized life. His communication with God at all times is effected by the angelic office of the heavenly 
spirits in this dynamic movement characteristic of the hierarchical pattern of creation.    
On the idealist interpretation of the doctrine of creation, we can endorse the following line, which 
in Chs.III-IV we saw was what the trajectory of Gregory and Dionysius’ work converges on. God creates 
matter through the celestial hierarchy. But his purpose in doing so is to prepare and bring about the 
historical reality of the incarnation of Christ and of his sacrifice on the Cross, accomplishing not only the 
communion of the Spirit to men, the lower priests, but through them and their embodiment, to 
communicate the Body of the Word, the Body of Sonship, the Eucharist. The angels too are perfected in 
joy in Christ, through the mediation of man. By regulating the experience of man, they create bodies, so 
that even though they are bodiless, they can offer the sacrifice of the body
92
 through the human mind, to 
which the mind of God is united. In the Ascension, the human nature in Christ is elevated above even this 
rank of intimacy with God, since man is the throne and dwelling of God, the tabernacle he fills and from 
which His glory radiates.
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 In light of the cosmic significance of the cross, this may well be an essential element for the completion of their 
divinization, or their sharing in the eternal delight of the life of the Trinity Cf. Lk 15:10. To say that the angels 
increase in joy, is not necessarily to say that they move in the order of glory. One could say with Aquinas (ST 
Ia.62.9) that beatification or creaturely perfection is a finite vision of the infinite divine essence which cannot be 
increased in beatitude, but the virtue of which can give rise to increasing joy as its reward.   
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Appendix - Natural Theology as Dionysian Symbolic Theology: A Government of the Word 
 
In discussing the role of the angelic hierarchy in the visible creation economy in IV.4 of the 
present work, I suggested that as part of their salvation ministry to men the angels facilitate the 
Incarnation by “participating with God in the creation of a visible world that unfolds at the human 
empirical perspective, by which it appears to us as progression from star dust to organisms, to human 
beings, to Israel, to Christ”. And I suggested the following schema for thinking of the hierarchical 
division of governance within the visible creation economy:  
      God 
              _/             \_                
World Order    Celestial Hierarchy 
   Moral, Socio-Historical --  First Triad 
   Physical   -- Second Triad 
   Phenomenological  -- Third Triad 
 
What I want to do here is begin to address a certain aspect of the way in which the different world-
governing assignments of the angelic hierarchy may be thought of as enacting a cosmic liturgy with 
Christ presiding.  
Consider how the natural as well as the social preconditions and influences of how we take our 
living in the world are determined by what we call “laws of nature” and their logical consequences. Per 
the lingustic model of Berkeley’s phenomenalistic idealism, they determine the order and sequential 
pattern of what we will experience given the choices we make. The interpretation we give to these 
patterns of experience is that of an external physical world, complete with the individual characteristics of 
everything from trees and rocks to water and wine. In this way, the laws of nature, or better, the “laws of 
experience”, are regular and universal; they hold across time and space, as well as across scale. For 
example, the law of nature we call the “law of gravitation” is a regularity holding not only for the fall of 
the rock that I drop, but for the fall of the moon towards the earth and the fall of the earth towards the 
sun—all of which is ultimately understood as having a certain empirical significance in relation to the 
primary tactual experience of downward resistance. The order of the natural laws encompasses ascending 
scales not only individually but collectively, so that the laws of perspective apply to individual 
experience, holding that if I move farther away from an object it will appear smaller to me, while the laws 
of trade apply to collective social experience, holding that if a society exports only the goods with the 
lowest opportunity costs then it will increase the surplus of all goods and associated production profits. 
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The laws of trade and the laws of perspective are not related as logical consequences but they are 
consistent with each other and encompassed within the coherent order of human experience. Human 
experience is ordered so that both sets of laws (and many others) pertain to it at the same time. In this 
way, the laws are mutually implicative—they “take each other into consideration”, so to speak.1  
In the sections of Ch.V we have argued with Berkeley that the (idealist) laws of nature that 
govern human experience (and in particular order the synthetic connections between vision and tactition, 
between coordinating data and sensations, and between sensation-volition pairs) do not have the status of 
logical necessities despite their regularity. What we now have to consider more fully is that this gives 
sensory experience the status of a language in very precise and technical sense. First, like the connection 
between words and ideas, the connections between experiences are regular but arbitrary. They are also 
universal and mutually implicative or non-atomistic in implication. They relate sets of possible 
experiences into sequences and that might be partially expressed as subjunctive conditionals, e.g. “if this 
set of experiences were to obtain, then this set of experiences would obtain”; and they are regular, 
universal, mutually implicative, and arbitrary. The laws that govern the pattern of human experience and 
constitute what we interpret as the created world are regular, universal, mutually implicative and arbitrary 
because they are a language in which God speaks to us, making himself and his purposes known to us 
through the very content of experience, as well as through the connections between waking experiences 
that make them coherent and maximally consistent, helping us to separate them out from dream and 
fantasy.  
On this view the order of creation down to the last law is merely the manifestation of what God 
intends in his wisdom with regard to human experience. That what we experience is regular and universal 
is a manifestation of his providence, since these features allow us to plan for the future and bring benefit 
into our lives by conforming our actions with our expectations. That the laws of nature are arbitrary is a 
clue to their utter dependence on divine sovereignty, in accordance with the traditional Christian doctrine 
of creation; they have no authority, no source of necessity, on their own but utterly manifest the will of 
God. Their arbitrariness is also a clue to their status as instrument of communication. It is perhaps one of 
the functions of the miracles recorded in scripture that they highlight the non-logical (but still predictively 
powerful or binding) regularity of experiential patterns. Just as the word ‘tree’, with its four letters and 
single syllable could easily refer to something that does not have leaves and roots
2
, day does not have to 
                                                          
1
 Berkeley had argued that there is context-sensitivity even in the phenomenological “laws of nature” (Principles, 
Secs. 30,32),  that determine the organization of human sensory experience, or the contingent regularities of visual 
and other coordinating data as signs for tangible sensations.  For him this was one more indicator of the linguistic 
character of the laws, since the meanings of words within language is similarly context-sensitive. This is a kind of 
mutual implicativity internal to the phenomenological domain itself.  
2
 Since the word bears no resemblance to its object and its referential connection with it is grounded in custom, and 
thus ultimately in the will of its speakers and their common knowledge of that will.   
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be followed by night or Spring by Summer
3
 simply in virtue of what we (can and do) experience them to 
be. Miracles make us aware of the amazing regularities which we normally take for granted but which, 
much more so than the miracles, call out for explanation. Regularities in experience point to a governing 
power beyond experience as their ground and sustaining cause; but the arbitrariness and mutual 
implicatively of the regularities points to the fact that this power must be free, providential and spiritual 
(that is, mental, possessing will and intellect), possessed of wise intentions, and indeed intentions that 
relate all of the physical world to human beings, in a manner very much like that in which a speaker 
relates words to objects by making his referential intentions known to his interlocutor.  
We can think of Berkeley’s divine language argument as an adaptation of Dionysius'  theological 
“method of dissimilar similarities” to natural theology. The world is a visible language in which God 
speaks to us because the organization of the images of sensory consciousness has the uniquely linguistic 
significance of the oracles of Scripture and the sacramental rites: they have their meaning because they 
bear the weight of the divine despite, or rather because of, their inadequacy. One event of experience 
points to another that God wills to follow it, as a word points to the object it refers to.
                                                          
3
 Fantasy stories are a source of evidence for the coherence of these and other imagined possible alternatives to the 
actual created regularities.  
210 
 
Bibliography 
 
Ambrose of Milan. De Sacramentis. Translated by T. Thompson. London: Macmillan,1919. 
 
Armstrong, D.M. Berkeley’s Theory of Vision. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1960.  
 
Aquinas, The Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger  
Bros., 1947. 
 
Atherton, Margaret. Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
 
Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram. English. The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Translated by John  
Hammond Taylor. New York: Newman Press, 1982. 
 
Ayer, A.J. Origins of Pragmatism. London: Macmillan Press, 1968. 
 
Ayers, Michael. “Ideas and Objective Being.” In The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century  
Philosophy, edited by Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics. Edited and translated by G. W. Bromiley and Τ. F. Torrance, et al.  
Edinburgh: Τ & Τ Clark, 1936-1975. 
 
Basil the Great. “Hexaemera.” In  Letters and Select Works. A Select Library of Nicene and Post- 
Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, vol. 8. Edited by P. Schaff and H. Wace. Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1996. 
 
Belfrage, Bertil, “The Scientific Background of George Berkeley’s Idealism”, in Eriugena, Berkeley, and  
the Idealist Tradition. Edited by Stephen Gersh and Dermot Moran. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2006. 
 
Berkeley, George. The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. Volume One, edited by A.A. Luce  
and T.E. Jessop. London: Thomas Newlson and Sons Ltd, 1948-57. 
 
211 
 
Bird, Alexander. Nature’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Boring, Edward. “The Moon Illusion.” American Journal of Physics 1 (1943): 55-60. 
 
Bouyer, Louis. Life and Liturgy. New York: Sheed & Ware, 1956. 
Eucharist: Theology and Spirituality of the Eucharistic Prayer. Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
Univeristy Press, 1968.   
Cosmos: The World and Glory of God. Translated by Pierre de Font-nouvelle. Petersham,       
MA: Saint Bede’s Publications, 1988. 
 
Bracken, H.M. The Early Reception of Berkeley’s Immaterialism: 1710–1733. The Hague: Martinus  
Nijhoff, 1965. 
 
 Berkeley. London: Macmillan Press, 1974. 
 
Brillioth, Yngve. Eucharstic Faith and Practice Evangelical & Practice. London: Society for Promoting  
Christian Knowledge, 1930. 
 
Bulgakov, Sergius. Jacobs Ladder: On Angels. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010. 
 
Burnyeat, Myles. "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,"  
Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 3-40. 
 
Bussanich, John, “Plotinus’ Metaphysics of the One.” In The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, edited  
by Lloyd Gerson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Caird, G.B. Principalities and Powers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.  
 
Clayton, Philip. The Problem of God in Modern Thought. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000. 
Clayton, Philip and Paul Davies, eds. The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis  
from Science to Religion. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
212 
 
Clayton, P. and A. Peacocke, eds. In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic  
Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 
2004. 
 
Cooper, John W. Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers—from Plato to the Present. Grand  
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006. 
 
Dainton, Barry. Time and Space. Chesham: Acumen, 2001. 
 
Daniélou, Jean. The Angels and their Mission: According to the Fathers of the Church. Westminster: The  
Newman Press, 1982. 
 
Dillon, John. “Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early Christianity.” The Philosophy  
in Christianity, edited by G. Vesey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to 220 A.D.. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
 
Dionysius the Areopagite. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, Translated by Colm Luibheid. Edited  
by Paul Rorem. New York: Paulist Press, 1987. 
 
Dix, Dom Gregory. The Shape of the Liturgy. London: Dacre P/Adams & Charles Black, 1947. 
 
Drake, Durant et al. Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge.  
London: Macmillan & Co., 1916. 
 
Dumsday, Travis. “Alexander of Hales on Angelic Corporeality.” Heythrop Journal LIV (2013): 360- 
370. 
 
Edwards, Jonathan. Works. Various (eds.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957–. 
 
Ellis, Brian. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Emilsson, Eyjolfur. "Cognition and its Object." in Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to  
Plotinus. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1996. 
213 
 
 
Plotinus on Intellect. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Enoch, David M. and Hadrian N. Ball. Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes. London: Arnold Publishing,  
2001. 
 
Epsen, Edward. “Charity and the Two Economies.” In Philanthropy and  Social Compassion in Eastern  
Orthodox Tradition, edited by Matthew Pereira. New York: Theotokos Press, 2010. 
 
Feigl, Herbert. “The ‘Mental and the ‘Physical’.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science  
Volume II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. 
 
Foster, John. The Case for Idealism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982. 
 
The Immaterial Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
“In Defence of Phenomenalistic Idealism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 
(1996): 509-29.  
 
The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
The Divine Lawmaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.  
 
Garber, Daniel and Michael Ayers, eds. The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Gersh, Stephen and Moran, Dermott, eds. Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition. Notre  
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. 
 
Gerson, Lloyd. Plotinus. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Gilson, Etienne. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. 
214 
 
  
Gilson, “The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics,” in A Gilson Reader: Selected Writings of 
Etienne Gilson (New York: Image Books, 1957 
 
Goodman, Nelson. The Structure of Appearance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. 
 
Gouhier, Henri.  La Pensée religieuse deDescartes, 2
nd
 ed. Paris: Vrin, 1972. 
 
Gregory of Nyssa. On the Soul and the Resurrection. Translated by William Moore and Henry Austin  
Wilson. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff 
and Henry Wace. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1893. Revised and edited for 
New Advent by Kevin Knight. http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2915.htm. 
 
On the Making of Man. Translated by H.A. Wilson. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
Second Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, NY: Christian 
Literature Publishing Co., 1893.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2914.htm. 
 
Grice, H.P. “The Causal Theory of Perception,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary  
Volume 35 (1961): 121–52. 
 
Griffiths, Paul. Decreation: The Last Things of All Creatures. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2014. 
 
Grunwald, M. Human Haptic Perception – Basics and Applications. Basel: Birkhaueser, 2008. 
 
Haanggi, A. and I. Pahl, eds. Prex eucharstica. Textus et variis liturgiis antiquoribus select. Spicilegium  
Friburgense: Friborg, 1968. 
 
Haber, Ralph Norman and Maurice Hershenson. The Psychology of Visual Perception. New York: Holt,  
Rinehart,& Winston, 1980. 
 
Hall, Stuart George, ed. Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on Ecclesiastes, An English Version. Berlin: Walter  
de Gruyter, 1993. 
 
215 
 
Hamilton, William, ed. Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855. 
 
‘Idealism; with Reference to the Scheme of Arthur Collier’ in William Hamilton (ed.) 
Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1855. 
 
Hatfield, Gary. The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz.  
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 
 
Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy,1805-6. Translated by E. S. Haldane, 1892-6. 
 
Heidelberger, Michael. “The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and  
Psychophysical Parallelism.” In Cogprints, edited by Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee  
Salmon. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2003. 
 
Hugget, Nick. From Zeno to Einstein. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. 
 
Hull, John E. The Holy Angels. London: SPCK, 1909. 
 
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1740/1978. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie  
(Husserliana Volume III, 1976) translated into English as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy by T.E. Klein. Springer, 2013.  
 
Jackson, Frank. “What Mary Didn’t Know.” Journal of Philosophy, 85(6): 291-5. 
 
“The Primary Quality View of Color.” Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (1996): 199–219. 
 
James, William. “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing.” In Essays in Radical Empiricism, edited by R.  
B. Perry. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1912. 
 
Jeremias, Joachim. The Eucharistic Words of Jesus. London: SCM Press, 2011. 
216 
 
 
 
John Paul II. “Angels Participate in the History of Salvation”. Catechesis on Creation, August 6,  
1986. 
 
Johnston, Mark. “The Obscure Object of Hallucination.” Philosophical Studies 103 (2004): 113-183. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
 
Leeming, Bernard. Principles of Sacramental Theology. Longmans, Green & Co., 1957. 
 
Lemna, Keith. “The Angels and Cosmic Liturgy: An Oratorian Angelology.” Nova et Vetera 8,4 (2010):  
901-921. 
 
Lewis, C.I.  Mind and the World Order. New York: Dover, 1929. 
 
Lewis, David. “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58  
(1980): 239-249. 
 
Louth, Andrew.  Denys the Areopagite. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989. 
 
Luce, A.A. Berkeley’s Immaterialism. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1945. 
 
Luce, A.A. and T.E. Jessop, eds., The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. Volume One.  
London: Thomas Newlson and Sons Ltd, 1948-57. 
 
Madell, Geoffrey. The Identity of the Self. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981. 
 
Mach, Ernst. The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical. Translated by  
C. M. Williams. La Salle: Open Court, 1984. 
 
Matthews, Garreth B. Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
217 
 
Mazza, Enrico. Mystagogy: A Theology of Liturgy in the Patristic Age. Pueblo Pub Co., 1989. 
 
McCracken, C.J. “Stages on a Cartesian Road to Immaterialism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy.  
24:19-30. 
 
Mellor, D. H. Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge  
& Kegan Paul, 1965. 
 
Menn, Stephen. Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Milbank, John and Catherine Pickstock. Truth in Aquinas. London: Routledge, 2000. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s  Philosophy in J.M. Robson (ed.) The  
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1865/1967. 
 
Moehler, Johann Adam. Unity in the Church Or the Principle of Catholicism: Presented in the Spirit of  
the Church Fathers of the Third Century. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 
1995. 
 
Moltmann, Jurgen. God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation. London: TCM, 1985. 
 
Moran, Dermot. “Idealism in Medieval Philosophy: The Case of Johannes Scottus Eriugena.” Medieval  
Philosophy and Theology, 8 (1999): 53-82. 
 
Mumford, Stephen. Laws in Nature. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
 
Pereira, Matthew, ed. Philanthropy and Social Compassion in Eastern Orthodox Tradition. New York:  
Theotokos Press, 2010. 
 
Perl, Eric. Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. Albany: State  
University of New York Press, 2007. 
 
218 
 
Perry, R.B., ed. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1912. 
 
Peterson, Erik. The Angels and the Liturgy. New York: Herder and Herder, 1964. 
 
Pitcher, George. Berkeley. London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 
 
Philo of Alexandria. The Contemplative Life, Giants, and Selections. Translated by David Winston.  
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1980. 
 
Plantinga, Alvin. “World and Essence.” In Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, edited by Alvin  
Plantinga. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
  
Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Price, H.H. Perception. London: Methuen, 1935. 
 
Putnam, Hilary. The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press,  
1999. 
 
Rahner, Karl. “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertion,” in Theological Investigations,vol. 4.  
Translated by Kevin Smyth. Baltimore, Md.: Helicon, 1966. 
 
Rist, John, “Plotinus and Christian Philosophy.” The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, edited by Lloyd  
Gerson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Robinson, Howard. Matter and Sense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Perception. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Robson, J.M.,ed. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  
1865/1967. 
 
Roques, René.  L’Univers dionysien. Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le pseudo-Denys. Paris.  
1954. 
 
219 
 
Rorem,Paul. Biblical and Liturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis. Toronto: Pontifical  
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984. 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
 
Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Mind. London: George Allen, 1921. 
 The Analysis of Matter. London: Allen and Unwin, 1927. 
Russell, D.S. The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964. 
 
Rutledge, Denys. Cosmic Theology, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of Pseudo-Denys: An Introduction.  
London: Routledge, 1964. 
 
Schaff, P. and H. Wace, eds. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 5. Translated by H.A.  
Wilson. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1893. 
 
Letters and Select Works. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian  
Church, vol. 8. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. 
 
Schumacher, Lydia. Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge.  
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. 
 
Schwarz, Robert. Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleyan Themes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 
 
Sorabji, Richard. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middles Ages.  
 Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
 
 Matter, Space and Motion. London: Duckworth, 1988. 
 
 
Staniloae, Dumitru. The Experience of God. Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998. \ 
 
Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
220 
 
 The Christian God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
 The Existence of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Trehub, Arnold. The Cognitive Brain. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Turner, Denys. The Darkness of God : Negativity in Christian Mysticism. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 1995. 
 
van Inwagen, Peter and Dean Zimmerman, eds. Persons Human and Divine. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2007. 
 
Vesey, G., ed. The Philosophy in Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
von Balthasar, Hans Urs. The Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor. San  
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004. 
 
Wagner, Michael. “Plotinus on the Nature of Physical Reality.” The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus,  
edited by Lloyd Gerson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
 
Ware, Kallistos. God Immanent yet Transcendent: The Divine Energies according to Saint Gregory  
Palamas in P. Clayton and A. Peacocke (ed.) In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: 
Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2004. 
 
Winkler, Kenneth. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
 
Witt,R.E. Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
Wolter, Allan B., O.F.M.  John Duns Scotus, Four Questions on Mary. Saint Bonaventure, New York:  
The Franciscan Institute, 2000. 
